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A board bill filed by Simon E. Grimes,, upon behalf of the infants, to litigate the matafter exceptions had been filed to its allow- ter. It is certainly obvious that under our laws ance, was later withdrawn, and the proceeds they could not have instituted an action on beof the sale divided in accordance with the half of the infants to determine their interests judgment. in the estate of Carrie N. Shaw, nor could they, this litigation, so as to give them the power to with any better right, bring such matters into represent the infants in reference thereto. The infants were not in court, upon that matter, and are not bound, in any way, by such action by the guardians ad litem, or by the judgment of the court resulting therefrom."

The total amount_collected from the personal property in Indiana, including dividends and interest, amounted to $18,052.27, subject to disbursements and costs of $1,319.18, leaving a net sum of $16,733.09, plus about $2,000 of real estate, to be distributed among the devisees. Included in the disbursements is an item of $160.50, set aside to the widow.

The infants were

In the report of the master, Minnie E. Grimes was charged with the sum of $8,956.68, representing advancements of $6,377.72 and $2,578.96 interest. charged with advancements of $13,380.57, interest $12,130.81, a total of $25,511.38, subject to a credit, including interest thereon of $2,760.79, leaving a net sum charged to them of principal and interest $22,750.59.

To equalize the widow and Minnie E. Grimes with the aggregate charged to the infants on this basis, Minnie E. Grimes should receive $13,793.91, and the widow, excluding the amount set apart to her $22,750.59, a total of $36,544.50.

If, therefore, it was proper to charge interest on the advancements, the net amount in the hands of the Indiana administrator of $16,733.09 lacked $19,703.46 of being sufficient to pay Minnie E. Grimes and the widow enough to equalize them with the infants. From the proceeds of sale of the four Meade county farms amounting to $71,400 there was first deducted by the lower court the sum of $36,544.50, being the sum necessary upon the basis adopted to equalize the widow and Minnie E. Grimes with the infants, and which left a balance of $34,855.50 for distribution among the devisees.

court were corrected by a motion and petiThereafter the errors pointed out by this tion filed in the circuit court by the present appellant as guardian for the infants, and from a judgment adverse to their contentions said guardian prosecuted this appeal, as well as appeals from the judgment of October 5, 1914, ordering a sale of the real estate in Kentucky, and from the judgment of January 29, 1915, confirming the report of sale.

It is first urged that, Josiah Shaw being a citizen and resident of Crawford county, Ind., at the time of his death, the circuit court of that county had original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle his estate as be tween his creditors, widow, and children. A motion to file an intervening petition raising this point was overruled.

[1, 2] Testamentary capacity as to personalty is governed by the law of the testator's domicile, and personalty should be distributed accordingly. Fletcher's Adm'r v. Wier, etc., 7 Dana, 345, 32 Am. Dec. 96; Atchison's Heirs v. Lindsey, 6 B. Mon. 89, 43 Am. Dec. 153; 11 R. C. L. 445. The construction and effect given a will by the courts of a testator's domicile are everywhere recognized as binding. This is on the theory that the situs of such property is supposed to be where the owner has his domicile. And while a will is presumed, in the absence of anything The master's report was confirmed with- to the contrary, to have been drawn in ac out exceptions, and no appeal was then prose-cordance with the laws of the testator's cuted from that judgment. Thereafter Minnie E. Grimes and her husband filed an assignment from the widow of her interest in the purchase bonds, and sought credit upon the sale bonds of S. E. Grimes, the purchaser, for the amount due the widow, who had died after the execution of the alleged assignment. The guardians ad litem for the infants filed exceptions to this assignment, claiming it was void on the ground that the widow was 80 years of age when she executed it a few days before her death, that it was without valuable consideration, and she did not

domicile, and will be interpreted accordingly, its effect and validity regarding the disposition of real estate or immovable property so situated or the creation of any interest therein will depend upon the lex rei sitæ. All instruments affecting the title of real estate situated in this state must be governed as to their execution, construction, and legal sufficiency exclusively by the laws of this commonwealth, and not by the laws of a sister state or foreign country, wherein the maker may reside at the time of its execution.

