house rent free, which she continued to do till her death on the 23rd of January, 1861. At that time the plaintiff, a cousin of Sarah Coles, was residing with Ann Heath as servant, but she then proposed, though without capital herself, to commence a millinery business in partnership with a friend of hers. According to the plaintiff's statement she abandoned this intention at Sarah Coles' request, and instead, agreed to occupy No. 7, Park Place, on payment of rates and taxes and ground rent only, and she, in fact, occupied the house on those terms till the death of Sarah Coles in 1871. Her case was, that Sarah Coles verbally agreed to give her the house for her life on those terms in consideration of her giving up the intended business. Sarah Coles died in March, 1871, having, by will, given all her property to the defendant. The defendant allowed the plaintiff to remain without paying any rent till the 31st of October, 1873, when he commenced an action of ejectment. Thereupon the plaintiff filed the present bill to restrain the action. The defendant, by his answer, stated that the real agreement was, that the plaintiff was to pay 21. a week rent for the house, and he pleaded the Statute of Frauds. The present motion was originally for an injunction, but was by consent turned into a motion for decree. Construction of Will-Gift to Children and Grandchildren— John Milsom, by his will, dated the 13th of April, 1872, gave daughters, Thomas Milsom, John Milsom, Lydia Watts, Matilda the residue of his real and personal estate unto his sons and Overton, Ellen Payne, and to the children born of the body of Eliza Hulbert his daughter, deceased, and the children born of the body of Lucy Hampton his daughter, deceased, to be divided among them in equal shares and proportions. The testator died leaving two sons and three daughters surviving him, all of whom had children. One of his deceased daughters had five children, and the other had two children. A question was now raised whether the residuary estate of the J. Pearson, Q.C., and Blackmore, for the plantiiff. Glasse, Q.C., and Chapman Barber, for the defendant. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that he must from the circum-testator was to be divided in sevenths between the five children stances presume that the plaintiff's view of the agreement was correct, and that the abandonment of the business and entering into possession was a part performance, which excluded the Solicitors: Hand, Son, & Johnson; Dunster. Statute of Frauds. HARVIE v. SOUTH DEVON RAILWAY COMPANY. Lands Clauses Act-Notice to treat-" House." The plaintiff was possessed of the residue of a ninety-nine years' lease in two plots of land, on part of which a continuous building was erected, which was occupied as two semi-detached houses, known as Nos. 1 and 2 Balmoral Villas, South Brent, in Devonshire. The rest of each plot of land consisted of a garden in front and at the back, and offices connected with the house. A brick wall separated the gardens. such children taking per stirpes the shares which their parents, if The dwellings were fitted up internally for the occupation of two families, and always had been so occupied, and the plaintiff purchased the leasehold interests at two different times. The only internal partition, however, between the two dwellings consisted of a party wall, constructed in the front of ordinary masonry carried up to the ceiling of the upper story, and at the V.-C. M. back, by what was called a stonenogged partition, about four inches thick, to the height of the first floor, and above that to the ceiling of the upper floor, one of lath and plaster only. The building consisted of only two storeys, and above the ceiling of the upper floor the slope of the roof was open all through, and it was possible to pass inside from one dwelling to the other. The gutter and drains were continuous. The company's line ran just below No. 1 Balmoral Villas, and the company having power to widen their line, served the plaintiff with a notice to treat for a portion of the garden of No. 1 required for the widening. The plaintiff served them with a counter notice to take the whole of the buildings and gardens of Nos. 1 and 2. Some negociations took place, in which the company offered to take the whole of No. 1, but no arrangement was come to, and the company desiring to take possession paid into Court 1897., being the estimated value of the portion included in their notice only. The plaintiff then filed the present bill, seeking to restrain them from entering, and for a declaration that they were bound to take all the premises included in his notice. Vacating a Lis pendens-30 & 31 Vict. c. 47. This was a motion on the part of the defendants that the registration on the 13th of June, 1872, of the plaintiff's bill in this cause