1. Narrative, explaining the course of events which led to the raising of the question to be discussed; or

2. Reflective, shewing (a.) that the subject is important, curious, or otherwise interesting; or (b) that it has been neglected, misunderstood, or misrepresented hitherto.

*

** Some high authorities in Rhetoric have recommended that, though the introduction stands first in the theme, it should be written last; that is, after the mind has become thoroughly imbued with the subject, and has satisfied itself as to the goodness of its case.

79. The Proposition, or statement of the case, should leave no doubt as to the question to be discussed, or the particular point to be proved. This need not be a stiff or formal announcement, like the enunciation of a proposition in Euclid, though it is necessary that it should have that definite shape in the writer's mind. Care must be taken to limit the field of discussion to the special point at issue, and to avoid vagueness or generality in referring thereto. In doing this, however, it must be remembered that a term is not a proposition, and that in treating of a term we are usually apt to be more vague and general than in discussing a proposition. For example, when treating of such a subject as "happiness," we may adopt any one of a number of different lines of thought, and be as discursive as we please; but in discussing such points as "wherein happiness consists," or "whence our notions of it arise," we have definite questions proposed to which we must return specific answers.

80. The Proof, or statement and enforcement of the arguments in support of the proposition, forms the main part of an argumentative theme, and therefore requires the greatest attention. Several points here call for consideration, of which the chief are these:-1. The different kinds of arguments; 2. Their comparative force and value; and 3. The order in which they should be introduced. Of these separately.

81. Arguments have been divided by Whately into two general classes, viz. :—

I. Such as would account for the fact or principle maintained, were its truth admitted.

II. Such as would not account for the fact or principle. The

former he calls the à priori argument; the latter comprises two classes, (a.) signs (including testimony), (b.) examples (including experience, analogy, &c.); e. g., when we infer that A murdered B, from the fact that he hated him and had an interest in his death, we use an argument of Class I., because, supposing A's guilt admitted, these circumstances would be sufficient to account for his having done the deed. When we infer that A murdered B, from the fact that A's clothes are bloodstained, we use an argument of Class II., for supposing A's guilt proved, the bloody clothes would not account for his having done the deed, though they would be accounted for thereby.

82. Though this classification is scientifically accurate, and appropriate in an advanced treatise on Rhetoric, a more popular division of arguments will better serve the purpose of the present work. They may be classified as follows:

1. Argument from Probability:

E.9.

States a cause to prove the probability of an effect.
Alleges hatred and interest to prove the probability of
murder.

Plausibility is a weaker form of this argument.

2. Argument from Necessity:—

(1.) States an effect to prove its necessary cause.

E. g.,

States the appearance of ice to prove that the temperature is below the freezing point.

(2.) States a fact to prove a necessary condition of it. E.g., Alleges that A died on Saturday to prove that he was alive on Friday.

3. Argument from Testimony:

Also states a fact to prove a condition. E. g., States A's testimony to a fact, to prove the truth of the fact. Had the fact not occurred, A could not have testified to it. The truth is a condition of the testimony.

4. Argument from Possibility :

States an effect to prove a possible cause. E. g., Alleges blood-stained clothes to prove murder.

5. Argument from Example:

Applies an individual case to the whole class, or to another

individual case. When the argument stops short at the general conclusion, or whole class, it is called Induction. E. g., Astronomy was denounced as hostile to religion. Induction; Every science is likely to be denounced as inimical to religion. Example; Geology is likely to be so denounced.

6. Argument from Analogy:

Adduces one instance of a relation to prove the probability
of another instance of that relation. The case is the
same as example if we regard the "whole class" as the
relation, including the two individual instances of its
Occurrence. It must be carefully noted that the analogy
is not between things but between the relations of
things. As proportion in numbers is "an equality of
ratios," so analogy is "an identity of relations.'
E. g.,

bird: egg
= plant: seed; and egg: young bird seed:
young plant. Analogy, Whatever is true of one of these
relations, may be expected to be true of the correspond-
ing relation.*

Exercise 27.

