EVIDENCE OF LORD CAMPbell.

The Lord Campbell, a member of the committee, makes the following statement:

I am of opinion that the present state of the law of libel in England is very defective. With regard to civil actions, I think that the distinction ought not to prevail between defamation by words only and defamation in writing. I think that it is absurd that a woman of rank and character may not maintain an action for words imputing to her want of chastity, spoken in the most public and offensive manner, and that a man cannot maintain an action for words at a county meeting, denouncing him as a liar, a coward, and a scoundrel. I think that an action ought to be maintainable for words that tend to defame and degrade, and that the evil that might be apprehended of frivolous actions for words being brought would be checked by the existing law, by which no costs are recovered by the plaintiff unless he obtains serious damages.

But I do not think it would be expedient to enact that there may be criminal proceedings for mere words of defamation, unless they are spoken with the actual intention of provoking a breach of the peace; because there is no necessity for treating this species of defamation as a public crime, and no inconvenience seems to have arisen in Scotland from private defamation being merely considered the subject of an action for damages.

I think that the law is defective at present with regard to civil actions, in saying that in all cases the truth shall be a justification. I think there are many cases in which an injury is done to an individual, although the words spoken may be true, if they refer to what has happened many years ago,-if they refer to personal defects, and to circumstances connected

with his family, in which the public have no interest. I therefore think that where an action is brought for defamation, whether written or spoken, in addition to an allegation of the truth of the imputation, the defendant should be bound to plead that it was for the interest of the public that he brought forward the charge, or to show some occasion justifying the speaking or writing the words, though they be true.

I think that it ought to be made clear that where an action is brought for defamation the defendant is at liberty to prove, in mitigation of damages, that an apology has been offered, or that there were circumstances connected with the publication to a certain degree to excuse the defendant, and to show that little injury has been inflicted upon the plaintiff.

In prosecutions for defamation I am of opinion that the truth should be permitted to be given in evidence, and that it should be left to the jury to say whether it was for the good of the public that the information communicated by the supposed libel should be communicated. I think that the truth ought not to be an absolute justification, but that it should be an ingredient in the defence; and that the question left to the jury beyond the truth should not be the private motive of the defendant, but the interest or benefit of the public. I think that it is peculiarly necessary that the truth should be admitted at the trial where a prosecution takes place by a criminal information under the authority of the court of Queen's Bench, because there, as affidavits are admitted before the rule is made absolute for the criminal information, when the trial comes on it is stated to the jury that the court have granted the information believing the libel to be false, and the defendant may have the means of proving the imputation to be true at the trial, although he had no such means before the rule was made absolute, because, as the law now stands, he cannot compel parties to make an affidavit, but he may compel by subpoena the attendance of witnesses at the trial; and at present he is under this peculiar hardship, that

at the trial it is stated to the jury that the libel is false, and he is not permitted to show that the imputation which it contains is well founded.

It seems to me that the ground upon which it is said that private defamation is criminal is wholly fallacious. The ground generally alleged is that it leads to a breach of the peace. I do not think that that is so either on principle or in practice. On principle, I think that defamation is a crime like theft or battery of the person; it is doing an injury to a member of society, who is entitled to the protection of the law, and the person who perpetrates that injury ought to be punished as an example to others, to prevent a repetition of the offence. In practice prosecutions for libel are uniformly instituted and conducted by the party injured, and merely with a view of vindicating the character of the party injured, or of having revenge upon the libeller, and not in the remotest degree with any view to the protection of the public peace.

There are some other alterations in the law upon this subject which I think might be beneficial. I think that it should be declared and enacted, that a fair account of any proceedings in courts of justice where the publication will not lead to any corruption of manners is justifiable. I think that this should extend to ex parte proceedings even before police magistrates, but by no means to proceedings before police magistrates where these magistrates have no jurisdiction whatever over the complaint that is made before them.

I think it should be declared and enacted, that a fair and faithful report of proceedings in either house of parliament, from which strangers are not excluded, is justifiable, and cannot be made the subject of any action or prosecution.

I think it should be declared and enacted, that it is lawful, during a trial that lasts several days, to publish the proceedings of that trial pending the trial, as I conceive this is only a mode of enlarging the court, and of making the public acquainted with the pro

ceedings as if they were actually present, and that no inconvenience to the administration of justice is likely to arise from this practice, but that it is almost impossible to prevent those publications, and that there is a danger of their being partial and defective, unless a general liberty of this sort is given.

I think that there ought to be some definition as to what shall amount to a publication of a libel; at present the law upon that subject is extremely vague, and that has led to very revolting consequences.

I likewise think that there ought to be some classification of the different sorts of libel and defamation, with a graduated scale of punishments; and that there ought to be some limit to the term of imprisonment for the offence of libel, as at present a judgment, though unjust, would not be erroneous, whereby for the offence of libel the defendant should be sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.

With a view to the protection of public journals which are respectably conducted, I think that there might be some enactment to meet the case where, without any bad design or gross negligence, they publish what may be considered libellous; and I think that it might be right to provide that they should be at liberty to plead, that without gross negligence and without malice they published the libel, that immediately they apologized or offered to apologize, and that they should under these circumstances be allowed to pay a sum of money into court by way of amends; and that if the plaintiff is not satisfied with that sum of money and proceeds, and the jury are of opinion that the publication was without malice and without gross negligence, and that an apology has been made or offered, and that the sum of money paid in is sufficient by way of amends, they shall find a verdict for the defendant.

I think that it would be fair and expedient to enact, that where on a prosecution for private libel the defendant is acquitted, he should be entitled to recover costs from the prosecutor.

I do not think that there can be any definition of private libel more specific than a writing tending to injure and degrade the character of the person who is the object of it; but I think that, upon a review of the criminal law, there might be a classification and definition of public libels, as they tend to produce insurrection or resistance to the law, or to undermine the foundations of religion, or to corrupt manners.