as a lis pendens in the register kept by the senior master of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, and in the register kept by the Registrar of Judgments in Ireland, to affect the estates of the said defendants, might be respectively vacated, and that entries of the discharge of such lis pendens might be directed to be entered on the said registers respectively-and that the plaintiffs might be ordered to pay to the defendants all their costs and expenses occasioned by the registration of the said lis pendens, and of this application, and of vacating the said registration. Freeling, in support of the motion, said that the plaintiff's bill had already been dismissed by consent of all parties, by an order made upon petition to the Master of the Rolls. A notice of this motion had been served upon Messrs. Syms & Co., the plaintiff's solicitors, but they stated that the bill had been dismissed, and they no longer acted for the plaintiffs. The estate of Captain Jervis, one of the plaintiffs, was in bankruptcy, and a trustee self might form as to their prospects of success, and therefore he could not say it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up. The petition must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: F. Heritage; A. Pulbrook. had been appointed. The trustee had been apprised of this THE VICE-CHANCELLOR thought the defendants were clearly V.-C. M. Nov. 5. RHYS v. DARE VALLEY RAILWAY COMPANY. Interest on Purchase-money-Railway Company-Possession taken, A question arose in this case as to the date from which interest was payable upon the purchase-money of lands of plaintiff taken by defendant company. Since the original notice to treat served by the company in August, 1864, the proceedings for the purpose of settling the amount of compensation payable to the landowners, Messrs. Rhys & Richards, plaintiffs in this suit, had been very complicated and the subject of continual litigation, arising principally from miscarriage on the part of the umpire. See In re Dare Valley Railway Company (Law Rep. 6 Eq. 429; 4 Ch. 554). The landowners having at length, in spite of the resistance of Nov. 13. the company, obtained the verdict of a jury assessing the amount of compensation at 20007., they bad filed this bill to enforce the contract and to obtain payment of the 20007. In re PETERSBURG AND VIBORG GAS COMPANY, Petition to wind up-Commencing Business within a Year-Just and Equitable Clause. This was a petition for winding up the Petersburg and Viborg Gas Company. The company was formed in February, 1872, for the purpose of obtaining and working a concession for establishing gasworks in St. Petersburg, Viborg, and other places in Russia. The capital was to consist of 150,000. in 15,000 shares of 107. each. 10,000 shares had been subscribed for, and 27. 10s. paid upon them. The petitioners were the Patent Gas Company, through their official liquidator. The Patent Gas Company had entered into a contract with the Petersburg and Viborg Company that the latter company should use their patent for a new process of making gas, and had taken 1000 shares in this company, but the patent having proved a failure, the company was now being wound up voluntarily. The case on behalf of the petitioners was that nearly all the money paid up had already been expended, and although the .company had been established for two years and a half they had not yet commenced business, and had therefore brought themselves within the second clause of the 79th section of the Companies Act, 1862. The petitioners were unwilling that a further call of 77. 10s. per share should be made upon them, when they believed that the whole project would turn out a failure, and that it would be throwing away their money. On the other hand it was shewn that the holders of 9000 shares out of the 10,000 were of opinion that the company ought to be carried on, for although no gas had been actually made, proceedings had been taken for attaining the objects of the company. A concession worth 16,000l. had been obtained, land had been purchased, and an imperial ukase authorizing the establishment of the company in Russia had been granted. A meeting of the shareholders had also been held, at which a resolution was passed shewing that all the shareholders except the petitioners were in favour of carrying on the company, and of opposing this petition. Glasse, Q.C., and Latham, in support of the petition. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that although no business had actually been commenced by the company in the sense of making and selling gas, yet that their proceedings were in so forward a state that it could not be said they had brought themselves within the 2nd clause of the 79th section of the Act of 1862; and considering that nine-tenths of the shareholders had passed a resolution in favour of proceeding with the company, he was not at liberty to act upon any view which he him The only question was the date from which interest was payable by the company upon the 20007. Kay, Q.C., and Freeling, for the plaintiffs, claimed interest from 1868, when the company took possession of the land. Cracknall (H. Matthews, Q.C., with him), for the defendant company, contended that plaintiffs were not entitled to interest from any earlier period than the verdict of the jury. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR :-As soon as the railway company, in the exercise of their statutory rights, took possession of the land they became owners of it, and liable to plaintiffs for the amount subsequently ascertained to be due for purchase and compensation money. It is not consistent with common sense, honesty, or justice that having entered upon the land and endeavoured by all legal or other means to postpone a settlement of the landowners' claim the company should be allowed to escape from payment of interest for the time during which they have been in possession. They must pay interest at 4 per cent. upon the 20001. from the time when they took possession. Solicitors: Peacopp; Field, Roscoe, & Co. Nov. 5. V.-C. B. HYDE v. CLARK. Practice-Foreclosure Decree taken against some of the Defendants pro confesso-Service of Decree out of Jurisdiction ordered to be effected by Advertisement-Cons. Ord. XXII. rr. 11, 12, 15. A mortgage of real estate was made in 1826. The original mortgagor and mortgagee were both dead; the mortgagee had been in possession twelve years when the bill was filed for foreclosure; and of the sixteen defendants, who were trustees and beneficiaries under the will of the mortgagor, four were out of the jurisdiction in America. Against them the bill had been ordered to be taken pro confesso at the hearing. Upon the hearing, none of the defendants appeared. Bovill, Q.C., and Lake Onslow, for the plaintiffs, asked for the ordinary foreclosure decree in favour of a mortgagee in possession, and applied under Order xxi. rule 12, that the time to be appointed by the Court to be specified in the service of the notice required by rule 11 to be served on the defendant should, in the case of the defendants out of the jurisdiction, be three months; also that service of the decree and notice upon the defendants out of the jurisdiction (rendered necessary by article 2 of rule 15) might be effected by advertisement-a course which they said had been taken by Vice-Chancellor Malins in an unreported case of Canter v. Wodehouse (7th of August, 1874) and, as they understood, in other instances also. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that considering the circumstances | withdrawing his objection. In July, 1871, a call was made in of the case (above stated), he thought service might be made by the winding-up. Nelson raised an objection, and his objection advertisement, but directed that the advertisement should appear was adjourned into Court, and the decision being against him, in at least one American paper as well as in the Times and another he had been compelled to pay 2001. In August, 1873, and London daily paper; and the order was accordingly made, as March, 1874, Wynne's Case (Law Rep. 8 Ch. 1002), and Beck's prayed. Case (Law Rep. 9 Ch. 392), were decided to the effect that the Solicitor: Richard Dickson. attempted transfer and all proceedings under it were void, and accordingly that shareholders in the Progress who had applied for an exchange of shares were under no liability to the United Ports Company. V.-C. B. BATLEY V. KYNOCK." Patent-Practice-Inspection. Nov. 12. In this suit, which was to restrain an alleged infringement by defendants of letters patent for improvements in cartridges adapted to breech-loading fire-arms, granted to Messrs. Jones in 1865, and vested in plaintiffs by assignment, issues had been settled for trial before this Court without a jury: (1.) Whether Messrs. Jones were the first and true inventors of the undisclaimed portions of the patent; (2) Novelty of invention; (3.) Infringement. Kay, Q.C., and Aston, Q.C. (Locock Webb with them), for plaintiffs, now moved for leave to inspect the defendants' manufactory. Swanston, Q.C., and Macrory (E. C. Willis, with them), for defendants, opposed the motion on the ground that plaintiffs had not shewn the absolute impossibility of proving their case except by an inspection of defendants' manufactory and machinery, which would alone justify the Court in making this stringent order. The patent being for improvements in cartridges, plaintiffs had only to buy cartridges made by defendants if they wished to get the necessary information. Kay, in reply. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR refused the motion. There was no allegation by plaintiffs that they could not make out their case without an inspection of defendants' manufactory, while defendants swore that inspection was unnecessary. Having regard to the nature of the invention for which protection was claimed by the patent-improvements in cartridges-plaintiffs had ample means of making out whether there had been an infringement by inspecting cartridges of defendants' manufacture. The mode by which the cartridges were made could not signify. Plaintiffs therefore were not entitled to inspection. Solicitors: Stibbard & Cronshey; Treherne & Wolferstan. In re UNITED PORTS AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY. NELSON'S CASE. Winding-up-Company-Invalid Transfer of Business-Delay. Application on behalf of Richard Nelson, whose name had been settled on the list of contributories of the United Ports Company in November, 1870, that no further proceedings might be taken against him for the purpose of enforcing calls; that his name might be removed from the list of contributories, and that the official liquidator might repay him the sum of 2001. paid by him in respect of the call made by an order of the 28th of July, 1871, with interest at 4 per cent. Nelson originally held forty 51. shares in the Progress Insurance Company (Limited), and upon the attempted arrangement, in June, 1869, for a sale of the Progress business to the United Ports Company, he filled up the form of application, which had been sent to him, for 200 17. shares (10s. paid up) in the United Ports in exchange for his shares in the Progress. A letter, dated the 5th of August, 1869, allotting him 200 shares was sent to him in reply. In November, 1869, the United Ports Company was ordered to be wound up, and the official liquidator was appointed in December. In April, 1870, notice of settling the list of contributories was served. Nelson objected to the insertion of his name, but in November, 1870, being advised that he could not successfully resist being placed on the list, a letter was sent by his solicitor In June, 1874, a second call having been made, Nelson made this application to have his name taken off the list, and to be repaid the amount paid by him upon the call of July, 1871. Kay, Q.C., and Speed, in support of the application. Eddis, Q.C., and Brookshank, for the official liquidator, contended that Nelson by allowing his name to remain on the list from April, 1871, until June, 1874, without taking any steps further than to dispute the amount of his liability, but not the fact of his acceptance of the shares, could not now claim the benefit of the recent decisions. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR could not listen to the argument that if justice were done to Mr. Nelson it would be inconvenient to other people whose rights had been calculated and adjusted on the footing of his being liable as a contributory. The simple question was, whether, having been compelled to pay a sum of money which he never owed, Nelson was entitled to have that money back. The case was completely covered by Beck's Case Contract between Nelson and the United and Wynne's Case. Ports Company to take shares there never was, and he never was under any liability to pay calls. Upon no ground could it be said that he had come too late, or that he had misled the official liquidator by anything done by him. His name must be struck off the list, and he was entitled to be repaid the amount which he had paid for calls under mistake. Solicitors: A. Pulbrook; Nicholson, Nicol, & Son. V.-C. H. CROMPTON V. LEA. Nov. 4. Demurrer-Mines—Working so as to flood a Mine at a lower Level -Danger to Life. The bill in this case was filed by the lessees of a mine near Wigan for the purpose of obtaining an injunction to restrain the defendants, who were owners of an adjacent mine (called the Eccles mine) at a higher level, from working their mine or leaving the shaft in such a manner as to cause or allow the river Douglas to flood the plaintiffs' mine. The bill alleged that the defendants' mine had been nearly worked out, and that the only legitimate use to which the upper seams of the Eccles Coal mine could be put was to serve as a pillar for the support of the river bed, and that the manner in which it had been worked made it impossible further to work them for any mining purpose, and the bill further alleged that in 1847 the river Douglas had burst through the property and caused a deplorable loss of life, and in 1857, 1860, and 1872, the river had again broken through, inflicting considerable damage. To this bill the defendants demurred. Dickinson, Q.C., Lindley, Q.C., and Clare, for the demurrer, contended that according to the authorities the defendants were entitled to work their mine in the ordinary manner whatever might be the result to the other mines. As a fact the cause of the apprehended danger was that the plaintiffs had done the very thing they complained of, and if they had not worked out the coal in their mine there would be no apprehension of danger. Fry, Q.C., Herschell, Q.C., and Finch, appeared for the bill. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the case made by the bill was that the defendants could not work their mine to any useful purpose, and that they were therefore not working their mine in the ordinary way of business. In that state of things he thought they were not entitled to damage the plaintiffs' pro- | estate was the primary fund for such purpose. The committees perty, and the demurrer must be overruled. Solicitors for the plaintiffs: Sharpe, Parkers, & Co. Provision for Wife by Settlement-Lunacy of Wife-Provision by The Rev. James Gisborne, who died in February, 1872, by his will in October, 1860, bequeathed his household furniture, consumable household stores, and other things, to trustees and executors, upon trust to permit his wife to have the use and enjoyment thereof during her life, and after her decease he directed the same articles, or such of them as were unconsumed, to be disposed of as part of his personal estate; and he devised all his real estate and bequeathed all his personal estate to which he might be entitled at his decease unto his brother, W. J. Gisborne, and Abraham Bass, their heirs, executors, &c., upon trust that they and the survivor should continue all or any of his personal estate in the same state of investment as the same might be in at his decease, except such part thereof as they might find it necessary to sell or call in for the purpose of raising money to pay his debts, funeral, and testamentary expenses, or in the discretion of his trustees at any time get in and convert into money all or any part of his personal estate, and invest the produce as in the will mentioned, or in such other manner as to his trustees might seem advisable, with power to vary investments; and should let and manage his real estate; and upon further trust that his trustees or trustee, in their discretion and of their uncontrollable authority, should pay and apply the whole or such portion only of the annual income of his real and personal estates, and of the investments and securities for the time being constituting or representing the same, as they should think expedient to or for the clothing, board, lodging, maintenance, ease, and support, or otherwise for the personal and peculiar benefit and comfort of his wife during her life, whether competent or competent to give an acquittance or discharge at such time and times, and in such proportions and manner in all respects as his trustees should think most conducive to her comfort, enjoyment, and convenience, without being liable to account for such payment or application, or pay the same income or any part thereof to any person or persons for the purposes aforesaid, without seeing to its application, and upon trust to invest and accumulate any unapplied income. And after the death of his wife the trustees were to convert all his property and pay certain legacies to the persons named, and the residue they were to divide into four equal shares, and pay one share unto W. J. Gisborne, and other two shares unto the persons named, and the remaining share they were to retain in trust for the persons named. had been allowed to prosecute, in the name of the wife, this suit, which prayed for the administration of the trusts of the will of the testator and "for a declaration that the wife was entitled to have a reasonable and proper provision made for her clothing, board, lodging, maintenance, ease, and support, and otherwise for her benefit and comfort, out of the income of the testator's estate for her life," and that such income was the primary fund for that purpose, and for consequential relief. Dickinson, Q.C., and Davey, for the plaintiff. Lindley, Q.C., and Rodwell, for the trustees of the will, and Greene, Q.C., and Gardner, for defendants entitled to threefourths of the residuary estate. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that, construing the words of the will according to their ordinary signification, the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration as prayed by the second paragraph of the prayer [in inverted commas above] and that the words "the testator's estate was the primary fund," might be added, though he did not see the necessity for them. Solicitors: Robinson & Preston, agents for Burne & Rooke, Bath; R. H. Wilkins, agent for Bass & Jennings, Burton-onTrent. V.