chauffeur were required only to exercise ordi- 350(2) (Tex. Civ. App.) Vernon's Sayles'
nary care was erroneous, in view of Motor Ve-
hicles Act, § 12, subd. 9, requiring the highest
degree of care, notwithstanding a proper in-
struction requiring a very high degree of care.
-Davis v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 218
S. W. 357.

Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1985, providing that
the court shall "submit all the issues made by
the pleading," and article 1984a, providing for
submitting upon request "special issues raised
by the pleadings and the evidence," require the
court to submit only the ultimate controlling
296(12) (Ky.) In an action by a passenger issues necessary to a judgment on the pleading,
for injuries, it was not error to refuse defend- and not subordinate issues necessarily embrac-
ant's request to define negligence, where the ed in the finding of the ultimate issue, so that,
court instructed the jury to find for defendant. if answers in a special verdict dispose of the
unless they believed from the evidence that controlling issues, judgment may be rendered
when plaintiff was leaving the car, and before thereon, although all issues are not answered.
she was clear of it, defendant's employés negli--Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Downing, 218
gently and carelessly started the car; circum- S. W. 112.
stances stated by the instruction itself consti- 350(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where question of
tuting the negligence_causing the injuries. possession had been fully and clearly submit-
South Covington & C. Ry. Co. v. Goldsmith, 218 ted, the court did not err in refusing to submit
S. W. 286.
special issues as to whether either of the par-
ties had held exclusive or joint possession of
the land in question; the statute on submission
of special issues not contemplating that evi-
dentiary matters be submitted.-Vaello v. Rod-
riguez, 218 S. W. 1082.

IX. VERDICT.

(A) General Verdict.

court's duty to submit all issues of fact to the
jury, under Rev. St. 1911, art. 1985, yet, if
there was no request for a submission of the
issues, the court itself could make a finding on
it.-Friemel v. Coker, 218 S. W. 1105.

329 (Mo.App.) Where, in suit against own-
er and city for injuries due to fall on icy side-351(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Although it was the
walk, the owner's only request was for a per-
emptory instruction in his favor, which instruc-
tion was not read, a verdict against the city
only, there being no finding as to the owner,
was not responsive to the issues and does not
sustain judgment (Rev. St. 1909, § 2097), on
theory that court sustained owner's demurrer
to the evidence.-Proctor v. Garman, 218 S. W.
910.
330(1) (Ky.) In libel action where an orig-
inal petition charged a publication of alleged
libelous article, and amended petitions charged
the mailing of such article to various persons,
separate verdicts should be rendered, one on the
original petition and one on the charges in the
amended petitions.-Baker v. Clark, 218 S. W.
280.

Where the court submitted an issue whether a
landlord's eviction of the tenant damaged the
tenant by depriving him of pasturage lands, the
tenant, if he desired a fuller statement of the
law in connection with the submitted issue,
should have requested it.-Id.

352(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In a bank's suit on
a note, the larger of two, claimed to have been
signed and delivered as a renewal of the small-
er, defendant maker, claiming that he had sign-
ed the larger note in blank, and that the cash-
ier of the bank had fraudulently filled in the
amount without authority, the issues submit-
ted whether the larger note was delivered as
a renewal, and whether it was fraudulently
filled out without defendant maker's authority,
were plain and sufficient.-Goree v. Uvalde Nat.
Bank, 218 S. W. 620.

333 (Mo.App:) Where, in an action for as-
sault, the court told the jury to find for plain-
tiff if he was assaulted and seriously injured,
and to find for defendant if plaintiff received no
injuries, a verdict finding the issues for plain-
tiff and assessing his punitive damages at $500,
and "for actual damages none," was contradic-352(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action under the
tory, and no judgment could be rendered there- federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp.
on-Lindstrom v. Kansas City Southern Ry. St. §§ 8657-8665) for the death of a fireman in
Co.. 218 S. W. 936.
a derailment caused by an open derail switch,
the court properly refused to submit to the
jury the inquiry, "Do you find from the evidence
that deceased, situated as he was, either saw or
should have seen the derail open in time to
have, by the exercise of ordinary care, request-
ed the engineer to stop the train, or so lessen-
ed its speed that the engine would not have
been derailed, or the tank would not have been
overturned, and the said M. would not have
been killed?" there being no evidence that the
open switch could have been seen in time to
have stopped the train.-Hines v. Mills, 218 S.
W. 777.

