Smith v. Moody and Others. It is objected, that if free colored persons, born within a particular State, and made citizens of that State by its constitution and laws, are thereby made citizens of the United States, then, under the second section of the fourth article of the constitution, such persons would be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and if so, that colored persons could vote, and be eligible not only to federal offices, but to State offices, even in States whose constitutions and laws disqualify colored persons from voting or being elected to office. This position rests upon a false assumption. Its basis is, that no one can be a citizen who is not entitled to all the privileges and franchises which are conferred on any citizen. This is not true under the constitution of the United States. The privilege of voting, and the legal capacity for office, are not essential to the character of a citizen, for women are citizens without either. A naturalized citizen cannot be President, nor a senator until after the lapse of nine years, nor a representative until after the lapse of seven years, from his naturalization. Yet, as soon as naturalized, he is a citizen. Indeed, in all the States, numerous persons, though citizens, cannot vote or hold office, on account of age, or sex, or the want of the necessary legal qualifications. By the act of congress of April 9, 1866, it is provided "that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right in every State and territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and Cox v. Behm. shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." There can be no doubt of the power of congress to pass this act. So far as it defines citizenship, it is declaratory. There is no attempt either to enlarge or abridge the right of citizenship. And so far as disabilities had been engrafted on slavery, or had grown out of the relation of master and slave, article thirteen of the constitution of the United States, abolishing slavery, confers express power on congress "to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." We think the court below erred in overruling the demurrer to the defendant's answer, and in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's reply. The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the demurrer to the answer, and for further proceedings. J. T. Dye and A. C. Harris, for appellant. Cox v. BEHM. SUPREME COURT.-ABSTRACT.-An appellant will be deemed to have waived all errors assigned by neglecting to comply with rule ten of the Supreme Court, requiring the appellant to furnish a complete abstract of so much of the transcript as is necessary to present the errors assigned and relied upon. SAME. The appellee cannot waive a compliance with the rule. SAME. An index to the record will not be accepted in place of the abstract. APPEAL from the Tippecanoe Circuit Court. RAY, J.-We have fully and carefully examined the record in this case and find no error; but the judges of The State on the relation of Alsop v. Husband and Others. this court deem it proper to affirm the case upon the ground that the appellant has waived the errors assigned, by his failure to comply with rule ten, requiring a complete abstract of so much of the transcript as is necessary to present the errors assigned and relied upon, to be filed by the appellant. The appellee cannot waive the filing of an abstract for the use of the court. It is the purpose of this court to enforce the rule, and an index to the record will not be accepted as an abstract. The abstract filed by the appellee in this case demonstrates the possibility of a full compliance with this rule. The judgment is affirmed with costs. H. W. Chase, J. A. Wilstach, D. Mace and B. F. Langdon, for appellant. S. A. Huff and R. P. DeHart, for appellee. THE STATE on the relation of ALSOP v. HUSBAND and Others. TOWNS.-ELECTion of Trustees.—Section three of the act providing for the incorporation of towns (R. S. 1843, p. 388) was intended to fix the term of office not only of the trustees first elected, but of their successors. DISSOLUTION OF TOWN CORPORATION.-As a method of dissolving the corporation is pointed out in section thirty of the act, whenever two-thirds of the inhabitants of the town shall desire such dissolution, the courts should not, upon a doubtful construction of the statute, resort to other methods of accomplishing the same result. APPEAL from the Posey Circuit Court. RAY, J.-An information was filed by an inhabitant of the town of New Harmony, in the name of the State of Indiana, against the appellees, charging that the said town The State on the relation of Alsop v. Husband and Others. was duly incorporated under the act of 1843, for the incorporation of towns, and that in the year 1864, the qualified voters of the town failed to elect trustees, and that on the day fixed by law for the annual election of trustees, in the succeeding year, the qualified voters of said town proceeded to exercise what they claimed as their charter right to elect trustees, and that the appellees, being then selected, claimed and exercised the powers belonging to such office. The prayer is that the corporation be declared dissolved, and that the appellees be enjoined from performing the duties of said office. A demurrer was sustained to the information. It is claimed that the failure to elect dissolved the corporation. The third section of the act of 1843, (R. S. 1843, p. 388) under which the trustees were elected, directing the method by which the first board of trustees should be selected, provides that each trustee "shall serve one year, and until his successor shall be chosen and qualified." The next section provides that an election shall be held annually, on the first Monday in May next after the first election. It is insisted on the part of the State, that the provision extending the term of office of trustees until their successors are elected and qualified is limited to the first board of trustees. If this were a proper construction, there would be no limit fixed by the statute to the term of office of their successors. The requirement that an election should be held on the first Monday in May, each succeeding year, does not determine when the persons so elected should qualify and take possession of their office. The third section of the act, alone, fixes the term of office, and that was plainly intended to apply alike to the trustees first elected and to their successors. The thirtieth section of the act provides that whenever two-thirds of the inhabitants of a town are desirous of dissolving the corporation, they may do so by following the method therein pointed out. The sole object in the establishment of such corporations being the welfare of the inhabitants of the town incorporated, and the statute having Williams v. The Franklin Township Academical Association. provided the method by which the corporation may be dissolved, whenever it fails to answer this purpose, in the opinion of the inhabitants, we will not, upon a doubtful construction of the statute, resort to other methods of accomplishing the same result, upon the motion of a single member of the community. The judgment is affirmed, at the cost of the relator. WILLIAMS V. THE FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP ACADEMICAL ASSOCIA TION. CORPORATIONS.-SUBSCRIPTIONS.-In a suit upon a subscription alleged to have been made to the stock of an existing corporation, organized under the laws of this State, where the name imports such a corporation as is authorized by law, a prima facie right to sue is shown without setting out the manner of the organization, or its specific objects. Page 313. HIGH SCHOOLS.-ACADEMIES.-The terms "high schools and academies," as used in the act of February 28, 1855, "to incorporate high schools," &c., have reference to the organization for the establishment, government and control of a school or seminary of learning, rather than to the mere erection of a building for such a purpose, and an association for the latter purpose, only, is not within the law. Page 314. SAME. Neither is an association for the building, merely, of a school house within the provisions of the act concerning voluntary associations. 1 G. & H., 672. Page 314. CORPORATIONS.-ESTOPPEL TO DENY EXISTENCE OF.-The rule that a person contracting with a corporation is estopped to deny the corporate existence is subject to the limitation that if the plaintiff assumes to be a corporation organized in this State, the name must be such as to imply such a corporation as is authorized by some statute of the State. Page 315. SAME. The rule does not apply to a suit upon a subscription of stock made with a view to the organization of a corporation, when other acts are re |