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Common Law.

Q. B.
SEARLE v. LAVERICK.

Jan. 28.
Bailee for Hire, Livery-stable Keeper, Liability of, for Care of

Carriage of Customer-Fall of Coachhouse.

The plaintiff brought his horses and two carriages to the Q. B. Cape v. Scott.

Jan. 27. defendant, a livery-stable keeper; the carriages were placed Common pur Cause de Vicinage-Distress - Damage feasant.

_Dormage feasant under a shed on the defendant's premises, a charge being made

by defendant for them. This shed had just been erected, the Replerin for taking twenty sheep on certain land (which was

upper part being still in the hands of workmen. The defendant set out by abuttals) and detaining them.

had employed a builder to erect the shed, as an independent Avowry, that the taking was for a distress damage feasant,

contractor and not as defendant's servant, and he was a comthe defendant having a right of common of pasture over the

petent and proper person so to employ. The shed fell down locus in quo.

(the defendant being ignorant of any defect) and the plaintiff's Plea, that the land was a common, hereinafter called Caldbeck

carriages were injured, upon which he brought an action to Common, forming part of the common and waste lands of the

recover damages from thë defendant for the injury. manor of Caldbeck, and by and from time immemorial had lain

At the trial, in addition to the above facts, the plaintiff's contiguous to a common hereinafter called Uldale Common,

counsel proposed to prove that owing to the neglect of the forming part of the common and waste land of the manor of

builder and his workmen the building had been unskilfully Uldale, and had never been divided or separated from the last built on

built, and that this was the cause of the fall. The learned inentioned common by any hedge or fence whatsoever sufficient lindoa rafinca

cient judge refused to receive the evidence, and nonsuited the plainto prevent cattle from time to time feeding on either common tiff. ruling that « the defendant's liability was that of an orgoing or escaping on to the other common; that from time im-ldin

! dinary bailee for hire, and he was only bound to take ordinary memorial the cattle duly put on either of the commons in

| care in the keeping of the plaintiff's carriages, and that if he exercise of rights of common over such common have gone and

had exercised in the employment of the builder such care as an escaped, and been accustoined to go and escape on to the

ordinary careful man would use, he was not liable for damage other common, and there to intermix with and feed with the cattle from time to time feeding on such other common; that defendant) had no notice.”

caused by the carelessness of the builder of which he (the the plaintiff is possessed of a messuage and lands in the parish

| Holker, 'Q.C., and Shield, for defendant. of Uldale, the occupiers of which for thirty years before this suit

C. Russell, Q.C., and Lewers, for plaintiff. enjoyed as of right and without interruption common of pasture

THE COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.), after time over Uldale Common for all their cattle levant and couchant to be

taken to consider, held the nonsuit right, being of opinion that upon the land of the plaintiff at all times of the year as to the

the case came within the second branch of the fifth sort of bail. land of the plaintiff appertaining; that being in possession of

ments mentioned by Holt, C.J., in Coggs v. Bernard (2 Ld. Raym. such messuage and land as aforesaid just before the time when, &c., be pat the sheep, being his own sheep levant and couchant,

at p. 918), viz. a delivery to carry or otherwise manage for hire,

to a person not exercising any public employment; and that no upon the land of the plaintiff upon Uldale Common in exercise

warranty or obligation ought to be implied against the defendant of his right of common, and the sheep of the plaintiff afterwards,

beyond that expressed in the ruling of the judge. and just before the time when, &c., of their own accord and

Attorney for plaintiff: John Scott, for Graham & Graham, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, went and

Sunderland. escaped out of Uldale Common on to Caldbeck Common and intermixed and fed with the cattle then and there feeding on Rubson. Sinderland.

Attorneys for defendant: Bell, Brodrick, of Bell, for W. W. Caldbeck Common.

Demurrer and joinder in demurrer.

Bompas, in support of the demurrer, contended that the replication was bad, inasmuch as one commoner cannot distrain the

| Q. B.
RAEBURN V. ANDREWS.

Jan. 29. cattle of another commoner.

