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purporting to establish such boundary at a line ten chains distant
from the line so flagged, and to stipulate that one of them will not
include in his filing any lands north of such line, nor the other in his
filing any land south thereof, and each thereafter files upon and ae-
quires title to the land he was entitled to acquire from the govern
ment, neither is estopped by such agreement from claiming all the
land included in his patent. (Cal.) Lewis v. Ogram, 151.

1.

See Navigable Waters.

BOYCOTTING.

See Injunctions, 8-10.

BUILDING CONTRACT.

See Principal and Surety.

CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
CONVEYANCES-Rescission

of for Mistake-Notwithstand-
ing Covenant for Title.-Although a vendee has a right to proceed
at law upon his covenants for title, he also has a right, when the
grantor has made a mistake in the description of the property con-
veyed, which he is unable to correct and which is material in its
character and affects the very substance of the transaction, to go
into a court of equity upon the ground of mistake, and have the
deed canceled and the purchase money refunded. (Va.) Lee v.
Laprade, 1021.

2. DEEDS-Cancellation for Mistake-Interest on Purchase
Money. If a deed is canceled on the ground of mutual mistake in the
description of the land conveyed, and a decree is rendered for the
repayment of the purchase money, the latter should bear interest
from the time when the mistake was discovered and demand made.
(Va.) Lee v. Laprade, 1021.

3. MISTAKE OF FACT, Canceling Contracts for.-Mutual con-
sent is requisite to the creation of a contract, and if there is a mis-
take of fact of one of the parties, going to the essence of the con-
tract, no agreement in fact is made, and equity will grant the
remedy of cancellation. (Ill.) Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 224.

4. MISTAKE OF FACT Due to Want of Care and Diligence.-
To warrant relief in equity because of a mistake of fact, it must not
have resulted from want of the care and diligence exercised by
persons of reasonable prudence under the same circumstances. (IL)
Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 224.

5. A MISTAKE Which will Justify Relief in Equity must affect
the substance of the contract, and not a mere incident or the induce-
ment for entering into it. (Ill.) Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 224.

6. MISTAKE OF FACT-Error in Adding Figures.-An error of
more than four hundred dollars in adding prices of articles correctly
set down on a paper, whereby the person for whom such adding was
made was caused to enter into a contract to furnish such articles for
a sum more than four hundred dollars less than if the adding had
been correct, is not a mistake of fact for which equity will cancel
the contract. (Ill.) Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 224.

CARRIERS.

Of Passengers.

1. RAILROADS-Duty to Passengers.-Railroad companies must
exercise the highest degree of care toward passengers on their trains,
and are liable for assaults committed upon them by employés. (Iowa)
Garvik v. Burlington etc. Ry. Co., 432.

2. RAILROADS-Liability for Rape by Employé.—A railroad
company is liable in damages for a rape committed by one of its
employés on one of its passengers. (Iowa) Garvik v. Burlington
etc. Ry. Co., 432.

Of Baggage.

3. CARRIERS-Sample Trunks as Baggage-Knowledge of Con-
tents. Courts take judicial notice of the fact that it is the general
custom of common carriers by rail to carry sample trunks with their
contents of merchandise as the baggage of traveling salesmen, but
not of the conditions or limitations, if any there be, under which
this is done, and it is not necessary to prove knowledge on the part
of the carrier or his agent of the contents of such trunks by evidence
of a direct statement made by the traveling salesman, or by other
direct evidence. Such fact may be inferred from the circumstances
of the transaction. (Minn.) McKibbin v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co.,
689.

4. CARRIERS-Baggage-Gratuitous Bailee.-A railway carrier
is not, as a matter of law, liable only as a gratuitous bailee of baggage
regularly checked, although the passenger owning it does not go on
the same train with it. (Minn.) McKibbin v. Wisconsin Central
Ry. Co., 689.

5.

CARRIERS-Baggage-Loss of Merchandise.—If a traveling
salesman regularly checks his sample trunks as baggage to a certain
point by railway, where they are destroyed through the carrier's neg-
ligence while in his station-house, the salesman may recover for their
loss, although he did not go on the same train with them, if he, in
good faith, intended to follow them on a later train. (Minn.) Mc-
Kibbin v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co., 689.

Of Goods.

