of important evidence, and conduce to the elucidation of truth.

The attention of the committee was particularly drawn to certain disreputable weekly newspapers which are said to exist by slander. It was stated to the committee that they are carried on under the names of men of straw, who are entered as proprietors at the stamp office, and are incapable of paying damages or costs; so that there is no use in bringing any action against them. The most effectual measure suggested for putting an end to this system appears to the committee to be, that the security given at the stamp office by the proprietors and printers of newspapers should extend to damages and costs in actions for libel. The proposed security probably would not be objected to by respectable newspapers, and could hardly be obtained by those infamous libellers who are now such pests of society.

With a view to afford protection to fair fame, to guard honourable men from vexatious litigation, and effectually to put down traffic in calumny, the committee have come to the following resolutions; viz. 1. That an action for defamation should be maintainable for any words, spoken without just cause, tending to injure the reputation of another; e. g. words imputing want of chastity to a woman, or want of courage or veracity to a man :

2. That in an action for words, unless the words impute an indictable offence, it shall be open to the jury, under the plea of not guilty or non damnificatus, to consider whether, under the circumstances when the words were spoken, they were likely to injure reputation; and if they think that they were not, to find a verdict for the defendant, without any special justification :

3. That in an action for defamation, whether spoken or written, the veritas convicii shall not be an absolute defence; but that the defendant, where he justifies specially on the record, in addition to the truth of the imputation, shall be obliged to allege that it was for the benefit of the community that the words should be spoken, or the alleged libel

written and published; and that unless the whole plea of justification is made out to the satisfaction of the jury there shall be a verdict for the plaintiff :

4. That in all actions for defamation it shall be lawful for the defendant (giving due notice to the plaintiff of his intention to do so) to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that he made or offered an apology before the bringing of the action; or if the action is brought before there has been an opportunity for making or offering such apology, as soon as possible after the bringing of such action:

5. That where an action is brought for a libel in any public newspaper, it shall be competent to the defendant to plead that the said libel was inserted in the said newspaper without malice and without gross negligence, and that before action brought, or as soon as it was reasonably possible, he inserted in the said newspaper a full apology for the said libel; and that he shall be at liberty to pay into court a sum of money, by way of amends, for the injury sustained by the publication of the said libel; that if the plaintiff is contented therewith, he may take the same out of court, with his costs incurred to that time; and that if the plaintiff is not contented therewith, he may proceed in the action, and the jury shall consider whether the allegations in the said plea are made out to their satisfaction, and the said sum is sufficient by way of amends as aforesaid,—in which case they shall find a verdict for the defendant; otherwise they shall find a verdict for the plaintiff, with such further sum by way of damages as they shall think he ought to recover:

6. That to any indictment or information for a private libel it shall be lawful for the defendant to plead that the imputation contained in the alleged libel is true, and that it was for the benefit of the community that the said alleged libel should be published, the prosecutor being permitted to

traverse the whole of the said plea, or only the truth of the said imputation, or that the said publication was for the benefit of the community; and that at the trial of such indictment or information the defendant shall be acquitted or convicted according to the opinion of the jury on the issue so joined:

7. That in an indictment or information for private libel it shall be competent to the prosecutor to allege that the defendant unlawfully, maliciously, and knowing the said libel to be false, and having previously attempted to extort money from the prosecutor by a threat to publish a libel against the prosecutor, or some of his family, kindred, or connexions, published the libel set out in the indictment or information; and that the defendant, being convicted on such indictment or information, shall be liable to fine and imprisonment not exceeding three years, and to be sentenced to hard labour:

8. That in an indictment or information for private libel it shall be competent for the prosecutor to allege that the defendant unlawfully, maliciously, and knowing the said libel to be false, published the said libel; and that the defendant, being convicted on such indictment or information, shall be liable to fine and imprisonment not exceeding two

years:

9. That in an indictment or information for private libel it shall be competent to the prosecutor to allege that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously published the said libel; and that the defendant, being convicted on such indictment or information, shall be liable to fine and imprisonment not exceeding one year:

10. That no action, indictment, or information shall be maintainable for a faithful report of any proceedings of courts of justice, or before magistrates acting in the discharge of their duty, or of any proceedings in either house of parliament at which strangers have been permitted to be present, pro

vided that such proceedings are not of such a nature that a report thereof would be contrary to good manners:

11. That it be declared that, upon the trial of an indictment or information for libel, it shall be competent for the defendant against whom a presumptive case of publication by an agent has been made to prove as an answer, that the act of publication was contrary to his orders, and under circumstances where it was impossible he should have been acquainted with the contents of the libel :

12. That in private prosecutions for libel, if there be a verdict and judgment for the defendant, the defendant shall be entitled to recover costs from the prosecutor, to be taxed by the proper officer of the

court:

13. That pending the trials of indictments or informations it shall be lawful fairly to publish the proceedings on the said trials from time to time before the conclusion thereof:

14. That the security given at the stamp office by the proprietors and printers of newspapers shall extend to damages and costs in actions for libel against them.

Y

EVIDENCE OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE.

The right honourable the Lord High Chancellor, attending by permission of the House of Lords, was examined.

1. How far, in your lordship's opinion, is it possible to define the law of libel so as to bring it within more distinct rules than at present?—I admit the great importance of the inquiry, and it is one to which, in common with those who have attended to the subject of libel law, I have at different times paid considerable attention, but, I must freely own, without any success whatever. I hold it to be hardly possible to define libels by which guilt may be incurred as tending to a breach of the peace, to other proceedings of a violent nature, to shaking the institutions of the country from the sovereign downwards, and loosening the foundations of society, and to a variety of other heads, under which may be classed, though without any distinctness of definition or any thing like exhaustion of the subject, the offences that are committed by publishing or uttering libellous or seditious expressions. Any definitions that I have ever seen given had one or other of two faults equally opposed to the requisites of a logical definition; they were either so vague and general as not to specify or define any thing, or, if they did not sin in that respect, they were only rendered particular and definite by omitting some species of libel or of sedition which, on the most cursory inspection, ought manifestly to have been comprehended. A definition, in order to satisfy the requisites of a good logical definition, ought not only to be sufficiently precise so that it shall take in nothing except what was intended to be specified, but also sufficiently comprehensive to omit nothing which ought to be included. I have never yet seen, nor been able myself to hit upon, any