Reg. NUNN, JAMES, tailor, Bury St. Edmund's. Pet. Jan. 16. Reg. & PROSSER, WALTER, out of business Gravesend. Pet. Jan. 12. Reg. & ROSE, HENRY, ale dealer, Sparkbrook. Pet. Jan. 14. Reg. & O. A. Reg. & O. A. Roberts. Sol. Roberts, Usk. Sur. Jan. 26 STEPHENSON, JOHN, grocer, Dewsbury. Pct. Jan. 14. Reg. & O. A. Nelson. Sols. Scholes and Brearey, Dewsbury. Sur. Feb. 4 WALKER, THOMAS, out of business, Pontypool. Pet. Jan. 15. Rez. Wilde. O A. Acraman. Sols. Greenway and Bytheway, Pontypool; and Davis, Bristol. Sur. Jan. 29 WARD, EDWARD, licensed victualler, Fenton. Pet. Jan. 11. Reg. & O. A. Keary. Sol. Ward, Longton. Sur. Jan. 30 WHITE, JOHN, journeyman butcher, Newport. Pet. Jan. 15. Reg. & O. A. Roberts. Sol. Catheart, Newport. Sur. Jan. 29 WILKINSON, JOB, cloth manufacturer, Morley. Pet. Jan. 18. BANKRUPTCIES ANNULLED. SPENCE, WILLIAM, jun., mercantile clerk, Fortess-ter, Junctionrd, Kentish-town. Aug. 28, 1868 Gazette, Jan. 15. ECHLIN, CHARLES, dealer in wines, Carlton-sq, New-cross. Feb. 21, 1869 HORNER, THOMAS WILLIAM, Queen's-rd east, Chelsea. Feb. 18, 1867 JELLICOE, ELIZABETH JANE, Southampton. Jan. 26, 1866 Dibidends. BANKRUPTS' ESTATES. The Official Assignees are given, to whom apply for the Dividends. Attwood, T. earthenware dealer, first, 5, 34d. Carrick, Exeter.Carpenter, W. S. draper, first, 3. 14. Carrick, Exeter.--Langmead, J. farmer, first, 2s. 6d. Carrick, Exeter.-Lee, W. builder, further, 4. Carrick, Exeter.-Speed, G. tailor, first, 1s. 10. Gregory, County Court, Chertsey.-Wade, G. DeV. scrivener, first, 1s. Parkyns, London. PEMBERTON, EDWARD THOMAS, brewer, Warrington. Dec. 17. REDFERN, THOMAS, grocer, Manchester. Nov. 20. Trusts. W. in 1 mo. SMITH, SAMUEL, gunmaker, Princes-st, Leicester-sq. Dec. 18. SNEATH, CHARLES, butcher, Grantham, Dec. 15. Trusts. W. Bath Gazette, Jan. 19. 58. BESSELL, CHARLES, flock manufacturer, Warmley. Dec. 22. by two equal instalments, in 3 and 6 mos-secured. Trusts. G. A. Bessell, accountant, Bristol, and C. W. Bessell, flock manufacturer, Warmley CHORLEY, FRANCIS, sen., St. Sidwell, and CHORLEY, WILLIAM PARAMORE, Montague-rd, Dalston, gentlemen. Jan. 4 and 5. 54, on rezistration COLEMAN, WALTER, draper, Surbiton. Jan. 5 11. by three equal instalments, in 3, 6, and 9 mos from Dec. 21-secured. Trusts. C. Crocker, warehouseman, Friday-st; C. A. Cobb, draper, Rochester; and C. Cobb, draper, Strood CRAWSHAW, THOMAS, and SNAPE, JAMES, cotton manufacturers, Tottington Lower End. Dec. 22. Trusts. J. Place, yarn salesman, and J. Holgate, yarn agent, both Manchester DUNK, SAMUEL CHARLES, builder, Penge. Dec. 16. 58. by two equal instalments, on execution and on Dec. 30, 1868 Jan. 12. FAIRBROTHER, GEORGE, cotton dealer, Heywood. Trusts. J. Harrop, cotton spinner, Oldham: T. Isherwood, cotton dealer. Heywood; and G. Wood, cotton waste dealer, Ashton-under-Lyne FOURACRE, WILLIAM, teadealer, Stokes Croft. Dec. 21. Trust. W. E. Arthur, tea merchant, Bristol FULLER, JOHN, shoe manufacturer, Manchester. Jan. 7. 8. G. by three instalments. 2x, G, on March 2, 2s. 6d. on May 3, and 28. 6d. on July 3-secured. Trust. W. Botteley, maker-up, Manchester GARBUTT, THOMAS, grocer, West Hartlepool. Dec. 21. 48, 6. by three equal instalments, in 3, 6, and 9 mos-secured. Trust. J. Greener, public accountant, West Hartlepool GOFF, JOSEPH CHARLES, clothier, East Greenwich. Dec. 31. 5. by two equal instalments. in 3 and 6 mos GOODMAN, ALFRED, and GOODMAN, WILLIAM JAMES, leather dressers, Amelia-row, Spa-rd, Bermondsey. Dec. 22. Trusts. W. Stockil, tanner, Bermondsey New-rd; D. O'Reardon, hide merchant, Bermondsey-st: B Hennessy, hide merchant, Pope's-quay, co. Cork; and T. Nunan, hide merchant, Kanturk, co. Cork HEARN, WILLIAM, grocer, Bristol. Dec. 26. Trust. J. Clutterbuck, drysulter, Bristol HUGHES, RODERICK, and VAUGHAN, THOMAS, grocers, Tre- 3. by three equal instalments, in 2, 4, and 6 mos from registration Assignment, Composition, Jaspectorship, and LOWOOD, WILLIAM ABRAHAM, licensed victualler, Birmingham. Trust Deeds. Gazette, Jan. 15. ALLEN, EDWARD, and WAGSTAFFE, SAMUEL, paper stainer, Glossop (under firm of Allen, White, and Co.) Dec. 16. 10.58. in 14 days and 5s. in 3 mos--secured ANSTICE, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, furniture dealer, Cardiff. Dec. 19. ATKINSON, JOSEPH, timber merchant, Manchester. Dec. 19. Jan. 7. 28. by equal Dec. 19. 8s, by three equal instalments, in 3, 6, and 9 mos,-secured. Trust. H. G. Nicholson, accountant, Manchester DUGUID, WILLIAM, house agent, Westbourne park- pl, Porchester-sq. Dec. 23. 2. in 2 mos, and 3s. in 6 mos by promissory notes. Trust. A. D. Boyd, gentleman, Inverness-vils, Hammersmith FERREY, FREDERICK WILLIAM, draper, Bournemouth. Dec. 17. Trusts. J. I. Hughes, warehouseman, Bow Churchyard, and G. Ferrey, jun., draper, Christchurch FORDHAM, THOMAS, Stonemason, Grimesthorpe. Dec. 11. Trusts. T. Moore, and H. Simpson, common brewers, both Sheffield Dec. 18. Trusts. S. FOSTER, JOHN, farmer, Shevington. Richardson, grocer's assistant, Shevington, and G. Ornrod, cheese factor, Wigan Trust. W. Green, FURNESS, ROBERT, draper, Bingley. Dec. 19. Dec. 14. Trusts. J. Burrill, grocer, Birmingham, and D. May, pork butcher, Dudley HEMBLEN, EDWARD THOMAS, grocer, Buckingham-st, Strand, HOLLINS, GEORGE TAYLOR, draper, Hedley, near Hexham. KING, HORATIO NELSON, lessee of the Theatre Royal, Bath. LISTER, JOSEPH, and MARRIOTT. JOHN, woollen manufacturers, LLOYD, HENRY, chemist, Richmond. Jan. 1. 1s. 31, on Aug. 1, 18. 34, en Feb. 1, 1870, 1s. . on Aug. 1, and Feb. 1, in each suc ceeding year, until debts have been paid in full,-secured. Trust. J. Crispe, chemist, Cheapside Jan. 12. 58., by two LUCAS, JAMES, mercer, Stone. Dec. 8. Trusts. P. Gillibrand and OLDERSHAW, WALTER, clerk to an insurance company, Harewood- Dec. 21. Trust. W. G. Dixon, accountant, Birmingham J. Douglas, stuff merchant, Bradford, and W. Cumming, woollen Jan. 2. Trusts. J. Jan. 11. 58. in MILLS, WILLIAM, builder, Plumstead. Dec. 18. Trusts. W. S. ROUCH, EDWIN, engineer, Bristol. Dec. 18. Trusts. J. Reynolds, SAVAGE, EDWARD, currier, Old Kent-rd. Dec. 22. G. by three Dec. 31. 2s. 6d. by two equal instalments, on May 1 and July 1 next WILLIAMS, ELIZABETH, milliner. Orchard-st, Portman-sq.. Nov. 27. Trusts. T. B. Morrish, silk mercer, Regent-st, and W. P. Steers, fringe manufacturer, New Bond-st WILSHAW, GEORGE, leather merchant, St. John's-sq, Clerkenwell. Dec. 16. Trusts. J. Barrow, tanner, Spa-rd, Bermondsey; D. Sharpe, tanner, White's-grounds, Bermondsey; and F. East, tanner, Bermondsey-st, Bermondsey YOUNGMAN, GEORGE, publican, Woolwich. Dec. 23. 