of persons conspiring for the purpose of injuring the business of another may legally do acts tending to accomplish that result. It is averred in the complaint that in the case at bar, and for the purpose above stated, and with intent to threaten and intimidate employés and patrons and customers of plaintiff, the said defendants do keep immediately in front of plaintiff's place of business, and threaten to so keep there, representatives and pickets bearing the placards and transparencies above set forth, and that by said means they have intimidated patrons and customers of plaintiff from entering said place of business, and will, if not restrained, continue to so intimidate the said patrons. It cannot be successfully contended that the said acts of defendants committed immediately in front of plaintiff's place of business as aforesaid, could not, in the nature of things, have had the effect of intimidating plaintiff's patrons, and as it is averred that they did have that effect, the fact of such intimidation must, for the purposes of this case, be considered as established. And such acts, having such effect, undoubtedly interfered with and violated plaintiff's constitutional right to acquire, possess, defend and enjoy property. In many cases cited in respondent's brief a "boycott"' was enjoined without reference to the means used to carry it into effect; as, for instance, in Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' etc. Union, 72 Fed. 695, it was held that "A boycott by members of trades unions as assemblies (which term in law implies a combination to inaugurate and maintain a general proscription of articles manufactured by the party against whom it is directed) is unlawful and may be enjoined by a court of equity." But there is no necessity to go that far in the case at bar; here the alleged acts tended directly to intimidate customers, and did intimidate them. That in such a case the threatened acts will be enjoined has been frequently held. In Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable 433 Lodge, 111 Fed. 264, the court said: "That a conspiracy existed among a number of these officers and members to stop and thereby injure the business of complainant by intimida tion and violence is evident. . . . These being the facts in the case, the law is clear and emphatic. The jurisdiction being established, is there any doubt as to whether the court should, in this case, grant the temporary injunction prayed for? I am clear there is not. As now presented, the court must grant the writ, in broad and unmistakable terms, com

mensurate with the exigencies of the situation, as shown by the facts and evidence upon this proceeding. To do so will work no hardship, nor will it even hamper the actions of any law-abiding person. Indeed, no one without purpose to commit an unlawful act could be affected thereby." In United States v. Haggerty, 116 Fed. 510, the court said: "This court, however, has heretofore, upon repeated occasions, recognized the power of the court to issue injunctions in cases where there is a combination and conspiracy upon the part of any class of people to prevent them from interfering with the business of others." In Frank v. Herrold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 52 Atl. 152, the court said: "Now, then, I think it is quite clear from what I have said that these defendants had no right to use the means which are forbidden by the restraining order now brought in question to prevent these operatives from continuing to work for the complainants, and that in doing so they are inflicting an injury upon the complainants, in respect to their private rights, precisely the same as they would if they broke, interfered with or clogged the engine that drove their machinery, and that for such injury the complainants are entitled to a legal remedy by action. Now, this being so, the next question is, What right have the complainants here in this court asking for the restraining power of the court? Why, the answer to this is twofold: First, it is quite clear that the relief in damages to be recovered in an action at law is entirely inadequate. It is quite absurd to say that they can sue each of these persons, and recover damages against them in separate suits, for every little act which in the aggregate tends to result in an injury. And, in the second place, the injury is continuing and irreparable, and not capable of admeasurement according to legal principles. So that at law the remedy is entirely inadequate. It 434 is, therefore, a clear case for the interposition of a court of equity to exercise its preventive remedy, and that is the particular sphere at this day of a court of equity, as contradistinguished from a court of law." There are many other cases to the same effect decided in England, and in many of the American states. Appellants cite Davitt v. American Bakers' Union, 124 Cal. 99, 56 Pac. 775; but in that case it was merely held that the complaint was defective because it dealt wholly in "generalities, presumptions and conclusions," and stated no "specific overt acts" done for the purpose of

carrying out the alleged conspiracy. That case, therefore, does not apply to the case at bar, for here the specific acts are alleged.

Appellants make the bare statement, without argument, that "an injunction in this case is also specifically forbidden by Penal Code, page 581." The section of an act of the legislature there referred to is somewhat difficult of construction; but, in the first place, it cannot, in our opinion, be construed as undertaking to prohibit a court from enjoining the main wrongful acts charged in the complaint in this action; and, in the second place, if it could be so construed, it would to that extent be void because violative of plaintiff's constitutional right to acquire, possess, enjoy and protect property.

It is contended by appellants that the judgment rendered in this case is too comprehensive, and enjoins them from doing some acts which are not within the averments of the complaint, or within the principle, even if conceded to be correct, upon which the court below based its conclusion. We think that this contention must be sustained, to the extent at least as is hereinafter stated. Some parts of the judgment seem to enjoin appellants from the mere expression of an opinion at any time or place as to plaintiff and its business, which would, at the worst, consist only of slander, which could not be reached in this form of action, and seem to restrain them from doing other things which do not appear to be connected with or incidental to the main acts and threatened acts done at and in front of plaintiff's said places of business as above stated. The judgment must, therefore, be modified so as to eliminate those objectionable parts.

