Chapter v. by a committee appointed to inquire into the state of the gaols, that Sir W. Rich, a prisoner in the Fleet, had been misused by the warden of the Fleet, in consequence of evidence given by the former to the committee. The house declared, nem. con., that the warden was guilty of contempt, and committed him to the Serjeant-at-arms.1

On the 10th May, 1733, complaint was made that Jeremiah Dunbar, Esq., had been censured by the House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay, for evidence given by him before a committee on a bill, upon which the house. resolved, nem. con., "That the presuming to call any person to account, or to pass a censure upon him, for evidence given by such person before this house, or any committee thereof, is an audacious proceeding, and a high violation of the privileges of this house." 2

In 1819, Thomas Stinton, a soldier examined before the Worcester Election Committee, was arrested by the sergeant of his regiment, in the lobby, for absenting himself from drill. There were, however, other circumstances in the case, which induced the house not to regard this as a breach of privilege.3

On the 2nd July, 1845, Mr. Jasper Parrott complained to the house, by petition, that an action had been commenced against him in respect of evidence which he had given before a committee. The plaintiff and his solicitors, having been ordered to attend, disclaimed any intention of violating the privileges of the house, and declared that the action. would be discontinued. They were, in consequence, discharged from further attendance, although the commencement of the action was declared to be a breach of privilege. It is worthy of remark, that the plaintiff's solicitor stated, in a petition to the house, that the declaration had been framed upon the assumption that a witness would not be protected, by privilege, in respect of any evidence which was wilfully and maliciously false, any

121 C. J. 247.

2 22 ib. 146.

3 39 H. D. 1 s. 1168. 1226.

100 C. J. 672. 680. 697; 81 H. D. 3 s. 1436.

The direc

tors of the

Railway

Company.

more than the powers of the superior courts at Westminster Chapter V.
would be exerted to protect any witness from an indict-
ment for perjury. The house, however, did not recognize
any such analogy: but resolved to protect the witness.
from all proceedings against him, in respect of the evidence
given by him before a committee.

In the same year, a similar case occurred in the House
of Lords. Peter Taite Harbin had brought an action, by
John Harlow, his attorney, against Thomas Baker, for
false and malicious language uttered before the House of
Lords, in giving evidence before a committee. On the 14th
July, the plaintiff and his attorney were summoned to the
bar, and on their refusal to state that the action should
not be proceeded with, were both declared guilty of a
breach of privilege, and committed.1

tion of re

mittees, see

On the 7th April, 1892, a member of the house, who was Cambrian a director of the Cambrian Railway Company, attended the house, in his place, and two other directors and the manager of the company, at the bar, under an order of the house made in consequence of a special report from the select Consideracommittee on Railway Servants (Hours of Labour). The ports from committee reported that, in the course of their inquiry, it select com. came to their knowledge that allegations were made that p. 420. certain persons had been reduced or dismissed from the service of the company, in consequence of the evidence they had given before the committee, and that in the case of one person, John Hood, he was dismissed by the company mainly in consequence of charges arising out of the evidence. given by him before the committee. The committee also reported that the manager of the company laid the evidence relating to John Hood before the directors of the company, and that they, the directors of the company then present, when John Hood asked for a re-hearing of the case, called him to account, and censured him for the evidence which he gave before the committee, in a manner calculated to deter other railway servants from giving evidence before a committee of the house.

1 82 H. D. 3 s. 431. 494.

withdraw.

Chapter V. The member was heard in his place, in behalf of himself and the other directors and the manager of the Cambrian Railway Company, and stated that they had not the slightest intention of deterring any railway servant from giving evidence before the committee; and that if they had, by the course they had adopted, unintentionally infringed any of the rules or privileges of the house, they asked the house to accept the unqualified expression of their regret; and one of the directors expressed his entire concurrence with Members to the member's statement. They then withdrew; and the see p. 330. house resolved that, while recognizing that the directors and manager of the company had disclaimed any intention. to deter any railway servant from giving evidence before its committee, and had expressed their unqualified regret for having unintentionally infringed any of its rules and privileges, the house was of opinion that they had committed a breach of the privileges of the house in their action towards John Hood, and that they be called in and admonished by Mr. Speaker for the breach of privilege that they had committed. The directors and the manager were accordingly called in, the member standing in his See formal place, and the other directors and manager standing at the bar, and received the admonition of the Speaker; which, by the order of the house, was entered upon the journal.1

Admoni

tion, see p.