20s. in 12 mos from registration BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. BURNESS.-On the 12th inst., at 16, East Claremont-street, Edin BRADFORD-MORGAN.-On the 9th inst., at St. Peter's Church, DEATHS. BREAKFAST-EPPS'S COCOA-GRATEFUL AND COMFORTING. The agrezable character of this preparation has The Civil Service rendered it a general favourite. Gazette says: "The singular success Mr. Epps attained by his homeopathic preparation of cocoa has never been surpassed by any experimentalist." Simply inade with boiling water or milk. Prepared solely by JAMES EPPS and Co., Homeopathic Chemists, London; and sold by the trade in all parts. in lb., lb., and 1lb. packets, tinlined and labelled.-[ADVT.] THE MANUFACTURE OF WATCHES AND CLOCKS.-A most interesting and instructive little work, describing briefly, but with great clearness, the rise and progress of watch and clock making, has just been published by Mr. J. W. Benson, of 25, Old Bond-street, 99, Westbourne-grove, and the City Steam Factory, 58 and 60, Ludgate-hill. The book, which is profusely illustrated, gives a full description of the various kinds of watches and clocks, with their prices, and no one should make a purchase without visiting the above establishments, or consulting this truly valuable work. By its aid, persons residing in any part of the United Kingdom, India or the Colonies are enabled to select for themselves the watch best adapted to their use and have it sent to them with perfect safety. Mr. Benson, who holds the Wales, sends this appointment to the Prince of pamphlet to any address on receipt of two postage stamps, and we cannot too strongly recommend it to the notice of the intending purchaser.-[ADVT. ] PRACTICAL LAW BOOKS FOR OFFICE USE, PUBLISHED AT 10, WELLINGTON-STREET, STRAND, W. C. ALLNUTT'S WILLS. Fourth Edition, price 21s. COX'S CRIMINAL LAW CASES. Quarterly, price 58. 6d COX'S DIGEST of CRIMINAL LAW CASES DECIDED from 1856 to 1867. Price 6s. 6d. COX'S LAW and PRACTICE of LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. Sixth Edition, price 12s. 6d. COX'S MAGISTRATES' and PARISH LAW CASES Quarterly, price 5s. 6d. Vols. 1, 2, and 3 may be had. COX and GRADY'S LAW and PRACTICE of REGIS TRATION and ELECTIONS. Tenth Edition, price 17s. 6d. DORIA and MACRAE'S NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW and PRACTICE. Two vols. cloth, price 428. EVANS' LAW DIGEST. Half-yearly, price Ss. 6d. FRANCIS'S LAW of CHARITIES. Second Edition, price 9s. 6d. GIBBONS' and HARVEY'S EQUITY in the COUNTY COURT. Price 10s. 6d. 254 254 254 255 233 235 Bill. Is returning thanks for his election in Renfrewshire, Mr. BRUCE, the Home Secretary, stated that he should feel it to be his duty to submit to Parliament a Bill giving more effectual powers for dealing with professional criminals by some256 thing in the nature of police surveillance. He admitted that the subject was surrounded with difficulties, and would require much deliberation, but he hoped to be able to frame a Bill that would be satisfactory. Mr. BRUCE promises to be an admirable administrator of the most important office in the Government. 256 256 258 Hull Law Students' Society Law Students' Debating Society.. 238 The Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Gateshead Articled Clerks' 258 LEGAL OBITUARY: Re BEASNEY'S TRUSTS MATHIESON . HARROD Copyright-Registration-Right to sue 258 239 200 258 THE Swiney prize of a silver goblet value 1007. with gold coins in it to the value of 1007., bequeathed by Dr. SWINEY to be awarded by the Society of Arts and the Royal College of Physicians jointly, under the presidency of the LORD CHANCELLOR, for the best published work All communications must be authenticated by the name on jurisprudence, has been awarded to Dr. GUY and address of the writer, not necessarily for publica- for his Principles of Forensic Medicine. Surely tion, but as a guarantee of good faith. To Readers and Correspondents. CHARGES FOR ADVERTISEMENTS. 3s. 6d. Every additional ten words NOTICE. other greater works on jurisprudence have been published during the last five years. THE death of Mr. ERNEST JONES, on the day chester to be their candidate in the vacancy after his selection by the Radical party of Manexpected from the disqualification of Mr. BIRLEY will elicit the sympathy of even his political opponents. Mr. JONES was a man of un- The LAW TIMES goes to press on Thursday evening, that it EVANS'S him, though still in the flush of manhood. Parliament-Borough vote-Occupation as owner 645 PEGLER. GURNEY AND HOARE Time for presenting a petition-Election Petitions Act 186, ss. 6 and 49 PEASE AND OTHERS . NORWOOD AND CLAY 647 Sufficiency of security Jurisdiction of court- Joint petition.. 648 COURT OF EXCHEQUER. THE SOUTHAMPTON STEAM COLLIER AND COAL COMPANY (LIMITED) r. CLARKE Ship and shipping-Charter-party-Cargo 651 Law and the Lawyers. THE following are all the appointments for the Petition-Irrelevant clause-Application to strike out..... 660 spring circuits of the Judges up to the present time:-Oxford (Mr. Justice KEATING and Mr. Justice HANNEN).-Reading, Feb. 24; Oxford, Feb. 27; Worcester, March 4; Stafford, March 9; Shrewsbury, March 17; Hereford, March 22; Monmouth, March 24; Gloucester, March 31. Northern (Mr. Justice LUSH and Mr. Justice BRETT).-Appleby, Feb. 15; Carlisle, Feb. 16; 662 Newcastle, Feb. 19; Durham, Feb. 25; Lancaster, March 3; Manchester, March 6; Liverpool, March 20. An interesting memoir of him will be found in another page. ONE of the first measures, we understand, the Government intend to introduce when Parliament meets, is a Bill to amend the law of bankruptcy. The Bill of last session, framed on the report of the committee which sat to consider the defects of the present system, will, no doubt, be the basis of the intended legislation. There are two suggestions we would offer for the consideration of the draftsman, namely, the necessity of consolidating a number of its clauses, and striking out those portions of the Bill which might properly come within the scope of the rules and orders. The less cumbrous the character of the Bill the greater the probability of its becoming law. finally committing itself to the Carey-street site, that he has carried with him a very large force of public opinion. We have already referred to the arguments of Sir CHARLES; but the observations of another contributor may be useful. He writes that Sir CHARLES's plea may be stated in few words. A better site has offered since the present site was selected. The Thames Embankment presents itself, with recommendations of position, space, and