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power (section 1681, Comp. Stat. supra) spe- ! These rights, however, are under the maxcifically gives the double power to tax and im, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas," subregulate many businesses and occupations, ject to reasonable restraint and regulation but does not specifically mention the vocation as are required to protect the public health, or occupation, the subject of the ordinance safety, morals and general welfare, and this under consideration, but it is claimed to be is the police power; but all such regulacovered by the general clause contained in tions, to be a valid exercise of the police powthe section, viz.:

er, must tend “in some degree towards the "To raise revenue by levying and collecting prevention of offenses, or the preservation a license tax on any business, or calling, or any of the public health, morals, safety, or welcorporation, and regulate the same by ordi- fare. It must be apparent that some such nance.

end is the one actually intended, and that It is evident that the primary object of there is some connection between the provithis clause is to give the power to tax for sions of the law and such purpose.” Tolrevenue occupations and callings, and the liver v. Blizzard, supra, 143 Ky. 773, 137 s. regulation is only incidental to the taxing W. 509, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893, 894, 17 R. power conferred; while it is equally evident C. L. p. 542. “To justify the state in thus that the object of the ordinance is the regu- interposing its authority in behalf of the lation of those following the occupation of public, it must appear, first, that the interlaying concrete or cement sidewalks.

ests of the public generally, as distinguished "The general rule deducible from the adjudica- from those of a particular class, require such tions is that, the power of the municipal cor- interference; and, second, that the means poration to impose a license tax, either as a po- are reasonably necessary for the accomplishlice regulation or for revenue, is made to de ment of the purpose, and not unduly opprespend upon the reasonable construction of the charter provision or the legislative act confer- sive upon individuals. The Legislature may ring the authority; and if it appears that such not, under the guise of protecting the public power has not been granted in unequivocal interests, arbitrarily interfere with private terms, invoking the rule of strict construction, business, or impose unusual and unnecessary the right to levy the tax will be denied.” McQuillin, Municipal Corp. vol. 3, 8987; also restrictions upon lawful occupations.” LawDillon, Munic. Corp. (5th Ed.) 8 667; 17 R. C. ton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 136, 14 Sup. Ct. 500, L. p. 525.

38 L. Ed. 385. “It is not sufficient that the

public sustains harm from a certain trade [1] The right to follow any of the common

or employment as it is conducted by some occupations of life or to earn one's living in engaged in it. Because many men engaged any innocent vocation without let or hin- in the calling persist in so conducting the drance is one of those inalienable rights cov- business that the public suffers and their ered by the statements in the Declaration acts cannot otherwise be effectually controlof Independence and secured to all those liv- led is no justification for a law which proing under our form of government by the hibits an honest man from conducting the liberty, property, and happiness clauses of business in such a manner as not to inflict the national and state Constitutions. 6 R.

injury upon the public.” Tolliver v. Blizzard, C. L. p. 266, and cases cited; Butchers' Union Slaughter House Co. v. Crescent City may be sustained as an exercise of the police

supra. "In order that a statute or ordinance Live Stock Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, power, the courts must be able to see that 28 L. Ed. 585; Tolliver v. Blizzard, 143 Ky. the enactment has for its object the preven773, 137 S. W. 509, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890; tion of some offense or manifest evil or the Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215, preservation of the public health, safety, 56 L. R. A. 558; 12 C. J. 921, and cases cited morals, or general welfare, that there is in notes; Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 213

some clear, real, and substantial connection Mass. 138, 99 N. E. 55, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1080. In the case of Butchers' Union Slaugh- ment and the actual provisions thereof."

between the assumed purpose of the enactter House Co. v. Crescent City Live Stock Co., 12 C. J. 929; In Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. supra, Justice Field, on page 757 of 111 U.