339(3) (Mo.App.) Where, in an action for
assault, the jury found for plaintiff, but also
found that he had sustained no actual damage,
and assessed merely punitive damages, the
court should have sent the jury back, with in-
structions to return a proper verdict, and, fail-
ing to do this, should have granted a new trial.
-Lindstrom v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.;
218 S. W. 936.

(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings.

349(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In a jury trial it was
reversible error to refuse to submit the case on
special issues, on request therefor before the
general charge had been submitted, and after
objections thereto had been overruled, in view
of Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art.
1984a; such statute being mandatory.-Jackson
v. Martin, 218 S. W. 4.

350(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) If under the evidence
an answer requiring a different judgment from
that rendered might have been made by the
jury to questions refused to be presented, re-
fusal of court to submit such issue was error.
-Lancaster v. Campbell, 218 S. W. 550.

355(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action against
railroad for loss of cattle through openings in
fence on railroad's right of way, where jury,
in answer to special issue as to whether 17
head of cattle had escaped through openings
complained of, had answered "Yes; at least 10
head," answer of jury in response to issue as
to reasonable value of "said cattle," if former
question was answered in the affrmative, of
certain amount, without specifying as to wheth-
er such amount was for 10 or 17 head of
cattle, was sufficient on which to base judgment,
in view of the pleadings, evidence, and instruc
tions of the court, warranting verdict for such
amount for loss of 10 head.-Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Baker, 218 S. W. 7.

350(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) In a bank's suit on
a note, where the trial court had sufficiently
defined where the burden of proof on the is-
sues rested, it did not err in refusing defend-356 (5) (Tex.Civ.App.) If answers in a
ant's requested special issue, whether the bank
had shown by a preponderance of evidence that
the note renewed by that in suit was execut-
ed by defendant or by his authority.-Goree v.
Uvalde Nat. Bank, 218 S. W. 620.

special verdict dispose of the controlling is-
sues, judgment may be rendered thereon, al-
though all issues are not answered.-Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Downing, 218 S. W.
112.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

357 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action against rail-erty which is transferred or conveyed to anoth-
road for loss of cattle through openings left er.-Vaello v. Rodriguez, 218 S. W. 1082.
in plaintiff's fence, where special issue submit-77 (Tex.Civ.App.) No resulting trusts can
ted question of whether the 17 head of cattle be created without proof of the payment of the
alleged in plaintiff's petition escaped through purchase money at the time the property is se-
opening, with the requirement that jury an- cured.-Vaello v. Rodriguez, 218 S. W. 1082.
swer yes or no, answer of "Yes; at least 1079 (Ark.) To establish a resulting trust in
head," held sufficiently responsive.-Gulf, C. & favor of one contributing money to purchase
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 218 S. W. 7.
land, it must be clearly shown that the whole
366 (Tex.) An objection that evidence was purchase money was paid by such person, or
insufficient to support a special issue submitted that the purchase was of some definite interest
in the main charge held not to be a mere com- or determinate aliquot part of the property.
plaint that said special issue ought not to have-Gordon v. Claridy, 218 S. W. 195.
been submitted to the jury.-Electric Express 81(1) (Ky.) Where three attorneys repre-
& Baggage Co. v. Ablon, 218 S. W. 1030.

sented plaintiff's in an action for the recovery of
lands, and, after judgment for the plaintiffs,
two of the attorneys, with knowledge of the
lien of the third, obtained a conveyance of coal
rights under the lands, held that such attorneys
of the third attorney.-Charles v. Whitt, 218 S.
became trustees for the preservation of the lien

X. TRIAL BY COURT.
(A) Hearing and Determination of Cause.
370(2) (Ky.) In a purely equitable action
court does not abuse its discretion in refusing
a jury trial, as, in any event, verdict would be
only advisory.-Quinn v. Hendren, 218 S. W.89(1) (Ark.) Evidence that wife furnished

1022.

(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

396(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try
title based on delivery of a deed to plaintiff's
decedent by his mother, where it appeared that
plaintiff's decedent requested his mother to
deed him certain property, and the mother be-
fore signing the instrument added to the words,
"After my death should I not make a will,'
but refused to acknowledge it, whereupon the
son said, "This is no good, Mother; you need
not sign it; it is no good without a notary;
and without witnesses it is not good," and
threw it to the floor, saying, "You have done
nothing for me; I do not want it," a finding
that the son said that the instrument was "of
no present value and conveyed no present title"
was not supported by the evidence and could
not support a judgment based on the acceptance
of such deed by the son.-Benavides v. Bena-
vides, 218 S. W. 566.

