III. Docks.

Docks1 usually consist of a series of basins connected by Definition. locks, together with quays, wharves, and warehouses, and are used for the convenience of unloading cargoes from vessels, as well as for refitting and repairing ships that have sustained damage during a voyage.

Though they are always erected in connection with some Ownership of. port or harbour, they are quite distinct therefrom; the property in a port, and that in the docks situated within the town, which is the head of the port, being frequently in different persons, as is the case both in the Liverpool and the London Docks.2

They may be in the hands either of trustees for the public benefit,3 or of a company of adventurers; but in each case they are usually established under a special Act of Parliament, by which the rights and duties of the proprietors are defined; and when that is the case, they cannot be exceeded.5 When the Act is silent on this point, the public have a right to enjoy the privilege of using the docks upon "reasonable terms," and the owner cannot impose what tolls or duties he pleases on them.6

The number of special Acts relative to docks led to the passing of The Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 27), the preamble of which recites that, "it is expedient to comprise in one Act sundry pro"visions usually contained in Acts of Parliament autho

rizing the construction or improvement of harbours, "docks, and piers, and that, as well for avoiding the neces"sity of repeating such provisions in each of the several "Acts relating to such undertakings, as for ensuring a "greater uniformity in the provisions themselves" (s. 1.)

Liability of dock companies.

By this statute, which is framed on the model of the Lands Clauses and Waterworks Clauses Consolidation Acts, various provisions usually contained in Acts creating dock companies are consolidated, and it extends to such "harbours, docks, and piers as shall be authorized by Acts "hereafter to be passed, which shall declare that this Act "shall be incorporated therewith" (sect. 1); the term "the undertakers" being defined by sect. 2 to mean “any person authorized by a special Act to construct any "harbour, dock, or pier."1

It is, however, to the special Act that reference must be made, to ascertain the rights of the dock proprietors; that Act constituting the form of contract between them and the public, and being regarded in the light of a bargain, any ambiguity in its terms will be construed as against the undertakers and in favour of the public.2

By Act of Parliament, the Hull Dock Company were authorized to make a dock, &c., and all goods which should be landed or discharged upon any of the quays, &c. should be liable to pay the like rates of wharfage as were usually taken for goods, &c. loaded or discharged on quays in the port of London. It was held, that as the premises were only vested in the company for the purposes of the Act, they had no common law right to compensation for the use of them, and that the statute did not give them any right to claim wharfage for goods shipped off from their quays; Lord Tenterden, C. J., saying, "The plaintiffs cannot "claim anything that is not distinctly given."3

The principle on which a private person or a company is liable for damages occasioned by the neglect of servants, applies to a corporation which has been entrusted by

1 For other general statutes relating to docks, see ante, Chap. I. p. 44; and post, Chap. VII.

2 Hull Dock Co. v. La Marche, 8 B. & C. 51. See too Leeds and Liverpool Canal v. Hustler, 1 B. & C. 424; Lord Tenterden's remarks in Stourbridge Canal v. Wheely, 2

B. & Ad. 793; Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal, 1 M. & K. 162, 169; and Lord Brougham's judgment in Stockton and Darlington Railway v. Barrett, 11 C. & F. 590 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 641.

3 Kingston-on-Hull Dock Co. v. La Marche, 8 B. & C. 42.

statute to perform certain works (as, for instance, to erect and manage docks), and to receive tolls for the use of the works; although these tolls, unlike tolls received by a private person, are not applicable to the use of individual members of the corporation, or to that of the corporation generally, but are devoted to the maintenance of the works, and, in case of any surplus existing, the tolls are themselves to be diminished. If knowledge of the existence of a cause of mischief makes persons responsible for an injury, they will be equally responsible when, by their culpable negligence, its existence is not known by them.1

On these principles, dock trustees were held liable to the owners of ships in actions for damages caused to them by negligently managing a harbour under their control.2

In the case of Coe v. Wise, it was held, on this principle, that commissioners, authorized by Act of Parliament to make and maintain a sluice, which burst owing to the negligence of their servants, were not exempt from liability, by reason of their being commissioners for public purposes; and the duty being imposed on them to maintain the sluice, they were liable for damage caused by negligent performance of that duty of their servants.

When the Bristol Dock Company were authorized to make a new course for the river Avon, of equal depth and breadth at the bottom, and of equal inclination at the sides as the old course, it was held, that a duty was thereby cast on them generally to repair the banks of the new channel, and that a mandamus would lie to compel them, though they might also be liable to indictment. A return, that they were not liable to repair, and that, as near as circumstances permitted, they had maintained the new channel of equal depth, breadth, and inclination, was, therefore, held not sufficient.4

1 Mersey Dock Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R., 1 H. L. 90; 11 H. L. Cas. 686; 12 Jur., N. S. 571.

2 Ib.

3 L. R., 1 Q. B. 711, following

Mersey Dock Co. v. Gibbs, L. R., 1
H. L. 90.

Reg.v. Bristol Dock Co.,2 Railw.
Cas. 599.

The same company, being authorized as above, were also required by their Act to compensate persons interested in lands injured. They purchased certain lands and closes, and sold parts in lots-a strip of land being left for a public road between the new channel and the lots. A portion of the road was washed away, and the owners of houses built on the said lots applied to the company to repair the bank, but they refused. On application by the corporation of Bristol, who were conservators of the river, and on affidavit stating these facts, and also stating apprehension of injury to the navigation, though no actual injury, it was held that a mandamus should issue to compel the defendants to repair.1

Their Act of Parliament directed the Bristol Dock Company to make a common sewer in a certain direction, &c., and to alter other sewers, so as to discharge considerably below the surface of the water of their floating harbour, and to make such other alterations, &c. in the sewers as might be deemed necessary in consequence of the floating of the said harbour. The company altered certain sewers, so as to discharge them considerably under the surface, but the sewage became a nuisance. It was held that, under the latter part of the above clause, they were required to make a new sewer, if necessary to remove the nuisance, the mode of remedying the evil being left to their discretion by the Act.2

On the other hand, dock companies, acting strictly in accordance with the terms of their statutes, will not be held liable to make compensation, even where such lawful acts prove indirectly injurious to the rights of others.

The London Dock Company were empowered to make a new entrance to their dock, and to take down houses and stoppages. Every person having an estate or interest, not less than a tenancy from year to year, who should be injured in his said estate or interest by the making of any

Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co., 11 Railw. Cas. 542.

2 Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 6 B. & C. 181.

such cut, sluice, bridge, road, or other work, was to be compensated. The company pulled down certain houses and made a cut which intercepted several thoroughfares, and the tenants of a neighbouring public-house demanded compensation for the loss of custom-not for loss of value as a private house. It was held that they were not entitled to such compensation, Lord Denman, C. J., saying, "It is the necessary consequence of the lawful act done by "the company."

By a section of a statute empowering commissioners to maintain a sluice, any person who, after the commissioners or any person authorized by them had begun to carry the statute into execution, should sustain any injury thereby, was to be compensated, and the damage or injury was to be ascertained before a jury before the sheriff. The sluice having burst and injured the property of the plaintiff, it was held, that the section only applied to damage resulting from acts authorized by the statute; but, if not, yet as the cause of action was for an omission or non-feasance, it was not within the subject of compensation.2

1 Rex v. London Dock Co., 5 A. & E. 163.

2 Coe v. Wise, L. R., 1 Q. B. 711.