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Opinion of the Court.

taxes and penalties shall have priority of any mortgage, judgment or other incumbrance held by the person giving the waiver. In other words, if the person executing the waiver owns the fee, the government, with his consent, is to have a first lien on the distillery premises; if he holds an incumbrance simply, then the lien of the United States is to have priority over that incumbrance. But in neither case, does the distiller acquire an interest in the premises; in neither, does the government acquire anything more than a first or prior lien.

But in what mode may the government enforce its prior lien? In order to collect the taxes due from Hinds, the distiller, it might have instituted a suit in equity, to which not only the distiller, who had simply a leasehold interest, but all persons having liens upon, or claiming any interest in, the premises could be made parties; in which suit, it would have been the duty of the court to determine finally the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property, and to order a sale distributing the proceeds among the parties according to their respective interests. Of course, the United States having, by stipulation, priority of lien, would have been first paid out of the proceeds. But no such course was pursued. The officers of the government preferred to adopt the summary method of sale by the collector upon notice and publication, as provided for in 3197. It may be conceded that if the distiller had been the owner of the fee, a sale in that mode would have passed his interest subject to the rights of any prior incumbrancer, and subject to the right of any subsequent incumbrancer to redeem the premises. But the delinquent distiller had no interest except a leasehold interest, and that expired, as we have seen, on the 1st of May, 1877. We are of opinion that the collector's sale in the summary mode prescribed in § 3197 passed, and under the statute could have passed, nothing more than the interest of the delinquent distiller. When the collector distrains and sells personal prop erty for taxes, his certificate, by the express words of the statute, (3194,) transfers to the purchaser the right, title and interest of the delinquent in the property sold. When he

Opinion of the Court.

sells real estate for taxes, the statute, in terms equally explicit, (3199,) declares that his certificate of purchase shall be considered and operate as a conveyance of the right, title and interest the party delinquent had in the real estate so sold. Now, if Congress intended to invest the collector with authority to sell, by the summary process of notice and publication, the interest of any other person than the delinquent distiller, the statute would have described a certificate that would pass the interest of such person in the property sold. The provision that the certificate of purchase shall pass the interest of the delinquent in the property sold by the collector excludes, by necessary implication, the interest of any other person. This is made clear by the fact that the statute, in the case of a sale by the collector, requires notice to "the person whose estate it is proposed to sell," ($ 3197,) which person is, of course, the one who is delinquent in the matter of taxes. Any other construction would impute to Congress the purpose, in order that the taxes against the delinquent distiller, having only a leasehold interest, might be collected, to seize and sell the interest of the owner of the fee, and to destroy the lien of an incumbrancer, without giving either an opportunity to be heard.

It is said that, under this interpretation of the statute, the execution of the waiver was a useless requirement, since, without such waiver, the government had the right to sell the leasehold interest of the tenant distiller. This view is more plausible than sound. By the waiver the government acquired one thing it would not have had without it; namely, a lien upon the premises prior to that held by Coates as security for the notes specified in the deed of trust to Westover. And it acquired the right, by a suit in equity, to have sold, under the decree of a court, not only the distiller's leasehold interest, but the fee in the premises, and to have obtained priority in the distribution of the proceeds over the person giving the waiver, whatever his interest might have been. It is of no consequence that the collector's notice of sale did not specify the leasehold interest as the thing he proposed to sell. His authority to sell, upon notice and publication, was given by

Opinion of the Court.

the statute, and was fettered by the condition that he could. give a certificate of purchase passing the interest of the delinquent. He had no authority, in that summary mode, to sell and convey the interest of one who was not a delinquent. His deed-if construed as conveying anything more than the interest of the government-shows upon its face, in connection with the statute, that he attempted to convey what he had no power to convey, the fee in the premises. As a conveyance of such fee, it was a nullity. The government neglected to pursue the only mode by which the fee could be sold; namely, a suit in equity, in which all persons interested in the property could have been made parties. When the distiller was in default in respect to taxes, it was for the proper officers of the government to elect whether they would seek satisfaction of its demands by means of a seizure and sale by the collector of the distiller's interest only, or by a suit to which all persons having claims upon the premises on which the government had a lien should be made parties. They chose to adopt the former method, under which only the interest of the delinquent distiller could be seized and sold. That interest being only a leasehold interest, the purchaser at the collector's sale acquired nothing more.