TROVER AND CONVERSION.

See Landlord and Tenant, 252; Stipula-
tions, 18; Venue, 8, 14.

W. 994.

part of money for purchase of real estate by
her husband held insufficient to show a result-
ing trust in favor of her or her heirs, but
sufficient to support a finding awarding a lien
on the land for the amount of money shown to
have been so furnished.-Gordon v. Claridy, 218
S. W. 195.

89(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence held insuffi-
cient to make out a case of resulting trust.-
Vaello v. Rodriguez, 218 S. W. 1082.

89(2) (Mo.App.) The presumption that a hus-
band's payment to his wife is a gift, instead of
a trust, with evidence that a husband deposited
money in the wife's name, taking certificates of
deposit, which were delivered to her, that the wife
was in poor health, that there was no necessity
for placing the money in her name, so far as
the husband's creditors were concerned, etc.,
held to establish that the money belonged to the
wife, with no resulting trust for the husband's
benefit.-Conqueror Trust Co. v. Craig, 218 S.
w. 972.

VI. ACCOUNTING AND COMPENSA-
TION OF TRUSTEE.

321 (Mo.App.) One who dissipates and con-
verts to his own use funds held in trust, or is
guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct
with reference thereto, is not entitled to any
compensation.-Berry v. Berry, 218 S. W. 691.

VII. ESTABLISHMENT AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF TRUST.

(B) Right to Follow Trust Property or
Proceeds Thereof.

352 (Mo.App.) A trustee must handle the
trust funds as a separate fund, preserving its
identity as such, and not mingling or using it
with any other fund.-Berry v. Berry, 218, S.
W. 691.

TUBERCULOSIS.

See Carriers, 318; Constitutional Law,
70.

TURNPIKES AND TCLL ROADS.
See Bridges, 15, 25.

TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS.
45.

See Reformation of Instruments,

44 (1) (Tex.Civ.App.) A parol trust may
be ingrafted on a deed absolute on its face by
the testimony of one witness, without proof of
corroborating circumstances.-Allen V. Wil- UNITED STATES RAILROAD ADMIN-
liams, 218 S. W. 135.

(B) Resulting Trusts.

72 (Tex. Civ.App.) A resulting trust arises
where one party furnishes money to buy prop-

ISTRATION.

See Appeal and Error, 216, 1173; Carriers,
319, 320; Evidence, 20; Railroads,
5; Trial, 256.

UNITED STATES TELEGRAPH
ADMINISTRATION.

See Telegraphs and Telephones, 26.

USE AND OCCUPATION.

(Ark.) An owner of land need not distinctly make out the relation of landlord and tenant in an action to recover the rental value from an occupant thereof; ownership on one hand and occupation on the other being sufficient.-Watson v. Arthur, 218 S. W. 849.

5 (Ark.) An owner of land may treat the possession of such land by the tenant of another as the possession of the one who rents the land to the actual occupant, and may recover the rental value of the land from him; one being in possession of land whose tenant occupies it for him.-Watson v. Arthur, 218 S. W. 849.

8 (Ark.) In an action to recover rental value of land, complaint alleging that plaintiff had foreclosed a deed of trust to the land, and that a commissioner's deed had been delivered to plaintiff, held to sufficiently allege, as against a demurrer, that plaintiff was the present owner of the land.-Watson v. Arthur, 218 S. W.

849.

In action to recover rental value of land oc

cupied by defendant, allegations in complaint to the effect that defendant collected $150 from one to whom he had rented the land sufficiently showed that the land had a rental value, although the sum collected by the defendant was not conclusive of the amount of such value. -Id.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

agent with defendant purchaser was unconditionally accepted by plaintiff, and that defendant, purchaser was notified thereof by June 1st, was warranted by evidence of acceptance on June 1st; "by" meaning on or before (citing Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, By).-Armstrong v. Palmer, 218 S. W. 627. II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF CONTRACT.