Practice-Security for CostsPlaintiff resident in ScotlandCrompton, contrà, contended that the right of common was in

31 6 32 Vict. c. 54. respect of a common pur cause de vicinage, which was a mere excuse The plaintiff, who was resident in Scotland, brought an action for a trespass, and that the cattle were therefore rightly distrained. against the defendant. The defendant moved for a rule calling

THE COURT (Blackburn, Quain, and Archibald, JJ.) held the on the plaintiff to shew cause why all proceedings should not bo replication bad, for cattle on the one common may well stray stayed until the plaintiff shall have given security for costs. and go on the other common without being distrained.

Lanyon, for the defendant. Attorneys for plaintiff: Bischoff, Bompas, & Bischoff.

THE Court (Blackburn, Quain, and Archibald, JJ.) refused Attorneys for defendant: Sharp d Ullithorne.

the rule, stating that the reason why a plaintiff resident abroad or in Scotland or Ireland was required to give security for costs was, that if a verdict be given against the plaintiff he was not

within the reach of the law, so as to have process served upon Q. B. THE QUEEN v. SUTTON COALFIELD. Jan. 28.

him for costs, but since the passing of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54, where Quarter Sessions, Appeal from-Case reserved on a Preliminary a judgment has been obtained in England a certificate thereof Point.

registered in Scotland has the effect of a decreet of the Court of On an appeal against a poor-rate to the quarter sessions the Sessions, and process would be issued on that certificate; the Bessions granted an application to enter and respite the appeal. defendant having therefore a remedy for his costs, he is no subject to a case for the opinion of the Court on a preliminary point. I longer entitled to have security for costs. Jan. 17. Hill, Q.C., and Soden, for the prosecution.

| Attorneys for defendant: Holland, Son, & Co. Wills, Q.C., and Dugdale, for the defendants.

Jan. 28. THE COURT (Blackburn and Quain, JJ) declined to take cognizance of the facts stated in the case, or to give any lo R

AYRES v, LoVelock.

Jan. 30. opinion on the questions reserved, the quarter sessions not having made an order either confirming or reversing the decision

Practice-Certificate for Costs under County Courts Acts Amendappealed against.

ment Act (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142) s. 5—"JudgeUndersheriff. Attorney for prosecution : R. F. Roberts.

Action of slander. The defendant did not appear, and on a Attorneys for the defendant: Beal & Co.

writ of inquiry before the under-sheriff, the jury assessed the

damages at one shilling. The under-sheriff certified under 8. 5 falso representation with respect to the credit and solvency of of the County Courts Acts Amendment Act (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142), one Sir W. Russell, whereby the plaintiff was induced to sell to which enacts that “if in any action in the superior courts the Russell certain goods for which the plaintiff had not been paid plaintiff shall recover a sum not exceeding 101. in an action of in consequence of Russell's insolvency. tort, whether by verdict, judgment by default, or on demurrer, or The Court of Queen's Bench held that both the banking comotherwise, he shall not be entitled to any costs of suit, unless the pany and Goddard were liable to the plaintiff. judge certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for Day, Q.C. (E. Clarke with him), for the plaintiff. bringing such action in such superior court."

| Benjamin, Q.C. (Sir J. B. Karslake, Q.C., and Anstie, with The master having refused to tax the plaintiff his costs, him), for the banking company. Jan. 26. T. Atkinson moved for a rule to the master to tax. Sir H. James, A.-G. (Jeune with him), for the defendant

THE COURT (Blackburn, Quain, and Archibald, JJ.) expressed Goddard. great doubt as to whether the undersheriff had power to certify THE COURT (Lord Coleridge, C.J., Bramwell, Pigott, and under s. 5," jadge" only being mentioned, and not " or other Cleasby, B.B., Grove and Denman, JJ.) affirmed the judgment of presiding officer," as in some similar enactments, and gave time the Court below so far as it related to the defendant Goddard, to counsel to look into the cases.

and reversed it so far as it related to the banking company. Jan. 30. T. Atkinson informed the Court that he found the Attorneys for plaintiff: Harper & Co. cases against him, and withdrew his motion.

Attorneys for defendants : Waterhouse & Winterbotham. Attorney for plaintiff: W, G. Brighten.

NOTE: -See dictum of Kelly, C.B., semble, to the contrary in Craven v. Smith
(Law Rep. 4 Ex. at pp. 149, 150).
Ex. Ch. from Q. B,

Feb. 3.
KELLOCK v. ENTHOVEN.
Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict, c. 89) s. 38– Winding-up-

Compromise by Transferee of Shares with Liquilator - Right of

Feb. 3.
Q. B.
SNEESBY v. LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.