Some stress is laid upon the fact that the property was not redeemed from the collector's sale within the time prescribed by the laws of Illinois. It is sufficient to say that no redemption was necessary. All that the purchaser got was the leasehold interest of the distiller, and that, it is agreed, ceased in May, 1877.

It is proper to say that the proceedings for the sale of these premises were not taken under any provision of the statute relating to the title vesting in the United States in case of the forfeiture of the distillery premises. A forfeiture could not have occurred unless the distiller defrauded, or attempted to defraud, the government of the taxes due from him. Sec. 3257; United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1. It is admitted that there was no ground for forfeiture by reason of the non-payment of the taxes due from the distiller Hinds.

Syllabus.

Upon the whole case we are of opinion that the legal title of the plaintiff must prevail in this action.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with direc tions to enter judgment for the plaintiff.

135 342

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135 342

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135 342 L-ed 168 611 969 135 342 L-ed 168 77f 839

135 342 L-ed 168 99f 443

YALE LOCK MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. BERK-
SHIRE NATIONAL BANK.

BERKSHIRE NATIONAL BANK V. YALE LOCK
MANUFACTURING COMPANY.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Nos. 261, 262. Argued April 11, 14, 15, 1890.

Decided May 5, 1890.

Claim 3 of reissued letters patent No. 7947, granted November 13, 1877
to James Sargent, for an "improvement in combined time-lock, combi-
nation lock, and bolt-work for safes," the original patent, No. 195,539,
having been granted to Sargent, September 25, 1877; namely, "3. The
combination, with the bolt-work of a safe or vault-door, of a combination
or key lock controllable mechanically from the exterior of said door,
with a time-lock having a lock-bolt or obstruction for locking and
unlocking controllable from the interior of the door, both of said locks
being arranged so as to rest against or connect with the bolt-work, the
time-lock being automatically unlocked by the operation of the time-
movement, both of said locks being independent of each other, and
arranged to control the locking and unlocking of the bolt-work, so that
said safe or vault-door cannot be opened when locked until both of said
locks have been unlocked or have released their dogging action, to enable
the door to be opened, substantially as described," is invalid, because
the specification of the original patent was not defective or insufficient,
and the patent was not inoperative; and the sole object of the reissue
was to obtain claim 3 as an enlarged claim; and the proceedings in the
Patent Office prior to the granting of the original patent show that Sar-
gent abandoned that claim; and because, although the reissue was
applied for only 13 days after the granting of the original patent, there
was not a clear mistake, inadvertently committed, in the wording of a
claim.

Claims 1 and 7 of reissued letters patent No. 8550, granted to the Yale
Lock Manufacturing Company, January 21st, 1879, for an improve-

66

Opinion of the Court.

ment in time-locks," the original patent, No. 146,832, having been granted to Samuel A. Little, as inventor, January 27th, 1874, and having been reissued as No. 7104, to that company, May 9th, 1876, and again reissued to it, as No. 8035, January 8th, 1878; namely, "1. The combination of independent multiple bolt-work with the time mechanism and locking or dogging mechanism of a time-lock, automatically both dogging and releasing the bolt-work at predetermined times, substantially as described." "7. In a time-lock, the combination, substantially as above set forth, of the time movements and two adjustable devices, one for determining the time of locking, and, the other of unlocking," are invalid, because the original patent was not inoperative or invalid by reason of a defective or insufficient specification, within the terms of the statute, so as to warrant the reissues; and because the claims are enlarged; and because of the unexcused delay of more than two years in applying for a reissue; and because the claims were formally abandoned during the proceedings in the Patent Office.

IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. George Ticknor Curtis and Mr. Edmund Wetmore for the Yale Lock Manufacturing Company, Sargent and Greenleaf.

Mr. William C. Cochran for the Berkshire National Bank and Hall's executors.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit in equity, brought January 29, 1879, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, by the Yale Lock Manufacturing Company, a Connecticut corporation, and James Sargent and Halbert S. Greenleaf, composing the firm of Sargent & Greenleaf, against the Berkshire National Bank, a national banking corporation doing business at North Adams, in Massachusetts.

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The suit was brought for the infringement of two reissued letters patent. One of them is reissue No. 7947, granted November 13, 1877, to James Sargent, as inventor, for an improvement in combined time-lock, combination lock, and bolt-work for safes," on an application filed October 8, 1877, the original patent, No. 195,539, having been granted to Sargent, September 25, 1877. Only claim 3 of reissue No.

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