the Keystone Telephone Company shall pay the charges authorized by law and ordinances now in force, and comply with all the police regulations now in force or hereafter to be adopted." This resolution contains this clause: "Provided the Keystone Telephone Co. annually report to the Borough Clerk in writing, the number of its poles and the number of miles of its wire maintained within the Borough of Norwood and shall pay the lawful charges therefor." Sub-joined to this resolution is a stipulation signed by the acting chief burgess, in these words: "No work is to be done, until these resolutions are accepted in writing by the proper officials of the Keystone Telephone Co." Then follows an acceptance by the defendant in these words: "Accepted by the Keystone Telephone Company of Philadelphia." A further acceptance was signed by the general agent of the defendant on April 10, 1912, as follows: "I have taken up the matter of resolutions passed by your honorable body on December 18, 1911, relative to the Keystone Telephone Company, of Philadelphia, and beg to advise you that the conditions stipulated and specified in said resolutions are hereby accepted." It further appears that by an ordinance of the plaintiff borough adopted on April 19, 1901, all telephone companies are required to pay an annual license fee of one dollar for each pole and two dollars and fifty cents for each mile of wire maintained within the borough. This suit is brought to recover these charges due on May 1, 1912, and May 1, 1913.

The affidavit of defense avers that the charges imposed by the ordinance of April 19, 1901, are unreasonable and void, because they are greatly disproportionate to any expense which could be reasonably and fairly incurred by the plaintiff in the exercise of the police power and that from the facts set forth in the affidavit such reasonable charge would not exceed one-fifth of the amounts charged.

To this the plaintiff has replied that the question of reasonableness is not open to inquiry in this proceeding, because the defendant has obligated itself by contract to pay the plaintiff annually one dollar per pole and two dollars and fifty cents per mile of wire.

The question presented therefore is, has the defendant so contracted?

It is not necessary to reason this question ab integro, because this case either trains with Cochranton Borough vs. Cochranton Telephone Co., 41 Pa. Supr. Ct. 146, or with Johnstown Telephone Co. vs. Ferndale Borough, 47 Pa. Supr. Ct. 468, and is therefore governed by precedent. In the first case the company by its predecessor accepted the provisions of a specified ordinance and agreed thereto. This ordinance fixed the license charges. It was held that this constituted a contract, and that the amount of the charges thus agreed upon was not open to be questioned for unreasonableness. In the latter case, the company agreed to be "governed by all the legal ordinances of a general nature now in force or that may hereafter be enacted." There was an ordinance previously passed fixing the amount of license charges. It was held that the company has not contracted itself from questioning the reasonableness of the charges. In our case there is no agreement to pay charges ordained by any particular ordinance. It is to pay the charges authorized by law and ordinances now in force. If the charges be unreasonable, they were not authorized by law, nor were they in force. The charges to be paid are designated as lawful charges. If they are unreasonable they are not lawful. We are of opinion that the case is ruled by the latter case, which is followed in Kittanning Borough vs. Natural Gas Co., 239 Pa. 210, and plaintiff's rule for judgment is therefore refused.

E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS POWDER CO. vs. MASLAND.

Trade Secrets-Master and Servant-Trade Secrets Obtained While Employed-Disclosure of Trade Secrets-Equity-Injunction Pending Appeal.

When in an action to restrain the disclosure of secret trade processes knowledge of which was obtained while defendant was in plaintiff's employ, the defendant asserts that some of the processes were not secret but such as any one has the full right to use, and on crossexamination asks a witness to state the formulae embodying the secret process, an objection will be sustained and a preliminary restraining order made pending an appeal to determine the right to have the question answered.

Sur motion to vacate preliminary injunction and restraining order in No. 1279, June Sessions, 1914.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court and in a former report of the case supra.

G. Q. Horwitz, for Motion.

Prindle, Wright & Small, Contra.

April 12, 1915. The Court: An unusual situation is presented in this case, the only way to cope with which is by a pro forma refusal of the present motion and the entry of an order continuing the trial of the cause until the question can be passed upon by an appellate court.

