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reason that, although the two statutes related to the same general subject, they did not cover the same ground and were not inconsistent with each other.
The court thus emphasized the general principle involved (supra, p. 148): “It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested. This court has said-and the principle has been often reaffirmed—that 'in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.'” And in the course of its review of the subjects embraced in the Federal legislation the court said (pp. 149, 150):
“Still another subject covered by the act is the driving on foot or transporting from one State or Territory into another State or Territory, or from any State into the District of Columbia, or from the District into any State, of any live stock known to be affected with any contagious, infectious or communicable disease. But this provision does not cover the entire subject of the transporting or shipping of diseased live stock from one State to another. The owner of such stock, when bringing them into another State, may not know them to be diseased; but they may, in fact, be diseased, or the circumstances may be such as fairly to authorize the State into which they are about to be brought to take such precautionary measures as will reasonably guard its own domestic animals against danger from contagious, infectious or communicable diseases. The act of Congress left the State free to cover that field by such regulations as it deemed appropriate, and which only incidentally affected the freedom of interstate commerce. Congress went no farther than to make it an
offence against the United States for any one knowingly to take or send from one State or Territory to another State or Territory, or into the District of Columbia, or from the District into any State, live stock affected with infectious or communicable disease. The Animal Industry Act did not make it an offence against the United States to send from one State into another live stock which the shipper did not know were diseased. The offence charged upon the defendant in the state court was not the introduction into Colorado of cattle that he knew to be diseased. He was charged with having brought his cattle into Colorado from certain counties in Texas, south of the 36th parallel of north latitude, without said cattle having been held at some place north of said parallel of latitude for at least the time required prior to their being brought into Colorado, and without having procured from the State Veterinary Sanitary Board a certificate or bill of health to the effect that his cattle--in fact, were free from all infectious or contagious diseases, and had not been exposed at any time within ninety days prior thereto to any such diseases, but had declined to procure such certificate or have the inspection required by the statute. His knowledge as to the actual condition of the cattle was of no consequence under the state enactment or under the charge made.
“Our conclusion is that the statute of Colorado as here involved does not cover the same ground as the act of Congress and therefore is not inconsistent with that act; and its constitutionality is not to be questioned unless it be in violation of the Constitution of the United States, independently of any legislation by Congress.
In Asbell v. Kansas, supra, the plaintiff in error had been convicted under a statute of the State of Kansas which made it a misdemeanor to transport cattle into the State from any point south of the south line of the State, except for immediate slaughter, without having first
Opinion of the Court.
caused them to be inspected and passed as healthy by the proper state officials or by the bureau of animal industry of the Interior Department of the United States. The court held that the statute was a valid exercise of the power of the State unless it were in conflict with the act of Congress. It appeared that since the decision in Reid v. Colorado, supra, Congress had provided that where an inspector of the bureau of animal industry had issued a certificate that he had inspected live stock and found them free from communicable disease they should be transported into any State or Territory without further inspection or the exaction of fees of any kind, except such as might be required by the Secretary of Agriculture. But as the law of Kansas recognized the Federal certificate, a conflict with the act of Congress was avoided, and hence the conviction under the state law was sustained.
Applying these established principles to the present case, no ground appears for denying validity to the statute of Indiana. That State has determined that it is necessary in order to secure proper protection from deception that purchasers of the described feeding stuffs should be suitably informed of what they are buying and has made reasonable provision for disclosure of ingredients by certificate and label, and for inspection and analysis. The requirements, the enforcement of which the bill seeks to enjoin, are not in any way in conflict with the provisions of the Federal act. They may be sustained without impairing in the slightest degree its operation and effect. There is no question here of conflicting standards, or of opposition of state to Federal authority. It follows that the complainant's bill in this aspect of the case was without equity.
Other objections urged by the bill to the validity of the statute, save so far as they may be deemed to involve the questions that have already been considered, have not been pressed in argument and need not be discussed.
Recurring to the contention that the product of the complainant is not within the statute, it is evident that, assuming the validity of the enactment, the complainant showed no ground for resorting to equity, as the nature of the composition must be determined according to the fact in the course of due proceedings for that purpose. The demurrer was properly sustained.
STANDARD STOCK FOOD COMPANY v. WRIGHT,
STATE FOOD AND DAIRY COMMISSIONER
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.
No. 222. Argued April 24, 1912.-Decided June 10, 1912.
Savage v. Jones, ante, p. 501, followed to effect that it is within the
police power of a State to prevent imposition upon the public and
to that end to require the disclosure of ingredients of food for stock. Where the fair import of the provisions of a state police statute is
that the fees exacted are for necessary expenses of inspecting an article properly the subject of inspection, and the bill alleges no facts warranting a conclusion that the charges are unreasonable as compared with the cost, this court will not condemn the statute
as an unconstitutional revenue measure. One attacking a state statute as unconstitutional must show that he
is within the class whose constitutional rights are invaded, and one admittedly doing a large business cannot be heard on the plea
that the act discriminates against those doing a small business. The Iowa statute of 1907 regulating the sale of concentrated commer
cial feeding stuff is not unconstitutional as depriving vendors of such stuff of their property without due process of law, or because it is a revenue measure in disguise.
225 U. S.
Argument for Appellant.
THE facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of the provisions in the statutes of Iowa relative to sale of feed for stock, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. F. H. Gaines, with whom Mr. E. G. McGilton, Mr. Sidney W. Smith and Mr. A. L. Hager were on the brief, for appellant:
The tax imposed is a license fee and therefore void as a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489; American Fertilizer Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. Rep. 609; Lee Co. v. Webster, 190 Fed. Rep. 353.
To require a manufacturer or one importing goods into a State to pay a tax before he has the right to sell his products within the State, is a tax on interstate commerce, and such legislative enactment of a State is void. Lyng v. Michigan, -135 U. S. 161. See, also, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; McColl v. California, 136 U. S. 104; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; Dooley v. United States. 183 U. S. 151.
The Iowa statute specifically requires manufacturers, dealers, importers, etc., without the borders of the State, to pay into the state treasury $100 each year before he is permitted to sell or offer for sale his products within the State. This is so clearly an attempt to levy a tax upon interstate commerce for the privilege of doing such business within the State, that no attempt will be made to sustain it, except on the assumption that such tax is an inspection fee, and therefore valid as an exercise of the police power of the State.
The statute nowhere contemplates an inspection of complainant's products before sale, and hence the license fee cannot be sustained upon the ground that it is to cover the cost of inspection. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38.