Transferor to be indemnified by Transferee in Respect of future

Calls. Railway Company-Negligence-Consequential Damage.

Error from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in The plaintiff, a cattle denler, had a herd of fat beasts, which favour of the plaintiff (reported Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 458). were being driven by four or five persons at 11 o'clock P.M. Benjamin, O.C. (Gully with him), for the plaintiff. along an occupation road to some fields to be ready for a market Herschell, Q.C. (Beresford with him), for the defendant. held the next morning at a neighbouring town. The road

The Court (Lord Coleridge, C.J., Bramwell, Pigott, Cleasby, crossed a siding of the defendants' railway on a level, and while BB.. Grove, and Denman, JJ.) affirmed the judgment of the the cattle were crossing the siding the defendants' servants neg

Court below. ligently sent some trucks down an incline into the siding, which

Attorneys for plaintiff: Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle. divided the cattle into two lots, and frightened them, and they

Attorneys for defendant; Elmslie, Forsyth, & Sedgwick.
rushed away with the drovers after them. The drovers suc-
ceeded in picking up most of the cattle, but they were unable
to find several of them, which were ultimately found at be-
tween 3 and 4 A.M., lying killed on another railway of the defen. In d

C. P.
MILLER v. DAVID

Jan. 24. dants; and it appeared that they had gone along the occupation | road up to a garden and orchard about a quarter of a mile from Defamation-Words not injurious per se, or connected by Implication the level crossing, had got into the garden through the fences. I or Averment with the Trade or Profession of the plaintiff. which were defective, and so on to the line; there was no evi- The declaration charged that the defendant spoke of the plaindence as to when they had been killed.

tiff, a working stonemason, the following words: “He was the Price, Q.C., and Beasley, for the defendants.

ringleader of the nine hours' movement," and that, “ He has Field, Q.C., for the plaintiff. THE COURT (Blackburn, Quain, and Archibald, JJ.) held that he has stopped several good jobs from being carried out, by being

ruined the town by bringing about the nine hours' system, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. It being admitted that the the ringleader of the system at Llanelly." defendants had been guilty of the negligence which caused the On demurrer. drovers to lose control over the cattle, and it being also ad

THE COURT held that, the words not being actionable in themmitted that the plaintiff's men had done a!l they could to recover

o recover selves, or connected by averment or by implication with the plaincontrol over the beasts, and had not been able to do so before

en able to do so before tiff's trade or profession, though alleged to have been followed by they were killed, their death was the consequence of the de

damage, the action was not maintainable. fendants' negligence, and the damage was not too remote.

Bray, for the plaintiff. Attorneys for plaintiff : Clarke & Son.

11. Giffard, Q.C., for the defendant. Attorneys for defendants : Clarke, Woodcock, & Ryland, for

Attorney for plaintiff: Stretton. Grundy & Co., Manchester,

Attorneys for defendant: Cowdell, Grundy, & Browne,

Ex. Ch. from Q. B.
Feb. 2. c. P.

Jan. 24. Swift v. WINTERBOTHAM (P.O.) AND GODDARD. WELLER v. LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY False RepresentationSignature of Party to be charged9 Geo. 4,

COMPANY. c. 14, s. 6-Signature by Agent of Company formed under 7 Geo. 4, Railway Company-Negligence at Station-Contributory Neglic. 46-Principal and Agent - Action against Joint Tortfeasors.

gence-Invitation to alight. Error from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in The plaintiff was a passenger by a train on the defendants' favour of the plaintiff (reported Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 244).

railway from London Bridge to Selhurst. He was a seasonThe defendant Winterbotham was sued as the public officer ticket holder, and frequently travelled by the line. On the of the Gloucestershire Banking Company, and the defendant arrival of the train at the Selhurst station between 6 and 7 in Goddard was the manager of the Cheltenham branch. The the evening of the 25th of November, the night being dark and declaration charged the bank and Goddard with making a joint the station imperfectly lighted, the porter called out “Selhurst, Selburst," and then the train stopped. Hearing the noise of the There was a coach-house connected with the White Hart, opening and shutting of doors, the plaintiff concluded he had which was not in the occupation of the plaintiff at the time of arrived at his destination, and stepped out of the second car- making the agreement, but was occupied by one Samson as riage from the engine; but instead of alighting upon the plat- tenant to the plaintiff, and of which the tenancy not being deterform, he fell a depth of 4) feet on to the embankment-the train mined at the time fixed for completion under the agreement, the having overshot the platform. There was no evidence that the plaintiff could not give the defendant possession at such time. driver backed or intended to baek the train; and others had got The verdict was entered on these facts for the plaintiff for out of the train before him.

