Moreland v. Page. prior to the tender of the money on the 1st day of November, 1851, except what is reasonably and satisfactorily accounted for on the ground of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the respondent; and after that time the fault was entirely his own, and neither the rules of common justice nor equity will allow him to take advantage of his own wrong. He can derive no benefit from his subsequent attempt to tender the deed, as it was then too late to impair the right of the complainant to insist upon performance; and we attach no importance whatever to his demand of the money, as he well knew at the time that the amount was deposited in the hands of the solicitor of the complainant, and that he could have it the moment he returned. It is a case of clear equity on the part of the complainant. He has been guilty of no negligence or fraud, and he was admitted into possession of the premises under the agreement, and suffered to make valuable improvements, without any notice to desist; and now, when he cannot be made whole in any other way, it [*522] is his right to insist that the agreement should be performed, and a court of equity is the proper tribunal to enforce his right. On the whole case, we are of the opinion that the supreme court of the territory of Minnesota erred in the order and decree made in this cause. The decree, therefore, of that court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, with directions to enter a decree affirming the decree of the district court, with costs. DAVID MORELAND, Plaintiff in Error, v. JEREMIAH PAGE. 20 H. 522. JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE COURTS. Where the question decided by the State court was merely one of boundary between parties claiming under patents from the United States, this court has no jurisdiction to review that decision. WRIT of error to the supreme court of Iowa. The case, is stated in the opinion. Mr. Badger and Mr. Carlisle, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Bradley, for defendant. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. In a court which is not bound by law to ignore all species of actions, and use only the generic name, this would be called an Moreland v. Page. action of ejectment. Plaintiff's statement alleges that "he is owner of certain adjoining quarter sections of land, and that the northern boundary thereof is a line surveyed by Joel Baily, as per diagram annexed, and that plaintiff claims the line A B to be the true line, while defendant claims that the line CD is the proper line between them. The defendant, by his plea or answer, denies that A B is the true line, and avers that C D is. On this issue the parties went to trial without a jury, and the court decided in favor of plaintiff. But, on appeal to the supreme court of Iowa, the judgment below was reversed, and judgment entered for defendant, establishing the line C D as the true line between the respective patents, according to a survey made by Edward James, "a copy of a plat of which is on file in the case, from the original deposited in the office of the surveyor general.” We have searched this record in vain to discover any authority for this court to assert its jurisdiction to review the judgment of the State court under the power granted by the twenty * fifth section of the judiciary act. The record does not [523] show that it draws in question any treaty, statute, or authority exercised under the United States; or the validity of any State statute, for repugnancy to the constitution of the United States; or the construction of any clause of the constitution; or of a treaty or statute commission held under the United States. It is a mere question of boundary between two neighbors, both admitted to have valid grants from the United States. It is a question of fact, depending on monuments to be found on the ground, documents in the land office, or the opinion of experts or surveyors appointed by the court or the parties. If the accident to the controversy that both parties claim title under the United States should be considered as sufficient to bring it within our jurisdiction, then every controversy involving the title to such lands, whether it involve the inheritance, partition, devise, or sale of it, may, with equal propriety, be subject to the examination of this court in all time to come. This question is not new; it was decided in the case of McDonough v. Millaudon, 3 How. 693, where this court refused to entertain jurisdiction to review the judgment of a State court, ascertaining the boundaries between complete grants under the French government, as it did not call in question either the construction or the validity of the treaty, or the title to the land held under it. (See also Kennedy v. Hunt, 7 How. 593.) It is therefore ordered that this case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 20h 523 L-ed 1010 131 24 McFaul v. Ramsey. ENEAS MCFAUL, Plaintiff in Error, v. JAMES C. RAMSEY. 20 H. 523. PRACTICE ON WRIT OF ERROR-PLEADING. 1. A general demurrer to a petition under the Iowa code is rightfully overruled when there is a good cause of action set forth in it. 2. The only bills of exception taken relate to the refusal of the court to grant a continuance and to change the venue. These are not grounds on which error can be assigned. WRIT of error to the district court for the district of Iowa. The case is fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Reverdy Johnson, sr., and Mr. Reverdy Johnson, jr., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Norris, for defendant. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. Ramsey, the plaintiff below, instituted this suit in the [* 524] *district court of the United States for the district of Iowa. The parties have been permitted by that court to frame their pleadings, not according to the simple and established forms of action in courts of common law, but according to a system of pleadings and practice enacted by that State to regulate proceedings in its own courts. This code commences by abolishing "all technical forms of actions," prescribing the following curt rules for all cases, whether of law or equity: "Any pleading which possesses the following requisites shall be deemed sufficient: "1st. When to the common understanding it conveys a reasonable certainty of meaning. "2d. When, by a fair and natural construction, it shows a substantial cause of action or defense. "If defective in the first of the above particulars, the court, on motion, will direct a more specific statement; if in the latter, it is ground of demurrer." If the right of deciding absolutely and finally all matters in controversy between suitors were committed to a single tribunal, it might be left to collect the nature of the wrong complained of, and the remedy sought, from the allegations of the party ore tenus, or in any other manner it might choose to adopt. But the common law, which wisely commits the decision of questions of law to a court supposed to be learned in the law, and the decision of the facts to a jury, necessarily requires that the controversy, before it is McFaul v. Ramsey. submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it, should be reduced to one or more integral propositions of law or fact; hence it is necessary that the parties should frame the allegations which they respectively make in support of their demand or defense into certain writings called pleadings. These should clearly, distinctly, and succinctly, state the nature of the wrong complained of, the remedy sought, and the defense set up. The end proposed is to bring the matter of litigation to one or more points, simple and unambiguous. At one time, the excessive accuracy required, the subtlety of distinctions introduced by astute logicians, the introduction of cumbrous forms, fictions, and contrivances, which seemed only to perplex the investigation of truth, had brought the system of special pleading into deserved disrepute, notwithstanding the assertion of Sir William Jones, that "it was the best logic in the world, except mathematics." This system is said to have come to its perfection in the reign of Edward III. But in more modern times it has been so modified by the courts, and trimmed of its excrescences, the pleadings in every form of common-law action have been so completely reduced to simple, clear, and unambiguous * forms, that the merits of a cause are now never sub- [* 525] merged under folios of special demurrers, alleging errors in pleading, which, when discovered, are immediately permitted to be amended. This system, matured by the wisdom of ages, founded on principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished in many of our States, who have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of sciolists, who invent new codes and systems of pleading to order. But this attempt to abolish all species, and establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of legislative omnipotence. They cannot compel the human mind not to distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common-law courts. The result of these experiments, so far as they have come to our knowledge, has been to destroy the certainty and simplicity of all pleadings, and introduce on the record an endless wrangle in writing, perplexing to the court, delaying and impeding the administration of justice. In the case of Randon v. Toby, (11 Howard, 517,) we had occasion to notice the operation and result of a code similar to that of Iowa. In a simple action on a promissory note, the pleadings of which, according to common-law forms, would not have occupied a page, they were extended to over Vol. ii-36 McFaul v. Ramsey. twenty pages, requiring two years of wrangle, with exceptions and special demurrers, before an issue could be formed between the parties. In order to arrive at the justice of the case, this court was compelled to disregard the chaos of pleadings, and eliminate the merits of the case from a confused mass of fifty special demurrers or exceptions, and decide the cause without regard to these contrivances to delay and impede a decision of the real controversy between the parties. In the case of Bennett v. Butterworth, (11 Howard, 667,) originating under the same code, the court were unable to discover from the pleading the nature of action or of the remedy sought. It might, with equal probability, be called an action of debt, or detinue, or repleven, or trover, or trespass, or a bill in chancery. The jury and the court below seem to have labored under the same perplexity, as the verdict was for $1,200, and the judgment for four negroes. In both these cases this court have endeavored to impress the minds of the judges of the district and circuit courts of the United States with the impropriety of permitting these experimental codes of pleading and practice to be inflicted upon them. In the last-mentioned case, the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The con[526] stitution of the United States has recognized the dis tinction between law and equity, and it must be observed in the federal courts." In Louisiana, where the civil law prevails, we have necessarily to adopt the forms of action inseparable from the system. But in those States where the courts of the United States administer the common law, they cannot adopt these novel inventions, which propose to amalgamate law and equity by enacting a hybrid system of pleadings unsuited to the administration of either.. We have made these few introductory remarks before proceeding to notice the merits of the controversy, as developed by the record, in order that the bar and courts of the United States may make their records conform to these views, and not call upon us to construe new codes and hear special demurrers or pleadings, which are not required to conform to any system founded on reason and experience. To test such pleadings by the logical reasoning of the common law, after requiring the party to disregard all forms of action known to the law under which he seeks a remedy, would be unwarrantable and unjust. The plaintiff's petition sets forth his grievances in plain, intelligible form, if not with technical brevity and simplicity. 1st. He alleges a contract with defendant to deliver to him eight hundred hogs, on or before a certain day; in consideration whereof, |