Opinion of the Court. 271 U.S. whatever source derived" without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that Amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power. Congress already had power to tax all incomes. But taxes on incomes from some sources had been held to be "direct taxes" within the meaning of the constitutional requirement as to apportionment. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 9, cl. 4; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601. The Amendment relieved from that requirement and obliterated the distinction in that respect between taxes on income that are direct taxes and those that are not, and so put on the same basis all incomes "from whatever source derived." Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 17. "Income " has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 335; Merchants L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 519. After full consideration, this Court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207. And that definition has been adhered to and applied repeatedly. See e. g. Merchants L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, supra, 518; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527, 535; United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 169; Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U. S. 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U. S. 189, 194; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 167; Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U. S. 628, 633. In determining what constitutes income substance rather than form is to be given controlling weight. Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206. 170 Opinion of the Court. The transaction here in question did not result in gain from capital and labor, or from either of them, or in profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital. The essential facts set forth in the complaint are the loans in 1911, 1912, and 1913, the loss in 1913 to 1918 of the moneys borrowed, the excess of such losses over income by more than the item here in controversy, and payment in the equivalent of marks greatly depreciated in value. The result of the whole transaction was a loss. Plaintiff in error insists that in substance and effect the transaction was a "short sale" of marks resulting in gain to defendant in error. But there is no similarity between what was done and such a venture. A short seller borrows what he sells, and the purchase price goes to the lender and is retained as security for repayment. The seller receives nothing until he repays the loan. Such a transaction would not meet the requirements of defendant in error. It needed the money for use and received the amount borrowed and expended it. The contention that the item in question is cash gain disregards the fact that the borrowed money was lost, and that the excess of such loss over income was more than the amount borrowed. When the loans were made and notes given, the assets and liabilities of defendant in error were increased alike. The loss of the money borrowed wiped out the increase of assets, but the liability remained. The assets were further diminished by payment of the debt. The loss was less than it would have been if marks had not declined in value; but the mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit or income. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS concurs in the result. TAYLOR, TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. VOSS, TRUSTEE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 199. Argued March 8, 9, 1926.-Decided May 3, 1926. 1. The "controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings" referred to in § 24a of the Bankruptcy Act, include those matters arising in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding, which are not mere steps in the ordinary administration of the bankrupt estate, but present, by intervention or otherwise, distinct and separable issues between the trustee and adverse claimants concerning the right and title to the bankrupt's estate. P. 180. 2. In such "controversies" the decrees of the court of bankruptcy may be reviewed by appeals which bring up the whole matter and open both the facts and the law for consideration. P. 181. 3. The "proceedings" in bankruptcy referred to in § 24b are those matters of an administrative character, including questions between the bankrupt and his creditors, which are presented in the ordinary course of the administration of the bankrupt's estate. In such administrative matters-as to which the courts of bankruptcy proceed in a summary way in the final settlement and distribution of the estate their orders and decrees may be reviewed by petitions for revision which bring up questions of law only. P. 181. 4. The essential distinction between the different methods provided for reviewing the orders and decrees of the courts of bankruptcy is, that "controversies" in bankruptcy proceedings, arising between the trustee representing the bankrupt and his creditors, on the one side, and adverse claimants on the other, affecting the extent of the estate to be distributed, may be reviewed both as to fact and law; while "proceedings" in bankruptcy affecting merely the administration and distribution of the estate, may be reviewed in matter of law only, except as to the three classes of such "proceedings" enumerated in § 25a, as to which a short right of appeal is given, both as to fact and law. P. 181. 5. Although a petition for revision cannot be treated as an appeal for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the review so as to extend to questions of fact, where a matter which is only reviewable in law is taken up by an appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals, if the question of law is sufficiently presented on the record, may treat the appeal as a petition for revision and dispose of it accordingly. P. 182. 6. A petition filed by the trustee, in the bankruptcy proceeding, todetermine an adverse claim to an interest in the bankrupt's real estate, based on the statutory rights of his wife, is a "controversy which may be reviewed by appeal under § 24a of the Bankruptcy Act. P. 182. 7. Section 4 of the Jurisdictional Act, of 1916, providing that no appellate court "shall dismiss a writ of error solely because an appeal should have been taken, or dismiss an appeal solely because a writ of error should have been sued out," can not be extended by implication to the special provisions of the Bankruptcy Act as to appeals and petitions for revision. P. 182. 8. In a "controversy" in a bankruptcy proceeding, when the facts are undisputed or no longer in question, it is not necessary to resort to an appeal under § 24a, but the controlling questions of law may also be reviewed by a petition for revision under § 24b, whether they relate merely to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or to the merits of the controversy. P. 182. 9. Such a review by petition for revision, is a concurrent remedy merely, and cannot, irrespective of any other limitation, be deemed an additional remedy which may be resorted to after the time for an appeal has expired. P. 187. 10. The right of inheritance, free from demands of creditors, granted by Indiana Rev. Stats. (1881), §§ 2483, 2491, to a widow upon the death of her husband, remains contingent during his life and can not be held to mature at his bankruptcy upon the theory that the adjudication brings about his "civil death." P. 187. 11. The adjudication of a husband as a bankrupt, followed by appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy, operates as a "judicial sale of his real estate within the meaning of the Indiana Judicial Sales Act, (Rev. Stats. 1887, §§ 2508, 2509,) in virtue of which the wife's inchoate interest in his real estate (not exceeding $20,000) thereupon becomes absolute and free from the demands of creditors as, and to the extent, provided by §§ 2483-2491 in case of his death. P. 188. 1 Fed. (2d) 149, reversed. CERTIORARI to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed, on a petition to revise, an order of the District Court sustaining the claim of Taylor, as testamentary trustee of a bankrupt's deceased wife, to an Opinion of the Court. 271 U.S. interest in her husband's real estate. The controversy was initiated by a petition filed in the bankruptcy proceedings by the trustee in bankruptcy, Voss. Mr. Daniel H. Ortmeyer, with whom Mr. Harold Taylor was on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. Henry B. Walker, with whom Mr. James T. Walker was on the brief, for respondent. MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court. In December, 1921, Wilbur Erskine, a married man, residing and owning real estate in Indiana, was adjudged a bankrupt on his voluntary petition in the federal District Court for that State. In February, 1922, the respondent Voss was appointed the trustee in bankruptcy. In March, before any sale of the real estate, the bankrupt's wife, Mary E. Erskine, died testate, leaving by her will her entire property to the petitioner Taylor, as testamentary trustee. In May, the trustee in bankruptcy filed a petition in the bankruptcy proceeding, alleging that the testamentary trustee claimed an interest in the real estate of the bankrupt, and praying that he be required to set up this claim, and that such interest be fixed by the court and the right to sell the real estate free from such claim be declared. The testamentary trustee answered, alleging that upon the adjudication in bankruptcy Mrs. Erskine had become absolutely vested under the state laws and the Bankruptcy Act, with a wife's interest in the real estate of her husband, to which she was entitled at the time of her death; and also praying that the court fix this interest. Pending a hearing as to this claim, the real estate was sold by the trustee in bankruptcy, by consent, for $36,870; under an agreement that not less than one-fifth of the proceeds should be held by |