Opinion of the Court. that, the patentees having been the first persons to succeed in producing an automatic machine for treating raw hide in the manner in which their machine treats it, the claims of the patent must be construed liberally. The plaintiff, who is one of the patentees, was examined as a witness on the trial, and fully explained the patented machine, its mode of operation, and the improvement it effected in the conversion of raw hides into leather. The defendant's machine has in it a cylinder which is arranged horizontally instead of perpendicularly, and corresponds to the cylindrical crib of the plaintiff's machine. The cylinder is constructed of two half-cylinders of iron, hinged together, inside of which are fixed semi-circular strips of wood, arranged lengthwise of the cylinder, so that the inside surface of the cylinder, when closed, is practically the same as the inside surface of the plaintiff's crib. The ends of the half-cylinders are secured in position rigidly. The general proportions of the two machines are in size about the same. The defendant's machine has a revolving central shaft, one-half of the diameter of which is removable in that part of it to which the hides are fastened. This half is in sections, which are held to the other part of the shaft, when fastened to it, by screws. The edges of the hides are fastened to the shaft by unscrewing such sections and placing one edge of each hide upon the face of the solid half of the shaft. The sections are then screwed on, over the edges of the hides, in which position they clamp the hides fast between the two halves of the shaft. There are grooves lengthwise along the face of the solid half of the shaft, and ribs along the faces of the removable sections, so that the edge of each hide which is fastened in the shaft is pressed down into the grooves, and is thus held more securely. There is a long opening in the side of the defendant's cylinder, through which the hides are drawn in by the revolution of the shaft, in like manner as they are drawn into the crib of the plaintiff's machine through one of the openings between the bars. As the defendant's machine is in a horizontal position, the end pressure on the coil of hides cannot be produced by a weight. Instead of that, it has two Opinion of the Court. sliding discs, one at each end of the horizontal coil of hides, which discs have a central hole in them for the central revolying shaft to pass through. There is an arrangement of screwbolts, nuts and hand-wheels, so that the two discs may be drawn together to make end pressure upon the coil of hides, and retracted therefrom; and there are springs to make the pressure yielding. The view taken by the Circuit Court was, in regard to claim 1, that the defendant's machine did not have the slot of that claim; and as to claim 2, that the defendant's machine could not be said to infringe it. We think the Circuit Court erred in not submitting to the jury the question of infringement, under proper instructions. If the patented invention was, within the ruling in Morley Machine Co. v. Lancaster, supra, "one of a primary character," and the patent was "a pioneer patent," which were questions of fact to be passed upon by the jury, then the question, on a proper construction of the patent, whether the defendant's machine infringed its claims, was a question of fact for the jury to determine, on all the evidence which the case might present. Tucker v. Spalding, 13 Wall. 453. It was not a matter of mere judicial knowledge that the mechanical differences between the two machines were material, in view of the character of the patented invention and of the claims of the patent; and we are unable to concur with the view of the Circuit Court, in its opinion denying the motion for a new trial, that this is a case where, if the jury had found a verdict for the plaintiff, on the evidence put in by him on the question of infringement, all of which evidence the bill of exceptions states is set forth therein, it would have been proper for the court to set aside such verdict. Keyes v. Grant, 118 U. S. 25, 36, 37. As there must be a new trial, we forbear remarking further on the questions involved. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the case is remanded, with a direction to grant a new trial. Syllabus. 135 326 L-ed 162 169 108 MANSFIELD v. EXCELSIOR REFINING COMPANY. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE No. 239. Argued and submitted March 28, 1890.- Decided May 5, 1890. In Illinois, the unsuccessful party in an action of ejectment is entitled, by statute, upon the payment of all costs, to have the judgment vacated and a new trial granted, but no more than two new trials can be granted to the same party under the statute. This statute governs the trial of actions of ejectment in the courts of the United States sitting in Illinois. In an action of ejectment, in Illinois, where the title of one of the parties depends upon a deed made by a trustee, invested with the legal title, and with power to sell and convey to the purchaser upon advertisement and sale, it is not material to inquire the deed from the trustee not appear ing upon its face to be void - whether the trustee conformed to all the terms of his advertisement for sale. By the statute of Illinois, all deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing, authorized to be recorded, take effect and are in force from and after the time of filing the same for record, and not before, as to creditors and purchasers without notice; and all such deeds and title papers must be adjudged void as to such creditors and subsequent purchasers, until the same be