ter 100, section 57, of bigamy, having gone through the ceremony of marriage. within seven years after she had been deserted by her husband. The jury found that at the time of the second marriage she in good faith and on reasonable grounds believed her husband to be dead. Held, by Lord Coleridge, C. J., Hawkins, Stephen, Cave, Day, A. L. Smith, Willis, Grantham and Charles, JJ. (Denman, Field and Majesty, JJ., and Pollock and Huddleston, BB., dissenting), that a bona fide belief on reasonable grounds in the death of the husband at the time of the second marriage afforded a good defense to the indictment, and that the conviction was wrong. The Queen vs. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D., 168.

MARRIAGE-CONTRACT.-A contract between husband and wife, whereby it was agreed to drop all matters of dispute, to refrain from scolding, fault-finding and anger, and live together as husband and wife; that the wife should keep her home in a comfortable condition; and that the husband should provide all the necessary expenses of the family, and pay the wife in addition a certain sum per month-is contrary to public policy. On rehearing. For opinion on appeal, see 35 N. W. Rep.

474.

The following may be of interest as being precisely the same as one of last year's moot court cases.

NON-LIABILITY of a Carrier for a FRAUDULENT BILL OF LADING ISSUED BY ITS AGENT.In the case of Friedlander vs. Texas &c. Ry. Co., 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570, the Supreme Court of the United States has again affirmed the senseless and unjust doctrine that, if the agent of a common carrier, in order to make some money for himself, conspires with a shipper to issue fraudu

lent bills of lading, against which drafts are drawn and money procured from innocent persons, who take them in the ordinary and well-known course of commerce, the carrier can not be held to make good the money which the consignee or banker has thus advanced upon the faith of the honesty of the carrier's agent and the goodness of the bill of lading, but the only recourse of the person defrauded is against those who committed the fraud. Look at it in a practical way. It is absolutely impossible for a banker advancing money on the security of a bill of lading signed by a known agent of a railway or other carrier, to know whether the goods have actually been received for which the bill of lading is issued, or not. He is absolutely helpless in the face of such a fraud, unless the agent is sufficiently solvent to answer to him for it, which it may safely be said is never the case. The decision is not only absurd and unjust, but the perpetuation of such a rule is a great injury to commerce. Under the operation of this rule, the bankers of the country are every day advancing vast sums of money, theoretically on the collateral security of personal property in the hands of railway carriers represented by bills of lading, but actually on the honesty of some thousands of railway station agents scattered all over the country. In dealing with such a question, judges cannot shut their eyes to the known habit of commerce in advancing money upon such a security; and that court has more than once held that this is the subject of judicial notice. In view of this habit, the true view is that every bill of lading is a representation to the public by the carrier that he has the goods; and if the agent of the carrier, albeit to accomplish some purpose of his own, issues the bill of lading in the name of the carrier

when he has not received the goods, has not the carrier, who appointed the agent and authorized him to make such representations generally, made a false representation to the public? And if so, why should he not answer for the conse

quences? The truth is that the decision. is not only destitute of justice and of commercial expediency, but the legal reasons on which it proceeds are too stupid for argument.-American Law Review.

We do not remember having ever seen in print the following anecdote of Judge Tappan, of Ohio, which was related to us by an old friend of the Judge. After he had studied law long enough to consider himself fitted to the bar, he made application for admission, and, at an appointed time, met the justices who were to test his knowledge by an oral examination. "Mr. Tappan," was the first question, "what is law?" The answer promptly: "An unjust distribution of justice !" Somewhat surprised, the examiner continued: "And what, then, is equity?" "An imposition upon common sense."

came

The justices held their heads together for a few moments, and unanimously declared that Mr. Tappan was fully qualified to practice.

An action was brought in a Wisconsin court, some years since, for shooting the plaintiff's goose and gander. The defendants admitted the killing, but claimed that it was accidental. After hearing the evidence, the court delivered the following able and lucid opinion:

"It is always best not to be too severe on damages, and yet it is best to give damages to the amount of the plaintiff's claim, and inasmuch as the killing of

those geese was wrong by the boys. It is the opinion of the court that the two geese were worth two dollars apiece in the spring of the year, and in all probabilities they would have had twelve goslings, and probably about one-half of them would have lived and the other half would have died; and it would not have cost the plaintiff much to keep them until fall, and the goslings would then be worth one dollar apiece, which would be six dollars, and the two old ones two, or four dollars, which would make ten dollars, which is the judgment of the court."

Citizens of the Empire State are to be congratulated upon the quasi-judicial recognition by the Massachusetts bench of the pleasing quality of their vocal organs. In Commonwealth vs. Williams, 105 Mass., 62, one Ball, who had been robbed, testified that the defendant had talked with him during the day, and that he had a "very interesting, manly, pleasant, smooth, gentle, handsome voice-a York State voice." And the evidence that this "pleasant voice" remarked, at midnight, to the plaintiff, "keep still, or you're a dead man," convicted the defendant.

In a case in Connecticut, the judge ruled that certain evidence was inadmissible.

The attorney took strong exceptions to the ruling, and insisted that the offered evidence was admissible.

"I know, your Honor," said he, warmly, "that it is proper evidence; here I have been practising at the bar for forty years, and now I want to know if I am a fool?'

"That," quietly replied the court," is a question of fact, and not of law; and so I will not pass upon it, but will let the jury decide."-Splinters.

Judge (to witness)-"Do you know the nature of an oath?"

Witness-"Sah?"

Witness-"Yes, sah; I'm to swar to tell de truf.”

Judge And what will happen if you do not tell it?"

Witness-"I spects our side 'll win de case, sah."-Albany Express.

Lawyer-"I have my opinion of you." Citizen-"Well, you can keep it. The last opinion I got from you cost me $150."

There is a curious legal distinction recorded in "Sixth Henry," Chapter III.," of English law, in which "per margin," is the following:

"All persons born in Ireland shall de

are to swear to?"

cepted which remain in England.”