Common Law.

Q. B. HORNE v. LYMINGTON RAILWAY COMPANY. June 2. Railway-" Superfluous Land"-Lands taken by voluntary Agreement-Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 Vict. c. 18), s. 127.

The defendants, by their Act of 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. lxxi), after reciting the deposited plans, &c., were authorized (by s. 18) to take the lands for the purpose of constructing a railway and landing-place; by s. 28 the railway and landing were to be completed within four years from the passing of the Act.

By s. 40 "the company may purchase from the owners thereof upon terms to be mutually agreed upon," a certain bridge, "together with all rights, roads, lands, buildings, and other works connected therewith, and also all tolls in respect of the same; and after the purchase the company may demand and take all the tolls which may now be legally taken."

For 100 years before the passing of the Act there had been connected with the bridge certain lands consisting of land on both sides of the river, and the bridge, works, tolls, &c., were known as the "Bridge Estates." The company, after negotiations, purchased of the proprietors of the bridge the said estates in September, 1857, which were duly conveyed to the company in 1858; and the company then expended a large sum in rebuilding the bridge, and altering and improving the approaches. The plaintiff, as owner of adjoining land, brought ejectment, claiming certain of the bridge lands as "superfluous lands" within s. 127 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act. None of the lands claimed were within the lines of deviation of the railway.

Kingdon, Q.C. (Cowie with him), for the plaintiff.
Pinder, for the defendants.

Q. B.

CUTLER, APP.; TURNER AND ANOTHER, RESPs. June 3. Master and Servant-Absenting from Service-Second OffenceMaster and Servant Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 141), s. 9. The appellant had agreed to serve the respondents as a fireiron forger, and was, on the 28th of October, 1873, summoned under "The Master and Servant Act, 1867," for absenting himlawful excuse, under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 141, s. 9, and ordered by self from the service of his employers, the respondents, without the magistrate to pay the sum of 117. 14s. to his employers as compensation to them for the breach of the contract.

The appellant had previously absented himself from the service of the respondents on the 1st of April, 1873, and was summoned for so absenting himself, and on the 13th of May was ordered to pay the sum of 117. 8s. to his employers as compensation for the breach of contract, but the sum of 117.8s. not having been paid, and the appellant not having any goods and chattels whereon to levy, he was adjudged to be imprisoned in the house of correction for three months. The amount was then paid on his behalf before his actual imprisonment. The defen1863, again summoned, and on the 7th of July ordered to find security for the fulfilment of his contract, and in default to be imprisoned until he should find security, but so that the term of his imprisonment should not exceed three months. This three months' imprisonment; and on his liberation he continued order was not complied with, and the appellant underwent the to absent himself from his employment. The summons of the 28th of October was then taken out and the order thereon made.

Attorneys for defendants: Hume, Bird, & Bird, for Moore & Jackman, Lymington.

June 3.

Q. B.
EASTWOOD v. MILLAR.
Gaming-Betting Houses Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), s. 3-Place-
Pigeon-shooting Match.

The appellant was charged for that he being the occupier of certain enclosed ground called the Borough Park Ground, did knowingly and wilfully permit such place to be opened, and kept, and used by other persons for the purpose of betting on a certain pigeon-shooting match for money, contrary to 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 3.

MULLER v. BALDWIN. Port Dues on Coals exported."

June 5.

PAINE. JONES (Will-General Devise-After-acquired real Estate-Tille of Tenant for Life by Adverse Possession-Estoppel). V.-C. M. 138 RICHARDS v. WILLIAMSON (Trade-mark-Injunction-Acquisition of Plaintiff's Mark by Purchase of Goods in open Market)

140

V.-C. B. 139 STRONG . BIRD (Debt-Appointment of Debtor as Executor-Intention to forgive Debt-Incomplete Gift) M. R. 137 TEWART . LAWSON (Will-Construction-Debts, &c., to be paid out of Rents and Profits-Tenant for Life or in Tail not to be entitled to Estates till clear of Debts-Perpetuity-Accumulation-Possession) V.-C. H. WARNE v. ROUTLEDGE (Copyright-Married Woman-ContractPublication of New Edition of Book). WILSON, Ex parte. In re FOREIGN AND COLONIAL GAS COMPANY (Company Shareholder Unwritten Agreement to take fully paid-up Shares-Registration of Shares as Ordinary Shares-Rectification-Companies Act, 1867, s. 25) V.-C. B.