Some courts recognize an exception to this

rule where it is sought to ascertain the intention of the testator solely from the language used in the will, in which case the law

have sufficient mind to execute this assignment, and further that it was procured by fraud and undue influence. Issue was joined of the testator's domicile or the lex domicilii upon the question of the validity of the ascontrols. signment, and a jury trial had thereon, reSneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh. Houser v. Paducah sulting in a verdict sustaining its validity. 460, 22 Am. Dec. 41; From this judgment the guardians ad litem Lands Co., 157 Ky. 252, 162 S. W. 1113; appealed. See Shaw v. Shaw's Adm'r, 174 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24 L. Ed. Ky. 398, 192 S. W. 524, in which the court, 192: Peet v. Peet et al., 229 Ill. 341, 82 N. in dismissing the appeal, held that the guard- E. 376, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780, 11 Ann. Cas. ians ad litem did not have the right or pow-576; Jacobs v. Whitney, 205 Mass. 477, 91 er to question on behalf of the infants the validity of the assignment, and were without right to prosecute the appeal in their behalf;

the court saying:

"Whatever, if any, rights these infants may have in the estate of Carrie N. Shaw were in no wise involved in this case, and the guardians did not have the power to bring such a matter into this action, so as to give them the right,

N. E. 1009, 18 Ann. Cas. 576; 1 Redfield on
Wills, 398, and Page on Wills, § 28.

is not charged on the advancements, and the
[3] It is argued by counsel that if interest
widow is charged with the sum of $160.50,
representing personalty set aside to her,
there would be sufficient funds in the hands
of the Indiana administrator to pay the
widow and Minnie E. Grimes an amount suf-

(218 S.W.)

ficient to equalize them with the total advancements to the infants, and hence a sale of the Meade county property was not necessary. As to any question involving real estate located in Kentucky the courts of this state are not bound by any decision of the Indiana court.

The right to charge interest on advancements is one of the main questions involved here. In the will of Josiah Shaw it is provided:

"Second. I give and devise all my estate of whatsoever kind, real personal and mixed to my beloved wife Carrie N. Shaw, one third (1/3) and to my grandchildren, Ava Loraine and Lyman Jr. Shaw children of my son Lyman P. Shaw one third (1/3) and to my daughter Minnie M. Grimes, wife of Simon E. Grimes one third (1/3) they to share and share alike, my said grandchildren Ava Loraine and Lyman Jr. taking one equal share, provided that there shall be charged against and deducted from the share of my said grandchildren, Ava Loraine, and Lyman Jr. any all sums of money which I have already advanced to or paid out for or shall hereafter advance to or pay out for my son Lyman P. Shaw, their father, which may be shown by his note or notes and my book account of the same charged against him, provided, also that there shall be charged against and deducted from the share of my daughter Minnie M. Grimes, any and all sums of money which I have already advanced to or paid out for or shall hereafter advance to or pay out for her or her said husband Simon E. Grimes as may be shown by his note or notes and my book account of the same charged against him."

"It is my desire and I direct that my beloved wife, and my two grandchildren, Ava Loraine and Lyman Jr. they taking one share, and my daughter Minnie M. Grimes shall be made equal in the final distribution of my estate."

The account book referred to is copied into the record, and, after enumerating the various advancements to Lyman P. Shaw, beginning in September, 1900, and continuing through July, 1908, the last being an item for burial expenses, there appear these notations: "1907 Sept. 3. The above account detter & credit both addete balance due J. Shaw and $12.399.40 adblow $12,640.00 and inst.

"1909 Jan. 20. To monument stone paid Taylor to be added to above $240.00. "The above is codicil to Will, Lawyer Judg Cooke said no codicil nesary to Will"

[4] Where there is no provision in a will providing for the payment of interest on an advancement, it is a rule of universal application that interest will not be chargeable thereon. 18 C. J. 931; Slaughter v. Slaughter, 21 Ind. App. 641, 52 N. E. 994.

As stated by the author in 40 Cyc. p. 1924, an advancement being in the nature of a gift, no interest is to be charged in determining its amount in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the will, which, of course, it is competent for the testator to make. See, also, Page on Wills, § 788.