98, 50 Am. Rep. 636. S., on page 661 of 4 Sup. Ct., 28 L. Ed. 585,

The police power has been termed the “law said:

of overwhelming necessity.” Dunne y. Peo"It has been well said that, 'The property ple, 94 Ill. 120, 34 Am. Rep. 213. And even which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so

where the matter under consideration has it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patri- been held a proper subject for regulation, mony of the poor man lies in the strength and all regulations must be reasonable and only dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what go so far as are reasonably necessary to inanner be thinks proper, without injury to his effect the legitimate object of the public proneighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred tection sought. 12 C. J. 934. "There must property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of be reasonable ground for the police interthose who might be disposed to employ him. As ference and also the means adopted must it hinders the one from working at what he be reasonably necessary for the accomplishthinks proper, so it hinders the others from embloying whom they think proper.' Adam

ment of the purpose in view. So in all cases Smith's Wealth of Nations, bk. I, c. 10." where the interference affects property and

goes beyond what is reasonable by way of struct or remove any sidewalk without first interfering with private rights, it offends obtaining a permit from the city engineer, against the general equality clause of the and prescribes that the permit shall be filed Constitution; it offends against the spirit with a return thereon showing date of comof the whole instrument.” Bonnett v. Val- pletion of the work; (section 732) that the lier, 136 Wis. 193, 202, 116 N. W. 885, 17 construction of all sidewalks and curb of L. R. A. (N. S.) 486, 491, 128 Am. St. Rep. artificial stone shall be constructed under 1061. "A municipality has power to enact the supervision of the city engineer or his reasonable ordinances only, and that the inspector, and shall at all times be subject court will annul ordinances which are un- to the inspection of the city engineer or his reasonable, illegal, or repugnant to law is inspector; (section 720) that all sidewalks a doctrine uniformly sustained. Jones v. hereafter constructed, reconstructed, or placSanford, 66 Me. 585; State v. Robb, 100 ed within the city of Sheridan shall be of Me. 180, 4 Ann. Cas. 275, 60 Atl. 874.” State granite, cement, concrete, asphaltum, vitriv. Starkey, 112 Me. 8, 90 Atl. 431, Ann. Cas.fied brick or some other hard and incombus1917A, 196, 198. "A statute passed pursuant tible material with stone or cement curb not to the police power should be reasonable. less than five inches thick, and that all ce Its real purpose must be to protect the pub-ment or concrete sidewalks shall be construct. lic health, morals or general welfare. A ed in accordance with the specifications and statute cannot, under the guise of the police rules in relation thereto prepared by the city power, but really to effect some purpose not engineer, and approved by the city council, within such power, arbitrarily interfere with and making it unlawful to construct any a person or a property right. The statute such sidewalk in any other manner than in under consideration unnecessarily interferes accordance with such specifications or rules, in several particulars with that liberty of and also making it unlawful to construct any person and property guaranteed by the Con. sidewalk of a different character than constitution.” People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, crete or cement, except in accordance with 149, 90 N. E. 451, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 528; 18 specifications and rules applicable to such Ann. Cas. 474. And such regulations must construction prepared by the city engineer not be such as to discriminate between per- and approved by the city council. sons engaged in the same or like vocations [6] It is seen that the power of the city or they will be void as "class legislation.” to designate the materials, manner of conPeople v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74, 110 N. E. 870, struction, and inspection thereof has been L. R. A. 1916C, 768, 779, Ann. Cas. 1917C, exercised and provided for in ordinances 1065; 28 Cyc. 370, 390.

that do not provide for a license fee and bond [2-5] Viewing the ordinance in question and cover sidewalks of all kinds of materials in the light of the above principles, we are that are permitted to be used. The right of constrained to hold that it is unconstitu- the relator to follow the business of laying tional and void because: First, that the concrete sidewalks and make his living that vocation of cement contractor is not a proper way cannot be disputed, and unless it can subject of police adegulation not affecting be shown that this work affects the public either the health, morals, safety, or welfare health, morals, safety, or welfare, the state of the public generally so as to be a neces- would have no power to restrict or prohibit sary subject of regulation; second, that no it, and no power to delegate such power to express power to regulate this vocation is a municipality. But the Legislature has not conferred upon the city, and none can neces- attempted to grant such power. We are not sarily be implied from the powers granted; referred to any statute that gives the power third, that, were the power given, the regu- to regulate the vocation of laying cement lations required are unreasonable, especially sidewalks, nor to any from which that power in requiring a naintenance bond to run five by necessary implication can be inferred. years; fourth, that the ordinance is discrim- In the case of Gray v. Omaha, supra, it was inatory and class legislation in that it re- decided that the ordinance was void because quires a fee and bond from one laying concrete the right was not granted to regulate, and or cement sidewalks and requires neither it is said (14 L. R. A. p. 1034): from those laying sidewalks composed of