-C. H. In re TANNER'S TRUSTS. Nov. 13. Married Woman-Separate Estate-Transfer of Fund. A sum of 80007, was on the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Tanner settled upon trust for the husband and wife for life and for the children and issue of the marriage as the parents should appoint, and in default of appointment for the children who should attain 21, and the issue born in the parents' lifetime of deceased children. There was the usual hotchpot clause. There were three children of the marriage. Several appointments were made, but and for remoteness, but as to one third of the fund the Vice-Chansome were considered to be void on the ground of fraud on the power cellor held that a valid appointment was made in favour of the petitioner Mrs. Crofton, one of the children, of a life estate for She therefore took this interest under the her separate use. inappointment, and under the trust in default of appointment, taken in connection with the hotchpot clause, she took the same third. The money had been paid into Court under the Trustee Relief Act and invested in Consols, and Mr. and Mrs. Crofton now, by their petition, asked that this third share should be transferred into the name of Mrs. Crofton as a married woman entitled thereto as for her separate estate. Previously to and at the date of the will the testator's wife was, and she had ever since continued to be, of unsound mind, and in November, 1872, she was by an inquisition found to be of unsound mind, and not competent for the management of herself or her estate, and committees had since been appointed, and a sum of 6967. a year allowed for her maintenance. Under the trusts of the settlement, dated in June, 1841, and made upon the marriage of the testator and his wife, she became entitled absolutely to about 10,300 37 per cent. bank annuities, and for life to the income of about 10,700. like annuities, all standing in the names of trustees, and under a suit instituted in May, 1872, provision had been made for the wife out of the income of the settled funds; but when the order was made the Court was not informed of the provisions of the testator's will. It was submitted that the wife was entitled to have her clothing, board, lodging, and maintenance provided for out of the income of the testator's real and residuary personal estate, and that it would be more for her benefit to be so maintained than out of the settled property, and that in fact the income of the testator's Dickinson, Q.C., and Hadley, for the petitioners. Bunkruptcy Act, 1869, s. 96-Summons for Examination-Service -High Bailiff of County Court-Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, rr. 58, 166, 167. The trustee under the bankruptcy of Holden desired to summon a person for examination under s. 96. His solicitor wished to serve the summons himself, but the registrar refused to allow it to be served except by the high bailiff of the court. The question was then brought before the Judge, who was of opinion that under rule 58 the high bailiff alone could make the service. The trustee appealed. a Herschell, QC., and Channell, for the appellant. 'De Gex, Q C., and J. Beaumont, for the high bailiff. THE CHIEF JUDGE said that the judge of the county court had discretion to direct by whom the summons should be served, and declined to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. Solicitors: Girling & Owles; Learoyd, Learoyd, & Peace. This was an appeal from an adjudication of bankruptcy made by the deputy registrar of the Newcastle County Court against Edward Lindsay. Lindsay gave no notice of intention to shew cause against the petition. At the hearing he did not appear. The petition did not allege any specific act of bankruptcy, but only in general terms that an act of bankruptcy had been committed by Lindsay having made "a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery, or transfer of his property, or of some part thereof." The only evidence before the deputy registrar in support of the allegation was the common affidavit (Form No. 11) that the statements contained in the petition were true. The deputy registrar made the adjudication, and Lindsay appealed. Little, Q.C., and Bagley, for the appellant, argued that there was no sufficient proof of an act of bankruptcy, and also that the deputy registrar had no power to make an adjudication. De Gex, Q.C., and Doria, for the petitioning creditor. THE CHIEF JUDGE thought that there was no sufficient proof of an act of bankruptcy. The affidavit (Form No. 11) was only for the purpose of obtaining the sealing of the petition, and there must be much more ample proof to justify an adjudication. As to the other point, by rule 1 the word "Registrar" was made to include "Deputy Registrar," and therefore rule 3 authorized the delegation of the powers of the judge to the deputy registrar. The adjudication must be annulled, and the petition must go back to the county court to be properly heard. Solicitors: Pyke, Irving, & Pyke; Hoyle. Trader Debtor-Execution-Sale-Liquidation Petition-Notice