[5] It will be seen by the second clause of the will that testator mentions advancements made to the father of the infants, and reference is made to certain notes and the book of account of the sum charged against him. In this book testator has totaled the amount of said advancements, and fixed the same at $12,640, which includes the proportion chargeable to the son for the erection of a monument. The totals of the items being $12,218 S.W.-29

399.40; adding to this the cost of the monument, $240, testator states the amount in round figures as $12,640. Immediately following the said last-named amount testator adds the words, "and inst.," from which it is manifest he intended to charge interest on the advancements from the date that he found the aggregate as above stated, to wit, September 3, 1907. But the master in his report charged interest on the several advancements from the dates when made, beginning as far back as 1900, and in some instances the items of interest are greater than the principal. That the master erred in so calculating the interest is manifest, and in approving this report the lower court fell into a like error. Testator unquestionably had the right to charge the father of these infants with interest on the advancements made. This is clear from the provisions of the will. It is equally clear that he did not intend to charge this interest from the time the advancements were made, because he has carefully totaled these several items, and fixed September 3, 1907, as the date from which interest was to run, and the infants should be charged interest from this date only, and not as allowed by the master from the several dates when the money was paid

or advanced.

Appraisers appointed by the Crawford circuit court fell into a similar error in charging interest. From their report, a copy of which is found in the record, they reached exactly the same total as did the master in Minnie E. Grimes with $22,750.59 and $8,the court below, charging the infants and 956.68, respectively, which includes the principal and interest. No exceptions were filed

to this report.

[6] It is claimed that evidence of or concerning the account book is inadmissible. In re Greenwood's Estate (Mo. App.) 208 S. W. 635, is cited in support of this contention. This is a decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. The case is not in point, because there the will of the testator made no effort to charge the devisees with advancements. The executor charged one of the devisees with advancements to her as shown by an account book, reference to which was not made in the will, and the court held that the entry made in the book, not having been will, was a self-serving statement, and therecontemporaneous with the execution of the

fore inadmissible. In the instant case the testator expressly directed, in the second clause of his will, that the infants and their father and Mrs. Grimes be charged with advancements as shown by his book of account. It was his evident intention to make this account book a codicil to his will-he so states in an unsigned memorandum in the book itself-he unquestionably had the right to refer to said book as evidence of the advancements with which the devisees were chargeable, and it is quite certain he intended the notation as to interest as a necessary part of these advancements.

[7] It is next urged that the judgment confirming the sale of the four farms was void. It is alleged in the petition that—

"Said four tracts of land are in their (devisees') possession, and cannot be divided between them under and in accordance with and SO as to meet the requirements of the last will of said decedent, without materially im

pairing the value of said land and without materially impairing the value of the interest of each of the plaintiffs therein."

Section 490, subsec. 2, of the Civil Code, provides that a vested estate in real property, jointly owned by two or more persons, may be sold by order of a court of equity, in an action brought by either of them, though the plaintiff or defendant be of unsound mind or an infant, if the estate be in possession and the property cannot be divided without materially impairing its value, or the value of the plaintiff's interest therein. We think the foregoing allegation a sufficient compliance with the Code provision. | The lower court held that the lands could not be divided between the devisees so as to permit them to share equally in the division thereof, without materially impairing its value and the value of the devisees' interest therein.

While the allegation as to divisibility was somewhat involved, and the questions propounded the witnesses on this issue were complicated, there was a sufficient compliance with the Code provision in each instance.

[8] But the proof is not satisfying. Two witnesses say the land could not be divided without materially impairing its value or the value of plaintiffs' interest therein; one witness testifies to the contrary. Before a court orders a sale of real property in which infants have a joint interest, the necessity for the sale must be shown; that is, its indivisibility must affirmatively appear. As said in McFarland v. Garnett, 8 S. W. 17, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 91:

"Undoubtedly, a tract of land, containing as many as 106 acres, may be divided without materially impairing its value. Prima facie, it is divisible without materially impairing its value, and the burden of proof is on the party contending contrariwise."

In Cherry v. Cherry, 162 Ky. 245, 172 S. W. 505, it was said that 159 acres and a fraction of an acre could be divided into three parts. See, also, Talbott v. Campbell, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2198, 67 S. W. 53.