"The power to pass a city ordinance must be asphalt, granite, vitrified brick or any other vested in the governing body by the Legislature hard and incombustible material. As said in express terms, or be necessarily or fairly

implied in and incident to the powers expressly in Gray v. Omaha, supra:

granted, and must be essential to the declared “It should not be sustained, unless vitally nec- purpose of the corporation; not simply conessary to the exercise by the city of the power venient, but indispensable. Dill. Mun. Corp. to designate the material and manner of con- (1st Ed.) 8 55; Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. struction of its walks. No adequate reason why 176, 2 L. R. A. 110, 10 Am. St. Rep. 175, 19 it is essential to the exercise of this power is Pac. 719. Powers encroaching upon the rights pointed out in the argument of the defendant; of the public or of individuals must be plainly and we have been unable to conceive one." and literally conferred by the charter.

State,

Breninger, Prosecutor, v. Belvidere, 44 N. J. The other ordinances of the city of Sheri- Law, 350. The power to license must be plaindan introduced in evidence provide (section Dill. Mun. Corp. (1st Ed.) § 295; Dunham y.

ly conferred, or it will not be held to exist.

v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.] 562, 48 Am. Dec., bar, was the case of Gray y. Omaha, supra, 679; Mays v. Cincinnati, i Ohio St. 268; St. and in that case it is said: Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn, 248, 33 Am. Rep. 462.”

"The only question involved is the right of But it might as well have been held in the city to compel the plaintiff to comply with

the requirements of the ordinance as a condiaddition that it was not within the police tion of following his vocation. We think the power of the state to grant such a power. restrictions imposed by the ordinance are not

Counsel for the defendant city in his brief only unreasonably oppressive, but unnecessary criticizes this Omaha case, and infers that terial and manner of construction of such walks.

to the exercise of the power to designate the mathe city of Omaha had no power to license Its provisions must prove onerous to the indioccupations either by way of raising revenue vidual of slender means engaged in the vocation or police power regulations. The charter sought to be regulated. He is required to pay

a fee of $10 for each year or fraction of a year, provisions governing the city of Omaha in

a not inconsiderable tax upon a small business. this matter are found in Cobbey's Annotated In addition to this he is required to give an„Statutes of Nebraska 1907, vol. 2, § 7678, mually a bond, upon which his sureties will be contained in chapter 37, under the heading continues in business for that period of time,

liable for a period of five years, so that, if he "Municipal Corporations," "Omaha Charter," he will be compelled to furnish five distinct which is as follows:

bonds, representing an aggregate liability of

$10,000, which is obviously impracticable, un“The mayor and council shall have power to less the applicant be of substantial means and tax for revenue, license and regulate pawn established credit.” brokers, peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, liquor dealers, toll-bridges, ferries, in

In the Omaha ordinance the license fee surance, telegraph, and express companies and was $10, and the bond was $2,000, instead vendors of patents; such tax may include both of $15 and $1,000, respectively, in the Sheria tax for revenue and license. The mayor and city council shall have power to raise revenue

dan ordinance. This ordinance under conby levying and collecting a tax on any occupa-sideration has the effect of preventing the tion or business within the limits of the city and following of his usual vocation by the relatregulate the same by ordinance. All such taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class upon or and others situated like him as regards which they are imposed: Provided that all scien- the possession of property. It was shown by tific and literary lectures and entertainments the evidence that the relator could not get a shall be exempt from taxation as well as con- bond from a surety company because he was certs and all other musical entertainments given exclusively by the citizens of the city. It shall not possessed of sufficient property real and be the duty of the city clerk to deliver to the personal, and although the ordinance does city treasurer the certified copy of the ordi- not require a surety company bond the evinance levying such tax and the city clerk shall dence discloses that the officers of the city append thereto a warrant requiring the city informed the relator that they preferred treasurer to collect said tax."

