tive philosophy, he has assigned it, it may afford us some fundamental principles for our discussion.

The word nature, as used by our author, includes only the material universe, and man is intended by it only so far as his corporeal structure is concerned. A corresponding definition would probably coincide with that of Dr. Bushnell, and the more restricted signification which Sir William Hamilton gives the word. We may notice, also, that it always applies in this work not to a mere mass of elements, which might be a chaos, but to a Cosmos, a system of things pervaded by laws. These laws are simply the modes in which things uniformly act, though they imply some necessity, which our author recognizes but never attempts to account for. It may be because of qualities inherent in the things themselves, or of some divine power present with them; but any inquiry on this point he regards as belonging not to physical but to metaphysical philosophy. The whole range of science then is confined to simple facts, that is, things and events, and its object is to observe these and to classify them according to the most perfect principles. Strictly speaking, on this supposition it can assert nothing but what relates to matters of direct experience. We see not how it could infer anything respecting the future; how it could arrive at any conviction of the uniformity of nature's laws we do not know. The same principle on which the physical inquirer is forbidden to infer a cause, and required to know nothing but what comes within the province of the understanding, mere antecedents and consequents, we should think would exclude all recognition of a necessary uniformity. When I perceive that fire burns my flesh as often as the experiment is tried, why do I conclude that it will always do so? Why am I surprised when I read that the Fire-king enters the flame unhurt, or that the three Israelites in Babylon, being cast into it, came forth uninjured? If it be replied that a belief in the constancy of nature is a conviction of the primary reason, and not an inference of the understanding, we inquire, What then has it to do with science, and ought it not to be removed to the doubtful region of metaphysics?

But without taking advantage of an obvious inconsistency in our author's reasoning, let us inquire whether science teaches that all nature's laws are equally unchangeable. Even if the

primary laws of matter are invariable, must those which we call derivative be so also? Some of these are exceedingly complex, and no human intellect can trace all the simple elements included in them. To a Divine mind, indeed, a complex law is as invariable as any, because each element in it can be distinctly known. It can never be the same with a human observer. What he ranks among the most unchangeable derivative laws may be in reality mutable. We might be sure that matter always will be extended, will attract, and will be divisible, but we cannot be sure that the sun will continue to rise and set as usual for a century hence. The law of the sun's rising and setting has been in operation each day for thousands of years; but there are too many elements in it for us to be certain of its permanence for the future. We may be satisfied that the offspring of African parents will be human, for this is according to a fundamental law of animal nature; but how can we have equal assurance that it will be black? Even the permanence of specific types in some extraordinary cases is by our author put in jeopardy. And yet some of the most complex derivative laws have been ranked among the greatest certainties of nature, and any interruption of them would have been at some periods reported as miraculous. One of the most remarkable fruits of modern science is the discovery of many new laws of nature, and the combination of others, so as to produce results beyond human power with only the knowledge of other times.

Nothing also is more common than for us to witness one law of nature apparently interrupted by another. Seldom do we see laws operating separately, but almost always together, or in conflict with one another. Not unfrequently they appear entirely to annihilate each other's influence, as when two bodies in motion come into such direct opposition that both are brought to a state of rest. In such cases we say not that there is a violation, but only a conflict of nature's laws. Two forces in the solar system are sometimes so exactly balanced that a planet is made to move in its orbit for ages; they are not annihilated, for each continues to act so as to hold the other in equilibrium. There is scarcely a law in the universe which is not in this manner in conflict with others. In some instances this seems so great as utterly to confound all our notions of order. A thousand regular processes are in a few moments

interrupted by some overwhelming superior influence. A deluge, a conflagration, an earthquake, a tornado, a pestilence, or a drouth, may interfere with a multitude of nature's more quiet movements. Every law is in action still; none are suspended, nor really interrupted, but their ordinary effects are neutralized or destroyed.

A similar remark may be made with respect to the interference of human agency. In what way mind acts upon matter no one can explain, for we learn nothing on this point by knowing the nervous apparatus through which its volitions are conveyed. But man is continually interfering with the courses of nature; he cannot, indeed, alter the primary laws of matter, but he can, to a great extent, combine and arrange them. And when we reflect how much the action of laws depends upon their arrangement, we shall conclude that this power is not to be despised. What would have been our solar system if one of its present elementary substances had been absent, if those elements had been differently combined, or if its planets had been differently arranged, or been made to move at a different angle to the plane of the ecliptic? Every law of matter might have been constituted as at present, but how differently would they have operated? Substances that cannot act upon each other apart, when brought together have a powerful mutual influence. The light and the materials used in the photographic plate have all existed with the same qualities for ages; but to obtain the beautiful images now so common, they had to be placed in peculiar relations. Man is continually discovering new ways in which he can accomplish the mightiest results by the simple power of collocation and arrangement.

