and wife may enjoin the sale under the foreclosure by showing that
the land was their homestead and occupied by them as such at the
time of the execution of the mortgage. (Miss.) McDonald v. San-
ford, 758.

3.

HOMESTEADS-Encumbrances-Nonjoinder of Wife.-No
conveyance or mortgage of a homestead without the wife joining in
the conveyance is anything less than utterly void, and a foreclosure
of such mortgage without making her a party, if it shall result in
a decree of sale, results in a decree which is void, for the reason
that she was an essentially necessary party thereto. (Miss.) Me-
Donald v. Sanford, 758.

Self-defense.
1.

HOMICIDE.

HOMICIDE-Self-defense.-A blow from the hand or fist, un-
der ordinary circumstances, neither justifies nor excuses the use of
a deadly weapon, and it is for the jury to decide in a particular case
whether the facts thereof are within the ordinary reason or not.
(Ala.) George v. State, 17.

2. HOMICIDE.-Instruction that the jury may take into con-
sideration the relative weight, age, size, and physical condition
of two combatants terminating in a homicide, in determining whether
the defendant was at the time in imminent danger of loss of his life
or was exposed to great bodily harm, is erroneous as being argumen-
tative and as giving undue prominence to certain facts. (Ala.)
George v. State, 17.

3. HOMICIDE-Self-defense-Threats.-If the other elements of
self-defense exist and the deceased has made threats against the de-
fendant, which have been communicated to him, he has the right to
act upon any overt act or hostile demonstration which may have led
to the honest belief that he was in imminent peril, although such act
or demonstration may not have amounted to a felonious assault.
(Ala.) George v. State, 17.

Evidence.

4. HOMICIDE-Evidence.-A declaration by the deceased that
he was cut is admissible in evidence although he did not state who
cut him. (Ala.) George v. State, 17,

5. HOMICIDE-Evidence-Threats.-General threats made by a
person accused of homicide having no reference to the deceased are
not admissible in evidence, against him. (Ala.) George v. State, 17.

6. EVIDENCE-Dying Declarations of Husband-Proof of by
Widow. On the trial of one for homicide the dying declarations of
the deceased, made under a sense of impending death, may be proved
by his widow. (Ky.) Bright v. Commonwealth, 590.

Verdict.

7. MURDER-Verdict Begging Mercy-Sentence.-A verdict in a
murder case that "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged
and beg the mercy of the court," followed by a sentence of death,
the court being silent as to the plea for mercy, cannot be sustained.
(Miss.) Avant v. State, 737.

8. MURDER-Clouded Verdict.-The legal effect of a verdict in a
murder that "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged
and beg the mercy of the court," is to impose the death sentence;

but, in such case, the court should require the jury to remove the
cloud from the finding and make the meaning of the verdict plain.
(Miss.) Avant v. State, 737.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Interest of Spouses in Each Other's Property.

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Descent and Distribution.-Husband
and wife, by virtue of the marital right, have each a contingent in-
terest in the other's property, which, in the event of death, becomes
fixed in the survivors, and which can be abridged or taken away
only to the extent stipulated in a marriage settlement. (Ind. App.)
Unger v. Mellinger, 348.

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Conveyances of Inchoate Rights.-
The inchoate interest of husband or wife in the other's property can-
not be conveyed without conveyance of the property of the other.
(Ind. App.) Unger v. Mellinger, 348.

Antenuptial Contracts.

3. MARRIAGE-Antenuptial Contracts.-An antenuptial contract
providing that, in consideration of the contemplated marriage, and
the release and relinquishment by the intended husband of all his
rights and interests in the property of his intended wife, she agrees
to provide from her estate, after her death, an annual income to him
so long as he should remain unmarried, is not in restraint of marriage,
but only a limitation on the duration of the income at the election of
the husband, and is therefore valid. (Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby,

709.

4. MARRIAGE-Antenuptial Contracts-An Antenuptial Con-
tract providing that, in consideration of the contemplated marriage,
and the release and relinquishment by the intended husband of all his
rights and interests in the property of his intended wife, she agrees
to provide, from her estate, an annual income to him so long as he
shall remain unmarried, provided the parties were, at the time of the
death of the wife, living and cohabiting together as husband and
wife, does not tend to induce a separation between husband and wife,
and is therefore valid. (Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

- Antenuptial

5. MARRIAGE
Contracts Consideration. - An
agreement to marry is a sufficient consideration to support an ante-
nuptial contract definitely fixing the property rights of the parties.
(Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