that kind of a bond to a personal one. And The power therein given is certainly as it can well be seen that the difficulty in sebroad as the provisions of the Wyoming sec- curing a surety bond because of the lack tion 1681, supra.

of property to some considerable extent The requiremeift of a maintenance bond would operate against obtaining a proper of $1,000 to guarantee all work for a period personal bond to guarantee the good condiof 5 years is certainly an unreasonable reg- tion of a sidewalk for five years, perhaps ulation and restriction upon those engaged after the principal had ceased to reside in in the vocation of mixing and laying cement the city. sidewalks, and is not necessary for the safe- It is clearly class legislation. The ordi. ty or welfare of the public. Counsel for the nance of the city permits sidewalks to be city state that “the requirement of a bond constructed of asphalt, granite, vitrified in connection with a license is a usual, cus- brick, and other hard and incombustible matomary, and reasonable one." We cannot terial, but requires no license or bond from agree with this statement, and the cases re- those laying such sidewalks. While it is ferred to by counsel are few, and all or near- established from uniform authority that ly all the cases cited under this statement in reasonable and necessary classification is his brief were for a bond conditioned on the permitted without violation of constitutionpayment of a license tax or in licensing non- al provisions, "the classification must be useful businesses, running pool halls and the reasonable in view of the object sought to like, conditioned on obeying the city ordi- be accomplished. The discrimination must nances, regulations, hours, forbidding minors rest upon some reasonable ground of differto frequent such places and the like, and in ence between the persons or things included several of these cases referred to the bond and those excluded, having regard to the was declared void beyond the term of the purpose of the legislation, and within the license. In fact the requirement of a bond sphere of its operation, the statute must afguaranteeing work for five years is so un- fect all persons similarly situated.” State v. usual a regulation accompanying a license Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 176, 105 Pac, 299, 27 of occupations under an alleged police power L. R. A. (N. S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819. that the only case that has come to our notice and the uniform rule is stated by this court where it was attempted, beside the case at in the opinion by Justice Beard in the case

of State v. Le Barron, 24 Wyo. 519, on page 147 Cal. 763, 82 Pac. 429, 2 I. R. A. (N. S.) 526, 162 Pac. 265, on page 266:

588, 3 Ann. Cas. 878; Vitrified Brick & Tile "As to classifications which are permitted and Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. $48, 66 L. which do not violate constitutional provisions it R. A, 185, 1 Ann. Cas. 936, 937. In the last is the uniform rule that the reason for the above cited case the court said: classification must inhere in the subject-matter, and must be natural and substantial, and must “The right to follow any lawful vocation and be one suggested by necessity, by such difference to make contracts is as completely within the in the situation and circumstances of the sub-protection of the Constitution as the right to jects as to suggest the necessity or propriety of hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or different legislation with respect to them. 6 the liberty to go when and where one will. One R. C. L. § 374. Or, as well stated in State ex of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. rel. Richards v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435: "The The right, therefore, to contract cannot be intrue principle requires something more than a fringed by the Legislature without violating the mere designation by such characteristics as will letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every serve to classify, for the characteristics which citizen is protected in his right to work whero thus serve as a basis of classification must be and for whom he will." of such a nature as to mark the objects so des

[8] Counsel for plaintiff in error comignated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legisJation. There must be substantial distinction, plains of that portion of the judgment of the having a reference to the subject matter of the court below which taxes costs against the proposed legislation, between the objects or relator, and quotes section 4647 of Comp. places embraced in such legislation and the ab- Stat. Wyo. 1910, which provides that in othjects or places excluded. The marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must er actions than those specifically mentioned be such, in the nature of things, as will, in some in the preceding section the costs may be reasonable degree, at least, account for, or, jus: equitably taxed in the discretion of the tify the restriction of the legislation. That

court. Counsel must have overlooked secprinciple is fully sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States (Con- tion 5068, which is contained in chapter 324, nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, under the title “Mandamus,” and reads as 22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679), where the deci

follows: sions are cited and reviewed."

