paper, purporting to be a copy of the reply of the "inspectors of prisons for the home district with "regard to the report of the court of aldermen to "whom it was referred to consider the first report of "the inspectors of prisons, as far as related to the "gaol of Newgate, and being the publications in

respect whereof this action (such action having been "commenced by virtue of a writ of summons bearing "date the 13th day of February last) hath been com"menced and prosecuted, were and are the book of "reports and paper, published by the above-named "defendants by order and under the authority of "house of commons.

"Given under my hand, in pursuance of the statute "in that case made and provided, this 20th day "of April in the year of our Lord 1840.

"CHARLES SHAW LEFEVRE,

Speaker of the said house of commons." There were affidavits verifying this certificate, and stating that the plaintiff in this action, and his attorney, had been personally served, at two o'clock on the day of making the motion, with a copy of that certificate. The affidavits also stated, that a writ of summons had been issued, and declaration filed, setting out fully all the proceedings that had been had, with their dates; and there was an office copy of the declaration, which, upon objection made, was verified by affidavit to be the declaration in the action in question.

It was objected to this form of certificate, that it ought specifically to refer to the declaration, so as to satisfy the court that the speaker was cognisant of its

contents.

The court, however, held, that the certificate was sufficient. Per Lord Denman, C.J., "The act is, on this

"point, we think, imperative; and it has been com

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plied with. The speaker, in his certificate, refers to "the declaration, and states that the action is in "respect of publications printed under the authority "of the house of commons. It is then contended, "that he does not say that he has seen the declaration "in respect of which he certifies. We must suppose, "however, that he has referred to it, and presume the "certificate to have been given under a full knowledge "of what was necessary to be known, and that it was the "declaration in the same action as that in respect of "which the present application is made. We are "satisfied upon this point, and this rule now applied for "must be granted."

Cause was shown against the rule in the first instance, but the court intimated that the plaintiff was not entitled of right so to do.

It was doubted whether this certificate would be valid before declaration. (b)

The rule was as follows: -"Upon reading the affi"davit of Frederick Hatton, and the certificate of the Right Honourable Charles Shaw Lefevre, speaker of "the house of commons, thereto annexed, another "affidavit of the said Frederick Hatton, and the paper writing thereto annexed; and upon hearing Mr. Platt, "of counsel for the plaintiff, and Mr. Wightman, of "counsel for the defendants; it is ordered that proceedings in this cause be stayed."

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The above action was brought in Hertfordshire.

A similar order was made the same day in an action between the same parties, brought a few days earlier, in Middlesex; the only difference in the two cases being,

(b) Stockdale v. Hansard and others, 11 A. & E. 297; 8 D. P. C. 669; 3 P. & D. 330; 4 Jur. 338.

that in the action last mentioned notice of a writ of inquiry of damages had been given. (c)

When a criminal information has been granted for a libel, and the party upon whose application it was filed afterwards brings an action for the same libel, it is of course to stay proceedings in such action, unless upon the motion the court should be of opinion that it is a proper libel for a civil action, and should specifically reserve the right. (d)

In Symms v. Blake (e) a verdict had been found, with damages, in an action of slander, for words imputing a felony; and after trial, and before judgment, the plaintiff was convicted of the same felony. The defendant in the action was a witness for the prosecution upon the criminal trial. Here the court refused to stay proceedings in the action, and would not even grant a new trial.

When two parties, who had been libelled in a newspaper, each sued a different one of the two proprietors of the newspaper, and, having recovered damages, commenced other actions, each suing the proprietor from whom the other had already recovered, the court refused to stay proceedings in a summary way. (f)

In an action of slander for words imputing to the defendant that he was the writer of a scandalous letter reflecting on the defendant, the latter in one of his pleas set forth the letter, and justified the words spoken. The court permitted the plaintiff to inspect the letter, with witnesses, in order that he might be

(c) 11 Adol. & E. 300.

(d) Rex v. Sparrow, 2 T. R. 198; Rex v. Fielding, 2 Burr. 719; Rex v. O'Gorman Mahon, 4 A. & E. 575.

(e) 2 C. M. & R. 416; 4 D. P. C. 263.

(f) Martin v. Kennedy, and Banning v. Perry, 2 B. & P.

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prepared at the trial to show that it was not in his handwriting. (g)

Where, after notice of declaration in an action of slander, the defendant signed a paper containing an apology, and a statement that at his request the plaintiff has consented, on his paying the costs as between attorney and client, and making such apology, to stay the proceedings thereon, and the notice of trial is accordingly countermanded, the court will summarily require the defendant to pay such costs, and in default will empower the plaintiff to sign judgment as for want of a plea. (h)

(g) Curtis v. Curtis, 3 M. & Scott, 819.

(h) Yardrew v. Brook, 2 N. & M. 835; 5 B. & A. 880.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE LIABILITIES OF AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS OF

LIBELS TO EACH OTHER, IN RESPECT OF INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION.

It is now settled law that the courts will not enforce any indemnity for the publication of a libel.

Shackell v. Rosier (a) was a case in which the proprietors of The John Bull newspaper sought to recover the amount of damages and costs which they had been compelled to pay in consequence of a libellous paragraph written by the defendant, and inserted by them in their newspaper at his request. The plaintiffs had defended the action under an indemnity from the defendant.

After verdict for the plaintiff judgment was arrested. The judgment of Bosanquet, J., seems to state with most conciseness the grounds upon which the court relied. His lordship remarked, "I am of opinion "that the promise and consideration both appear on "the record to be illegal. The promise is to save "harmless and indemnify the plaintiff from, and re"imburse him, all payments, damages, costs, charges, " and expenses which he should or might incur, bear, pay, sustain, or be liable for, for or by reason of "his so as aforesaid publishing the said statement and paragraph, and of his defending the said action. "And it appears that the publication was made at the "solicitation of the defendant; a publication manifestly illegal, and open to indictment; at once the (a) 2 Bing. N. C. 634.

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