6. CARRIERS-Liability for Loss by Delay-Negligence.-A
carrier is not permitted to invoke the act of God which destroys
goods while in transportation, as an excuse for unreasonable delay
and failure to deliver, when, if the carrier had discharged his duty, the
goods would not have been destroyed. (Ala.) Alabama Great South-
ern R. R. Co. v. Quarles, 54.

7. CARRIERS-Loss of Goods by Delay-Negligence-Act of
God. If a carrier is intrusted with goods for transportation and they
are lost, he is responsible therefor unless the loss was caused by the
act of God or the public enemy, and to avail himself of such exemp-
tion he must show that he was free from fault at the time. If there
is an unreasonable delay on the part of the carrier in forwarding the
goods and they are destroyed by the act of God during this delay, or
such delay causes their destruction, the carrier is liable. (Ala.)
Alabama Great Southern R. R. Co. v. Quarles, 54.

8. CARRIERS-Delay in Delivery-Conversion.-A failure by the
carrier to deliver goods within a reasonable time does not establish
a conversion but is a mere breach of contract, and the consignee

cannot refuse to accept the goods on the ground of the delay and
recover their full value, unless the delay destroyed the value of the
goods entirely, or caused what is equivalent to a total loss. A
mere delay being no conversion, the consignee must receive the goods,
although he at that time has no use for them, and he cannot refuse
to accept and recover their full value. (Ala.) Central of Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Montmollen, 58.

9. CARRIERS-Delay in Delivery-Missing Goods.-Although
there has been a delay in delivery of goods by a carrier, the mere
Iact that some of the articles shipped are missing does not justify
the consignee in refusing to receive, nor entitle him to maintain
action for failure to deliver. (Ala.) Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Montmollen, 58.

an

10. CARRIERS-Delay in Delivery-Damage to Goods-Burden of
Proof. In an action to recover for failure to deliver goods offered
to be delivered by the carrier and delivery refused, the damages re-
coverable are limited to those sustained to the goods together with
those arising from the delay in making delivery. (Ala.) Central of
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Montmollen, 58.

11.

CARRIERS-Delivery at Unusual Place-Waiver.-If a carrier
fails to deliver goods after the consignee has absolutely refused to
receive them, although delivery is sought to be made at an unusual
place, the consignee by such refusal waives the right to insist upon
delivery at the usual place. (Ala.) Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Montmollen, 58.

12. CARRIERS-Action by Commission Agent for Damages.-
When goods consigned to a commission agent are negligently delayed
in transit and converted by the carrier, so that sales previously made
by the consignee are canceled, he may in his own name recover dam-
ages on account of his lost commissions and also for the value of the
property. (Kan.) Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Peruvan Zandt Im-
plement Co., 468.

13. CARRIERS-Delay in Transit-Damages in Excess of Freight.
When a carrier negligently delays the delivery of goods so that the
damages thereby occasioned amount to more than the charges due
for transportation, the consignee may demand delivery without pay-
ing the freight, and the refusal of the carrier to surrender posses-
sion amounts to a conversion. (Kan.) Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Peruvan Zandt Implement Co., 468.

14. CARRIERS-Knowledge of Effect of Delay in Shipment.—
When a threshing-machine is consigned in June to an implement
dealer in Kansas, the carrier will be deemed to have notice that the
machine, if not already sold, is intended for immediate sale, and
that a delay until the close of the threshing season will defeat the
purpose of the shipment. (Kan.) Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Peru-
van Zandt Implement Co., 468.

15. CARRIERS-Damages for Delay in Shipment.-When ma-
chinery consigned to a commission agent is negligently delayed in
transit and converted by the carrier, so that sales previously made
by the consignee are canceled, the measure of damages in an action
for the loss of his commission and the value of the property is the
amount for which the sale had been made. (Kan.) Missouri Paciäs
By. Co. v. Peruvan Zandt Implement Co., 468.

See Constitutional Law, 12-16; Railroads; Street Railways.

CERTIORARI.