"If judgment be given for the defendant, all No reason why sidewalks constructed of costs shall be adjudged against the relator." asphalt or other hard and incombustible ma This is a mandatory provision as to costs terial are not as liable to deteriorate or in mandamus cases, and the court having crumble within five years as one laid of found the ordinance void, there could be no cement or concrete has been pointed out to right to the writ or 'the relief prayed for, us, and we do not conceive any, and imper- and the judgment had to be for the defendfections in one kind would be as dangerous ant. Under these conditions and this statto the public as another. This ordinance is ute the court had no discretion to tax the not an attempt to regulate a vocation as costs except against the relator. such, and therefore does not pretend that For the foregoing reasons, the findings the vocation is one so connected with the and judgment of the lower court must be afhealth, safety, and general welfare of the firmed. public as requires restriction and regulation. Affirmed, A cement contractor is not prevented under its provisions, without a license, from mix

POTTER, C. J., and BEARD, J., concur. ing and laying cement and concrete either on walks or for other purposes on private

(25 Wyo. 367) property or any other place except on side- INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. OF walks on the streets.

AMERICA V. JACKSON LUMBER [7] There is still another reason why this

CO. et al. (No. 872.) ordinance is void. It interferes with the (Supreme Court of Wyoming. Jan. 21, 1918.) free right to contract. The statutes and the 1. STATUTES C 188 — CONSTRUCTION ABother ordinances of the city of Sheridan re SENCE OF AMBIGUITY. quire the property owner to either construct Even in the absence of the statute fixing or pay the cost of the construction or re- rule of construction, if the language employed pair of the sidewalks adjoining his proper- room for construction.

in an act is plain and unambiguous there is no ty, and the evidence shows that the city 2. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF Ow37—BILL OF Exauthorities required him to do so. This or CEPTIONS

REDUCTION OF EXCEPTIONS TO dinance by express terms forbids the con

WRITING-STATUTE. tracting by or with any one who has not that the party objecting to the decision must er.

Under Comp. St. 1910, $ 4595, providing procured the license provided by the ordi- cept at the time the decision is made, and that nance, and no license could be issued except time may be given to reduce the exception to to those who could furnish the bond. Thus writing, but not beyond the first day of the next

succeeding term, the exception must be reducthe property owner was required to stand ed to writing at the time, unless further time is the expense of construction and repair while asked and granted. he was prevented from hiring to do the 3. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF 37—BILL OF Exwork the one who, in his judgment, was per

CEPTIONS-PRESENTATION OF EXCEPTION TO

COURT-STATUTE. haps the most competent to do good and last

Under Comp. St. 1910, $ 4598, the time ing work. 12 C. J. 919; Ex parte Drexel, I within which an exception must be presented to

do so.

the court or judge is within the time given the same for allowance. The bill was alfor allowance, and the party excepting has lowed July 10, 1916. The petition in error not an indefinite time, as until the adjournment of the court for the term, within which to

was filed April 4, 1916.

The contention of counsel for plaintiff in 4. APPEAL AND ERROR Cm 859—WRIT OF ER- error is that, as the bill was allowed during

ROR-ERROR APPARENT ON RECORD OR ERROR the term at which the motion for a new trial or FACT, At common law a writ of error might be

was denied, it was within time, and no order had either for error apparent on the record or of the court giving time to reduce the excepfor an error of fact, but not for an error of law tions to writing and to present the same to the not appearing on the record.

court or judge for allowance was necessary. 5. STATUTES 181(1) CONSTRUCTION — IN

The question must be determined by the TENTION OF LAWMAKERS.