[9] In the instant case, the land owned by decedent comprised a total of 1,274 acres, purchased by him as four separate farms, respectively, of 675, 429, 124, and 46 acres. It would seem this land can be divided among those entitled thereto without injury. The proof does not convince us it cannot be done. The evidence was not sufficient to authorize a sale of the land on the ground of indivisibility. [10] In any event, before a division is made, or sale of the real estate ordered, the personalty should be first exhausted. It is necessary, of course, under the provisions of the will, that to equalize the three shares the advancements must be reckoned with. Utilizing the amount in the executor's hands for this purpose, which should first be done, it will doubtless be found that the balance necessary to make the three parts equal will not be so great, but what an adjustment can be made without impairing the value of the farm as a whole. It may be that, by disposing of only one of the original farms, sufficient proceeds will be derived to equalize the beneficiaries and thus leave intact the remaining farms.

[11] It is next urged that the power to sell infants' land is purely statutory, and if the statute is not complied with the sale is void. This is true, but an examination of the rec

ord convinces us that the statute has been complied with.

[12] Appellant has properly proceeded in its endeavor to set aside the several judgments appealed from. Both the master and the lower court approved the allowance of $160.50 to the widow-this is represented by certain personalty taken by her. In so doing they erred, because the widow was one of the devisees under the will and was entitled to one-third only of the estate, and her assignee could not claim any further interest therein, and in so far as the allowance of this item affects the infants' one-third interest in the estate it must be disallowed. Upon a return of the case the infants will be allowed their one-third of this $160.50. The funds in the hands of the executor must be first exhausted in the adjustment of the advancements, and so applied as to make the beneficiaries equal so far as possible. The infants should be charged with interest from September 3, 1907, on all advancements made prior to that date to them or to their father, and not from the several dates of the payments as allowed by the master.

[13] There is no provision in the will or account book authorizing the allowance of interest on any credits to any of the beneficiaries, and none will be allowed.

desire

[14] It was testator's expressed that the persons mentioned in his will should share equally in the division of his estate, and, though no cross-appeal was prosecuted, it would be inequitable to charge the infants with interest on advancements from a fixed date and allow the ruling of the master to stand charging Minnie E. Grimes with interest on the several advancements to her from the several dates thereof. In regard to interest on advancements, all will be dealt with alike, and Minnie E. Grimes will be charged with interest from September 3, 1907, on all advancements to her or her husband prior to that date. The note dated September 22, 1911, by its terms 'bears interest from its date. As to other items, such as improvements, rents, timber, and interest (except as herein mentioned), these are referred to the lower court for adjustment. The present state of the record renders it impossible for us to decree a proper settlement thereof.

So much of the land shall be ordered sold, perhaps one only of the original farms, or two of the farms, if need be, as may be necessary to put the beneficiaries upon an equal footing.

For the reasons given, the judgments appealed from will be reversed, the sale of the 1,274 acres set aside, a new trial ordered, and for further proceedings consistent herewith.

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(218 S. W.)

Action by E. E. Reid against H. L. Wiley's | above I have this day sold unto Geo. E. Petty Administrator and others. Plaintiff dying during the pendency of the action, it was revived in the name of his executrix Daisy Ellen Reid Craig. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Bennett, Robbins & Robbins, of Clinton, for appellant.

John E. Kane, of Bardwell, for appellees.

CLAY, C. On May 8, 1895, E. O. Reid & Son sold to H. L. Wiley a stock of merchandise at Arlington for the sum of $7,994.22. For the purchase price Wiley executed to Reid & Son four promissory notes, one for $1,920.81, due September 1, 1895, one for $1,920.81, due December 1, 1895, one for $2,074.47, due in one year, and the last for $2,228.13, due in two years. The four notes were secured by a mortgage on the stock of goods, and also on several houses and lots. The first two notes were paid and canceled. In order to secure the last two notes Wiley, on January 6, 1896, executed another mortgage on a lot of land, the mortgage stating

that there was then due on the last two notes the sum of $3,183.85. E. O. Reid died in September, 1899. Wiley died in 1911. On May 1, 1912, E. E. Reid, the surviving member of E. O. Reid & Son, brought suit against H. L. Wiley's administrator and others, to recover the balance due on the $2,074.47 and the $2,228.13 notes, and to enforce the mortgage lien by which the notes were secured. The defendants pleaded payment, ⚫ limitation, and other defenses. During the pendency of the action E. E. Reid died, and the action was revived in the name of Daisy Ellen Reid Craig, the executrix and sole devisee of E. E. Reid. The case was referred to a special commissioner, who reported that the notes sued on had been paid, and that there was a balance due from Reid & Son to Wiley. On final submission the exceptions to the commissioner's report were overruled, and judgment rendered, dismissing the petition. Plaintiff appeals.