In all this conflict of laws with each other, and this action upon them from without, there is no violation of the established constitution of nature. We are quite as anxious to maintain this principle in its integrity as any special devotee of science can be. There could be no extraordinary events if there were no ordinary uniformity. The Scriptures themselves are very explicit in their assertion of the stability of general order. They represent it as the product of the Creator's wisdom, and hence needing no change. It is the manifestation of his unchangeable attributes. There can be no permanent order which is not indicative of the mind of him who arranged it, and he

who formed the world "hath no variableness or shadow of turning." "He established the earth and it abideth; they continue according to his ordinances, for all are his servants. A providence by means of natural law is quite consistent with, yea, is demanded by a real and a special providence. Comte and some others imagine that "what can be calculated upon with certainty cannot be dependent upon volition." On the other hand we contend, and the Bible goes upon the principle, that God's providential purposes are formed on such a perfection of wisdom that they must be the perfection of stability. The highest illustration God could adduce of the unchangeable covenant which he intended to make with his people was his covenant with day and night, the ordinances of heaven and earth which he had appointed. He it is who "binds the sweet influence of Pleiades, and brings forth Mazzaroth in his season. He knows the ordinances of heaven, and sets the dominion thereof in the earth." He promises that "while the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease." In the account of creation a permanent constitution of the universe is asserted, and as each object comes into being it is arranged in its class, and the distinction of genera and species is preserved, "each after their kind." In an age when all possible aid from heaven was expected in behalf of eminent saints, none were encouraged of God to hope for personal favors inconsistent with natural order, and even the Son of God and his apostles refused conscientiously to tempt the Lord by relying upon extraordinary interferences for their own advantage. The promises to prayer, when interpreted with a due regard to the laws of hyperbolic language, no more imply that God will violate nature's laws than when it is said that man uses those laws and bends them to his purposes. These ordinances of heaven he does not abolish or violate, but uses as "his servants.” †

Indeed, the principal objection we have to our author's views of laws is that he does not consistently carry them out in all departments of the Creator's works. He implies that miracles are violations of regular order, and then, with this understand

James i, 17; Psalm cxix, 90.

↑ Jer. xxxiii, 25; Job xxxviii, 31-33; Gen. i, 11, 12, 21; viii, 22: Matt. iv, 3-7 Phil. ii, 23, 27.

ing of them, admits their occurrence, and contends for them in the spiritual world. We can acknowledge them in this sense no easier in the spiritual than in the material world. We are unwilling to admit, with Dr. Bushnell, that even sin is a violation of mental law. Of moral law it unquestionably is, but by the laws assigned us in our mental constitution we are at perfect liberty to sin. We not unfrequently bring about a collision, a conflict of laws in the world of mind, just as we often do in the world of nature; but no original power, or (which is here the same thing) primary law of mind is subverted or suspended. An error of judgment or of morals, a wrong exercise of our powers, disturbs no constitutional law of the spirit any more than an injury to our bodies disturbs a physical law. We know of no limits to the prevalence of this order short of those which belong to the universe of being, material, spiritual, and even divine. Fully to comprehend its extent and power, we need to venture the sublimest flights and explore the vast depths of eternity. To explain what takes place in one part of this universe by principles drawn exclusively from that single section, would as surely involve us in errors as to attempt a complete explanation of one portion of this world's phenomena without reference to any other. We may concede the independence of the sciences, and all that Prof. Powell contends for with respect to the separate provinces of matter and of mind; but when he treats expressly of the relation of the natural to the supernatural he ought not to ignore all facts of a general character, and confine himself to the results of natural science alone. He should rise to a higher position, and take within his view all that can be known of the natural and spiritual world. Then what may have seemed disorder in the contracted, may be found the highest order in the universal sphere; just as what would be easily explained in the animal and vegetable kingdoms would seem inexplicable and even miraculous on the principles merely of the inorganic kingdom.

II. We have still more decided objections to the author's idea of miracles. Familiar as he shows himself with all that has been written upon this subject, he deals only with two representations of miracles: the one as violations or suspensions of nature's laws, and the other as natural results, provided for by the Creator in the original constitution of things. To the