81 (Ark.) It cannot be said as a matter of law that the words "personal effects" in a contract of sale of a hotel, "It is understood and agreed by us that all equipment and furnishings now in and around said house are to go to H. for the consideration of $4,000, as above stated, except the own personal effects of said E.; in other words, the hotel is to be left fully equipped for business as it now stands" may be restricted to mean such tangible property as is worn or carried about the person.-Ellege v. Henderson, 218 S. W. 831. IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT. (A) Title and Estate of Vendor. 134(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Under for the sale of land, where the vendor agreed to pay the taxes for the year 1917, vendor did not offer performance by tendering deed without offering to pay the amount of the taxes for 1917, where the taxes were due at the time of the execution of the contract and tender of deed, but would not become delinquent until thereafter; the mere fact that the taxes would not become delinquent and penalty added until after January 1, 1918, under Rev. St. 1911. arts. 7615, 7624, not being sufficient to rebut presumption that provision for payment of taxes was a dependent obligation.-Echols v. Miller, 218 S. W. 48.

a contract

of lands required the vendor to furnish a good deed, and, in event of inability, to return the down payment, there was no requirement that the title should be satisfactory to the purchaser's attorney, and where the vendor furnished a good title, though it was disapproved by the purchaser's attorney, the purchaser cannot recover the down payment.-Bodine v. Taylor, 218 S. W. 374.

See Action, 25; Adverse Possession, 63, 72, 73, 82; Appeal and Error, 1073; 137 (Ark.) Where a contract for the sale Bills and Notes, 132; Bridges, 15; Brokers, 106; Covenants, 84; Estoppel, 62; Evidence, 450; Execution, 220; Executors and Administrators, 138, 344; Frauds, Statute of, 56, 116, 129; Guaranty, 47; Husband and Wife, 181, 187, 202; Infants, 37, 40; Liens, 7; Limitation of Actions, 105; Logs and Logging, 3; Marshaling Assets and Securities, 2; Mines and Minerals, 81;144(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) A reservation in 2 Partition, 77; Public Lands, 180; contract of sale of land of the right to the Sales; Specific Performance, 43, 101; vendee to perfect the title at the vendor's Taxation, 629, 630, 849; Trusts, 79, expense conferred a privilege, and did not 89. impose a duty on the vendee, and the vendee had the right to refuse a tender of the deed, where taxes for the year were not paid by the vendor, as agreed.-Echols v. Miller, 218 S. W. 48.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT.

144(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) The liability of the vendee on a contract with a vendor who does not have the title himself, but who at the proper time is ready to make the title contracted for, depends on the answer to the query as to whether the vendor is a bona fide contractor.-Armstrong v. Palmer, 218 S. W. 627. (B) Conveyance.

30 (Ark.) It is not enough for plaintiff, suing to cancel her contract of sale on the ground of her mental incapacity, to show that at times she displayed childishness and lack of mental vigor, but she must show that at the time of contract she was mentally incapable of acting intelligently in matters of that importance. Mellroy v. Rivercomb, 218 S. W. 841. 43(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) If plaintiff, after discovering that the vendor's notes transferred to plaintiff by defendant for plaintiff's property 148 (Tex. Civ. App.) Purchaser's repudiawere not good notes and well secured as rep- tion of contract before time for delivery of resented by defendant, tried to sell the notes deeds made formal tender of deeds by vendor to third persons, and, as defendant's agent, unnecessary.-Armstrong v. Palmer, 218 S. W. tried to sell to third persons the land he had conveyed to defendant, he waived the fraud practiced upon him by defendant and ratified the contract.-Kiehn v. Willmann, 218 S. W. 15.

44 (Tex.Civ.App.) In grantor's action to set aside conveyance and cancel note upon ground of grantee's fraudulent representations as to value and security of vendor's notes given grantor in exchange for property, evidence held to sustain findings that grantor, after discovery of the fraud, tried to sell the notes to third persons and to sell the property as grantee's agent.-Kiehn v. Willmann, 218 S. W. 15.

44 (Tex.Civ.App.) Jury finding that contract made by plaintiff vendor's real estate

627.