1001., the sum mentioned in the contract, leave being reserved Upon this evidence, Borill, C.J., nonsuited the plaintiff ; to enter it for the defendant, or to reduce the damages to 301., raling that there was no evidence of negligence in the company's the sum found by the jury to be the actual damage sustained servants to go to the jury; but he reserved leave to the plaintiff by the plaintiff. to move to enter a verdict for 1001. (agreed damages), the Court A rule nisi had been accordingly obtained, against which to be at liberty to draw inferences both as to negligence by the M. Chambers, Q.C., and McMahon, shewed cause. defendants and want of reasonable care of the plaintiff.

Murphy and Bray supported the rule. 1, Seymour, Q.C., Willis, and Hilbery, for the plaintiff.

THE COURT (Coleridge, C.J., Keating and Denman, JJ.) hell Lopes, Q.C., and Joyce, for the defendants.

that the true construction of the contract was that the words “he THE COURT made a rule absolute, holding that there was now occupies” were not falsa demonstratio, but an essential part evidence which wonld justify a jury in finding negligence on the of the description of the subject matter, and therefore that the part of the company, and no contributory negligence on the part plaintiff was in a condition to perform his contract and so of the plaintiff.

entitled to recover against the defendant, but that the 1001. Attorney for plaintiff : Henry Aird, 1

mentioned in the contract was a penalty and not liquidated Attorneys for defendant: Barter & Co.

damages, and therefore the damages must be reduced to 301.

Rule absolute accordingly.
Attorneys for plaintiff: Cox & Sons,

Attorney for defendant: Murrough.
C.P.

CARTER, Pet.; MILLS, RESP. Jan. 27.
Election Petition-Dissolution of ParliamentReturn of
Deposit.

C. P.
NEWELL v. VAN PRAAGH.

Jan. 29. This was a petition against the return of respondent as a Debtors Act. 1869. s. 5-Judge's Order for Payment of Judgment member of Parliament for the city of Exeter. A dissolution of

Debt by Instalments-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 126 -ComposiParliament haviug taken place before the hearing of the petition

tion, Default in Payment of - Revival of Creditoi's Original it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petition thereby abated, and application was made on his behalf for a

Rights-Application for Committal of Deblor. return of the deposit.

In this case the plaintiff had recovered judgment for a debt Chandos Leigh, for the petitioner.

against the defendant, and a judge's order was subsequently Petheram, for the respondent.

made against the defendant under the Debtors Act, 1869, for TAE COURT (Coleridge, C.J., Keating and Derman, JJ.) wore payment of the debt by instalments. Some of the

payment of the debt by instalments. Some of the instalments of opinion that by the dissolution of Parliament the petition

having been paid, but others not being yet due, the defendant abated, and granted the application.

commenced proceedings for the purpose of effecting a composition Application granted.

under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and a resolution was passed by Attorneys for the petitioner: Hoskins & Wyatt.

his creditors accepting a composition upon his debts. The defenAttorney for the respondent: Philbrick.

dant made default in payment of the composition to the plaintiff, who thereupon applied to a judge at chambers under the 5th section of the Debtors Act, 1869, for an order for the committal

of the defendant for non-compliance with the former judge's C. P. MAGEE v. LAVELL.

Jan. 27. order for payment of the debt by instalments. The judge reAgreement for Assignment of Tenancy-Parcels- Falsa demon- ferred the matter to the Court. stratio-Liquidated Damages-Penalty.

