al., 12 I. C. C., 418. That this is the view of the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania has been declared in Central Railroad Company of New Jersey vs. Mauser, 241 Pa. St., Page 603, and in the case of the Crane Railroad Company vs. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, the opinion of which was filed March 12th, 1915, though not yet reported. In the above case the facts were almost identical with the facts in this case; the entry of a judgment by the lower court for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense was sustained. The Court, therefore, reaches the conclusion that so far as cars transported were interstate commerce, the plaintiff carrier is entitled to judgment. It appears that some of the transportation was to points within the State of Pennsylvania, such transportation rates must be uniform to all shippers within its destination. As to points either within or without the state there can be no discrimination: Section 3 of Article 17 Constitution of Pennsylvania. We, therefore, reach the conclusion that the plaintiff is also entitled to judgment in so far as the claim relates to interstate commerce traffic.

Now April 5, 1915, rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense made absolute; judgment to be entered for the sum of $1,252.16 with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from April 1, 1911, or a total of $1,553.51.

LUTZ vs. LUTZ.

Partnership-Proof of Partnership-Evidence.

Evidence sufficient to establish a copartnership, when a mother engaged in business dies, and a son and daughter continue the business thereafter.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Cora M. Lutz vs. Josiah J. Lutz. No. 2 September Term, 1913. In Equity.

Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Plaintiff.
George M. Lutz, for Defendant.

Groman, P. J., June 28, 1915. The attention of the Court has been called to the fact that the Court failed to

answer defendant's request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law numbered seven, eight, nine and ten; so as to complete the record, the Court hereby specifically affirms Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of defendant's request for Findings of Facts, and refuses Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

The first question to be determined then is: Was there a partnership or was there not? It appears the mother, Amanda C. Lutz, died intestate, leaving to survive her husband and the plaintiff and the defendant. The mother died seized of real estate, also possessed of personal property. The father twelve years before the death of his wife failed in busines; upon the death of his wife, legal advice was secured and a method suggested for the purpose of carrying on the business of the mother under the firm name of J. J. Lutz & Co. The indebtedness of the mother was provided for by the plaintiff and the defendant and the business conducted under the management of Elihu F. Lutz until his death, and thereafter by the defendant. Upon a reference to the testimony of the plaintiff on Page 4 we find the following: What was said in that conversation between your brother, and father and yourself? A. We just made a verbal agreement that we were to carry on the business, my brother and myself.

Q. Under what name? A. J. J. Lutz and Company. The defendant on Page 80 denied the verbal partnership agreement but when asked:

Q. What was done with the name? A. We changed the name to J. J. Lutz & Co. I came down to my attorney at that time and I asked him after we had loaned that money.

Q. Who was your attorney? A. Mr. Marcus Kline. On Page 95 the defendant in answer to the question Q. Isn't it a fact that your interest in that stock of that store business which you inherited from your mother, and Cora's share which she inherited from her mother went into that firm and continued under the name of J. J. Lutz & Co. up to within a short time ago? A. That is the way we done, yes.

Q. And isn't it a fact that up to within a short time ago? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did Cora's share in that store business continue in there under the name of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And this continued in the same way, didn't it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then about a year ago you undertook to dispose of this store stock where Cora's share was in the name of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

On page 97, Q. Don't you know that Cora was there after your mother died for eight years and helped to run the business, and helped to buy the goods? A. I don't recollect that she did buy.

Q. Do you recollect that she was by when goods were bought? A. I can't recollect that. * * *

Q. What interest had Cora in J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. I don't think she had more interst than I had.

Q. Did she have the same interest in it as you had? A. Well, I don't know.

Q. Did she have the same interest in it as you had? A. She had the same.

Q. That is your share of your mother's estate was in there and so was Cora's? A. Yes, sir.

Q. So you and Cora had the same interest, an equal interest in this business of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes.

On page 99, Q. You said from 1910 on when your father was unable to attend to the business, you conducted it? A. I carried on the business under the instructions of my father.

By the Court: As J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, I didn't change the name.

Q. Deposited the money in bank and drew checks? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And drew checks J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir. Q. And your orders were given for J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Up to within almost a year ago? A. Yes, sir. (By Mr. Diefenderfer) Q. You signed the checks? A. I signed the checks.

On page 92 we find the following:

Q. Then this business from that time on was carried on in the name of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, the name of J. J. Lutz & Co. was used all the time.

Q. The purchases were made under the name of J. J. Lutz & Co., weren't they? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And goods came to the station at Jacksonville marked J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have a bank account for the store business? A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what name was that? A. J. J. Lutz & Co.

Q. So practically all the business was done from a short time after your mother's death down to near the present time, was done in the name of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You say this name was adopted after the money was borrowed, borrowed from whom? A. James L. Merkel.

Q. And that note was signed by you and Cora? A. Yes.

Q. And since you and Cora had signed the note to borrow money for the business, you adopted that firm name of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were in the firm, you were J. J. Lutz? A. That is my name, yes.

Q. And Cora, your sister, is the one who signed the note with you to Mr. Merkel about the time when this name was adopted, this partnership name? A. It was before.

Q. How long before? A. I can't tell.

Q. About how long before? A. Have no idea.

Q. But after you and Cora had signed this note, then you adopted this firm name of J. J. Lutz & Co.? A. Yes, sir.

From the foregoing testimony and the manner in which the business was conducted during all the time, the Court reaches the conclusion that a partnership was entered into.

The mother died intestate leaving personal property. Under the intestate law of the State of Pennsylvania each of the parties hereto had an interest therein as well as the father, subject to the payment of the debts. The debts of the mother were paid by the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective interests in the personal estate contributed by them to the partnership fund. There was no fraud in this, nor effort to defraud the creditors of the estate. The parties had a right to protect their interests in the estate of the mother; the creditors of the father had a remedy in so far as the interest of the father in the personal estate of his wife

was concerned. The Court cannot find as a fact that the partnership was a fraudulent partnership.

The business was conducted as a family affair and it seems that the plaintiff at times bought and sold personal property in the store and gave the matter some attention. From the testimony, the Court cannot find that there was an abandonment of the partnership; such being the case, the exceptions are dismissed.

Now June 28, 1915, exceptions dismissed. The defendant is ordered and decreed to account to the plaintiff for the property and effects, stock in trade as well as all assets of the partnership and of all partnership

accounts.

NORWOOD BOROUGH vs. KEYSTONE TELEPHONE COMPANY.

Fus.

Boroughs-Telephone Companies-Poles and Wires-License

A borough resolution granting permission to a telephone company to erect and maintain its system, provided that the company should pay the charges authorized by law and ordinances then in force and comply with all police regulations then in force or thereafter to be adopted and that the company should annually report to the Borough Clerk the number of poles and miles of wire maintained and pay all lawful charges therefor. The company accepted the resolution. An ordinance then in force fixed annual license fees. Held, that the company in accepting the resolution had not contracted against questioning the reasonableness of the charges.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

E. P. Bliss, for Rule.

W. Roger Fronefield, Contra.

December 7, 1914. Broomall, J. By the statement of plaintiff's claim, it appears that the plaintiff borough on December 14, 1911, granted permission by resolution of council, approved by the acting chief burgess, to the defendant company, to erect and maintain certain poles and wires in the streets of the borough, subject to certain conditions, among which is this condition: "Provided