The judgment, after the first paragraph thereof, is amended 435 and modified so as to read as follows: "Now, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760 of San Francisco, T. F. Finn, T. J. White, and all and each of the defendants herein, and each of their officers, members, agents, clerks, attorneys, and servants be, and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from interfering with, or harassing or obstructing plaintiff in the conduct of its business at any of its said places of business No. 432 Pine street, No. 232 Sutter street, and No. 965 Sutter street in the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, by causing any agent or agents, representative or repre

sentatives, or any picket or pickets, or any person or persons, to be stationed in front of or in the immediate vicinity of said places of business, with a placard or transparency having on it the words and figures as alleged in the complaint herein, or any placard or transparency (having words or figures) of similar import, and from, at said places of business, or in front thereof, or in the immediate vicinity thereof, by means of pickets or transparencies, or otherwise, threatening or intimidating any person or persons transacting or desiring to transact business with said plaintiff, or being employed at said place or places by the plaintiff." And as thus amended and modified the judgment will stand affirmed.

Shaw, J., Lorigan, J., Sloss, J., Angellotti, J., Henshaw, J., and Beatty, C. J., concurred.

Boycotting is the subject of a note to Gray v. Building Trades Council, 103 Am. St. Rep. 488. The subject is further considered, with special reference to conspiracies, in the recent cases of Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 110 Am. St. Rep. 248; Purrington v. Hinchliff, 219 IlÍ. 159, 109 Am. St. Rep. 203, and cases cited in the cross-reference note thereto. If a labor union attempts to injure a person in his business in order to coerce him into submission to the demands of such union, requiring him to furnish the capital and his business to be controlled in its essential features by such union, which is in no way responsible for the capital invested or the losses entailed, such attempt is a conspiracy, and equity will restrain such interference by injunction: Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Pa. 348, 112 Am. St. Rep. 757. Strikes and strikers are discussed in the note to O'Neill v. Behanna, 61 Am. St. Rep. 706.

LEWIS v. OGRAM.

[149 Cal. 505, 87 Pac. 60.]

BOUNDARY, Agreement Undertaking to Establish What the Parties Know not to be Correct.-An agreement between coterminous owners, though in writing, undertaking to establish as a boundary between their lands a line which they know not to be the true boundary will not be enforced. If its object is to pass the title to land, it cannot be conceded that effect unless it contains apt words of conveyance. (p. 154.)

AGREEMENT to Establish Boundary, When Without Consideration. An agreement purporting to establish the boundary between the lands of coterminous proprietors at a line where both know such boundary is not, and the result of which, if it is given effect, must be to transfer to the one lands which both know do not belong to him, ie without consideration and inoperative. (pp. 155, 156.)

ESTOPPEL, When not Created by an Agreement Purporting to Establish a Boundary Line. If two persons having the right to acquire title to adjoining tracts of public land, the boundary between which, as both know, has already been flagged by a government surveyor, but not finally located, enter into an agreement in writing purporting to establish such boundary at a line ten chains distant from the line so flagged, and to stipulate that one of them will not include in his filing any lands north of such line, nor the other in his filing any land south thereof, and each thereafter files upon and acquires title to the land he was entitled to acquire from the government, neither is estopped by such agreement from claiming all the land included in his patent. (p. 156.)

William G. Griffith, for the appellant.

B. F. Thomas, for the respondent.

506 SHAW, J. Lewis sued Ogram to recover damages for trespass on land alleged to be in his possession, described as the north half of the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 23, township 5, range 28. Ogram filed a cross-complaint in the usual form to quiet his alleged title against the claims of plaintiff. Issue was joined upon the averments of the complaint and cross-complaint, respectively, and after a trial the court gave judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

The southwest quarter of section 14 lies north of and adjoins the northwest quarter of section 23. The official United States survey of the boundary line between the sections was not completed until February, 1900. In April, 1897, Lewis was residing upon the southwest quarter of section 14, and Ogram was residing upon the northwest quarter of section 23, each claiming the right, under the United States land laws, to file a homestead claim upon his particular tract when open for entry. The location of the division line between the two tracts was at that time uncertain, but both parties supposed it to be about ten chains south of the true line as afterward surveyed and established. Lewis was occupying all that part of the actual northwest quarter of section 23, lying between this supposed line and the true line, embracing substantially the north half of said forty-acre tract, claiming and believing, until 507 August, 1898, that it was a part of the southwest quarter of section 14, and that it was covered by his entry. In August, 1898, the government surveyor, at Ogram's request and with the knowledge of Lewis, "flagged" a line through between the two sections, on or near the true line, and set a post at the common section corner thus located at the west end line. The court