where he intends they shall remain until he gives further orders for their disposal. . . . In such a case, I have no doubt that the right of stoppage in transitu should be considered as at an end the moment the goods are thus deposited after a perfect entry for that purpose has been made."1

§ 1586.. "The mere fact," however, said Lowell, J., "that goods imported from abroad upon the order of a buyer have come into the hands of the officers of the customs, and have been by them put into a warehouse, the buyer exercising no acts of ownership over them, has been held not to terminate the transit." As stated by Chancellor Walworth in the case first referred to, "the removal of the goods from the vessel to

2

1 In Mottram v. Heyer (1846), 5 Denio (N. Y.), 629 [quoted in Cart wright v. Wilmerding (1862), 24 N. Y. 521, 537].

2 In Parker v. Byrnes (1871), 1 Low ell, 539, 18 Fed. Cas., p. 1119. Citing Burnham v. Winsor, 4 Fed. Cas. 784; Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. St. 301. To like effect: Sheppard v. Newhall (1893), 7 U. S. App. 544, 4 C. C. A. 352, 54 Fed. R. 306; Harris v. Hart (1857), 6 Duer (N. Y.), 606; Guilford v. Smith (1858), 30 Vt. 49, where the cases are fully reviewed. See also Jones on Liens, § 931 [citing Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613; Burnham v. Winsor, 5 Law R. 507, 4 Fed. Cas. 784; Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell, 539, 18 Fed. Cas. 1119: Burr v. Wilson, 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 478: Lewis v. Mason, 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 590; Ascher v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 36 id. 609; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 629; Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 76, 104; In re Bearns, 2 Fed. Cas., p. 1190, 18 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 500; Hoover v. Tib bits, 13 Wis. 79; Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. St. 301].

In Lewis v. Mason (1875), 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 590, supra, goods purchased

by M. in Hamilton were consigned to him by the sellers at Montreal, being delivered in bond to the railway. On their arrival at Hamilton on February 16th, they were placed in the customs warehouse and M. was notified, but allowed the goods to remain there without making entry or paying dues until May 23d, when the sellers gave notice of stoppage, as M. had become insolvent. M. had previously accepted the sellers' draft for the price, due June 14th, and they had discounted this at the bank; but they took it up at maturity and produced it at the trial. Held, that the stoppage was effectual as against M.'s assignees.

In Donath v. Broomhead (1847), 7 Pa. St. 301, supra, it was held that, to quote the language of the syllabus, "where goods shipped to a vendee arrived at their port of destination, and the vendee paid the freight and gave his note for the price, but the goods, in consequence of the loss of the invoice, were stored in the custom-house and remained there until the dishonor of the note, the vendor's right of stoppage remained."

the public store by the custom-house officers, until the consignees should entitle themselves to claim the possession and disposition of the goods by completing their entry by the payment of the duties, was merely substituting the public store in the place of the vessel as a place of deposit in the transmission of the goods to their place of destination; which place of destination was the place where the consignees expected to sell the goods, or to deposit them to await their further order and direction."1

§ 1587.. On the other hand, however, as has been stated, when the consignee has duly entered the goods and done all that is required of him in that regard, the transit is at an end.2 Such an entry, in the language of Ritchie, J., of the supreme court of Canada, is to be deemed "an acceptance of the goods by the consignee, and equivalent to taking actual possession of them; and the warehouse becomes the warehouse of the vendee, as between him and the vendor, and consequently the transitus, so far as the vendor is concerned, is at an end and his right of stoppage ceases to exist."3

§ 1588.

Goods in hands of local truckman.- The goods may still be in transit, though they have passed out of

1 In Mottram v. Heyer, supra. 2 Sheppard v. Newhall (1893), 7 U. S. App. 544, 4 C. C. A. 352, 54 Fed. R. 306, supra. In this case the goods were entered in the name of the purchaser, a bond for the payment of duties given and a warehouse receipt issued to the assignees before any attempt at stoppage. "In respect to these goods," said the court, "we have no difficulty in holding that the transit had ended before the attempt was made to stop them. . . They had left the hands of the carrier, and the place of their deposit was in no way connected with their transmission to the purchaser. They had reached their destination, and

the purchaser had by his personal and affirmative act disposed of the goods, and his assignees had given bond for the payment of the duties upon them and deposited them in his own name in a bonded warehouse, for which they held the warehouse receipt." Fraschieris v. Henriques, 6 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 251; Wiley v. Smith, 1 Ont. App. 179, and Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521, 537, were relied upon. See also Burdick on Sales, 234, citing Cartwright v. Wilmerding,supra; Lewis v. Mason, supra, and Wiley v. Smith (1877), 2 Can. Sup. Ct. R. 1.