other advantages, which would undoubtedly have secured for it the preference, could it have been seen in contrast with the site chosen. The selected site is found not to be large enough for the purposes designed and to be inconvenient of access, insomuch that it must be approached at the front by no less than thirty steps. As an artistic and ornamental question, affecting the future fame of the metropolis, it is beyond even controversy. We must buy a great deal more ground, and after all cramp the building. Then why should we not, it is argued, seize the opportunity to do now, before it is too late, what we should have done at first if the choice had been then presented to us? It is then urged that the expense will not be greater, if so great; and suggestions are made for turning the cleared site to profitable account. In fact, a very excellent case is made out for reconsideration, at least, if not for a change of resolution. As a matter of adornment of the metropolis, we assent entirely to the argument; we are also of opinion that the balance of convenience to the public and Profession between the selected and proposed site is not so great that it should impede the adoption of that which would be most desirable in other respects. no But a suggestion has been offered which ought to reconcile the differences of the rival sites; it is to use both of them. The Carey-street site is not sufficient, and a much larger area must be cleared, at an enormous cost, for the property that bounds it is extremely valuable. The proposition is, to place the courts on the Embankment, and the offices in Carey-street. This seems to present a combination of advantages. In the first place, it would be desirable to separate the courts from the offices. The effect of crowding a multitude of rooms in and about public halls is, to stifle the assembly room in its auxiliaries. It is not only destructive of architectural and pictorial effect, but it is extremely inconvenient to those who have business there. If proof of this be wanting, look at the palace at Westminster-a complete labyrinth, only to be threaded by long practice. Nor can we discover any serious disadvantages in such a severance. There is necessary connection between the courts and the offices. Their distance apart would not be more than ten minutes in time of transit, and no references from the courts to the offices are of such urgency that a messenger could not convey them in good time for all practical purposes. Chambers might be provided for the chief clerks attached to each of the equity courts; and a Judge should sit daily in a practice court, to do the work of the chamber Judges, and attached to the court should be chambers for the Masters. For this the Embankment offers a site without rival in Europe, while the offices, remitted to the Careystreet site, would be conveniently near to those who most want to use them. Lastly, there is the still greater advantage, that the work will be done better and more speedily. The courts will not be marred without nor cramped within, and they will be completed in a moderate time from designs which, under the improved conditions, may be expected vastly to excel anything hitherto produced. We trust that Parliament will be induced to reconsider the question on the basis of this new suggestion of two buildings instead of one. TEMPLE REFORM. EVERYTHING in the Temple wants reforming. There is nothing, from the constitution of the governing bodies of the Inns of Court, to dinners, which does not call for thorough investigation and amendment. Recent public discussions reveal this. The paper read by Mr. ScOTT before the Jurisprudence Section of the Social Science Association, on the 16th instant, shows the enormous revenues of the Inns, and the wretchedly poor results in point of education and accommodation to members produced by their expenditure. In the first place, as stated by the Hon. G. DENMAN at the discussion which followed the reading of Mr. Scorr's paper, there are four governing bodies where there ought to be one only. He believed that the benchers of Lincoln's Inn perform their duties diligently and conscientiously; but, he says, when any essential change is proposed by one of the four corporate bodies "it is pretty sure to be thrown out by another." This, then, is the true reason why reform stands still as regards the Inns of Court. But there is not this obstacle to the proper management of the affairs of each particular Inn. Why do not these wealthy bodies devote some of their capital to building chambers in which a man can obtain decent accommodation at a reasonable rent? Why do they not furnish libraries sufficiently spacious, free from draughts, and kept open at available hours? The only good feature about the libraries at present is to be found in the gentlemen who fill the positions of librarians; and-speaking here more particularly of the Middle Temple library, with which we are best acquainted-in this respect we have to acknowledge the very greatest courtesy and indefatigable energy in procuring rare works. Otherwise the libraries are a disgrace to a country whose system of jurisprudence is as ancient as our own is. Again, why do not these bodies provide proper food in Hall? So bad, indeed, is the wine at the Middle Temple that a journalist has mentioned as the first desirable step to a reform in dinners that all the casks in the cellars of that inn should be broached in Middle Temple-lane. Further, why do not these bodies educate their students? What a scandal it is that it should be open to anyone to say what Mr. FREDERIC HILL said at the discussion to which we have referred, that "as to the examinations in the Inns of Court, he believed they were as near a farce as they could be." We quite agree with Mr. HILL that the rage for examinations is a stupid rage, and that many men will succeed in a profession who could not pass an examination. But any rate there should be some guarantee of a man's fitness to do the work which he seeks. It is only fair to men themselves that they should be prepared for the work even if they be indisposed to undergo the necessary exertion. What then would be the scheme of education? Mr. WENTWORTH DILKE is an authority on these matters, and he thought it worth considering whether the Inns of Court are not making a mistake in trying to steer a middle course between the establishment of a sort of university where men undergo a course of legal training, and the old course which the university had so long pursued of simply bringing men together at dinner, leaving them to