Common Law. .

M. R. 138

139

140

141

142

DE WOLF. ARCHANGEL MARITIME BANK (Marine Insurance-
"Voyage Policy on Ship at and from "-Unreasonable Delay
in Ship reaching Port at which Risk is to attach-Risk varied
by unreasonable Delay)
Q. B.
Fox v. CLARKE (Conveyance of House-House now in Occupation
of P.
-Ornamental Frontage extending across adjoining
House)
Ex. Ch. from Q. B.
FOWLER v. LOCK (Master and Servant-Relation of Cab Proprietor
and Driver-Bailor and Bailee)
Ex. Ch. from C. P.
HUTTON v. BULLOCH (Undisclosed Foreign Principal-Authority of
English Merchant when buying Goods on Account of Foreign
Constituents-" Purchases" to be made "on joint Account of
English and Foreign Firms)
Ex. Ch. from Q. B.
NEVILL v. BRIDGER (Burial Fees-Right to charge for Selection of
Site-Opening Vaults-Non-Parishioner)
Ex. 142
OGEEN v. BENAS AND ANOTHER (Cheque payable to Order-Forged
Indorsement-Right of Indorsee)

141

142

141

. C. P. 141

RODOCONACHI v. ELLIOTT (Marine Assurunce Restraint of
Princes)
Ex. Ch. from C. P.
SWIFT. JEWSBURY (P. O.) AND GODDARD (Costs of Unsuccessful
Defendant-Certificate to deprive Defendant of Costs-3 & 4
Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 32-Statement of Case on Appeal) Q. B.
TAYLOR AND OTHERS v. LIVERPOOL AND GREAT WESTERN STEAM
COMPANY (Ship and Shipping-Bill of Lading-Exception of
"Thieves," "Barratry' "" Damage" to Goods which can be
insured against)
. Q. B.
WESTERN COUNTIES MANURE COMPANY v. LAWES MANURE COM-
PANY (Disparaging Statement as to Plaintiff's Goods-Special
Damage-Malice-Intention to injure)
Ex.

142

141

140

142

June 12. Debt-Appointment of Debtor as Executor-Intention to forgive Debt-Incomplete Gift.

This was a suit instituted by one of the next of kin of Frances Bird, who died in December, 1870, having made a will containing an appointment of the defendant as executor, but no disposition of her residuary personal estate. The question, which now came before the Court on an adjourned summons, was whether the defendant was to be charged with a debt of 9001. alleged to be due from him to the estate.

It appeared that the testatrix was the step-mother of the defendant, and for several years previously to her death resided with him and his wife. She had an annual income of 2000., and paid to the defendant a sum of 2127. 10s. per quarter for her board and lodging. In 1866, the defendant borrowed of her a sum of 1100., and it was agreed that this loan should be paid off by a deduction of 1007. from each quarter's payment for board. Accordingly deductions of this amount were made from the quarterly payments made by the testatrix in June and October, 1866. At Christmas, 1866, according to the evidence of the defendant and his wife, a conversation took place between them and the testatrix, in the course of which the testatrix stated that she did not want to have any more of the money lent returned; and she thereupon drew and gave to the defendant a cheque for the full quarterly payment of 2127. 10s., and she continued down to the time of her death to pay to the defendant the like quarterly sum. The evidence of the defendant and his wife was corroborated by memoranda in the handwriting of the testatrix.

The chief clerk found by his certificate that the defendant remained liable for the debt, and thereupon the defendant took out a summons to vary the certificate, which now came on to be heard.

Southgate, Q.C., and G. Miller, for the defendant.

