answers to interrogatories in applications for policies of life insurance,
applicable to all life insurance companies doing business in the State of
Ohio, and in force at the time the policy of insurance sued on in this
case was issued, was within the power of the State over corporations,
and not in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Warren, 73.
4. A by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exer-
cise of legislative power, delegated by the legislature as a political sub-
division of the State, having all the force of law within the limits of
the municipality, that it may properly be considered as a law, within
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. St. Paul Gas
Light Co. v. St. Paul, 142.
5. In this case, as no legislative act is shown to exist, from the enforcement
of which an impairment of the obligations of such a contract did or
could result, it follows that the record involves solely an interpreta-
tion of the contract, and therefore presents no controversy within the
jurisdiction of this court. Ib.
6. The provision in the statute of March 13, 1899 of Idaho that "whenever
the governor of the State of Idaho has reason to believe that scab or any
other infectious disease of sheep has become epidemic in certain locali-
ties in any other State or Territory, or that conditions exist that render
sheep likely to convey disease, he must thereupon by proclamation,
designate such localities and prohibit the importation from them of
any sheep into the State, except under such restrictions as, after con-
sultation with the state sheep inspector, he may deem proper," does not
conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Rasmussen v. Idaho,
198.
7. In this case the court proceeds on the assumption that the legal import
of the phrase "due process of law" is the same both in the Fifth and
the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
and that it cannot be supposed that it was intended by the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose on the States, when exercising their powers of
taxation, any more rigid or stricter curb than that imposed on the Fed-
eral Government by the Fifth Amendment in a similar exercise of power.
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 324.
8. It was not the intention of the Fourteenth Amendment to subvert the
systems of the States pertaining to general and special taxation: that
amendment legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and resi-
dents of the States, the same protection against arbitrary state legisla-
tion, affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded by the Fifth
Amendment against similar legislation by Congress, and the Federal
courts ought not to interfere when what is complained of is the enforce-
ment of the settled laws of the State, applicable to all persons in like
circumstances and conditions, but only when there is some abuse of law,
amounting to confiscation of property, or deprivation of personal
rights. Ib.
9. The conclusions reached by this court in many cases cited and summa-
rized by the court in its opinion are thus stated by two writers, (Cooley
and Dillon) whose views this court adopts. "The major part of the
cost of a local work is sometimes collected by general tax, while a smaller
portion is levied upon the estates specially benefited. The major part
is sometimes assessed on estates benefited, while the general public is
taxed a smaller portion in consideration of a smaller participation in
the benefits. The whole cost in other cases is levied on lands in the
immediate vicinity of the work. In a constitutional point of view, either
of these methods is admissible, and one may sometimes be just, and an-
other at other times. In other cases it may be deemed reasonable to
make the whole cost a general charge, and levy no special assessment
whatever The question is legislative, and, like all legislative ques-
tions, may be decided erroneously; but it is reasonable to expect that,
with such latitude of choice, the tax will be more just and equal than
it would be were the legislature required to levy it by one inflexible
and arbitrary rule. The courts are very generally agreed that the au-
thority to require the property specially benefited, to bear the expense
of local improvements is a branch of the taxing power, or included
within it .. Whether the expense of making such improve-
ments shall be paid out of the general treasury, or be assessed upon
the abutting or other property specially benefited, and, if in the latter
mode, whether the assessment shall be upon all property found to be
benefited, or alone upon the abuttors, according to frontage or accord-
ing to the area of their lots, is, according to the present weight of au-
thority, considered to be a question of legislative expediency.” Ib.
10. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, considered, and held not to be inconsist-
ent with these views Ib.
11. A constitutional right against unjust taxation is given for the protection
of private property, but it may be waived by those affected, who con-
sent to such action to their property as would otherwise be invalid.
Wight v. Davidson, 371.