151 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract obligating vendor to furnish abstract and deed and to show good and merchantable title held a personal one, entitling the purchaser to a warranty of the title from the vendor, who, as part owner of the land, could have fulfilled his contract either by taking deeds from the other owners of the land to himself and executing his own deed to the purchaser, or perhaps by securing deed to the purchaser from the other owners for the parts of the land owned by them and executing his own warranty of the title to all the land.-Armstrong v. Palmer, 218 S. W. 627.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

VI. REMEDIES OF VENDOR. (A) Lien and Recovery of Land.

(D) Payment of Purchase Money. 176 (Ark.) As respects right of deduction for shortage, the seller of land was bound by246 (Tex. Civ.App.) A vendor's lien is but his misrepresentation of acreage, whether or not he knew the representation was false; the an incident to the debt, and follows the debt in matter being material, so that innocent repre- Knight, 218 S. W. 648. whatever form it may be evidenced.-Ater v. sentations bound him.-Solmson v. Deese, 218265(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where duly recorded deed recited vendor's lien was retained to purchaser was chargeable with notice of the purchase-money note, a subsequent lien.-Ater v. Knight, 218 S. W. 648.

S. W. 657.

Shortage of 66 acres in a sale of 304.26 acres

was so large a proportionate part of the whole as to constitute a gross mistake, so that the buyer was entitled to deduction therefor, despite the description of the land in the deed as "304.26 acres, more or less."-Id.

Where a sand bar in land was not considered in making a sale except as something conveyed in addition to the property for which value was paid, acreage in the sand bar need not be taken into account in determining the deduction to which the purchaser is entitled for an acreage deficiency.-Id.

V. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PARTIES.

(C) Bona Fide Purchasers.
229(1) (Ky.) Knowledge is fastened by law
upon a purchaser of lands where he has knowl-
edge of acts which would put an ordinarily
prudent man upon inquiry, where it is his
duty to inquire, and the inquiry, pursued with
ordinary diligence and understanding, would
lead to knowledge of the required facts.-Charles
v. Whitt, 218 S. W. 994.

231(3) (Ky.) A purchaser of lands is chargeable, as a general rule, with notice of everything affecting the land which may appear on the face of any deed which forms a necessary link in the chain of title under which he holds, and with notice of every fact which he could have learned with inquiry, and which the things recited in the deeds made it his duty to inquire about.-Charles v. Whitt, 218 S. W. 994. A recitation in a deed of a judgment or an action at law, as part of the chain of title, is constructive notice to the grantee of the things which are shown by the record of the action or the judgment.-Id.

secure

Rev. St. 1911, art. 6840. as to lis pendens notice, does not deal with the rights of persons ties, and filing notice is unnecessary as against with either actual or constructive notice of equia subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer with actual or constructive notice; so that, where a purchaser of land had notice of vendor's lien thereon, the right to foreclose such lien against such purchaser in suit to revive a prior judgment on the vendor's lien note for the purpose of foreclosing the lien was not affected by the fact that, in the suit in which the judgment was recovered, no lis pendens notice was filed in the county where the land was situated.-Id.

Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 5694, as to 4-year limitation on vendor's lien, and article 5695, as to extending payment of vendor's lien note and recording the evidence thereof, and providing that the owners of a vendor's lien note, executed subsequently to July 14, 1905, shall have 4 years after the act takes effect, which was July 1, 1913, within which to enforce their vendor's lien, purchaser in 1916 of a lot against which there was, as shown by the deed records, a vendor's lien for the purchasemoney debt, evidenced by a note due in 1910, could not be an innocent purchaser as to such lien, since, under article 5695, it was enforceable until July, 1917; it being immaterial that such purchaser had no notice that the note and lien had, prior to such purchase, been merged in a judgment, to which the 10 years' statute applies, and that suit was not brought on such judgment and to foreclose the vendor's lien as incident thereto, until 1919, as bringing suit dispensed with necessity of extending the note under article 5595.-Id.

231(17) (Ky.) The provision of Ky. St. 8 107, giving the attorney for plaintiff in an ac-278 (Tex.Civ.App.) Rev. St. 1911, art. tion for the recovery of lands a lien for his fee, that if the record show the name of the attorney the defendant shall have notice of the lien, does not apply to a third person, who purchases the lands from plaintiffs after termination of the litigation.-Charles v. Whitt, 218 S. W. 994.

239(4) (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 4130, giving the commonwealth, county, and taxing districts liens on the real estate of sheriffs and other collectors for money collected, those who innocently purchased real estate from sheriff, who was in default, take the same subject to lien, notwithstanding at the time of the purchase settlement had been made by the sheriff with the county commissioner, and a quietus granted by the fiscal court.-Mason v. Cook, 218 S. W. 740.