obtain legal education in any manner they thought best. Some ex Undoubtedly this is so. If we are to have an university it should be an university altogether apart from social considerations. perience tells us that nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that any benefits are derivable from dining as a young man in Hall. As Mr. DILKE points out Cambridge men were for example take care to come up in parties of four, forming their own mess, and, usually coming so as to eat Saturday's dinner, and return after Monday's. "Any advantage to be derived, according to the old theory, from intermixture with other men, was simply out of the question. The attendance at chambers in Cambridge was allowed by the benchers, and men thus went to the bar without any chance of having come into contact with any except Cambridge men." So it is in any other cases. Men arrange their messes so as to exclude strangers from their circle as far as possible. The social advavtages attaching to dinners should therefore be put entirely out of the question, and education regarded technically, be considered the first object. We wholly agree with Mr. BRYCE, when he compares the state of the English course of study to that of English law; in which there is an absence of system which makes its attainment difficult to the student and its codification difficult to the practitioner. "The first remedy for such a state of things," he says, "would be found in the establishment of a systematic course of legal instruction in connection with the Inns of Court." Mr. NASMITH attributes the present outcry against the Inns of Court to the general tendency everywhere to attack anything that is old. We do not know whether he speaks from personal experience, but we should hope that the plea of antiquity will never be allowed to prevail against a disposition towards an obviously necessary reform. The matter is now under consideration of the Jurisprudence Department of the Association. But what good will that do? We anticipate that the benchers will wait just long enough to bring about the destruction of their exclusive privileges and jurisdiction. SUBROGATION. THE necessity for allowing third persons to become clothed with the rights of parties between whom may exist a cause of action has been recognised of late in various ways, and notably in the recent statute giving to assignees of marine policies a right to sue in their own names, and also in the 157th section of the Companies Act of 1862, by which when a chose in action is assigned in a winding-up under that Act the assignee is empowered to bring an action, or proceed in his own name. Further, by the Act 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144, s. 1, it is provided that any or hereafter becoming entitled by person now assignment, or other derivative title, to a policy of life assurance, and possessing, at the time of action brought, the right in equity to receive, and the right to give, an effectual discharge to the assurance company, shall be entitled to sue at law in his own name. These statutes are really importing into the common law what has always been a recognised principle in equity. Courts of Chancery, from the earliest times, thought the doctrine upon which the common law proceeded in these cases too absurd to adopt, holding that a man may bind himself to do anything which is not of itself impossible. tion, as our readers know, arises where a person This is not, however, subrogation. Subrogasatisfies a claim which another has against a third person, and becomes entitled to pursue the Prominent instances of this are given us in the remedies of the other against the third person. insurances where the office pays for damage done cases of fire and marine insurances; in fire by a riot for which the hundred is liable; and in marine insurance where the underwriter pays the amount of a general average contribution which other owners are compellable to pay. We shall not now deal with the latter class of cases, which is in a very doubtful position at the present time, but we will endeavour to extract analogous examples. the general principles from fire insurances and are termed valued policies; but where there is a In fire insurances there are very rarely what valuation it is, we venture to think, to be taken in cases where a loss has to be estimated, as a limitation. Because, at the root of the matter, we find the principle that a policy of insurance is a contract of indemnity. Baron Parke, in Dalby v. The East India and London Life Assurdero, 2 Sm. L. Cas., 222, says, "Policies of ance Company, which overruled Godsall v. Bolare both properly contracts of indemnity, the assurances against fire and against marine risks, insurer engaging to make good, within certain limited amounts, the losses sustained by the insured in their buildings, ships, and effects. Supposing, then, that the insured claims directly against an office in case of fire where a remedy remains over against a third person, to what is the insurer subrogated? There may, we should here observe, be a remedy against a hundred, or against a neighbour in whose house the fire was negligently allowed to originate. Now we find it stated at page 165 of Mr. Bunyon's work on The Law of Fire Insurance that "in all those cases where the insured have a primary right against third parties, who have been the authors of the injury either through negligence or more culpable misconduct not amounting to felony, the insurers, on making good the loss, are intitled to enforce the remedy of the assured, and in their name to recoup themselves for their expenditure. The contract of insurance is treated as an indemnity and the insurer as a surety who is entitled to all the remedies and securities of the assured and to stand in his place choose to enforce the claim against the insurers If they (the assured) in the first instance, the latter are entitled to use the name of the assured in an action to recover back the money which they have paid." Then the question comes, What must be paid In a case between neighbours of course proof must be given of the actual damage, and it is open to doubt whether an estimated value agreed upon between the person aggrieved and an insurance company could bind the third person who is asked to pay for the damage. Or if it could, the amount fixed could only be regarded as the measure of liability: (Irving v. Manning, 6 C. B. 39 and other cases.) That is to say, it is to be taken as the outside value but liable to be reduced upon proof being obtainable to show that at the time of the fire the goods | were