94.

motions, p.

215.

The privilege of protection from molestation in respect Protection of what they have stated professionally, is also extended to counsel. to counsel. On the 21st March, 1826, complaint was made that an insulting letter had been written by John Lee Wharton to Mr. Fonblanque, K.C., in relation to a speech Mr. Fonblanque. made by him, at the bar of the House of Lords, on the 16th March. Mr. Wharton attended, according to order, and on making a proper submission and apology, was discharged. from further attendance.2

to Parlia

And apart from the protection afforded by privilege, it Statements appears that statements made to Parliament in the course ment not of its proceedings are not actionable at law. In Lake v.

actionable.

1 147 C. J. 166.

P.

2 58 L. J. 128. 145.

K

Admissible

as evidence.

King,1 which was an action upon the case for printing a Chapter V.
false and scandalous petition to the committee of Parlia-
ment for grievances, it was agreed by the court, "that the
exhibiting the petition to a committee of Parliament was
lawful, and that no action lies for it, although the matter
contained in the petition was false and scandalous, because
it is in a summary course of justice, and before those who
have power to examine whether it be true or false. But
the question was, whether the printing and publishing of it,
in the manner alleged by the defendant in his plea," viz.
by delivering printed copies to the members of the com-
mittee, "according to custom used by others in that behalf,
and approved of by the members of the said committee,"
was justifiable or not? Judgment was given for the de-
fendant, by Hale, C.J., upon the ground, "that it was the
order and course of proceedings in Parliament to print and
deliver copies, whereof they ought to take judicial notice."

In Rex v. Merceron, an indictment against a magistrate
for misconduct in his office, in having corruptly granted
licences to public-houses, which were his own property, it
was proposed, in behalf of the prosecutor, to prove what had
been said by the defendant, in the course of his examination
before a committee of the House of Commons, appointed
for the purpose of inquiring into the police of the metropolis.
The defendant had been compelled to appear before this
committee, and had, upon examination, delivered in a list
of certain public-houses, with the names of the owners and
other particulars. On the part of the defendant it was
objected, that since this statement had been made under a
compulsory process from the House of Commons, and under
the pain of incurring punishment as for a contempt of that
house, the declarations were not voluntary, and could not
be admitted for the purpose of criminating the defendant:
but Abbott, C.J., was of opinion that the evidence was
admissible.2

11 Saunders' Reports, 131 b; 1 Lev. 240; 2 Keb. 361. 383. 462. 496. 659. 801. See also 2 Inst. 228, as to

evidence before a jury being privi-
leged.

2 2 Starkie's Nisi Prius Cases, 366.

Chapter
VI.

Table of Contents, see Introduction.

Considera

tion of matters of privilege, see p. 270.

CHAPTER VI.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF LAW IN MATTERS

OF PRIVILEGE.

of the

THE precise jurisdiction of courts of law in matters of privi- Difficulty
lege, is one of the most difficult questions of constitutional question.
law that has ever arisen. Upon this point the precedents
of Parliament are contradictory, the opinions and decisions
of judges have differed, and the most learned and experienced
men of the present day are not agreed. It would, therefore,
be presumptuous to define the jurisdiction of the courts, or
the bounds of parliamentary privilege: but it may not be
useless to explain the principles involved in the question;
to cite the chief authorities, and to advert to some of the
leading cases that have occurred.

stated

It has been shown already (see p. 59), that each house Principles of Parliament claims to be sole and exclusive judge of its own privileges, and that the courts have repeatedly acknowledged the right of both houses to declare what is a breach of privilege, and to commit the parties offending, as for a contempt but, although the courts will neither interfere with Parliament in its punishment of offenders, nor assume the general right of declaring and limiting the privileges of Parliament, they are bound to administer the law of the land, and to adjudicate when breaches of that law are complained of. The jurisdiction of Parliament, and the jurisdiction of the courts, are thus liable to be brought into conflict. The House of Lords, or the House of Commons, may declare a particular act to have been justified by their order, and to be in accordance with the law of Parliament; while the courts may decline to acknowledge the right of one house to supersede, by its sole authority, the laws which have been made by the assent, or which exist with the acquiescence, of all the branches of the legislature. It is