The principal parties to the transactions involved in the action died without testifying, and the evidence consists of account books, letters, receipts, and other documents found in the possession of the parties. In addition to a written agreement by Wiley to keep the merchandise insured for the sum of $4,000, and an inventory showing the value of the goods to be $7,911.21, the material exhibits are as follows:

"For and in consideration of the note of Geo. E. Petty, for the sum of $775.00 @ 8 per cent. interest from date due and payable twelve months after date executed this day to E. O. Reid and the further consideration of the following lands, to wit: [Here follows description of the various tracts of land]-making a sum total of $1,280.13 figured at $2.985.00, all of which land said Geo. E. Petty agrees to convey to E. O. Reid with covenants of general warranty, and in consideration of the

an undivided one-half interest in a stock of merchandise consisting of fixtures, dry goods, notions, gents furnishing, coats, hats, caps, character belonging to the stock now being run boots and shoes and all goods of any kind and in the storehouse of H. L. Wiley in the town of Arlington, Kentucky, said stock is to be deeds to said lands are received and after which controlled and run by E. O. Reid until the time said stock is to be moved by said E. O. Reid and Geo. E. Petty to Searcy, Arkansas, and run by them with a view to selling out the entire stock by mutual agreement on said sale and not run nor put up in Searcy with a view to continuing or keeping up a partnership business unless by further agreement. "Arlington, Kentucky, this December 15th, 1896. "[Signed]

E. O. Reid. "Geo. E. Petty.

"Deed from Geo. E. Petty and son C. Petty to the above described lands received dated December 17-96, before Geo. T. Petty, J. P.

"E. O. R."

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"Your letter got in this ev. will come over tomorrow or Sunday, but can see no use of me coming over there, as we will have to do whatever is done here, or by mail, proximating the note we owe to Earnest and the money you have advanced on debts of H. L. Wiley & Co at 6150.00 and letting the Pettie matter but 3760.00 and putting out goods enough to make 2000.00 additional credit on those two items would leave 390.00 or thereabouts, and about 1500 in goods to put in Carman hands on commission, out of which the above bal could be it be, we could give note for that balance and paid, and for your assistance if any assistance fix it so we could meet it and you could use it making it in 2 or three installments- The Flegle note & co on the small mortgage note, and then we have the note 2228, not yet due to contend with, Figering that the notes and acts will pay the Cairo and Mayfield notes, and if we can arrange the matters in this way and succeed in procuring credit in the market will soon pay you out. If you will let us have the shoes, 1/2 the hats and 1⁄2 the dry goods & dry goods notions on something after the above plan, we can put your goods for the present in the back room, and keep them in showing shape or pack them in boxes after we get some new goods in to get boxes. If you are favorable to this idea write me, so that can see Gus, What do you think of making stile of firm, Carman & Wiley, as to better than a new name entirely. We can arrange for about 500.00 Write me. cash to put in new stuff.

"Yours

H. L. Wiley."

"This is to certify that in the transactions of H. L. Wiley & E. O. Reid under the firm name of H. L. Wiley & Co-that H. L. Wiley received all benefits from said concern & was to settle all debts, said E. O. Reid having no further interest than to get his money back & interest& it now appears that there is one note left

& due Alexander County Ntl Bank for $400,00
due on or about Jany 11th/98 signed by H. L.
Wiley & Co which it is my duty to pay off-
and if there are any other debts due by said
firm of H. L. Wiley & Co., it is my duty to pay
off same out of my own effects, further, in 1896,
E. O. Reid took in trust the stock of goods
of H. L. Wiley & Co to further settlement &
close up said business, and said E. O. Reid has
disposed of said stock of mdse & settled with
me in full satisfaction for all mdse. notes &
accts &c turned over to him by me-the whole
of it being under my supervision all the while
the last transaction being the goods moved to
Clinton, & the purchase of safe now in my
store house at Arlington which is fully settled
for and paid-
"Jan'y/98-
H. L. Wiley."

"H. L. Wiley

"Clinton, Ky., April 11th, 1899.

