The Fashion. Mr. Haven, for appellants. Mr. Russell, for appellee. [* 245 ] *Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal in admiralty from a decree of the district court for the district of Wisconsin. The libel states that the goods in question were shipped on board the Fashion at the port of Two Rivers, in the State of Wisconsin, to be delivered at the port of Milwaukee, in the same State, and that the master by reason of negligence, and the unskillful navigation of the vessel, and of her unseaworthiness, lost them in the course of the voyage. The respondent sets up, in the answer, the seaworthiness of the vessel, and that the goods were jettisoned in a storm upon the lake. The evidence taken in the court below was directed principally to these two grounds of defense; but, in the view the court has taken of the case, it will not be important to notice it. The act of congress of 26th February, 1845, prescribing and regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts in admiralty upon the lakes, and which was held by this court in the case of the Genesee Chief, (12 How. 443,) to be valid and binding, confines that jurisdiction to." matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats and other vessels” "employed in business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and territories upon the lakes, and navigable waters connecting said lakes," &c. * * * This restriction of the jurisdiction to business carried on between ports and places in different States was doubtless suggested by the limitation in the constitution of the power in congress to [246] regulate commerce. The words are: "Congress * shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." In the case of Gibbon v. Ogden, (9 Wh. 194,) it was held, that this power did not extend to the purely internal commerce of a State. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, observed: "It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States." Again, he observes: "The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally, but not to those which are com Allen v. Newberry. pletely within a particular State, when they do not affect other. States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the Government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, he observes, may be considered as reserved for the State itself." (Ib. 195.) This distinction in the act of 1845 is noticed by the present chief justice in delivering the opinion in the Genesee Chief. He observed: "The act of 1845 extends only to such vessels when they are engaged in commerce between the States and territories. It does not apply to vessels engaged in the domestic commerce of a State." This restriction of the admiralty jurisdiction was asserted in the case of the New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The Merchants' Bank, (6 How. 392,) the first case in which the jurisdiction was upheld by this court upon a contract of affreightment. It was then remarked, that "the exclusive jurisdiction of the court in admiralty cases was conferred on the national government, as closely connected with the grant of the commercial power. It is a maritime court, instituted for the purpose of administering the law of the seas. There seems to be ground, therefore, for restraining its jurisdiction, in some measure, within the limit of the grant of the commercial power, which would confine * it, in case of contract, to those concerning the navigation [* 247 ] and trade of the country upon the high seas, &c., with for eign countries and among the several States. "Contracts growing out of the purely internal commerce of the State, &c., are generally domestic in their origin and operation, and could scarcely have been intended to be drawn within the cognizance of the federal courts." The contract of shipment in this case was for the transportation of the goods from the port of Two Rivers to the port of Milwaukee, both in the State of Wisconsin; and upon the principles above stated, the objection to the jurisdiction of the court below would be quite clear, were it not for the circumstance that the vessel at the time of this shipment was engaged in a voyage to Chicago, a port in another State. She was a general ship, with an assorted cargo, engaged in a general carrying business between ports of different States; and there is some ground for saying, upon the words of the act of 1845, that the contracts over which the jurisdiction is conferred, are contracts of shipment with a vessel engaged in the business of commerce between the ports of different States. But the court is of opinion that this is not the true construction and import of the act. On the contrary, that the contracts mentioned relate Vol. ii-49 The Fashion. to the goods carried as well as to the vessels, and that the shipment must be made between ports of different States. This view of the act harmonizes with the limitation of the jurisdiction as expressed, independently of any act of congress, in the case of New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The Merchant's Bank, before referred to. We confine our opinion upon the question of jurisdiction to the case before us, namely, to the suit upon the contract of shipment of goods between ports and places of the same State. The court is of opinion that the district court had no jurisdiction. over it in admiralty, and that the jurisdiction belonged to the courts of the State. It may be, that in respect to a vessel like the present, having cargo. on board to be carried between ports of the same State, as well as between ports of different States, in cases of sale or bottomry of a cargo for relief of the vessel in distress of voluntary strand[*248] ing of the ship, jettison, and the like, where *contribution and general average arise, that the federal courts shall be obliged to deal incidently with the subject the question being influenced by the common peril in which all parties in interest are concerned, and to which ship, freight, and