Chitty, Q.C., and Jolliffe, for the plaintiff, contended that the debt was not released at law, and that there were no circumstances which would induce a court of equity to treat the debt

kin.

niece Ann Hasler for her life for her separate use, and after her death to convey the same freehold and copyhold estates to the children of Ann Hasler as tenants in common in fee. In September, 1824, certain freehold estate was conveyed to the testator to the ordinary uses to bar dower.

. Copyright-Married Woman-Contract-Publication of New Edition of Book.

This was a suit by a firm of publishers to restrain the publication by Messrs. Routledge of a second edition of a work of which they claimed to have the exclusive right of publication until the first edition was sold.

In 1873 the plaintiffs entered into a verbal agreement with a married woman, who was the authoress of a book entitled How to Dress on 157. a year as a Lady,' for the publication of the work, and that the plaintiffs should bear all expenses and pay to the authoress a royalty of one penny for each copy sold, reckoning for this purpose thirteen copies as twelve. The plaintiffs expended a considerable sum in advertising the book, which had a large sale, and they paid the authoress 100%. on account of royalty.

Differences having arisen between the plaintiffs and the authoress, she arranged with Messrs. Routledge to bring out a second edition of the work, revised, before the whole of the first edition was sold off. The plaintiffs accordingly filed their bill against Messrs. Routledge, and the authoress and her husband as defendants, praying a declaration that the authoress was entitled to the copyright of the said book for her separate use, and that she had entered into an implied contract with the plaintiffs that no other edition of the said book should be published until the plaintiffs should have sold all the copies of the book to be published in accordance with the agreement, and that the separate copyright of the authoress in the book, or in the copyright thereof, was bound by such implied contract.

E. Beaumont (Fry, Q.C., with him), for the plaintiffs.
Daniel Jones, for Messrs. Routledge.

Shortt and J. D. Bell, for the authoress and her husband. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS considered that whatever contract the authoress as a married woman might have made, the actual contract in this case was not for any definite time, but was determinable by either party at pleasure, and only amounted to this, that while it existed no one else was to be at liberty to publish the book; the Court could not import a new term into the contract, and the bill must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: Beaumont & Son; Allen & Son.

Will-General Devise-After-acquired real Estate-Title of Tenant for Life by Adverse Possession-Estoppel. William Nicoll by his will, dated the 12th of April, 1824, devised all his freehold and copyhold estates and also all other his estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, and of what nature and kind soever, of which he might be possessed at the time of his decease, to his wife Charlotte Nicoll and Thomas Harrison, their heirs and assigns, upon trust to pay the rents and profits to Charlotte Nicoll during her life for her separate

In December, 1830, the testator died. Thomas Harrison disclaimed the trusts of the will, and Charlotte Nicoll entered into possession of all the testator's real estate, including that acquired by him subsequently to the date of the will.

Ann Hasler intermarried with William Paine, and had issue seven children, of whom the plaintiff was one.

In 1852 the children of Ann Paine instituted a suit of Paine v. Nicoll against Charlotte Nicoll, praying for administration of the trusts of the testator's will, and for the appointment of new trustees. Charlotte Nicoll put in an answer by which she admitted that the after-acquired real estate of the testator was subject to the trusts of the will. After the filing of the answer an arrangement was made for putting an end to the suit; and by an order dated the 4th of December, 1852, a new trustee of the will was appointed jointly with Charlotte Nicoll, and she was ordered to convey all the real estate of the testator to the use of herself and such new trustee upon the trusts of the will. In the preparation of the conveyances necessary to carry this order into effect, it was for the first time discovered that the after-acquired real estate of the testator did not pass by the will, and Charlotte Nicoll upon being informed of this refused to convey the same; and by an order dated the 26th of February, 1853, made on the petition of the plaintiffs in the suit, it was ordered that Charlotte Nicoll should convey only the property which passed by the will.

