Where the property belongs to a county, as a county gaol, bridge, lunatic asylum, it should be stated as the property of the inhabitants: (7 Geo. 4, c. 54, s. 15.)

As regards parish property, applied to the use of the poor, it should be laid as the property of the overseers.

As regards materials used for the highways, the property in them should be laid as the property of the surveyor or surveyors for the time being (7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 16.)

If the highway be in a district formed under the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61, the property should be laid as the property of the highway board of the district, according to its corporate name.

If the property be possessed under any turnpike trust, it should be stated to belong to the trustees or commissioners of the road: (7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 17.)

(See the above statute, sect. 18, as to stating property in the Commissioners of Sewers.)

As regards the property of friendly societies, it may be described as the property of the trustees of the society for the time being: (18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, s. 18.)

So, as to loan societies, their property may be laid as that of the trustees for the time being: (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 23, s. 4.)

As to Allegations of Place.-Before the passing of the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, it was necessary to add a place, or special venue, to every material allegation, as thus in an indictment for larceny, "That J. B., late of the parish of C., in the county of D., on the 1st day of June, A.D. 1840, at the parish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, one coat of the value of twenty shillings, the goods and chattels of one E. F., then and there

being found feloniously," &c.; but we have seen (ante, p. 2) that as regards the special venue, it is unnecessary to state it, but the venue in the margin of the indictment shall be taken to be the venue for all the facts stated in the body of the indictment. It is therefore now unnecessary to state any place (venue) in the body of the indictment in connection with any of the facts set forth.

If, however, local description is requisite, the venue in the margin will not suffice, but such local description must still be stated in the body of the indictment, as in an indictment for burglary, housebreaking, sacrilege, demolishing churches, houses, &c., non-repair of a highway, a nuisance, or for a forcible entry.

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As to Allegations of Time.-Also before the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, every material fact stated in an indictment must have been alleged as happening at a time certain. By section 24, however, it is enacted that no indictment for any offence shall be held insufficient for . . . omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed, in any case where time is not of the essence of the offence, nor for stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offence to have been committed on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment, or on an impossible day, or on a day that never happened."

The usual mode of alleging time is thus-that "A. B. on the day of A.D. 1871," &c. Although it is in general immaterial that in fact the offence was committed on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment-as where a theft or a crime of violence is charged; yet, as there are some offences in the charging of which time is material, care in such cases should be

observed that the time laid will agree with the offence as it can be proved. Thus, in the case of an indictment for a nuisance in carrying on an offensive trade,-as the indictment will state the nuisance as existing on a day certain and on divers days and at times between that day and the day of the taking of the inquisition, it will be judicious to lay the day sufficiently remote from the finding of the indictment to include all the proof intended to be given in support of the charge.

As to the Statement of Facts Constituting the Offence. As every indictable offence consists in the commission or omission of certain Acts under certain circumstances, it is, as a general rule, necessary to set forth in what those acts consist. Stating an offence in general words is insufficient

-as that A. B. stole the goods of C. D., or committed a burglary in his house. But to this rule there are some exceptions. Thus, in the case of an indictment for murder or manslaughter, it is enacted by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 6, that in any such indictment, "or for being an accessory to any murder or manslaughter, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in any indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased; and it shall be sufficient in any indictment for manslaughter to charge that the defendant did feloniously kill and slay the deceased; and it shall be sufficient in any indictment against any accessory to any murder or manslaughter to charge the principal with the murder or manslaughter (as the case may be), in the manner hereinbefore specified, and then to charge the

defendant as an accessory in the manner heretofore used and accustomed." So also a person may be indicted for keeping a common gambling-house or bawdy-house without stating the particular facts necessary to show it to be such. So, too, under some Acts of Parliament it is declared to be unnecessary to set out the particular facts constituting the offence; thus, under the 26 Vict. c. 29, s. 6, in an indictment for bribery or undue influence, it is declared to be sufficient to allege that the defendant was at the election guilty of bribery, treating, or undue influence.

As the peculiar requisites of the indictments for the various descriptions of offences hereafter referred to, will be set forth in their appropriate places, it will be unnecessary more particularly to mention them here. There are, however, some general rules which it may be as well at once to state.

As to the Necessity for Certainty of Statement.With certain exceptions, to some of which reference has already been made, all the circumstances necessary to constitute the offence charged, should be stated with certainty and precision, to the end that the defendant may be enabled to form a judgment whether or not they constitute an indictable offence, and so demur or plead accordingly; or that he may be enabled to plead autrefois acquit, or convict, or a pardon, in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offence; and in order, also, that the Court may know what judgment may legally be passed in the event of a conviction. The Courts, however, will construe the words of an indictment according to their ordinary and usual acceptation; and as regards technical expressions, these they will construe

according to their technical meaning, and if the sense of a word be ambiguous in its ordinary acceptation it will be construed according as the context and subject matter may require, in order to render the whole consistent and sensible; and in doing so, the Courts will disregard ungrammatical language if the real meaning be sufficiently expressed: (R. v. Stevens, 5 East, 244; R. v. Stokes, 1 Den. C. C. 307.)

But although the Courts will thus construe the averments of an indictment so as to give effect to them, they will not supply the omission of anything which is essential. If, therefore, any necessary averment is omitted no intendment will be made in its favour-the rule upon the subject being, that the Courts will presume the negative of everything that has not been expressly affirmed, and the affirmative of everything which has not been expressly negatived.

The statement of the offence charged must not be in the alternative, for although the statute constituting the crime may so describe it, it will vitiate the count if it be stated in the disjunctive. Thus, to state that the defendant "forged or uttered" a certain instrument, or that he wounded with intent to murder, or disfigure, or disable, or to do some grievous bodily harm, would render the count bad. If it be doubtful which offence he has committed, each should be the subject of a separate and distinct count.

But, though the offence, that is, the same criminal act, may be charged in different ways in different counts, it cannot be so varied in any one count as to make it in fact two or more distinct offences.

As to the Use of descriptive Words.-In every indictment it is necessary that certain descriptive