The question arises out of this condition of facts. The bill was filed to restrain the defendant from disclosing what are claimed to be the trade secrets of the plaintiff; knowledge of which came to the defendant while in plaintiff's employ, and which were confidentially communicated to him. An application for a preliminary injunction was refused because, among other reasons, no finding against the defendant of any intention to disclose was at the time justified. The case was met in the highly commendable spirit on both sides of a due regard for the rights of each other, and it was arranged that no disclosure should be made by defendant without notice beforehand sufficient to give plaintiff time to apply for relief, and express leave was granted to renew its application for a preliminary injunction or restraining order should need for protection arise. Efforts were then made to devise some method of trying the case without divulging any of the processes claimed to be the property of the plaintiff. To this end depositions were taken and the defendant given information of what the claimed secret processes were, the formulae of which were kept in camera. A predicament then arose. The defendant maintains that some of the claimed secret processes are not such at all but processes which any one in the business has the free right to use. The truth of the averments on the one side and the other are asserted to be the proper subject of expert knowledge and testimony. The defendant therefore notified the plaintiff and the court that he proposed to exercise his claimed right of employing experts and discussing with them the features of the case which were in controversy. This, as was to be expected, alarmed the plaintiff who renewed its application for a preliminary injunction or restraining order.

The dilemma in which the plaintiff was placed could not be ignored.

The exigencies of the case were met by the order of the court allowing the injunction. This was made with the thought in mind that there was no immediate need for the employment of experts and that the cause might proceed to trial in the hope that some method of conserving the rights of both parties could be found. Leave was therefore given the defendant to move to vacate the order at any time, and if unprepared at the trial to present his defense, to move for a continuance. To this as a practical expedient, defendant had no objection, provided he was fully protected in the assertion of his claimed rights. The order was heretofore made and an exception allowed to the defendant and the parties proceeded to trial. To further raise the question witnesses for the plaintiff were asked on cross-examination to state the formulae embodying the secret processes, and the present motion to vacate was made.

This brings us face to face with the predicament which now must be met. The dilemma of the plaintiff has become acute. It would, of course, be idle to the point of flat absurdity for the trial judge to compel the plaintiff to publicly disclose its processes in the act of protecting them from disclosure. This difficulty could be met by an appropriate order for keeping the answer to the questions asked in camera. There is an admitted necessity that the trial judge, parties and counsel on both sides should know. To this plaintiff does not object. Counsel for defendant claims (and we cannot do otherwise than find this to be in good faith) that it is necessary for them to employ and confer with experts. They claim this to be their right. If it is allowed by the trial judge, the practical result is that plaintiff is driven to an abandonment of its case without being able to have the ruling reviewed by an appellate court. The only way out of this dilemma is for us to pro forma refuse the defendant's motion and continue the preliminary injunction, restraining the defendant from disclosing to expert witnesses employed by him the processes claimed by the plaintiff as its secrets in order to afford an opportunity to the defendant to appeal from this order and to have their rights in the premises declared.

This order is accordingly made and an exception is allowed the defendant.

Opinion by Dickinson, J.

BUCHER, ET AL., vs. CITY OF JOHNSTOWN.
Taxatian-Assessments-"Somers System."

Cities of the third class have the power to employ expert assistance to the City Assessors, in making assessments of real estate. The "Somers system" can be so employed, it, however, not to usurp the functions of the legally constituted authorities in determining and fixing the assessed value on taxable property.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. Sitting in Equity.

Stephens, P. J., August 3, 1915.

This is a motion to make permanent a preliminary injunction issued at the instance of the plaintiffs in this case, who are citizens and tax payers of the city of Johnstown, against the defendants above named, to restrain those of the defendants who are representatives of the city of Johnstown from entering into a contract with the Manufacturers' Appraisal Company, one of the defendants, as authorized by an ordinance of said city of Johnstown, entitled, "An ordinance providing for assistance to the city assessors to make the triennial assessment for the year 1915 in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Wards of the city of Johnstown, and providing for the payment of such assistance," passed finally in council and approved by the mayor on the 5th day of March, 1915; and also, to restrain the said defendants, other than the Manufacturers' Appraisal Company from paying sum or sums of money on account of said proposed contract.

The ordinance providing for assistance to the assessors of the city of Johnstown is as follows:

"AN ORDINANCE

Providing for assistance to the city assessor to make the triennial assessment for the year 1915, in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Wards of the city of Johnstown, and providing for the payment for such assistance. "Section 1. Be it enacted and ordained by the