Statement of the Case.

made with full knowledge of all the facts on the part of the complainant, and that after such settlement was made he left in the possession of the complainant papers and accounts plainly showing the whole transaction and all the facts in regard to the case, an examination of which would give all necessary information about the partnership affairs. He also alleged that the complainant was endeavoring, after a lapse of more than three years and with a full knowledge of all the facts, to attack this settlement as void, and he alleged that the claim made by the complainant was old and stale, and he pleaded the statute of limitations in his behalf, and alleged that the claim did not accrue nor was any demand made to show whether error or otherwise were made within the period of three years.

After the injunction restraining the further prosecution of this action had been dissolved, and on February 10, 1892, the defendant filed a plea to the declaration herein, in which he denied, (1) that he was indebted to the plaintiff; (2) he alleged that he never promised as set up in the declaration; (3) that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue within three years; (4 and 5) a set-off of $35,873.35. This set-off was alleged to have arisen out of the dealings between the parties in the partnership already mentioned.

The plaintiff Baker joined issue upon the plea on August 24, 1892. Further proceedings in this action were delayed by mutual consent until the trial of the suit in equity. Upon that trial the complainant obtained a decree for thirty-odd thousand dollars, after deducting the amount claimed to be due the plaintiff in this action. That decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District, and the case was taken by appeal to this court, where the decrees of the courts below were reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the Supreme Court to dismiss the bill. The dismissal was general, and not "without prejudice" or any similar expression. 169 U. S. 189. After the entry of the decree dismissing the bill on the mandate of this court in the equity suit, Baker, the plaintiff herein by leave of the court filed in this action a replication to the plea of setoff, setting up the commencement of the equity suit, and stating the issues involved therein and the decree made upon the deci

Statement of the Case.

sion of this court dismissing the bill, and claimed that judgment as res adjudicata of the matters of set-off contained in the fourth and fifth counts of the defendant's plea. Then by a series of pleadings, too long and too technical for repetition, the final question was raised by demurrer as to whether the plaintiff's replication of res adjudicata to the defendant's plea of set-off was good or not. Upon the argument of the demurrer the Supreme Court held that the replication was good; that the merits of the whole case had been decided in the equity suit, and that the judgment in that suit was a bar to all claims of set-off on the part of the defendant Cummings in the action at law. The parties came to trial after the argument and decision upon the demurrer, and having waived a jury the following stipulation was filed:

"It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties to this cause, by their respective attorneys, that this cause may be tried by the court without a jury, the parties hereby expressly waiving the same, upon the following agreed statement of facts, subject to the limitations herein contained:

"That on the 31st day of July, A. D. 1889, and for a long time prior thereto, the plaintiff and the defendant were copartners engaged as attorneys in the prosecution of claims against the United States, the net fees derived therefrom being under the contract of partnership equally to be divided between them, the said partners; that on the 19th day of December, A. D. 1889, the plaintiff instituted this action to recover the sum of $2712.81, with interest from the 31st day of July, A. D. 1889; that the said sum is the identical sum referred to on pages 227 and 248 of the record on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States in the equity cause hereinafter referred to; that after the institution of this suit the defendant herein instituted a certain equity proceeding against the plaintiff herein in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the same being known and numbered on the dockets of said court as equity cause No. 12,263; the record, decrees and opinions of the respective courts therein, both in this and the appellate courts, are hereby referred to and made part hereof; that the several items of account set forth in the pleas of set-off herein are re

Opinion of the Court.

spectively the identical items set up, referred to and claimed in said equity cause.

"If the court on inspection of said record and proceedings in said equity cause and of the record and proceedings of this cause shall be of opinion that the defendant herein may not set up in bar of the plaintiff's action any of said items of set-off and counter claim as pleaded in this action, but is concluded by the proceedings and decree in said equity cause, then this court may enter judgment for the plaintiff in this action for the sum of $2712.81, with interest thereon from the 31st day of July, A. D. 1889, as claimed in his declaration herein, but if the court shall be of opinion that any of said items of set-off and counter claim may be set up in bar of the plaintiff's action herein, then this cause shall be remanded to the docket for trial by jury. Both parties hereto reserve the right of appeal or by writ of error from the judgment of this court or of any court of review passing hereon, and also any other remedy which they may by law be entitled to."