A rule nisi had been obtained for the committal of the defen

dant, against which Declaration for breach of an agreement between the plaintiff

| Croome shewed cause. and defendant, whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell and the

F. M. White supported the rule. defendant to buy the interest, goodwill, &c., of the plaintiff in a

The Court (Coleridge, C.J., Keating, Brett, and Denman, JJ.) certain public-house called the White Hart.

held that the true construction of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, Breach: refusal by the defendant to carry out the agreement.

was that on default in payment of the composition, the creditor Plea: that the plaintiff was not able to give the defendant on

was remitted to his original position, and that consequently the the day fixed for completion possession of a certain part of the

order of the judge at chambers was a subsisting order, and might premises included in the agreement.

now be enforced by committal of the defendant. Issue.

Rule absolute. At the trial, which took place betore Honyman, J., at the

Attorneys for plaintiff: Jones, Arkcoll, & Jones. sittings during Trinity Term, the facts were as follows:

Attorney for defendant: Brown. The subject matter of the agreement, which was in writing, was "house and premises he now occupies known by the sign of the White Hart, with stabling and garden." It provided for the purchase by the defendant of certain stock on the premises, lc. P. PHILLIPS 1. MILLER AND OTHERS. Jan. 30 and that the plaintiff should discharge all rates, taxes, &c., growing due up to the time fixed for completion under the agreement,

Vendor and Purchaser-Sale of Real Property-- Incumbrancesand concluded, if either party shall refuse or neglect to per

Terms of existing Tenancies, Notice of. form all and every part of this agreement, they hereby promise Special case stated in an action for breach of a contract by and agree to pay to the other who shall be willing to complete vendors of real property to convey certain premises free from the same, the sum of 1001, as damages, and recoverable in any of incumbrances to the purchaser. Her Majesty's courts of law."

The facts were in substance as follows:-Part of the estate in

question consisted of three farms in Hampshire, and it appeared that it was in effect allowing a new petition to be filed after the that in that county valuations between outgoing and incoming lapse of the twenty-one days limited by the statute. tenants of hay, straw, and manure are made at what is called Agents for petitioners : Paterson, Snow, & Burney. . “fodder value," which is lower than what is called “market Agent for respondent: J. J. Darley. value.” The three tenants of the above-mentioned farms held under verbal agreements from year to year according to the custom of Hampshire. In April, 1868, the defendants gave 0..P.

OULTON V. RADOLIFFE.

Jan. 31. notice to the tenants to quit, but they alleged that they had been

| Court of Pleas at Lancıster-Jurisdiction of the Court-Service of promised leases by the defendants' predecessor in title, and

Writ out of the District. ultimately it was agreed that if they would give up possession according to the notices half a year's rent should be remitted to A writ of summons was issued out of the Court of Common them, and they should be paid for hay, &c., on going out at Pleas at Lancaster against the defendant at the suit of the plainMichaelmas, 1869, at market value. In June, 1868, the estate

tiff. The cause of action did not arise within the county palawas put up for sale by auction. In the particulars the three tine of Lancaster, neither did the defendant reside or carry on farms were described as being in the occupation of the tenants

business within that jurisdiction, nor was he personally served. at various rents, but there was no express mention in the par

The writ was sent by the plaintiff's attorneys to the defendant's ticulars of the above-mentioned agreements with the tenants. attorney at Stone, in the county of Stafford, and the latter gave The property was bought in at the sale by auction, and afterwards

an undertaking to appear, and afterwards duly appeared. sold by private contract on the 18th of July, 1868, to the plaintiff.

R, G. Williams, for the plaintiff, The contract for sale described the property purchased as the

Gully, for the defendant. property mentioned in the foregoing particulars, and as being

THE COURT refused to set aside the service, holding that there purchased subject to the foregoing conditions, and was written being no want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the on one of the printed copies of the particulars and conditions of action (goods sold and delivered) any irregularity in the service sale. At the time that the plaintiff bought he had no knowledge

was waived by the defendant's appearance. of the agreements with the tenants above-mentioned. The plain Attorneys for plaintiff: Neal & Philpott, for Evans & Lockett, tiff afterwards hearing of the terms of these agreements, it was Liverpool. agreed that he should complete the purchase without prejudice

Attorneys for defendant: Chester, Urquhart, Bushby, & Mayhew, to his claim to be indemnified in respect of the agreement to for G. W. Hodgkinson, Stone, Staffordshire. pay the tenants market instead of fodder value for the hay, straw, and manure. The plaintiff afterwards paid the tenants the amount of the valuations of hay, straw, and manure at C. P.