"Dear Sir: Enclosed find your note, which please write the word from, before the words date until paid so as to leave it clear to bear interest from date until paid-I have credited it on the note of yours, dated May 8th-95$2074.47 dollar note, which likes about 30 dollars I reckon of paying it off-I credited stating with same liens reserved that the old note holds

"I suppose without looking at the deed that
the word 'from' added will correspond with the
deed see if it does-I also enclose you the note
you executed to Payne signed by myself as se-
curity-The above will cover your receipt-The
above note referred to, to be changed calls for
$441.25/100 bearing date Feb'y 4th-99 due two
years after date & the credit of same on H. L.
Wiley note due E. O. Reid & Son bears same
date-I have written this in a hurry, but guess
it can be understood & interpreted by an Ar-
lington lawyer-whether a N. Y. one can or not.
Return the note at once-That Ernest can file it
with my papers & get the matter off of file-
"Yours truly
E. O. Reid.
"P. S. Write me at Heber will leave tonight."
"Received of H. L. Wiley three notes against

James E. Golston for three hundred and twelve
50/100 dollars each aggregating nine hundred
and thirty seven 50/100 dollars with interest
from date which notes I agree to account for
on settlement between myself & said Wiley
these notes being land notes
"This April 30/1901
"The note 38.08
Int. to April 30th 01- 7.40

45.48

E. E. Reid."

"This note paid out of James E. Gholson notes-3-312.50 notes making total of 937.50 all of which is credited on notes of H. L. Wiley this note being retained by agreement between me & H. L. Wiley settled as of April

30th 1901.

E. E. Reid."

3 notes of James E. Gholson of $312.50 each making total of $937.50 credited to II. L. Wiley on all notes this note $257.25 which was security on & the balance of the $937.50 is credited on other notes & statement attached all this agreed to by H. L. Wiley & I am to hold note showing how paid- E. E. Reid." Note H. L. W.

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469.08
45.48

257.25
165.69

"Total amount of James E. Gholson notes for and in Hickman County Ky-above list shows when same was credited & by agreement between H. L. Wiley & me just when this amount was to be settled as of April 30th 1901 date of Gholson notesE. E. Reid.

"Arlington, Ky.. Sept. 18, 1899 "Earnest E. Reid, Clinton, Ky. Dear Sir: "You have my profound sympathy in the loss of your father, never was more surprised as I had a letter a few days ago saying he was as well as usual, and had not heard he was sick. Would suggest that as a legal proposition that you continue the business in the same firm name-without any change. You will find this to be best for many reasons. If there is any matters in Arkansas that needs looking after, any matters that needs adjusting down there, I can and will help you in any way I can. I expect that I can do you some good in the Ark. affairs and as I am owing you all and if you think you can use me in looking up any matter, either in Ark as I went with him over the Ark land carefully once, I will serve you as best I can. Let me hear from you soon. "Yours, H. L. Wiley."

In support of the finding of the chancellor that the two notes sued on had been paid, 'the argument is as follows: The stock of merchandise for which Wiley executed his notes to Reid & Son on May 8, 1895, amounted to $7,994.22. The first two notes of $1,920.81 each were satisfied before January 6, 1896. On that date the second mortgage was executed, showing a balance due on the stock of merchandise of only $3,183.85. Some time during the year 1896, E. O. Reid. took the stock of merchandise in trust for the purpose of liquidating the balance of the indebtedness due by Wiley. An inventory made on October 26, 1896, showed that the stock of goods amounted to $7,911.21. On December 15, 1896, E. O. Reid traded a half interest in the stock of goods to George E. Petty for a note for $775 and land val ued at $2,985, making a total of $3,760. Petty received the goods and paid the consideration to Reid. The stock of goods and safe at Arlington were sold to E. O. Reid previous to January 8, 1898, and moved by him to Clinton. The item on the "Stock and Cash Book" showed that the note for $2,228.13 had been paid. The receipt given by Wiley on January 8, 1898, showed that the only debt known to the parties to be due by H. L. Wiley & Co. was a note for $400, and that E. O. Reid had disposed of the stock of merchandise and settled with Wiley for all the merchandise, notes, accounts, etc., turned over to him by Wiley. This receipt shows that the parties made a complete settlement. It does not appear that Wiley & Co. were otherwise indebted to Reid & Son, and the only way that Reid & Son could have settled with Wiley for the goods sold was by paying the amount of the pur chase on the notes in question.

We cannot construe the entry of February 937.50 13, 1897, on the "Stock and Cash Book" as

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