Chapter See also v. Gosset. In giving judgment upon the case of Bradlaugh v. Gosset, Bradlaugh Mr. Justice Stephen affirmed the principle that the House of Commons has the exclusive power of interpreting a statute, "so far as the regulation of its own proceedings within its own walls is concerned; and that even if that Attorneygeneral v. interpretation should be erroneous, this court has no power Bradlaugh, to interfere with it directly or indirectly." He moreover P. 167. stated that "a resolution of the house, permitting Mr. Bradlaugh to take his seat on making a statutory declaration, would certainly never have been interfered with by this court," and that "if we had been moved to declare it void, and to restrain Mr. Bradlaugh from taking his seat until he had taken the oath, we should undoubtedly have refused to do so." The judge, however, declared that " on the other hand, if the house had resolved ever so decidedly that Mr. Bradlaugh was entitled to make the statutory declaration instead of taking the oath, and had attempted by resolution or otherwise to protect him against an action for penalties, it would have been our duty to disregard such a resolution, and if an action for penalties were brought, to hear and determine it according to our own interpretation of the statute "1 (see also p. 145). adverse to With these conflicting opinions as to the limits of parlia- Judgments mentary privilege, and the jurisdiction of courts of law, if claims of privilege. either house of Parliament insist upon precluding other courts from inquiring into matters which are held to be within its own jurisdiction, the proper mode of effecting that object, is the next point to be determined. If the courts were willing to adopt the resolutions of the house as their guide, the course would be clear. The authority and adjudication of the house would be pleaded, and the courts, acting ministerially, would at once give effect to them. But Stockdale v. Hansard, and Howard 1 12 Q. B. D. 280. See also the act committed within the walls of Case of Sir W. Williams. VI. if the court regards a question of privilege as any other Chapter Having opened the principles of the controversy respect- Sir William Williams, Speaker of the House of Commons, in the reigns of Charles II. and James II., had printed and published, by order of the house, a paper well known in the histories of that time as Dangerfield's Narrative. This paper contained reflections upon the Duke of York, afterwards James II., and an information for libel was filed against the Speaker, by the attorney-general, in 1684. He pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court, that as the paper had been signed by him, as Speaker, by order of the House of Commons, the Court of King's Bench had no jurisdiction over the matter. On demurrer, this plea was overruled, and a plea in bar was afterwards made, but withdrawn; his plea, that the order of the house was a justification, was set aside by the court, without argument, as "an idle and insignificant plea ;" and he was fined 10,000l. Two thousand pounds of VI. Chapter this fine were remitted by the king, but the rest he was obliged to pay. The Commons were indignant at this contempt of their authority, and declared the judgment to be an illegal judgment and against the freedom of Parliament. It was also included in the general condemnation by the Bill of Rights, of "prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench for matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament."1 ham. The next important case is that of Jay r. Topham, in 1689. Jay v. TopAfter a dissolution of Parliament, an action was brought in the Court of King's Bench against John Topham, Esq., Serjeant-at-arms, for executing the orders of the house in arresting certain persons. Mr. Topham pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court the said orders: but his plea was overruled, and judgment given against him. The house declared this judgment to be a breach of privilege, and committed Sir F. Pemberton and Sir T. Jones, who had been the judges in the cause, to the custody of the Serjeant-at-arms. They had protested, in their examination, that they had not questioned the legality of the orders of the house, but had overruled, on technical grounds, the plea to the jurisdiction. They averred also, that if there had been a plea in bar, the defendant would have been entitled to a judgment. Assuming the truth of their statements, it has been generally acknowledged that these proceedings against the judges were liable to great objection. Lord Ellenborough said, that it was surprising "how a judge should have been questioned, and committed to prison by the House of Commons, for having given a judgment which no other judge who ever sat in his place could have differed from." And Lord Denman, in Stockdale v. Hansard, said that this judgment was righteous, and that the judges "vindicated their conduct by unanswerable reasoning;" and again, in Howard v. Gosset, he called the commitment of these judges "a flagrant abuse of privilege:" but, on the other hand, Lord Campbell has pointed out that there had been a plea in bar, which had VI. been overruled, as stated in the petition of Topham to the Chapter The remarkable cases of Ashby and White, and the Ayles- At a later period a series of cases arose, in which the authority of the House of Commons, and the acts of its officers, were questioned. They have caused so much controversy, and have been so fully debated and canvassed, that nothing is needed but a succinct statement of the 110 C. J. 104. 227; 12 Howell, St. Tr. 829. 831; Stockdale 1". Hansard, Proceedings as printed by the House of Commons, 1839 (283), 76. 149; 2 Lives of the Ch. Justices, Chapter proceedings, and a commentary upon the present position of parliamentary privilege and jurisdiction. VI. papers; v. Hansard. Messrs. Hansard, the printers of the House of Commons, Printed had printed, by order of that house, the reports of the in- Stockdale spectors of prisons, in one of which a book published by John Joseph Stockdale was described in a manner which he conceived to be libellous. He brought an action against Messrs. Hansard, during the recess in 1836, who pleaded the general issue, and proved the order of the house to print the report. This order, however, was held to be no defence to the action but Stockdale had a verdict against him upon a plea of justification, as the jury considered the description of the work in question to be accurate. On that occasion Lord Chief Justice Denman, who tried the cause, made a declaration adverse to the privileges of the house, which Messrs. Hansard had set up as part of their defence. In his direction to the jury, his lordship said "that the fact of the House of Commons having directed Messrs. Hansard to publish all their parliamentary reports is no justification for them, or for any bookseller who publishes a parliamentary report containing a libel against any man." In consequence of these proceedings, a committee was appointed, in 1837, to ascertain the law and practice of Parliament in reference to the publication of papers, printed by order of the house. The result of these inquiries was the passing of resolutions by the house, declaring that the publication of parliamentary reports, votes, and proceedings was an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parliament; that the house had sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine upon the existence and extent of its privileges; that to dispute those privileges by legal proceedings was a breach of privilege; and that for any court to assume to decide upon matters of privilege inconsistent with the determination of either house of Parliament was contrary to the law of Parliament.1 Stockdale, however, immediately commenced another action, and the house, instead of acting upon its resolutions, directed Messrs. Hansard to plead, and the attorney-general 1 92 C. J. 418. |