3 In Wiley v. Smith, supra.

the hands of the carrier who brought them to the town or city of their destination, and are in the possession of a local truckman or other similar carrier for transportation to the buyer's place of business. Whether they are still in transit must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. If the buyer sends his own servant and truck for the goods and the servant receives them for the buyer, the transit is at an end. And so, it has been held, is the transit ended where the local carrier has general authority to receive and receipt for all goods coming for the buyer, or special authority to receive the particular goods in question, and does so receive and receipt for them.1

§ 1589.. But where, on the other hand, the goods are in the hands of the local carrier as a continuation of the original transit, as where, for example, the railroad company which

1 In O'Neal v. Day, 53 Mo. App. 139, a local carrier, acting under a previous general authority to receive all goods consigned to the buyer, received the goods in question at the freight office and took them to the buyer's store, but the buyer there refused to receive them because of a temporary inconvenience and directed them to be taken back to the freight office. This was done and the goods were then attached by the buyer's creditors. Held that, prima facie at least, the transit was at an end upon the receipt of the goods by the local carrier. Said the court: "If Johnson, the local carrier, was the agent of the attachment debtor, with full authority to receive and receipt for the goods, then upon the goods being delivered by the common carrier to Johnson, and upon his receipting for them, the transit was at an end. There is no pretense that the goods were to be delivered by the common carrier at the store, or at any other place but its depot; nor is there any

pretense that Johnson, in receiving and receipting for the goods, acted as agent of the common carrier. In White v. Mitchell, 38 Mich. 390 (post), and in Inslee v. Lane, 57 N. H. 454 (ante), where a delivery to a local carrier under similar circumstances was held not to terminate the transit, the vendee had absconded before the arrival of the goods, and it was held that his absconding at once put an end to the local carrier's authority to receipt for him. In Mason v. Wilson, 43 Ark. 172 (post), the vendee had notified the vendor before the arrival of the goods that he would not receive them on account of insolvency, which was held to terminate the authority of a local carrier to receive them for the vendee under a general authority to receive and receipt. The case of Macon, etc. Ry. Co. v. Meador, 65 Ga. 705, was decided under a clause of the Georgia code which provides that the right of stoppage in transitu continues until the vendee obtains actual possession of the goods."

brought the goods to the buyer's town maintains its own trucks for the delivery of goods to the places of business of the consignees, or where the railroad company voluntarily delivers the goods to some local carrier to be taken to the buyer, the transit would doubtless be held to continue while the goods were in the hands of such a carrier.1

§ 1590.. And so it has been held that the transit continues, notwithstanding a delivery to a local transfer company, acting under previous general orders from the consignee, where the local carrier receives them for conveyance merely and not as the agent of the buyer to receive and receipt for them.?

§ 1591. How when consignee refuses to receive goods. If the vendee refuse to receive the goods upon arrival, either because they do not fulfill the contract, or because, by reason of his insolvency, he is desirous of protecting the seller from loss, the right of stoppage will continue.

Upon this subject Mr. Benjamin' says: "The question now always turns upon the point whether - First, the buyer has left anything undone for the perfect transfer of the property to himself, in which case, the sale being incomplete, he may honestly decline to complete it to the prejudice of his vendor; or, secondly, whether, although the transfer of the property be complete, the transit into his possession remains incomplete, in which event he may honestly refuse the possession, so as to leave to his vendor the right of stoppage in transitu, which will be equally available to the latter if he can accomplish it before the assignees get possession of the goods."2

§ 1592. "In some early cases," says Mr. Benjamin further, "before the principles were well settled, countenance was given to the idea that a buyer might rescind a sale after its performance by the actual delivery of the goods into his possession, if the rescission was accomplished, and the goods returned to the vendor, before the buyer committed an act of bankruptcy;" but the ratio decidendi of these cases, he con

S. W. R. 68, 34 Am. St. R. 796, it was held that though the goods, by the direction of the buyer, were on drays in process of being carried from the railroad station to the purchaser's store, they were still in transit, and the seizure of them by the sheriff at the suit of the buyer's creditors could not defeat the right of stoppage.

1 Benjamin on Sales (6th Am. ed.), § 488. pp. 438, 439.

2. The different cases in which buyers have adopted this course, and thus kept unimpaired the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, are:" Atkin v. Barwick, 1 Str. 165, 10 Mod.

R. 432, Fortes. 353; Salte v. Field, 5 T. R. 211; Bartram v. Farebrother, 4 Bing. 579; Smith v. Field, 5 T. R. 402; James v. Griffin, 2 Mees. & Wels. 623; Siffken v. Wray, 6 East, 371; Heinekey v. Earle, 28 L. J. Q. B. 79, 8 E. & B. 410; Bolton v. Railway Co., L. R. 1 Com. Pl. 431; Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 Mees. & Wels. at p. 529.

3 Mr. Benjamin here refers to Atkin v. Barwick, supra; Alderson v. Temple, 4 Burr. 2235; Harman v. Fisher, 1 Cowp. 117, and Salte v. Field, supra.

In Grout v. Hill (1855), 4 Gray (Mass.), 361, it appeared that the buyer, learning of his insolvency be