6. MARRIAGE-Antenuptial Contracts-Consideration. Although
an original engagement to marry is absolute and entered into some
months before the execution of an antenuptial contract between the
parties, the agreement to marry remains as a sufficient consideration
to support such contract. (Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

7. MARRIAGE.-Antenuptial Contract cutting off the homestead
right of the husband and his statutory one-third interest in his wife's
property is valid. (Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

8. MARRIAGE.-Antenuptial Contracts in anticipation of mar-
riage, equitably and fairly entered into, exclude the operation of law
in respect to the property rights, so that so far as the contract ex-
tends, it, and not the law, furnishes the measure of such rights.
(Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

9. MARRIAGE-Antenuptial Contracts.-A valid antenuptial con-
tract respecting the property rights of the parties fully performed

by one of them after the marriage and before her death, will not
be declared void at the instance of the surviving husband merely
because one of the provisions of the contract might be so construed
as to have justified the one performing in adopting a course before
her death that would have rendered the contract inoperative. (Minn.)
Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

10. MARRIAGE-Antenuptial Contracts-Wills.-A valid antenup-
tial contract definitely settling the property rights of the parties so
far as the husband is concerned is a sufficient assent on his part to
the provisions of the will of his wife, disposing of the remainder
of her property in trust to a charity, especially when the terms of
the will are in substantial compliance with the contract. (Minn.)
Appleby v. Appleby, 709.

11. MARRIAGE-Antenuptial Contracts-Wills.-If an antenuptial
contract in favor of the contemplated husband definitely settling the
property rights of the parties is fully performed after the marriage,
the wife has the right to dispose of the remainder of her property
by will in trust for a charity, and in so doing she does not violate
the statutes against uses and trusts. (Minn.) Appleby v. Appleby,
709.

12. HUSBAND AND WIFE—Antenuptial Settlements Considera-
tion.-Marriage furnishes a consideration for an antenuptial agree-
ment, which will be effective to control the marital right of each in
the estate of the other, although the statute may provide a different
rule. (Ind. App.) Unger v. Mellinger, 348.

Postnuptial Settlements.

13. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Postnuptial Settlements-Considera-
tion.-Marriage furnishes no consideration for a postnuptial settle-
ment. (Ind. App.) Unger v. Mellinger, 348.

14. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Postnuptial Settlements Considera-
tion. A postnuptial promise by a husband to release his wife's
property from any claim of marital right is no consideration for a
promise by his wife to release her marital rights in her husband's
property. (Ind. App.) Unger v. Mellinger, 348.

15. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Postnuptial Settlements.—A post-
nuptial agreement by a husband to release his claim of marital rights
in his wife's property, in consideration that she release her marital
rights in his property, is executory and without consideration, and
may be disregarded by either. (Ind. App.) Unger v. Mellinger, 348.
Liability of Wife for Harboring Dogs.

16. DOGS.-A Married Woman cannot be Charged with Harboring
a dog "as owners usually do" under proof showing no more than that
the dog belonged to her husband, and that she allowed it to remain
on the home premises, the legal title to which was in her. (Iowa)
Burch v. Lowary, 443.

17. DOGS Married Women as Owners of.-A married woman who
owns her own home, and permits dogs belonging to her husband to re-
main on the premises, is not liable as their owner or as harboring
them as owners usually do" for injuries caused by them to one driving
along the public highway. (Iowa) Burch v. Lowery, 443.

Criminal Conversation.

18.

CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-Trial-Instructions.-If, in an
action for criminal conversation, the charge of the court makes the

whole case turn upon the sole question of whether the defendant
was guilty of the act of intercourse alleged, and the defendant dis-
claimed any theory of conspiracy, and the jury finds for the plain-
tiff, a refusal to charge that collusion cannot be inferred from cer-
tain facts appearing in the case is not prejudicial to the plaintiff.
(Mich.) Smith v. Hockenberry, 615.

19. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-Condonation-Mitigation of
Damages. In an action to recover for criminal conversation, the fact
that the plaintiff has continued to live and cohabit with his wife
after learning of the wrong may be considered in mitigation of dam-
ages. (Mich.) Smith v. Hockenberry, 615.

20. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-Evidence of Character of
Wife-Mitigation of Damages.-In an action to recover for criminal
conversation, evidence tending to show the criminal intimacy of plain-
tiff's wife with other men, her association with women of bad repute,
and of her general reputation for chastity, is admissible in mitiga-
tion of damages. (Mich.) Smith v. Hockenberry, 615.

21. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-Evidence of Character of
Wife-Mitigation of Damages. In an action for criminal conversa-
tion, evidence that plaintiff's wife consulted counsel in regard to
bringing suit before plaintiff did, offered solely for the purpose of
showing the depravity of plaintiff's wife and as tending to show that
the alleged criminal conversation was brought about by her under
circumstances indicating that discovery was expected, is admissible
in mitigation of damages. (Mich.) Smith v. Hockenberry, 615.

22. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-Evidence. In an action for
criminal conversation a female witness having testified to seeing the
defendant and plaintiff's wife in a compromising situation, it may
be shown that such witness had stated that there was an understand-
ing between herself and plaintiff's wife to get money out of the
defendant. This is not collateral matter, but bears directly upon the
truthfulness of the witness, and tends to show a conspiracy. (Mich.)
Smith v. Hockenberry, 615.

Note.

Ill-fame, illustration of contracts void as being connected with the
maintenance of houses of, 510-512.

sale of goods to be used in houses of, 509, 510.

In General.

INJUNCTION.

1. INJUNCTION-Denials of Averments of a bill upon which the
right to injunctive relief is based do not necessarily demand the re-
fusal of the writ, and they may be disregarded when the respondent
does not assert a right to commit the acts sought to be enjoined. In
all cases the comparative injuries which may result to the contending
parties by granting or refusing to grant the writ may be considered.
(Colo.) People v. Tool, 198.

To Restrain Shooting.

2. INJUNCTION Against Shooting-Increased Hazard-Nuisance.
As the hazard from the use, or threatened use, of dangerous instru-
mentalities, such as shotguns, to land owners increases, the responsi-
bility of the persons employing them becomes stricter and may
amount to an insurance of safety, and all remedial resources of law
and equity may be exercised to prevent such peril to person or prop-

erty, or to prevent conduct likely also to result in a breach of the
peace. (Minn.) Whittaker v. Stangvick, 703.

3. INJUNCTION Against Use of Shotguns.-Shooting shotguns over
another's land, so as to cause considerable damage, and impair the
value of the land owner's shooting privileges, is such a wrong as may
be restrained by injunction. (Minn.) Whittaker v. Stangvick, 703.
To Restrain Crime.

4. INJUNCTION to Restrain Crime.-Suits for injunction may
be maintained by private parties to restrain crimes when their eom-
mission will injuriously affect their property rights. (Colo.) People
v. Tool, 198.

5. INJUNCTION to Restrain Crime.-The state may, by injune-
tion, restrain the commission of a crime when its interests or the
interests of those entitled to its protection, are injuriously affected.
(Colo.) People v. Tool, 198.

6. INJUNCTION to Restrain Conspiracy.—Individuals cannot
invoke the power of a court of equity to enjoin a conspiracy to
commit illegal acts affecting the entire state, but the state, in its
Sovereign capacity, as parens patriae, has a right to enjoin the com-
mission of such acts and protect its citizens when they are incompe-
tent to act for themselves. (Colo.) People v. Tool, 198.

7. INJUNCTION at Suit of State.-When Acts, Though Consti-
tuting Crime, will interfere with the liberties, rights and privileges of
citizens, the state not only has the right, but it is its duty, to re-
strain by injunction the commission of such acts. (Colo.) People v.
Tool, 198.

To Restrain Boycotting.

8. BOYCOTTING, Injunction Against.-An injunction will issue
against members of a local union of stablemen to prevent their con-
tinuing a boycott carried on by them by means of pickets or repre-
sentatives in front of complainant's place of business, carrying
placards, for the purpose and having the effect of intimidating em-
ployés and patrons of complainant from entering his place of busi-
ness. (Cal.) Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 145.

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Statutes Undertaking to Forbid an
Injunction Against Boycotting.-If a statute may be construed as
prohibiting the courts from enjoining acts in the nature of boycotting,
and which are done for the purpose and have the effect of intimidating
complainant's patrons and employés from entering his place of busi-
ness, such statute must be pronounced void as violative of his right
to acquire, possess, enjoy and protect property. (Cal.) Goldberg,
Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 145.

10. INJUNCTION Against Boycotting, When too Comprehensive.
An injunction against members of a stablemen's union engaged in an
unlawful boycott must not assume to restrain them from mere ex-
pressions of opinion as to complainant and his business, which, at
most, consist of slander which could not be reached in the suit in
equity, nor from doing other acts not connected with or incidental
to the main acts and therefore acts properly enjoined, and the judg
ment will be modified on appeal by striking out the matters properly
enjoined. (Cal.) Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 145,
See Contempt; Elections, 3-5; Exemptions, 2; Garnishment; Nuisance,
1; Taxation, 2-6.