On the 3rd of August, 1853, Charlotte Nicoll, who claimed to have acquired the fee simple of the after-acquired property by adverse possession, conveyed the reversion then expectant on her own life to one Jones in fee for valuable consideration. Charlotte Nicoll died in 1858. In 1860, Jones for valuable consideration conveyed one moiety of the property to Johnston, who had acted as solicitor for Charlotte Nicoll in the suit. Ann Paine (formerly Ann Hasler) died in 1868.

In 1869, Jones and Johnston sold the property to a Miss Sandford, and in the beginning of the following year she sold and conveyed the property to Thomas Salter, who died shortly afterwards, having devised it to Rebecca Salter and George Redding upon certain trusts.

In 1871 this bill was filed, alleging that the property was subject to the trusts of the will of the testator, and that Jones, Johnston, Sandford, and Salter, purchased with notice that such was the case; and praying that they or their representives might convey the property to the present trustee of the testator's will, and might account for the mesne profits.

The cause now came on to be heard.

W. Pearson, Q.C., and Warmington, for the plaintiff, contended that Charlotte Nicoll was estopped from denying that the property passed by the will of the testator.

Cotton, Q.C., and W. Barber, for Johnston and the representatives of Jones.

Glasse, Q.C., and Graham Hastings, for the representatives of Salter.

Stirling, for Miss Sandford.

E. B. Cooper, for the trustee of William Nicoll's will. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that although it had been decided that where a testator purported to devise a specific property to a tenant for life with remainder over, the tenant for life could not acquire a title by adverse possession against the remaindermen claiming under the same instrument, that doctrine did not apply to the present case, where the will had no effect whatever on the after-acquired property, and that Charlotte Nicoll was not bound by the admissions in her answer, which were made in ignorance of her rights, and he dismissed the bill.

Solicitors: A. G. Ditton; Johnston & Jackson; Gamlen & Son ; Nickinson, Prall, & Nickinson; Tayler & Baxter.

V.-C. B.

In re FREEHOLD INVESTMENT COMPANY. GREEN'S CASE.

from Office-Lapse of Time.

Summons on behalf of the official liquidator to place the name of William Green on the list of contributories for twenty director's qualification shares, the chief clerk having refused.

The company was registered on the 7th of June, 1864, with a capital of 250,0007., in 10,000 shares of 251. each. By the articles of association the qualification of a director was the holding of twenty shares. Green was not named a first director.

On the 3rd of March, 1865, Green was at a board meeting elected to be a director. On the 7th of March, a prospectus, about to be issued for the purpose of raising further capital, in which the name of Green appeared as one of the directors, was submitted to him for amendment. On the 17th of March, and the 7th of April, he attended board meetings and on both days signed the attendance book. In April, 1865, the prospectus was issued, but only to the extent of a few copies. Green declined to be a director until he had ascertained the position of the company, and attended the board meetings as visitor only. On the 4th of May he wrote to the secretary as follows: "As from what I can learn of the result of your appeal to the public, my name has been of no assistance to the company, I feel it will be of little use my sitting at the board, therefore with every wish for the satisfactory progress of the undertaking, I beg leave to withdraw, and in doing so I must express my regret that my name has been of such little service." On the 30th of May, 1865, he was asked to qualify as a director, and on the 2nd of June he replied to the letter thus: "I infer that you consider I remain as a director of the company; if so, I beg leave again to withdraw my name . . . I had no intention of departing from my letter of earlier date." The company was ordered to be wound up on the 27th of May, 1870.

W. Pearson, Q.C., and North, for the official liquidator.
Romer, for Mr. Green.
Pearson, in reply.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said it would be in the highest degree unreasonable that Mr. Green's name should be placed on the list, both from the lapse of time and the circumstances of his withdrawal from the office of director; and the summons must be dismissed, but without costs.

Solicitors: W. Moon; Hunter, Gwatkin, & Co.

V.-C. B.

RICHARDS v. WILLIAMSON. June 9. Trade-mark —Injunction—Acquisition of Plaintiff's Mark by Purchase of Goods in open Market.