not of the value stated in the policy. As put in Wright v. Pole, 1 A. & E. 621, the actual cost or value of the property destroyed must be the limit of the claim of the assured. That was a case in which an insurance had been effected upon the Ship Inn and offices, and the assured claimed loss of profits consequential upon the stoppage of their business during the reinstatement. It was held that such a claim could not be sustained. This was decided on the principle that insurers cannot be involved in the fluctuation of profits except by an express provision in the policy. Analogous cases will suggest themselves to the minds of our readers, but they are not important to be considered. That which it is desirable to remember is that it is advisable to avoid the complication of subrogation where possible, and that where this cannot be done the position and remedies of the party subrogated should be distinctly defined. THE RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEES TO TITLE DEEDS. ONE of the most important doctrines of which the law knows anything is that which says that innocent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice shall hold their acquired estate free of all other legal and equitable claims; "the principle of the plea" as Mr. Fisher says (Law of Mortgage, p. 635), "being simply that it is contrary to equity to disturb the title of one who has honestly and bona fide paid his money for the purchase of any estate or interest." But it is observable, and this is our present point, that Lord Cottenham in Frazer v. Jones, 17 L. J., N. S., 353, Ch., hinted that there might be a difference between cases in which the person setting up the defence had only contracted for an equitable title, and those in which the grantor assumed that he was in possession of, and purported to convey, the legal title: (Wallwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 24.) The case which has drawn our attention to this matter is that of Newton v Newton, before the Lords Justices, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 588, Ch., where there arose a dispute as to the right to certain title-deeds. The sole trustee of a fund in settlement for the benefit of the plaintiff, sold the fund, and invested the proceeds in a mortgage to himself of real estate. He then deposited the mortgage and the other title-deeds with defendants to secure a loan to himself, but gave them no notice of the trust. Under these circumstances it was held, that as the plaintiffs had priority over the defendants, being, in fact, entitled to the whole beneficial interest in the estate, the decree had properly ordered that the title-deeds should be delivered up to them. This was the question in effect of Joyce v. De Moleyns, 2 Jo. & Lat. 374, namely, whether, assuming that the person entitled to the prior charge is entitled to a declaration to that effect, he is entitled to have the deeds delivered up to him which were deposited with the second incumbrancer or otherwise, or in what manner the equity of the first incumbrancer is to be worked out. The first judgment in Newton's case was delivered by the Master of the Rolls, and his Lordship said: "In my opinion, after consulting the various authorities upon the subject, the way in which it is to be worked out is exactly the same as if the subsequent incumbrancer had taken the charge with full knowledge of the prior one; and, consequently, it depends upon whether a person creating the charge, or attempting to create the charge, in favour of the subsequent claimant, had any interest whatever in the subject-matter which he proposed to charge. If he had, then the person in whose favour he has created this latter incumbrance, and who has got possession of the title-deeds belonging to the estate, may hold them until he is redeemed or foreclosed, and in such case the court will not go into the question of the greater or lesser amount of the prior charge; but if he had a beneficial interest in the property, or a right to redeem it, that is sufficient to give the last incumbrancer a right to hold the deeds. But this is not so if the person proposing to create the charge had no interest whatever in the subject-matter which he proposed to charge." He put a case of an equitable owner of an estate who creates a first charge on it in favour of A., and afterwards one in favour of B., and afterwards one in favour of C,, to whom he delivers up the custody of the title-deeds. Then C. cannot be compelled to deliver up the title-deeds until he is foreclosed or redeemed, because there is a possibility of interest in the estate remaining in him after payment of the prior charges of A. and B. In Newton's case the claimants of the deeds were cestuis que trust and the mortgage was a trust mortgage. Tortgagor was a trustee, and had no interest in the property except as trustee of the settlement. It was assumed that the mortgagees had an equitable incumbrance upon the property, and therefore a title to hold the deeds. This Lord Romilly pointed out as a defect in the reasoning. He held that they had no incumbrance at all. And then comes the question of the nature of title-deeds, and his Lordship says: "I think that there is no interest in the parchment as distinct from the land to which it relates, and although I do not doubt that in some cases, as I have already stated, a person may hold deeds relating to a property where (having regard to comparative value of the property charged, and the prior charges on it), his charge and his interest are merely nominal, yet in that case he has a scintilla of interest which entitles him to hold the deeds; but when he has no charge at all, then he is not at liberty to hold the deeds against the rightful owner of the property." The Lords Justices agreed with the Master of the Rolls in his law, although differing as to their view of the facts. The importance of ascertaining the exact nature of a mortgagee's interest is quite clear when it is remembered that a mortgagee may lose his priority if he give up, without good reason, the possession of the title-deeds. EQUITY JURISDICTION IN DIVORCE. Ir is rarely that we hear of applications to a court of equity to restrain proceedings in the Divorce Court. But it is not difficult to imagine cases in which the jurisdiction may be called into operation. An example of the most prominent kind is afforded us in Brown v. Brown, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 596. That was a case in which a husband had been induced, by the solemn assurance of his wife that within a specified period she had been