to On the 26th of February Mason recovered judgment in an action against W. Smith for 10527. and costs. On the 7th of May, Mason levied execution for 10747. on the growing crops and other effects of Smith, who was a farmer. On the 18th of May the sheriff sold the goods to Mason by private contract for 11277., and on the 25th of May he paid Mason back 10747. Smith was in fact a trader, he having made and sold a medicine for cattle, but of this the sheriff was ignorant. There was nothing at the farm to indicate the trading. On the 1st of June Smith filed a liquidation petition describing himself as a trader. The same day notice was served on the sheriff that a liquidation petition had been filed by one W. Smith. This notice was intituled in an action brought by Lechmere and others against W. Smith and J. Smith, and stated that "W. Smith, the abovenamed defendant," had filed a liquidation petition. It did not, however, state that he was the same person as the W. Smith whose goods had been sold, or that he was a trader. The deputy judge held that the sheriff must pay the 10747. over again to the trustee under the liquidation. The sheriff appealed. E. C. Willis, for the sheriff. De Gex, Q.C., and Finlay Knight, for the trustee. THE CHIEF JUDGE held that the notice to the sheriff was insufficient. The sheriff was not bound to inquire whether a man whose goods he had sold under an execution was a trader. The person who wished to avoid the execution was bound to give a proper notice to the sheriff. The order of the county court must be discharged. Solicitors: Chauntrell, Pollock, & Mason; Duignan & Smiles. Q. B. Master and Servant-30 & 31 Vict. c. 141, s. 3, sch. 1-4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3-Proceedings against Servant who has not entered into Service-Parol Contract not enforceable-Statute of Frauds, 8. 4. The By a parol hiring on the 11th of November, respondent agreed to serve appellant as a servant in husbandry for one year, to commence on the 23rd of November, at 137. per annum. appellant paid respondent 3s. as fastening money, which respondent returned to appellant on the 30th of November. Respondent did not enter into the service, and an information was taken out against him under the Master and Servant Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 141). The justices dismissed the information on the grounds: (1.) That the contract being not to be performed within a year, and not being in writing, s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds prevented any proceeding at law being taken to enforce it; (2) That by 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, proceedings against servants in husbandry, &c., who had not entered into the service could only be taken where the contract was in writing signed by both parties; and that 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, being mentioned in the schedule to 30 & 31 Vict. c. 141, the operation of that latter Act was by s. 3 confined to cases within 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, and therefore the present hiring being by parol was not within Gibbons, for appellant. the Act. Kingsford, for respondent. THE COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held that the decision of the justices was right on both grounds. Attorneys for appellant: Ridsdale, Craddock, & Ridsdale. HAIGH, APP.; Town Clerk of Sheffield, Resp. Betting Houses Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 19) ss. 1,3-“ Place”—Perso knowingly and wilfully permitting Place to be used by other Person for the Purpose of Betting with Persons resorting thereto. The appellant was convicted of knowingly and wilfully permitting a place to be used by another person for the purpose of betting, within the meaning of the Betting Houses Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119) ss. 1, 3, under circumstances precisely similar to those in the case of Eastwood v. Miller (Law Rep. 9 Q.B. 440). Philbrick (Crompton with him), for the appellant. J. C. Barker, for the respondent. THE COURT (Blackburn, Melior, and Lush, JJ.) adhered to the former decision, and held the conviction right. Attorneys for appellant: Doyle & Edwards, for Binney & Sons, Sheffield. Attorneys for respondent: R. & W. B. Smith, for Yeomans, T. C. Sheffield. PLUMSTEAD BOARD OF WORKS v. BRITISH LAND COMPANY. Metropolis Management Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 77Owners of "Land"-Public Roads-Land-Conveyance, intention not to pass Soil of adjacent Road. The defendants, a land company, in 1863, being owners of certain lands in Plumstead laid them out for building purposes, and made roads and ways across them; and nearly the whole of the estate was sold in lots to different purchasers and conveyed to them by metes, bounds, and admeasurements, set forth on |