filed for record. Held, That although a grantee in a quitclaim deed is a purchaser within the meaning of the statute, and the prior recording of such a deed will give it a preference over one previously executed but not recorded until after the quitclaim deed, yet the grantee in the latter deed is charged with notice of what may be done under a trust deed conveying the same lands, filed for record before the quitclaim deed, and his rights are, therefore, subject to those of the grantee in a deed from the trustee, not filed for record until after the quitclaim was recorded. Whatever is sufficient notice to put a purchaser of land on inquiry is sufficient notice of an unrecorded deed. Where distillery premises, in the occupancy of a distiller, who is operating the same under a lease to expire at a specified time, are seized and sold by a collector of internal revenue for taxes due from the distiller to the government, a sale of such premises, by the collector, by the summary mode of notice and publication provided in Section 3196 of the Revised Statutes, for the taxes so due, will pass to the purchaser only the interest of the delinquent distiller, and will not affect the interest in the premises, either of the owner of the fee or of a third person having a lien thereon, even where the government holds a waiver, executed by the owner of the fee or by such third person having a lien, consenting that the distillery premises may be used by the distiller for distilling spirits Opinion of the Court. subject to the provisions of law, and expressly stipulating that the lien of the United States for taxes shall have priority of any and all interest and claims which the waiver may have to the distillery and premises. In the case of such a waiver, the interest of the owner of the fee or the liens on the premises held by other persons, cannot be affected except by a suit in equity to which they are parties, as provided in Section 3207 of the Revised Statutes. EJECTMENT. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry B. Mason, for plaintiff in error, submitted on his brief. Mr. W. E. Blake for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action in the nature of ejectment. It was brought by the plaintiff in error, December 24, 1879, to recover from the defendant in error the possession of a tract of land in Henderson County, Illinois, containing ten acres more or less, and upon which was a distillery. The plea was, not guilty of unlawfully withholding the premises described in the declaration. There were three trials of the case, each time by the court, pursuant to a written stipulation of the parties waiving a jury. Upon the first trial there was a judgment for the defendant. At the instance of the plaintiff a new trial was granted in conformity with a statute of Illinois, which provides that at any time within one year after a judg ment, either upon default or verdict in an action of ejectment, the party against whom it is rendered, his heirs or assigns, shall be entitled, upon the payment of all costs, to have the judgment vacated and a new trial granted; no more, however, than two new trials to be granted to the same party under the statute. Rev. Stats. Ill. 1845, p. 208, § 30; 1874, p. 447, § 35; 1 Starr & Curtis' Anno. Stat. 989. The first new trial under this statute is the right of the unsuccessful party, and is not dependent upon the discretion of the court. Vance v. Schuyler, 1 Gilman, 160; Riggs v. Savage, 4 Gil Opinion of the Court. man, 129; Emmons v. Bishop, 14 Illinois, 152; Chamberlin v. McCarty, 63 Illinois, 262; Lowe v. Foulke, 103 Illinois, 58. These statutory provisions govern the trials of actions of ejectment in the courts of the United States sitting in Illinois. Equator Company v. Hall, 106 U. S. 86. At the second trial there was a judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant then took a new trial under the statute, and when the case was last tried the court ruled that, upon all the evidence, the law did not authorize a recovery by the plaintiff, and gave judgment for the defendant. The present writ of error brings up that judgment for review. The parties entered into a written stipulation as to the principal facts. The main question in the case arises out of a sale by a collector of internal revenue of the premises in dispute, including the distillery thereon, for taxes due from the distiller. The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them, may be thus summarized: On the 20th of September, 1873, the Bank of Chicago was the owner in fee of the premises. It executed to the United States, April 22, 1874, in conformity with the statute of the United States, what is called a waiver, which recited that George E. Hinds intended to carry on the business of distilling and manufacturing high wines in the distillery on these premises, and contained the following provisions: "And whereas the undersigned, the Bank of Chicago, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois, of the county of Cook and the State of Illinois, has an interest in the title of said lot of land and distillery and appurtenances: Therefore, in order to enable the said George E. Hinds to carry on said business on said lot of land in said distillery, and to comply with the requirements of the eighth section of the act of Congress, approved July 20th, A.D. 1868, and in consideration thereof, the said bank does hereby express and give its consent that said distillery and premises may be used by said Hinds for the purpose of distilling spirits, subject to the provisions of law; and the said bank does hereby expressly stipulate that the lien of the United States for taxes |