faithful to him, to enter into a deed of separation. This assurance was not founded on truth, the wife having had a miscarriage within the period referred to. Upon discovering this fact the husband applied to the Divorce Court for a dissolution of the marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery. She thereupon applied to the Court of Chancery to restrain the proceedings in the Divorce Court, because the deed of separation by its terms was a barrier thereto. One of these terms was to the effect that " no proceedings shall be commenced or prosecuted by or on behalf of either party against the other with respect to any cause of complaint that now exists or has arisen before the date of these presents, and every offence (if any) which has been committed or permitted by either party against the other shall be considered as, and the same is hereby, forgiven and condoned. And in case either party shall hereafter commence or prosecute any proceedings against the other in respect of any cause of complaint which may hereafter arise, no offence or misconduct which has been committed or permitted before the execution of these presents, and no act, deed, neglect, or default of either party, in relation to any offence or misconduct, shall be pleaded or alleged by either party or be admissible in evidence." The question was whether the husband should be allowed to pursue his remedy in the Divorce Court notwithstanding this deed, and the Vice-Chancellor (Malins) decided that as the execution of the deed by the husband was obtained by the fraudulent misrepresentation of the wife, it was void and could not be enforced by the granting of the injunction prayed for. The cases referred to in support of the conclusion that the court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction by granting the injunction, were Hunt v. Hunt and Rowley v. Rowley. The former is reported in 5 L. T. Rep. N.S. 412, and on appeal, 778, and the application there was to restrain the breach of a covenant not to sue for restitution of conjugal rights. The Master of the Rolls had refused the injunction, but on appeal it was granted. But a glance at the judgment in that case will show that it is not directly analogous to Brown v. Brown. The validity of the deed was not disputed in the one case, whilst fraud was alleged against it in the other. In the one case it was hoped that the policy of the law in discouraging separation of husband and wife would override a covenant not to sue for restitution although founded on a good legal consideration. In the other it was a question between se paration and divorce, and there was the element of fraud affecting the execution of the deed. But the principle laid down in Hunt v. Hunt is fully recognised in Brown v. Brown. The Lord Chancellor, in the former, says, "If the covenant of the husband not to sue for restitution, which is a release of the right to compel cohabitation, be founded upon a valuable consideration, an action can be maintained upon it as upon any other legal covenant. A court of equity, in regarding these covenants cannot take a higher or different ground; it is, in this respect, bound to follow the law, and the remark that a court of equity in enforcing the covenant, would be taking on itself the jurisdiction of the Court of Divorce is no more applicable to this court when granting its injunction, than it would be to a court of law when supporting an action on the covenant." A covenant in a deed of separation is to be enforced or restrained in a court of equity according to its validity in a court of law. The Vice-Chancellor says, in Brown v. Brown, "Assuming that I have jurisdiction, I confess i can see no more propriety in making an order in the present case than if, there being a release of a debt, proceedings were taken at law to recover it, and those proceedings were sought to be restrained; you could not come here to restrain it; the release can be pleaded to the action." It will be seen from this extract that the Vice Chancelior thinks that a court of equity ought not to be appealed to. And he refers to a statement which he has heard with reference to Hunt v. Hunt. He says "whatever private opinion I might have, I must, of course, take the law from the Lord Chancellor. But I am told that the matter was taken to the House of Lords on appeal, but no judgment was given by reason of the death of Mrs. Hunt. Of course I cannot tell what the House of Lords would have done, although it is stated that the decision of the Lord Chancellor might probably have been overruled." And the effect of the reversal of the Lord Chancellor's judgment would have been the confirmation of the judgment of the Master of the Rolls. The material part of this latter judgment is this:-"In all cases of injunction to restrain the proceedings of individuals in other courts it is a first principle that the injunction granted by this court is not, and never is intended to be, an interference with the jurisdiction of any other court. The injunction operates only in personam with a view of compelling the individual to a strict observance of the agreement, contract, or covenant into which he may have entered, and, so far there is no distinction between suits of divorce or suits of a testamentary character. As for instance where a party has agreed not to move for the withdrawal of probate of a will, then, if an injunction is issued by a court of equity it is not intended to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court of Probate, but only to compel the party to perform his agreement. It is upon the like principle that a court of equity acts, when it restrains a person by injunction from filing a bill in Chancery, or proceeding to obtain a private Act of Parliament, although indeed it would not interfere with any application that the party may make to members of the Legislature, or other the personal influence which he may exert to induce Parliament to pass a public Act for effectuating the object he may have in view. So also in cases like the present, this court will not take upon itself the jurisdiction of the Divorce Court. It is clear, therefore, that a court of equity will not interpose in cases between husband and wife, simpliciter; will not assume to itself any power to determine questions relating to the propriety or impropriety of the husband and wife cohabiting together, or of their being separated or divorced. No decision upon the conduct of the parties themselves can be pronounced by this court, for all such matters are within the province of the Divorce Court. If then, this