Boon, APP.; HOWARD, RESP. Jan. 31° market value, and now sought to recover the difference be- Vote for Parliament-Borough Voter - Part of a House occupied as tween that and fodder value from the defendants.

a separate Dwelling and separately rated-30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, The case was argued in Easter Term last by

$5. 3, 61. Shapter, Q.C. (of the Equity Bar), (Channell with him), for the

The respondent did on the 31st of July, 1873, occupy, and plaintiff. Field, Q.C. (Bowen with him), for the defendants.

had occupied during the preceding twelve calendar months, part

of a house, consisting of two rooms, which were not structurally And was reargued in Hilary Term by

separate from the rest of the house. The two rooms were conChannell, for the plaintiff, and

nected by a staircase and passage wbich were used by the reField, Q.C. (Bowen with him), for the defendants.

spondent in common with the persons who occupied the rest of THE COURT (Coleridge, C.J., and Keating and Denman, JJ.), the house. The respondent and his family lived entirely in these gave judgment for the defendants on the ground that according two rooms, sleeping and cooking and having their meals there. to the true construction of the contract for salo there was The landlord did not live on the premises or retain any control nothing to shew that the premises were to be conveyed free over them; but the other rooms in the house were let out in a from the claim of the tenants to be paid at market value, similar manner to other tenants. There was an outer door to but that the contract was to convey subject to the existing the house, over which the tenants only had control. tenancies, of which the agreements with the tenants formed

Two rates were made in the parish in which the rooms were terms, and that notice to the plaintiff of the tenancies was notice

situated during the twelve months ending the 31st of July, 1873, to him of all the terms of such tenancies.

viz , in the month of November, 1872, and the month of May, Judgment for the defendants.

1873; and in both these rates the two rooms in question were Attorneys for plaintiff: Allen & Son.

rated separately from the rest of the house ; and the respondent Attorneys for defendants: W. & A. R. Ford.

was rated in respect of them.

The two rooms in question were not rated separately from the

rest of the house to the rate made in May, 1872, which was the C. P.

Jan. 30.

last rate made before the commencement of the year ending MAUDE AND OTHERS, APPS. ; LOWLEY, RESP.

the 31st of July, 1873. There was no statement in the case as Municipal Election Petition- Amendment of Petition under

to whether or not this last-mentioned rate had been paid by

anybody. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60.

The revising barrister held that the two rooms were occupied A petition against the election of a town-councillor for the by the voter as a separate dwelling-house, and were separately North Ward of Leeds complained of the employment as paid rated to the relief of the poor, within ss. 3 and 61 of the Reprecanvassers of persons who were voters for that ward. The sentation of the People Act, 1867, and retained his name on tho election took place on the 4th of December, 1873. The petition list. against the return of the respondent was presented on the 29th Upon an appeal against that decision, of December, and on the 16th of January, 1874, an order was THE COURT were equally divided, and consequently the yote made by Martin, B., at chambers, for the amendment of the and others depending on the same circumstances, stood. petition by adding the words "and other wards in the said Lopes, Q.C., for the appellant. borough.”

Kingdon, Q.C., for the respondent. Cave, and Lockwood, for the petitioner.

Attorney for appellant: Philbrick. Tennant, for the respondent.

Attorneys for respondent: Coode, Kingulon, & Colton, for Hloud, The Court set aside the order on motion, upon the ground Exeter.

TABLE OF CASES.

PACE

| before referred to stood limited by virtue of the marriage settlement of St. John Charlton, made in 1820, to W. Charlton, the father of St. John Charlton, for life, with remainder to St. John Charlton for life, with remainder to his first and other sons suc

cessively in tail male, with remainders over. Equity.

St. John William Charlton was the eldest son, and Thomas BRISTOL AND NORTH SOMERSET RAILWAY COMPANY v. SOMERSET

Charlton was the second son of St. John Charlton. AND Dorser RAILWAY COMPANY (Notice to treat for Land

In March, 1854, St. John Charlton and his eldest son joined constitutes Equitable Ownership) . ,

V.-C. M. 34

in barring the entail of the Shropshire estates, and conveyed a LOVERING, Ex parte. In re PEACOCK (Execution Creditor-Trader

part of them, called Oakingates, to St. John Charlton in fee, Debtor-Debt under 501.- Prior Execution for Debt abore

and re-settled the rest to such uses as St. John Charlton and 501. Liquidation Petition - Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 88. 6

St. John William Charlton should jointly appoint, and subject (sub 8. 6), 13, 87) . .