Plaintiff, a gunmaker of repute, by his bill stated that his business was to employ makers of locks, barrels, and other parts of guns, and himself to fit together the pieces, and complete the article. Having done this, he marked his name Westley Richards," and formerly his firm's name "Westley Richards & Co," on the lock-plate. He alleged that by this use by himself and other gunmakers of the name on the lock-plate was understood by the trade, not that he and they made the several portions, but only that they fitted them together, and guaranteed the perfect state of the whole. Upon the levers of the breech-actions of some guns issued by the plaintiff, he also formerly used to mark the words, "Westley Richards' Patent," he having at one time held a patent for this portion of the gun, then actually made by him, but which patent had since expired. He complained that, the government having bought many of his guns, and having after a certain amount of use taken them to pieces, and sold the separate portions for old iron-the defendants had bought the separate portions and pieced them together into what seemed to be new guns, having lock-plates and sometimes levers with plaintiff's name on them, thus leading the trade and the public

them; that the trade were not deceived, because the understanding that a name on a lock-plate was a guarantee of the whole article prevailed only with regard to sporting, not military guns; and that to the public the plaintiff's way of using his own name was a misrepresentation.

Kay, Q.C., Aston, Q.C., and W. P. Beale, for the plaintiff. W. Pearson, Q.C., and O. L. Clare, for the principal defendants, the makers.

Hadley, for other defendants, traders.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the use of the plaintiff's name in the way described on the lock-plate was his trade mark; and that no one had the right to put the name of Westley Richards on the lock-plate of any gun not made by him. The defendant asked to be permitted to have the use, which he had acquired by accident, of this name; the effect of which would be to induce the belief that the plaintiff and not the defendant was the manufacturer. This was contrary to the law as established from Sykes v. Sykes (3 B. & C. 541) downwards. The case, moreover, was of some public importance, if the allegation were true that these guns thus pieced together were dangerous to the persons using them. There must be an injunction to restrain the defendants from making firearms with lock-plates or levers or any other portion bearing the name of" Westley Richards" or "Westley Richards & Co.," or any other indication purporting that the same were wholly of the plaintiff's manufacture, or from selling any such fire-arms not wholly made by the plaintiff; and to restrain the other defendants from receiving; the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.

Solicitors: Sharpe, Parkers, & Co., for Ryland, Martineau, & Carslake, Birmingham; Neal & Philpot, for Alfred Walter, Birmingham, and Robinson & Preston, for Robert Myers Wood, Birmingham.

In re FOREIGN AND COLONIAL GAS COMPANY. Ex parte WILSON. Company-Shareholder- Unwritten Agreement to take fully paidup Shares-Registration of Shares as Ordinary Shares-Rectification-Companies Act, 1867, s. 25.

Motion on behalf of James Edwards Wilson to have the register of shareholders of the company rectified by inserting his name as the holder of 250 fully paid-up ordinary shares, and 250 fully of 250 ordinary and 250 preference shares. paid-up preference shares in the company, instead of as the holder

The company was incorporated in 1872 for undertaking commercial operations in connection with gas supply at home and abroad, and in 1873 an unwritten agreement was entered into between Wilson and the company whereby the former, either as principal or agent, agreed to sell, and the latter agreed to purchase, certain concessions which Wilson was stated to have obtained from municipalities at Naples and elsewhere, for which the company agreed to give 10,000l., of which 2000. was to be paid in cash, and 80007. in certain proportions contingent on the subscription of capital. On the 28th of March, 1873, the company paid Wilson the 20007., and he having consented to alter the terms of the agreement as to the balance, the directors, at a board meeting, held on the same 28th of March, resolved, as appeared by their minute-book, to issue to him 250 ordinary, and 250 preference shares of 10. each, each "fully paid-up." Ordinary share certificates were handed to Wilson, and he gave a receipt for them; and his name was entered on the register as the holder of 500 shares; nothing being said as to their being fully paid-up. The excuse of the company for not registering the shares as fully paid-up was, that Wilson had failed to hand over and transfer the concessions, as he had agreed to do. On