court were to restrain a husband who has entered into a covenant such as we have here, from instituting a suit for the restitution of his conjugal rights, it must do so on the assumption that the covenant is, in the opinion of the court of equity, a bar to the suit. But the Court of Divorce considers, and in this very case has decided, that in point of law-of the law as administered in this court-such a covenant is not a bar to the suit." It will be seen that if this judgment were upheld it would still be open to a court of equity, in a case in which it could see an element such as fraud lying at the root of the covenant, to interfere by injunction. And we cannot help thinking that it would be a very good thing if Lord Westbury's decision were overruled, and parties thus left to the Divorce Court where there is no peculiar element calling for the interference of equity. In Rowley v. Rowley, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. App. the flouse of Lords showed a disposition to follow the ancient policy of the law, and to encourage the compromise of marriage differences. It was there decided that where a suit is not in derogation of the marriage contract, but, on the contrary, is for the restitution of conjugal rights, the Divorce Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, will disregard all private arrangements; subject, however, to the interposition of the Court of Chancery by injunction "on proper occasions." Vice-Chancellor Malins, in Brown v. Brown, states in what cases he thinks a court of equity ought to interfere with courts of law, referring particularly to Berkeley v. Dicker, where he refused to interfere, believing that the Court of Bankruptcy could do equity between the parties: (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 556.) He also referred to Dempster v. Dempster, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 433. There being the element of fraud in Brown v. Brown, the Vice-Chancellor was enabled to escape from the difficulty of directly conflicting with Lord Westbury's decision. He refused the motion mainly on the ground that the wife did not come before him with clean hands, and on the ground also that the deed could be set up in the Divorce Court as a defence. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST. A NEW question relating to the privilege from arrest of parties going to and coming from a court of justice has been raised before the Court of Exchequer. The well known general rule is that barristers, attorneys, parties, and witnesses are privileged while attending the courts, eundo manendo, et redeundo. Nothing is said in any statement of this rule about persons criminally arraigned and admitted to bail on remand; and the new question is, whether a person charged before a magistrate and so admitted to bail on remand can be considered to be within the meaning of the rule. At page 781 of Chitty's Practice the courts attendance in which confers the privilege are these: the Bankruptcy Court, all inferior courts of law, such as the sessions, County Courts, &c., the Court of the Sheriff and of the Judge Advocate, the court of an arbitrator, whether under a compulsory reference or upon a submission. In the case before the Exchequer the defendant, Samuel Benjamin, was the first person charged under Mr. Russell Gurney's Act with felony, in misappropriating partnership funds. The magistrate at Worship-street, Mr. Ellison, remanded him for a few days on bail, and on his way from the court he was arrested under a ca. sa., upon a judgment obtained in the Court of Exchequer in an action for debt. Counsel moved, upon affidavits, for a rule to discharge him from custody on the ground that he was privileged from arrest. The Lord Chief Baron, after taking time to consider his judgment, decided, with the concurrence of his brother judges, that the defendant was entitled to his relief. Looking at the question, he said, apart from the doctrine of contempt of court, with which it was not necessarily conneeted, it had to be reviewed in respect, first, to the administration of justice; and, secondly, to the party who claimed the privilege. With regard to the administration of justice the privilege extended to prosecutors, witnesses, and jurors, both in civil and criminal cases, when going to the court, while they remained in court, and on their return home. Why, then, should an exception be introduced in the case of an accused person remanded on bail, and who was under the same obligation to appear on the day of remand? He saw no reason for such an exception and such an anomaly in the law. There was certainly no authority directly affirming that the privilege applied to a party accused of a crime on going to or returning from a court, whether to take his trial, or undergo a preliminary investigation; but the argument that it did apply to him was supported by the principle of numerous decisions, and by solemn and important considerations and irrefragable reasons connected with the administration of justice. It had been held, no doubt, by Lord Campbell, that a person tried for a criminal offence and acquitted was not privileged from arrest under a civil process on returning home, but the courts in Ireland had taken a different view of the law. It was, however, not for this court to say which of those decisions was in conformity with law, as the party in this instance had not been acquitted. This judgment establishes a reasonable and important principle. Imprisonment for debt is of doubtfuul expediency, and it certainly ought not to be allowed to interfere with the liberty of a person bailed on a criminal charge, and who has to prepare a defence. We do not see that the court could have come to any other conclusion. ARBITRATION UNDER THE LANDS CLAUSES ACT. had before them a case which discloses an arbitration. THE Court of Queen's Bench have recently mission in the Lands Clauses Act as regards By that act provision is made for the disposal of superfluous lands of the company, sect. 128 enacting that, before the promoters of the undertaking dispose of such superfluous lands, they shall, unless such lands be situate within a town, or be lands built upon or used for building purposes, first offer to sell the same to the person then entitled to the lands (if any) from which the same were originally severed; or if such person refuse to purchase the same, or cannot after diligent inquiry be found, then the like offer shall be made to the person, or to the several persons, whose lands shall immediately adjoin the lands so proposed to be sold, &c. The 130th