ticular religious denomination having, as such, any peculiar mode of entering the marriage relation; but such marriages must be declared, as provided in section seventy-six, and be acknowledged and recorded, as provided in section seventy-seven. Where a marriage is declared as provided in said section seventy-six, the husband must file said declaration with the county recorder within thirty days after such marriage, and upon receiving the same the county recorder must record the same; and if the husband fails to make such declaration and file the same for record, as herein provided, he is liable to the same penalties as any person authorized to solemnize marriages, who fails to make the return of such solemnization as provided by law. 1905-555.

Section

ARTICLE III.

Judicial Determination of Void Marriages.

80. Void marriages.

80. Either party to an incestuous or void marriage may proceed, by action in the superior court, to have the same so declared. 1880-4.

82. Annulling marriages generally 85. Children, annulled marriage. 83. Commencement of action.

84. Illegitimate children.

86. Judgment.

82. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was under the age of legal consent, and such marriage was contracted without the consent of his or her parents or guardian, or person having charge of him or her; unless, after attaining the age of consent, such party for any time freely cohabitated with the other as husband or wife.

2. That the former husband or wife of either party was living, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. 3. That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabit with the other as husband or wife. 4. That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

5. That the consent of either party was obtained by force, unless such party afterwards freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

6. That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the marriage state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable. 1873–187.

83. An action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced within the periods and by the parties, as follows:

1. For causes mentioned in subdivision one: by the party to the marriage who was married under the age of legal consent, within four years after arriving at the age of consent; or by a parent, guardian, or other person having charge of such non-aged male or female, at any time before such married minor has arrived at the age of legal consent.

2. For causes mentioned in subdivision two: by either party during the life of the other, or by such former husband or wife.

3. For causes mentioned in subdivision three: by the party injured, or relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party.

4. For causes mentioned in subdivision four: by the party injured, within four years after the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.

5. For causes mentioned in subdivision five: by the injured party, within four years after the marriage.

6. For causes mentioned in subdivision six: by the injured party, within four years after the marriage. 1873-188.

84. A judgment of nullity of marriage does not affect the legitimacy of children begotten before the judgment. 1905.-555.

85. The court must award the custody of the children of a marriage annulled on the ground of fraud or force to the innocent parent, and may also provide for their education and maintenance out of the property of the guilty party.

86. A judgment of nullity of marriage rendered is conclusive only as against the parties to the action and those claiming under them.

1. By the death of one of the parties: or,

2. By the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction decreeing a divorce of the parties. 1873–189.

91. The effect of a judgment decreeing a divorce, is to restore the parties to the state of unmarried persons. 1873-189.

92. Divorces may be granted for any of the following causes:

1. Adultery.

2. Extreme cruelty.

3. Willful desertion.

4. Willful neglect.

5. Habitual intemperance.

6. Conviction of felony. 1873-189.

93. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife.

94. Extreme cruelty is the wrongful infliction of grievous bodily injury, or grievous mental suffering, upon the other by one party to the marriage. 1905-75.

95. Willful desertion is the voluntary separation of one of the married parties from the other with intent to desert.

96. Persistent refusal to have reasonable matrimonial intercourse as husband and wife, when health or physical condition does not make such refusal reasonably necessary, or the refusal of either party to dwell in the same house with the other party when there is no just cause for such refusal, is desertion.

97. When one party is induced by the stratagem or fraud of the other party to leave the family dwelling place, or to be absent, and during such absence the offending party departs with intent to desert the other, it is desertion by the party committing the stratagem or fraud, and not by the other.

98. Departure or absence of one party from the family dwelling place, caused by cruelty or by threats of bodily harm from which danger would be reasonably apprehended from the other is not desertion by the absent party, but it is desertion by the other party.

99. Separation by consent, with or without the understanding that one of the parties will apply for a divorce, is not desertion.

100. Absence or separation, proper in itself, becomes desertion whenever the intent to desert is fixed during such absence or separation. 1873-189.