5694, barring rights under vendor's lien in 4 years, applies to vendor's lien evidencing indebtedness due for the purchase money, and not to a judgment based on such indebtedness. -Ater v. Knight, 218 S. W. 648.

The rule that a vendor's lien is preserved from the bar of limitations on the purchasemoney note if personal judgment is had on such note, so that after expiration of the period of limitation on the note a proceeding_may be commenced to revive the judgment and enforce the vendor's lien as an incident to the debt evidenced by the judgment, is not changed by the passage of Rev. St. 1911, art. 5694, prescribing 4-year limitation for suits to recover land by virtue of vendor's lien.-Id.

279 (Tex.Civ.App.) The maker of a vendor's lien note who had transferred the property was a necessary party to a suit to foreclose the lien, though he was a nonresident.— Spitzer v. Smith, 218 S. W. 599.

239(4) (Ky.) Where an attorney for the recovery of lands failed to take steps to enforce the lien for his fee or to make the same of record, a purchaser of the lands from the plain-299 (1) (Tex.Civ.App.) The running tiff in good faith for value and without notice of the lien will take the lands free from any lien.-Charles v. Whitt, 218 S. W. 994.

A purchaser of lands from plaintiffs, who had recovered the same in an action at law, held a bona fide purchaser, and to take the same free from the lien of one of the attorneys of the plaintiffs, the grantors.-Id.

239(9) (Ky.) An innocent grantee of one who obtained land by fraud acquires good title to the land.-Phillips v. Murphy, 218 S. W. 250.

An innocent grantee of one who obtained a conveyance from one lacking mental capacity acquired good title as against the original grantor.-Id.

of

Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5694, barring right to recover real estate by virtue of a superior title retained in a conveyance after four years from the maturity of the note, against vendor's suit to recover the land, is not suspended by a suit by the vendor to recover the amount of the notes, and precludes recovery of the land by suit brought more than four years after maturity of the notes, though recovery on the notes was denied because of illegality of the contract.-Stone v. Robinson, 218 S. W. 5.

(B) Actions for Purchase Money. 301 (Tex.Civ.App.) The vendor in executory contract for the sale of land can, on

an

303 (Tex.Civ.App.) In order for vendor to recover on a breach of a contract to purchase land, he must show that he performed, or offered to perform, the obligations imposed by the contract upon him, provided such obligations were not independent, or some other valid reason for the failure of the plaintiff to per- See Trial, 329–366. form, or offer to perform.-Echols v. Miller, 218 S. W. 48.

306 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a suit on vendor's See Execution, 163. lien notes, the purchaser of land can interpose as a defense the illegality of the contract, by which the equitable title was conveyed to him and the lien retained, to defeat recovery on the lien notes.-Stone v. Robinson, 218 S. W. 5.

I. NATURE OR SUBJECT OF ACTION.
3 (Tex.Civ.App.) An action by an attorney
to recover fees, brought in the county court,
is controlled as to venue by Vernon's Sayles'
Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1830, relating to spe-
cial proceeding in such courts, and it was See Appeal and Error, 172.
therefore error, in overruling defendant's plea
of privilege, to base the decision upon Ver-
non's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 2308, subd.

4, relating to venue in justice courts, and pro- See Highways, 92.
viding that in all suits to recover for labor ac-
tually performed suit may be maintained where
such labor is performed, whether contract is
oral or in writing.-Fears v. Fish, 218 S. W.
507.

3 (Tex.Civ.App.) Rev. St. 1911, art. 2308, subd. 4, as amended by Act March 29, 1917 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 2308, subd. 4), providing that in all suits to recover for labor actually performed suit may be brought and maintained where such labor is performed, applies only to suits brought in the justices' courts.-Randall v. Harris, 218 S. W.

14 (Mo.App.) Where a contract of sale was to be performed by delivery at the town of the buyers place of business, its breach by failure IX. PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY. to deliver made the cause of action accrue in such town; the county in which it was situ(A) Domestic and Municipal Purposes. ated being the proper venue of the buyers' ac-195 (Tex.Civ.App.) Water supply company tion.-Mayo v. J. L. Price Brokerage Co., 218 S. W. 932.