section enacts as follows:-"If any person entitled to such pre-emption be desirous of purchasing any such lands, and such person agree as to the price thereof, then such price shall be ascertained by arbitration, and the costs of such arbitration shall be in the discretion of the arbitrator." By an earlier series of sections under the heading "and with respect to the purchase and taking of lands otherwise than by agreement," provisions are enacted for the compulsory purchase and sale of lands for the purpose of the undertaking; and a course of proceeding is directed where the parties cannot agree upon the price of compensation. and the promoters of the undertaking do not arbitrator. Sect. 34 enacts that "all costs of Sect. 25 provides for the appointment of an any such arbitration and incident thereto, to be settled by arbitrators, shall be borne by the proshall award the same or a less sum than shall moters of the undertaking, unless the arbitrators have been offered by the promoters of the undertaking, in which case each party shall bear his own costs incident to the arbitration, and the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the parties in equal proportions." Sect. 35 enacts that "the arbitrators shall deliver their award in writing to the promoters of the undertaking, and the said promoters shall retain the same, and shall forthwith on demand, at their own expense, furnish a copy thereof to the other party to the arbitration, and shall at all times on demand produce the said award and allow the same to be inspected or examined by such party, or any person appointed by him for that purpose.' The question in Jones v. The South Staffordshire Railway Company (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 603) was whether the court under these sections could issue a writ of mandamus to compel the company to take up the award of an arbitrator who had, by means of a reference, ascertained the price of certain superfluous lands of the company which the plaintiff wished to buy. The court recognised the fact that the Act in all its sections points to compensation to be paid by railway companies to persons whose land they take, and considering the question one of great doubt refused the writ. The simple result is, that the arbitration clauses of the Consolidation Act are unavailable for the purpose of ascertaining the price to be paid to a company for its superfluous lands consequently, it is vain to appoint an arbitrator for such a purpose. His appointment must be invalid and his award bad. It was suggested by one of the judges that the plaintiff might take up the award and sue upon it. Sue for what? The plaintiff might go into equity; but even then, there being no statutory powers for the appointment of an arbitrator, the award probably could not be enforced. As the Chief Justice said, this is clearly a casus omissus. ELECTION LAW. LAW AND PRACTICE OF ELECTION PETITIONS. (Continued from page 226.) SCRUTINIES. No petitioner has yet adventured upon a scrutiny. The reasons are obvious. The result is of necessity uncertain, for every vote upon the poll on both sides is open to question; the cost is enormous, and if the election can be avoided, it will be much cheaper to go to a new election than to fight the scrutiny, while the result can scarcely be more doubtful. Hence it is that, when the Judge has determined the election to be void, the inquiry is brought to a close. It is a common remark, even in the Profession, that ceedings. the new mode of trial has shortened the proWe doubt it much, if like be compared with like. All the cases as yet tried have been directed to the unseating of the member on the grounds of bribery and treating, and once only has there been a recriminatory case. Such an inquiry must be limited. One well proved case suffices for the purpose, and when bribery or treating is sufficiently established, the Judge intimates his opinion that, unless it can be answered, he is satisfied, and counsel will not sanction the heaping of case upon case for the mere purpose of accumulating costs, or, which is the more common desire, to gratify local and personal spites and hatreds. But even with all this, if the petitions on the ground of bribery and treating under the new tribunal be compared with similar that these latter did not occupy even so many petitions before the old tribunal, it will be found. days in the trial. Two or three exceptional cases are remembered in which two or even three weeks were occupied in the hearing before a Parliamentary Committee, but these were usually cases of scrutiny; the cases of unseating for bribery were, for the most part, determined It yet remains for in three days at the utmost. money a scrutiny proof what time and will consume. It may be predicted that it will far exceed the present length of trial and not fall short of the like trials under the old surpass them, by reason of the facility provided. regime; indeed, the probability is that it will for sustaining objections, which must have the effect of immensely multiplying them. In preparing for a scrutiny it was the former practice to be chary of objections and to make none without substantial grounds of which some good proof had been procured. The motive for this caution was the cost of proof. It was ruinous work to send two or three witnesses to London for a chance shot at an individual vote. But now that the cost of a witness is only a few shillings, the barest chance of cutting off a vote in a closely run scrutiny justifies the objection being made upon a mere suspicion of invalidity. Hence the long lists of objections that have been supplied by the parties in all the cases as yet prepared for trial; tenfold those which would have been presented to a committee. For it is not sufficient for the petitioner to object to so many as will suffice to put him in a majority; he must anticipate, so far as he can, the objections to his poll that will be made by the respondent, and swell his own list to a number that would secure his majority after the respondent has decimated his ranks. Where a scrutiny is prayed, the fight is altogether different from that where only a void election is sought for. It is, in fact, a threefold battle. In the latter case there can be no recrimination; the petitioner has no more to do than to prove a good case of bribery or treating against the respondent, and his object is gained. There can be no retort, even though the party of the petitioners were ten times more guilty than the party of the respondent. Advantage can be taken of the misdeeds of the petitione |