cargo, as the case may be, are liable to contribute their share, of the loss. A small part of the goods in question in this case were shipped for the port of Chicago, but are not of sufficient value to warrant an appeal to this court. The decree of the court below dismissing the libel affirmed. Mr. Justice WAYNE, Mr. Justice CATRON, and Mr. Justice GRIER, dissented. Mr. Justice DANIEL concurs in the decree for the dismission of the libel in this case, but not for the reasons assigned by the court. It being my opinion, as repeatedly declared, that the admiralty jurisdiction, under the constitution of the United States, is limited to the high seas, and does not extend to the internal waters of the United States, whether extending to different States or comprised within single States. If there be any inefficiency in this view of the admiralty powers of the government, the fault is chargeable on the constitution, and on the want of foresight in those who framed that instrument, and it can be legitimately remedied by an amendment of the constitution only. Maguire v. Card. THE GOLIAH. THOMAS MAGUIRE, Appellant, v. STEPHEN CARD. 21 H. 248. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. 1. Contracts of affreightment to be performed on rivers wholly within a single State are not the subjects of admiralty jurisdiction; and so also in regard to supplies furnished to a vessel so engaged. 3. Nor will the federal courts sitting in admiralty enforce the statutory liens given by State laws for such contracts. Rule 12 of the admiralty rules of this court, as amended at this term, explained and defended. THIS is an appeal from the circuit court for the northern district of California. The matter is sufficiently stated in the opinion. Mr. Blair, for appellant. Mr. Doyle, for appellee. * Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. [* 249] This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of California, in admiralty. The suit was a proceeding in rem against the Goliah, to recover the balance of an account for coal furnished the steamer while lying at the port of the city of Sacramento, in the months of October and November, 1855. The vessel, according to the averments in the libel, and which are not denied in the record, *was [* 250] engaged in the business of navigation and trade on the Sacramento river, exclusively within the State of California, and, of course, between ports and places of the same State. She was therefore engaged, at the time of the contract in question, in the purely internal commerce of the State, the contract relating exclusively to that commerce, and which does not in any way affect trade or commerce with other States. The court has held, in the case of Rufus Allen et. al. v. H. L. Newberry, at this term, that a contract of affreightment between ports and places within the same State was not the subject of admiralty jurisdiction, as it concerned the purely internal trade of a State, and that the jurisdiction belonged to the courts of the State. That case occurred upon Lake Michigan, within waters upon which the jurisdiction of the court was regulated by the act of congress of the 26th February, 1845; but the restriction of the jurisdiction by that act was regarded by the court as but declaratory of the law, and that it existed independently at that statute. The Goliah. The contract in that case, as we have said, was one of affreightment between ports of the same State; but we perceive no wellfounded distinction between that and a contract for supplies furnished the vessels engaged in such a trade. They both concern exclusively the internal commerce of the State, and must be governed by the same principles. There certainly can be no good reason given for extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty over this commerce. From the case of Gibbon v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 194,) down to the present time, it has been conceded by this court that, according to the true interpretation of the grant of the commercial power in the constitution to congress, it does not extend to or embrace the purely internal commerce of a State; and hence that commerce is necessarily left to the regulation under State authority. To subject it, therefore, to the jurisdiction in admiralty would be exercising the jurisdiction simply in the enforcement of the municipal laws of the State, as these laws, under the conceded limitation of the commercial power, regulate the subject as completely as congress does com[*251] merce *"with foreign nations, and among the several States." We are speaking of that commerce which is completely internal, and which does not extend to or affect other States, or foreign nations. We have at this term amended the 12th rule of the admiralty, so as to take from the district courts the right of proceeding in rem against a domestic vessel for supplies and repairs which had been assumed upon the authority of a lien given by State laws, it being conceded that no such lien existed according to the admiralty law, thereby correcting an error which had its origin in this court in the case of the Gen. Smith, (4 Wheat. 439,) applied and enforced in the case of Peyroux and others v. Howard and Varion, (7 Peters, 324,) and afterwards partially corrected in the case of the steamboat New Orleans v. Phoebus, (11 Peters, 175, 184.) In this last case, the court refused to enforce a lien for the master's wages, though it had been given by the local laws of the State of Louisiana, the same as in the case of supplies and repairs of the vessel. We have determined to leave all these liens depending upon State laws, and not arising out of the maritime contract, to be enforced by the State courts. So in respect to the completely internal commerce of the States, which is the subject of regulation by their municipal laws; contracts growing out of it should be left to be dealt with by its own tribunals. For these reasons, we think the decree of the court below should |