101. Consent to separation is a revocable act, and if one of the parties afterwards, in good faith, seeks a reconciliation and restoration, but the other refuses it, such refusal is desertion.

102. If one party deserts the other, and before the expiration of the statutory period required to make the desertion a cause of divorce, returns and offers in good faith to fulfill the marriage contract, and solicits condonation, the desertion is cured. If the other party refuse such offer and condonation, the refusal shall be deemed and treated as desertion by such party from the time of refusal. 1873.-190.

103. The husband may choose any reasonable place or mode of living, and if the wife does not conform thereto, it is desertion.

104. If the place or mode of living selected by the husband is unreasonable and grossly unfit, and the wife does not conform thereto, it is desertion on the part of the husband from the time her reasonable objections are made known to him.

105. Willful neglect is the neglect of the husband to provide for his wife the common necessaries of life, he having the ability to do so;

or it is the failure to do so by reason of idleness, profligacy, or dissipation.

106. Habitual intemperance is that degree of intemperance from the use of intoxicating drinks which disqualifies the person a great portion of the time from properly attending to business, or which would reasonably inflict a course of great mental anguish upon the innocent party. 1901.--337.

107. Willful desertion, willful neglect, or habitual intemperance must continue for one year before either is a ground for divorce.

112. Connivance is the corrupt consent of one party to the commission of the acts of the other, constituting the cause of divorce.

113. Corrupt consent is manifested by passive permission, with intent to connive at or actively procure the commission of the acts complained of.

114. Collusion is an agreement between husband and wife that one of them shall commit, or appear to have committed, or to be represented in Court as having committed, acts constituting a cause of divorce, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.

115. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness of a matrimonial offense constituting a cause of divorce.

116. The following requirements are necessary to condonation: 1. A knowledge on the part of the condoner of the facts constituting the cause of divorce;

2. Reconciliation and remission of the offense by the injured party; 3. Restoration of the offending party to all marital rights.

117. Condonation implies a condition subsequent; that the forgiving party must be treated with conjugal kindness.

118. Where the cause of divorce consists of a course of offensive conduct, or arises, in cases of cruelty from excessive acts of ill-treatment which may, aggregately, constitute the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness, shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to condone. 1873-190.

119. In cases mentioned in the last section, condonation can be made only after the cause of divorce has become complete, as to the acts complained of. 1873-190.

120. A fraudulent concealment by the condonee of facts constituting a different cause of divorce from the one condoned, and existing at the time of condonation, avoids such condonation.

121. Condonation is revoked and the original cause of divorce revived:

1. When the condonee commits acts constituting a like or other cause of divorce; or,

2. When the condonee is guilty of great conjugal unkindess, not amounting to a cause of divorce, but sufficiently habitual and gross to show that the conditions of condonation had not been accepted in good faith or not fulfilled.

122. Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce.

123. Condonation of a cause of divorce, shown in the answer as a recriminatory defense, is a bar to such defense, unless the condonation be revoked, as provided in section one hundred and twenty-one, or two years have elapsed after the condonation, and before the accruing or completion of the cause of divorce against which the recrimination is shown. 1873-190.

124. A divorce must be denied:

1. When the cause is adultery and the action is not commenced within two years after the commission of the act of adultery, or after its discovery by the injured party; or,

2. When the cause is conviction of felony, and the action is not commenced before the expiration of two years after a pardon, or the termination of the period of sentence.

3. In all other cases when there is an unreasonable lapse of time before the commencement of the action. 1873-191.

125. Unreasonable lapse of time is such a delay in commencing the action as establishes the presumption that there has been a connivance, collusion, or condonation of the offense, or full acquiescence in the same, with intent to continue the marriage relation notwithstanding the commission of such offense.

126. The presumptions arising from lapse of time may be rebutted by showing reasonable grounds for the delay in commencing the action.

127. There are no limitations of time for commencing actions for divorce, except such as are contained in section one hundred and twenty-four.

128. A divorce must not be granted unless the plaintiff has been a resident of the state one year, and of the county in which the action