a decree for the Government; and the Circuit Court of Appeals, taking a like view of the evidence, affirmed the decree. 194 Fed. Rep. 59.

The rule is well settled that findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts will not be disturbed by this court unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 14; Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24; Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Association, 209 U. S. 20, 23; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana, 232 U. S. 338. Applying the rule to the evidence in this case, we think the findings below should not be disturbed.

Only two of appellant's contentions merit special notice. Without any uncertainty the evidence demonstrated that the lands were known to be valuable coal lands when the homestead entries were made and commuted, and that the affidavits and proofs to the contrary, upon which the patents were procured, were false. Not only were the lands in a well known coal region and generally reputed to be coal lands, but a tunnel, slope and other openings upon them, costing about $8,000, had disclosed that they contained coal of such quality and quantity as to render them valuable for coal mining. The entrymen so understood, and resorted to severe measures to keep coal prospectors off the lands.

The appellant's chief contention is, that there was no evidence, or at least no substantial evidence, that it took the title with notice or knowledge of the fraud perpetrated by the entrymen. But the record shows otherwise. The appellant's vice-president, who represented it in the negotiations, had theretofore, as agent of another company, learned that the latter was interested in the coal development work before mentioned and was, with others, bearing the expense of that work with a view to acquiring the lands as coal lands. This was recalled to his mind at the time of the negotiations. He caused the section to be

examined by an engineer, who found and reported the tunnel and other openings disclosing the coal, and, following that report, the transaction was consummated on the theory that the lands were valuable for their coal contents. There was no claim that there was any development work or coal discovery after the entries were made, and it is quite apparent from what was said of the engineer's report that the tunnel and openings gave visible evidence that they were not recently made. Of course, the appellant was bound to take notice that the patentees with whom it was dealing had obtained the lands under the homestead law, for it was so recited in the patents. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 437. In these facts there was, as we think, persuasive evidence that the appellant took the title with notice or knowledge of the fraud.

It is contended also that the proceedings resulting in the patents were not ex parte but adversary; that the land officers found the lands to be agricultural in character, and that this finding was conclusive upon the Government. No doubt those officers found from the proofs submitted to them that the lands were agricultural and not coal lands, for that was a prerequisite to issuing the patents, but the proceedings were not adversary in any true sense of the term. The applications and proofs of the entrymen were strictly ex parte. The Government was not called upon to make any adverse showing, no issue was framed, no hearing was had, and no one represented the Government save in the sense that the land officers did so. As this court has often held, the findings of the land officers in such a proceeding, although not open to collateral attack, are not conclusive against the Government when it sues to cancel the resulting patent upon the ground that it was obtained by means of false and fraudulent proofs. United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233; McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 504, 509, and cases cited. In such

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

234 U. S.

a suit the action of the land officers is given appropriate effect by treating it as presumptively right and as requiring the Government to carry the burden of proving the fraud by that class of evidence which commands respect and that amount of it which produces conviction. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U. S. 236, 239.

Decree affirmed.

NEW ORLEANS & NORTHEASTERN RAILROAD CO. v. NATIONAL RICE MILLING CO.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 615. Argued February 27, 1914.-Decided May 25, 1914.

Where the judgment of a state court rests upon an independent ground not only adequate to sustain it but in entire harmony with an asserted Federal right, there is no denial of that right in the sense contemplated by § 237 of the Judicial Code, and the writ of error will be dismissed.

Where the initial carrier sets up the Carmack Amendment and also denies negligence, but the state court finds from conflicting evidence that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the connecting carrier, the judgment rests on that finding as an independent ground, and this court has not jurisdiction.

A party is entitled to the benefit of all the testimony in the case from whatever source it comes; and, although having the burden of proof, need not prove any fact otherwise established.

Writ of error to review 132 Louisiana, 615, dismissed.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of a state court within § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. J. Blanc Monroe, with whom Mr. John K. Graves and Mr. Monte M. Lemann were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The sole issue in the case is not merely an issue of fact; nor is the Federal question frivolous.

The judgment of the lower court does not rest upon a question of general law, broad enough to sustain it, so that the decision of the Federal question is unnecessary.

In support of these contentions, see Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Maryland, 20 Wall. 643; Creswill v. Grand Lodge, 225 U. S. 246; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Elam v. St. Louis &c. R. R. Co., 93 S. W. Rep. 851; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592; International R. R. Co. v. Gergman, 64 S. W. Rep. 999; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Albers Com. Co., 223 U. S. 573; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79; Mackay v. Dillon, 4 How. 421; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589; Memphis R. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Schlemmer v. Buffalo &c. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 1; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Terre Haute v. Indianapolis &c. Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 579.

Mr. W. Catesby Jones, with whom Mr. Gustave Lemle and Mr. Arthur A. Moreno were on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action to recover the value of two cars of rice destroyed by fire in August, 1908, while being transported over connecting railroads from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Charleston, South Carolina. The rice was shipped upon through bills of lading issued by the initial carrier and was destroyed while in the second carrier's custody at Old Hamburg, South Carolina. The two cars, with others VOL. CCXXXIV-6

containing quicklime, were side-tracked in the yard at that place awaiting further movement towards their destination. The yard adjoined the Savannah River, which was then almost out of its banks and steadily rising as a result of extraordinary rains and cloudbursts extending up the river and its tributaries one hundred miles. The waters continued to rise, spread over the yard to a considerable depth, and ultimately reached the quicklime, thereby causing the cars to burn and destroying the rice. The cars had been in the yard about sixteen hours when the fire started. The action was against both carriers, and it was alleged in the petition, which based the right of recovery upon the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 595, c. 3591, §7), that the loss of the rice was caused by the negligence of the second carrier, and that the two carriers were jointly liable. Issue was joined, and, after a trial, the district court of the parish rendered a judgment against the carriers jointly and in solido, which the Supreme Court of the State at first reversed and then, after a rehearing, affirmed. 132 Louisiana, 615; 61 So. Rep. 7C8. The carriers sued out this writ of error, basing their right so to do upon a claim that by the judgment of affirmance they were denied a right or immunity asserted under a law of the United States.

A motion to dismiss was presented along with the merits, and we think it is well taken.

The bills of lading contained these stipulations:

"This company or other carriers over whose line the property may pass, shall not be held responsible for loss or damage [unless through proved carelessness or negligence of their employés] resulting from heat, cold, fire, flood, storms, mobs or other causes not subject to the carrier's control.

"Neither this company nor any of its connecting carriers shall be liable for any damage to, or destruction of