12. It was within the power of Congress, by the act of March 3, 1899, c. 431,
30 Stat. 1344, to extend S street in the District of Columbia, to order
the opening and extension of the streets in question, and to direct the
Commissioners of the District to institute and conduct proceedings in
the Supreme Court of the District to condemn the necessary land; and
it was also competent for Congress, in said act, to provide that, of the
amount found due and awarded as damages for and in respect of the
land condemned for the opening of said streets, not less than one half
thereof should be assessed by the jury in said proceedings against the
pieces and parcels of ground situate and lying on each side of the ex-
tension of said streets and also on all or any adjacent pieces or parcels
of land which will be benefited by the opening of said streets as pro-
vided for in said act; and that the sums to be assessed against each
lot or piece or parcel of ground should be determined and designated
by the jury, and that, in determining what amount should be assessed
against any particular piece or parcel of ground, the jury should take
into consideration the situation of said lots, and the benefits that they
might severally receive from the opening of said streets. Ib.
13. The order of publication gave due notice of the filing of the petition in
this case, and an opportunity to all persons interested to show cause
why the prayer of the petition should not be granted. Ib.
14. It also operated as a notice to all concerned of the pending appoint-
ment of a jury, and that proceedings would be had under the act of
Congress. Ib.
15. The act of March 3, 1899, was a valid act, and the proceedings thereunder
were regular and constituted due process of law. Ib.
16. The Court of Appeals, in regarding the decision in Norwood v. Baker, 172
U. S. 269, as overruling previous decisions of this Court in respect to
Congressional legislation as to public local improvements in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, is overruled. Ib.
17. It was not the intention of the court in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S.
269, to hold that the general and special taxing systems of the States,
however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been
subverted by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States; but the purpose of that Amendment is to extend to the
citizens and residents of the States the same protection against arbi-
trary state legislation, affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded
by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress. Ton-
awanda v. Lyon, 389.
18. It is within the power of the legislature of a State to create special
taxing districts, and to charge the cost of local improvements, in whole
or in part, upon the property in said district, either according to valu-
ation, or superficial area, or frontage; and it was not the intention of
this court, in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, to hold otherwise.
Webster v. Fargo, 394.
19. The court holds and adheres to its decisions in French v. Asphalt Pav-
ing Co., Tonawanda v. Lyon and Wight v. Davidson, and finds nothing in
the record to show that the complainants have entitled themselves to
its interference. Cass Farm Company v. Detroit, 396.
20. Cass Farm Company v. Detroit, ante, 396, followed in holding that it
was not the intention of the Fourteenth Amendment to subvert the
systems of the States pertaining to general and special taxation; that
Amendment legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and resi-
dents of the States the same protection against arbitrary state legisla-
tion affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded by the Fifth
Amendment against similar legislation by Congress; and Federal
courts ought not to interfere when what is complained of is the en-
forcement of the settled laws of the State, applicable to all persons in
like circumstances and conditions, but only when there is some abuse
of law, amounting to confiscation of property, or deprivation of per-
sonal rights, as was instanced in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172
U. S. 269. Detroit v. Parker, 399.
21. Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, and French v. Barber As-
phalt Paving Co., ante, 324, followed. Wormley v. District of Columbia,
402.
22. French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., again followed in holding that
the contract in question in this case made for the construction of a
sewer and the assessment against the property of the plaintiff in error
for the cost of making it were not null and void. Shumate v. Heman,
402.
23. French v. Barber Asphalt Co., ante 324, and Wight v. Davidson, ante 371,
followed. Farrell v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 404.
24. There is no such difference in the several statutes of North Dakota, so
far as regards the rights of the parties, as to forbid the application of
the latest statute to a case where a mortgage was given, and the mate-
rials furnished prior to its passage; and the legislation under review
cannot be held to violate any rights of the plaintiff in error, protected
by the Constitution of the United States. Red River Valley Bank v.
Craig, 548.
25. A mortgage which is subsequent to the right of subsequent lienors who
furnished materials or labor in the erection of a building to sell the
same, and have it removed for the payment of the liens, is not reduced
in value by a statute authorizing the sale of the property such as is set
forth in the opinion of the court. Ib.
26. Questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
were presented at the trial of this case in the Supreme Court of the
State, and were decided against the party invoking their protection.
Had that Court declined to pass on the Federal questions, and dismissed
the petition without considering them, this Court would not undertake
to revise their action. Mallett v. North Carolina, 589.
27. The legislation of North Carolina in question in this case, did not make
that a criminal act which was innocent when done; did not aggravate
an offence or change the punishment and make it greater than it was
when it was committed; did not alter the rules of evidence and require
less or different evidence than the law required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offence; and did not deprive the accused of any substantial
right or immunity possessed by them at the time of the commissions
of the offence charged; and the law granting to the State the right of
appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court of the State was
not an ex post facto law. Ib.
28. The contention that the plaintiffs in error were denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws because the State was allowed an appeal from the
Superior Court of the Eastern, and not from the Western, District of
the State, is not well founded. Ib.
29. It appears by the statement of the plaintiffs in error in their petition
for a reargument, that no Federal question was raised or considered in
the criminal court or in the Superior Court in respect to the admission
of the evidence; and therefore there was no basis on which to claim
error in this respect in those courts; nor did the Supreme Court in
passing on the contention, deal with it as a Federal question, but as a
mere question arising under the criminal law of the State; and hence
there is nothing in its action for this court to review. Ib.
See CORPORATION;
QUARANTINE.
CONTRACT.
1. Any seal may be used and adopted by a corporation as well as an individ-
ual, and the same general principles respecting seals apply to municipal
as well as private corporations. District of Columbia v. Camden Iron
Works, 453.
2. It was for the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to determine
whether the interests of the District required the contract in this case
to be sealed. And the contract having been executed as and for the
District, the seals of the Commissioners are to be assumed to have
been affixed as the seal of the corporation. Ib.
3. Where work is to be completed within a specified number of days from
the date of the execution of a contract, parol evidence that the con-
tract was executed and delivered subsequent to its date, is admis-
sible. Ib.
4. Covenant will lie on a contract under seal, though not fully performed,
where absolute performance has been dispensed with. Ib.
5. Where strict performance by plaintiff is prevented or waived by defend-
ant, a claim by defendant of fines and penalties for delay or failure
cannot be sustained. Ib.
6. The matter of interest was properly left to the jury. Ib.
1. The Building Association, a corporation organized under the laws of
New York, was authorized by law to make advances to its members.
The statutory provisions regarding such advances and the securing of
the same are stated in the opinion of the court. Bedford, a resident in
Tennessee, became a shareholder by subscription to the stock, and by
payment therefor. The statutes of Tennessee authorized the corpora-
tion to do business in that State. Bedford, after subscribing to the
stock, paid his subscription, and on his application secured a loan from
the corporation and mortgaged his property to secure it. All this was
authorized by the statutes of Tennessee at the time when it was done.
Subsequently a new statute was enacted, the provisions in which are
set forth in the opinion of the court, and an act was passed concerning
building associations, the parts of which, relating to foreign build-
ing associations, are also set forth in the opinion of the court. The
Building Association subsequently filed its charter with the secretary
of state of Tennessee, and an abstract of the same in the office of the
register of Shelby County, but it did not comply with the building as-
sociation laws. Bedford defaulted in his payments on the notes, and
the association filed a bill in equity in the United States Circuit Court
to foreclose the mortgage, and collect the amount due under his con-
tract. Bedford answered that the notes and mortgage violated the
laws of Tennessee, and were void. Held: (1) That Bedford's subscrip-
tion to the stock of the association, its issuance, and the application of
a loan in pursuance of it, constituted a contract, which is inviolable by
the state legislature. (2) That by his subscription to the stock of the
association, Bedford became a member of it, bound to the performance
of what its by-laws and charter required of him, and entitled to exact
the performance of what the by-laws and charter required of the asso-
ciation. Bedford v. Eastern Building & Loan Association, 227.
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