Assign each of the following Arguments to its proper class, and precisely explain its nature:—

1. From the burning of Mexico in September 1812, we infer that it existed in August 1812.

2. From the presence of a mortal wound in a dead body, we infer violent death.

3. From misfortune and unhappiness we infer suicide.

4. From the gospel history we argue the truth of miracles.

5. From the appearance of smoke we infer the presence of fire.

*The above classification may be shewn to be co-extensive with the classifications both of Aristotle and of Whately.

1, corresponds with Aristotle's first class, ɛizóra, proofs of probability. 2, 3, 4, correspond with his second class, onusia, signs or symptoms. 5, 6, correspond with his third class, Tagadeiyuara, examples. Whately's Class I. again corresponds with Aristotle's first, and his Class II. with Aristotle's second and third.

6. From the queen's being on the throne, we conclude that she is a Protestant.

7. From strychnine poisoning a dog, we infer, first, that it will poison all animals; secondly, that it will poison man.

8. From the revival of nature in spring, we infer the probability of the continuance of life beyond the grave.

9. From the universality of moral distinctions, we infer the divine origin of conscience.

10. From the ruins of a hut on a desert island, we infer the presence at some time of man.

11. Since young children omit the particles of speech, and Anglo. Saxon poetry does the same, we infer that their poetry belonged to the infancy of the nation.

12. From the possession of stolen property we infer theft.

13. From malice we infer incendiarism.

14. Since the abuse of supreme power led to a revolution in England, we infer (1.) that the abuse of supreme power is likely always to lead to a revolution, and (2.) that it is likely to lead to a revolution in Austria.

15. From the appearance of infinite design in the world, we infer an omnipotent Designer.

16. Since the adaptation of means to ends proves a designer in a watch, we argue that the adaptation of means to ends proves a designer in the world.

17. From finding A's clothes on the brink of a river, we infer that he has drowned himself.

18. From the benevolence of God in this world, we infer that he will be benevolent in the next.

19. From the gradual acceleration of motion by the gradual removal of resistance, we conclude that, if there were no resistance, motion would be perpetual; hence the law of vis inertiæ.

20. Since virtue leads to happiness, we argue that vice will lead to misery.

Exercise 28.

Give three Examples of each kind of Argument.

83. The value of the different arguments varies somewhat according to the different purposes for which they are used. They may be employed, as was stated above (§ 75), either to instruct those who have no fixed opinion on the subject, or to convert those of a contrary opinion. As a general rule, the argument from probability will be found to give most satisfaction to an unbiassed mind. For effecting a change of opinion,

the other kinds of argument are generally considered the most forcible. Of the latter, that from necessity is the weightiest and most conclusive. The deducing either of a necessary cause or a necessary condition from the existence of their effects, is, as is evident from the examples given above (§ 82, 2), not only warrantable, but inevitable. The argument from probability cannot of itself be a conclusive proof, though it is often of advantage to be able to prove that the truth of our proposition is possible, as, when supported by testimony or example, it may lead to extreme probability, if not complete demonstration. The argument from testimony, like that from possibility, to which it is closely allied, is mainly of force in establishing past facts; but it involves the question of the credibility of witnesses, which must be separately established, by internal consistency or by example. In the case, however, of a plurality of witnesses on the same point, this is not necessary, as the mere concurrence of their testimonies, provided there has been no collusion, is of itself a strong proof of truthfulness. Testimony is also admitted in matters of opinion, and is forcible in proportion as the men whose opinions are quoted are recognised as wise and honourable. Example is chiefly serviceable in establishing the likelihood of future events. It is not excluded, however, says Whately, "from the proof of matters of opinion; since a man's judgment in one case may be aided or corrected by an appeal to his judgment in another similar case."* It is on this principle, he points out, that we are enjoined to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us, and that we ask our heavenly Father to forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us; that is, in judging how we should treat others, we form to ourselves a supposed similar case, in which we change places with our neighbour. This then becomes our example in arriving at the judgment in question. The difference between example used as argument, and example used merely for the sake of illustration, must be carefully noted, as the confounding of these two uses of it leads often to misapprehension, and weakens the proof. The same distinction is to be observed in the use of analogy, which is indeed a species