It is incumbent on the Supreme Court to proper construction to be placed upon the construe the statutes and laws of the state ac- statutes in force at that time, and which must cording to what it is convinced was the true in control. Those statutory provisions read as tent of the lawmakers.

follows: 6. APPEAL AND ERROR 511(1) - RECORD JUDICIAL Act – ORDER GRANTING TIME TO

Section 4595, Comp. Stat. 1910: PREPARE BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

"The party objecting to the decision must exThe making of an order granting time to cept at the time the decision is made; and prepare a bill of exceptions and to present it for time may be given to reduce the exception to allowance is a judicial act, and, like any other writing, but not beyond the first day of the judicial order, must appear by the record next succeeding term.” brought to the Supreme Court.

Section 4598, Id.: 7. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF 39(2) FILING “When the decision is not entered on the rec

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS AFTER COMMENCEMENT ord, or the grounds of objection do not suffiOF PROCEEDINGS IN ERROR.

ciently appear in the entry, or the exception is The bill of exceptions is not required to be to the opinion of the court on a motion to difiled with the petition in error, and may be al rect a nonsuit, to arrest the testimony from the lowed to be filed thereafter, if within the time jury, or for a new trial for misdirection by the prescribed by the rules for filing briefs.

court to the jury, or because the verdict, or if 8. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF Cm36(3)-RECORD- against the law or the evidence, the party, ex

a jury was waived, the finding of the court, is BILL OF EXCEPTIONS FILED MONTHS AFTER cepting must reduce his exception to writing TRIAL, A bill of exceptions which does not purport thereof in vacation, within the time given for

and present it to the court, or to the judge to have been presented for allowance until allowance. If true, it shall be the duty of the months after the trial was ended by denial of court, if presented 'in open court, or the judge motion for new trial is not properly a part of of the court before whom the cause was tried, the record.

if presented in vacation, to allow and sign it, Error to District Court, Sweetwater Coun- whereupon it shall be filed with the pleadings as ty; John R. Arnold, Judge.

a part of the record, but not spread at large up

on the journal. If the writing is not true the Action by the International Harvester court or the judge in vacation shall correct it, Company of America against the Jackson or suggest the correction to be made and it shall Lumber Company, a copartnership, Victor then be signed as aforesaid.” Smith, and others. To review a judgment for [1] The Legislature has prescribed rules of defendants, plaintiff brings error, and de- construction of statutes. Section 3617, Comp. fendants move to strike the bill of exceptions Stat. 1910: from the record and to dismiss the proceed “The construction of all statutes of this state ings. Bill of exceptions stricken, and pro- shall be by the following rules, unless such ceedings in error dismissed.

construction shall be plainly repugnant to the

intent of the Legislature: 1. Words and phrasT. S. Taliaferro, Jr., and W. A. Muir, both es shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and of Rock Springs, for plaintiff in error. Wal

usual sense, but technical words and phrases

having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in ter B. Dunton and D. A. Reavill, both of law shall be understood according to their techRock Springs, for defendants in error. nical import.”

The rule was considered in Rasmussen v. BEARD, J. This case is before the court Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 Pac. 819, 821 (38 L at this time upon the motion of defendant in R. A. 773), where it was said: error to strike the bill of exceptions from the "If the language employed is plain and unrecord and to dismiss the proceedings in er. ambiguous, there is no room for construction." ror upon the grounds that the bill of excep- (Citing and reviewing authorities.) tions was not presented for allowance within Such also is the rule in the absence of a the time allowed by law, and was not so pre statute on the subject, and has been so sented until after the filing of the petition in repeatedly stated by the courts and text-writerror. The motion for a new trial was denied ers that the citation of authorities would March 31, 1916, to which decision of the dis- seem to be superfluous. It is clearly and contrict court in denying said motion the plain- cisely stated in Lake County v. Rollins, 130 tiff at the time duly objected and excepted; U. S. 662, 670, 9 Sup. Ct. 651, 652 (32 L Ed. but it does not appear, either in the bill or

1060): the certificate of the judge allowing the same, in a statute, a contract, or a constitution, the

"To get at the thought or meaning expressed that time was asked or given within which to first resort, in all cases, is to the natural signifireduce the exceptions to writing and present)cation of the words, in the order of grammatical

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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