Upon this stipulation in connection with the record in the equity suit, the Supreme Court held that the defendant Cummings could not in this action set up in bar to plaintiff's action any of the items of set-off attached to his plea, and therefore judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the amount claimed by him. On appeal to the Court of Appeals the judgment was reversed, and a new trial granted, Mr. Chief Justice Alvey dissenting.

Mr. Clarence A. Brandenburg for petitioner.

Mr. Holmes Conrad opposing. Mr. Franklin H. Mackey was on his brief.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the above statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

A perusal of the record in this case demonstrates at least how conservative Congress has heretofore been in relation to the adoption of any amendment of the law relating to pleading

Opinion of the Court.

and procedure in the District of Columbia. The last of the series of pleadings herein by which the question of the validity of the defence of res adjudicata was finally brought before the court is denominated "defendant's joinder of issue on plaintiff's second sur-rejoinder to defendant's fourth rejoinder to plaintiff's third replication.' Replications, rejoinders, sur-rejoinders, rebutters, sur-rebutters and demurrers abound, and they all seem to have been regarded as properly filed for the purpose of presenting the question whether the decree in the equity case was res adjudicata or not. In reading these pleadings we seem to be transported back to the days when the practice of the special pleader had become a science by itself. In spite of the pleadings, however, the question before us is a simple one.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant a certain amount of money alleged to be due on an account stated between the parties. The defendant, before pleading in the action, commenced a suit in equity for an accounting between himself as complainant and the defendant in the equity suit in relation to all partnership matters, and, as a part of the relief, prayed the cancellation of a written assignment made by complainant of his interest in the inspector cases of the partnership to the defendant, procured, as complainant alleged, by fraud. It was alleged that the items of the claim of Baker, the plaintiff in this action, arose out of the partnership transactions, and they were included in the issue made in the equity suit. There was a full hearing in that suit in regard to all the matters between the parties, including those arising in this action. At the end of the hearing the trial court entered a decree in favor of the complainant for over $30,000, after deducting the amount claimed against him by the plaintiff herein. That decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but upon appeal here both decrees were reversed and the cause remanded to the lower court with instructions to dismiss the bill. The court, upon the receipt of the mandate, did dismiss the bill with costs. The plaintiff in this action then proceeded with his case and set up, by leave of the court, the decree in the equity suit as an adjudication of all the matters relating to the validity of the defendant's set-off to his demand, and the question is, Shall

Opinion of the Court.

the adjudication be treated as conclusive upon those matters, or shall the inquiry be again entered upon as to the facts upon which the set-off rests?

Stated generally and without detail, the theory of the law is that matters which have once been fully investigated between the parties and determined by the court shall not be again contested, and that the judgment of the court upon matters thus determined shall be conclusive on the parties and never subject to further inquiry. The whole doctrine has been lately gone over in this court in Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, and the law in regard to it is so well settled that other citations are not required. The question is not what the doctrine is, but does it apply to the particular case? We have to inquire, therefore, whether the decree in the equity suit did cover and conclude the matters in difference, regarding the defendant's set-off in this action? If it did, that decree must be treated as conclusive, and the judgment of the court below refusing to give that character to it must be reversed.

It appears by the stipulation between the parties that the several items of account set forth in the defendant's plea of setoff in this action are respectively the identical items set up, referred to and claimed by complainant in the equity cause. The record in the equity cause is made a part of the record herein, and the facts upon which the complainant proceeded are set forth in the report of that case in this court, already referred to. The mandate from this court in that case, which by stipulation of counsel has been included in the record herein, sets forth our decree, which reversed the decree of the Court of Appeals with costs, and ordered that the cause be remanded to that court with directions to set aside the decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and to remand the cause to that court with instructions to dismiss the bill. There was added the usual formula directing that such further proceedings be had in the cause in conformity with the opinion and decree of this court as ought to be had, etc. The proceedings, however, which were thus directed to be taken were simply to reverse the judgment of the lower court and to dismiss the