CERTIORARI-Questions Reviewable on.-The whole judg
ment of the lower court is reviewable on certiorari, though as to
one of the questions involved, it was decided not on its merits, but
because the case must necessarily find its way to the supreme court
on the other questions involved. (Mich.) Township of West Bloom-
field v. Detroit United Ry., 628.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

1. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Description, When Insufficient. The
description, "One 15 H. P. traction engine, Westinghouse make; one
O a 32x47 Westinghouse grain thresher, one Woods self-feeder main
drive belt wagon box elevator tank pump and hose," is insufficient in
a chattel mortgage made by a husband and wife, though the mortgage
describes the county of their residence, and no other threshing outfit
of the same number and style was in the county, as against one hav-
ing no actual notice of the mortgage, though it is of record, when it
does not expressly state which of the mortgagors owns the property.
(Iowa) Westinghouse Co. v. McGrath, 421.

2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Description-Constructive Notice.-
To constitute the record of a chattel mortgage constructive notice,
the description of the property must be sufficiently definite to direct
the mind of the searcher of the record to facts from which he may
ascertain the property with reasonable certainty. (Iowa) Westing-
house Co. v. McGrath, 421.

3. CHATTEL MORTGAGES not Satisfied by Substitution of Prop-
erty.—If a contract for the sale of a mule provides that the vendee
may return it and receive another in case it proves unsatisfactory,
such return and substitution do not satisfy the note and mortgage
executed by the vendee to the vendor for the purchase price at the
time of the original sale. (Ark.) Jones v. Wolfort, 101.

4.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES to Secure Future Advances.-A chat-
tel mortgage may be made to secure future advances which are in con-
templation of the parties at the time of the making of the mortgage,
and when the indebtedness to be secured, including the advances con-
templated, has been fully satisfied and discharged, the mortgage is can-
celed and extinguished by operation of law. Such a mortgage cannot,
however, by subsequent agreement between the parties, be made to
cover other advances not in contemplation at the time the mortgage
was made unless, possibly, such agreement amounts to a new mortgage
in parol. (Iowa) Wright v. Voorhees, 429.

5.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Future-acquired Property-Descrip-
tion.-A chattel mortgage covering "future acquisitions of the above-
described property" is not sufficient in description to cover all future
acquisitions of property by the mortgagor. (Iowa) Wright v.
Voorhees, 429.

CHECKS.

See Banks and Banking.

CHILD LABOR ACT.

See Constitutional Law, 18-24.

CLOUD ON TITLE.

See Taxation, 2-5.

Note.

COMMERCE.

See Constitutional Law, 12.

Commissioners and Referees, contempt, power of to punish, 957, 958.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Departments of Government and Their Functions.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-De Facto Legislature.-The acts of
a de facto legislature, so long as its members remain actual incum-
bents of their offices, are valid. (N. Y.) Sherrill v. O'Brien, 841.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Conferring Legislative Power on
Courts. A statute providing for the extension of the corporate
limits of cities and towns, designating the circuit judges of the state
in which the premises lie as the governmental agency for carrying
out the provisions of the statute, and conferring upon them the
power to determine the boundaries, and the necessity for and ex-
pediency of extending such limits, is not unconstitutional as con-
ferring legislative power on such courts. (Va.) Henrico County v.
City of Richmond, 1001.

Interpretation of Constitution.

3.

CONSTITUTIONAL and Statutory Construction.-Where a
Word in the Amendment or Re-enactment of a Constitution or Stat-
ute is Omitted, the omission must be assumed to have been inten-
tional. (N. Y.) Sherrill v. O'Brien, 841.

4.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Interpretation of Constitution by
Aid of Proceedings in the Constitutional Convention.-The courts may
properly look, when construing the constitution, to proceedings in
the convention proposing it. (N. Y.) Sherrill v. O'Brien, 841.

Constitutionality of Statutes.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The Authority of the Judicial De-
partment Both of the State and of the National Government to Deter-
mine the Validity of Legislative Acts is no longer an open question.
(N. Y.) Sherrill v. O'Brien, 841.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Presumption of Constitutionality,
and of Facts Required to Support a Statute.-The presumption is that
an act of the legislature is constitutional, and when this depends
upon the existence or nonexistence of some fact, or state of facts,
the determination thereof is primarily for the legislature, and the
courts will acquiesce in its decision, unless error clearly appears.
(Cal.) In re Spencer, 137.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A statute will not be declared
unconstitutional unless there is a clear violation of some explicit
provision of the constitution. (Va.) Henrico County v. City of
Richmond, 1001.

Liberty of Press.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Liberty of Press. A statute pro-
viding, among other things, that no account of the details of an
execution of a convict, beyond the statement of the fact that such
convict was on the day in question duly executed according to law,

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