. BNKCY. 36 thereto, to the use of St. John Charlton for life, with remainder LYALL v. WELDUEN (Transfer-Costs) . L. C. & L. JJ. 33

to St. John William Charlton for life, with remainder to the use MEYRICK V. MATHIAS (Will-Shifting Clause-Re-settlement of the

of his first and other sons successively in tail male, with reEstate). . . . . . . L. C. & L. JJ. 33

mainder to such uses as St. John Charlton and Thomas Charlton OLD, Ex parte. In re Bright (Liquidation-Duties of Trustee

should appoint, with remainder to the use of Thomas Charlton -Retention of Moneys in his Hands-Direction of Creditors

for life, with remainder to his first and other sons successively as to Bank into which Money is to be paid-Audit of Trustee's in tail male, with remainders over. Accoun'sBankruptcy Act, 1869, ss. 20, 30, 55, 125 (sub-88. 7,

St. John William Charlton died in 1864 without issue, and 8, 9)-Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, r. 109; . . BNKCY. 36 in 1866 St. John Charlton and T. Charlton resettled the ShropPINCHARD v. FELLOWS (Mortgage-Creditors' Suit by Mortgagees

shire estate, subject to St. John Charlton's life estate, giving Deficient Estate-Costs) . . . . . V.-C. B. 35 them to T. Charlton's eldest daughter with divers remainders Rasch v. DowSON (Solicitor's Lien upon Documents-Equitable over until the entail of the Pembrokeshire estates should be Deposit) . . . .

.
.
.

barred, and then to T. Charlton for life, with remainders over.

V.-C. M. 31 SNELLING v. Tuomas (Specific Performance - Written Agreement St. John Charlton died in 1873. -Parol Variation-Claim against Representative of One of

The bill was filed by William Meyrick and his oldest son for the contracting Parlies) . . . . . V.-C. B. 35 the administration of the estates of Thomas Meyrick, the testator, TALBOT 0. TALBOT (Practice-Infant Plaintiff-Death of Next and the question which now came before the Court for its

Friend-Appointment of New Next Friend) . . M. R. 31 decision was, whether the shifting clause contained in his will WOODFORD v. BROOKING (Mortgage - Foreclosure Suit - Sale - took effect on the death of St. John Charlton, or whether it had Absent Mortgagor). .

. . . V.-C. B. 36 become inoperative by reason of the re-settlement of the Sbrop

shire estates. Common Law.

Southgate, Q.C., Jackson, Q.C., and Rowcliffe, for the plaintiffs.

Fry, Q.C., G, S. Law, Rawlinson, and Spencer Butler, for the LORD V. Peice (Sale of Goods-Lien for unpaid Purchase-money defendants. -Trorer . . . . . . . . De

Ex. 36

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that the clear meaning of the shifting clause was that it should take effect only on T. Charlton

or his issue becoming entitled under the marriage settlement of During the sittings of the Courts THE WEEKLY NOTEs will be published St. John Charlton. But in the events that had happened he had on Saturday, and will generally comprise Notes of the Decisions up to

not become entitled to the estates under that settlement, for a

new and different estate had been created, and moreover, some and including those of the previous Wednesday. All cases of permanent

part of the property had been removed out of the settlement interest noted herein will be reported in full in THE LAW REPORTS.

entirely. He was therefore of opinion that the shifting clause
could not now take effect, and that the plaintiffs had no title to
the Pembrokeshire estates.

THE LORDS JUSTICES JAMES and MELLISH concurred.
Solicitors for the plaintiffs : Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle.
Solicitors for the defendants : Law, Hussey, & Hulbert

Equity.

opeal by specjalck, by his wiates to trustees to his first such

L. C. & L. JJ. MEYRICK V. MATHIAS.

Feb. 9.
Will-Shifting Clause-Re-settlement of the Estate.

L. C. & L.JJ. LYALL v. WELDHEN.

Feb. 11. This cause was heard in the first instance by the Court of

Transfer-Costs. Appeal by special leave.

This was an application to transfer the suit of Lyall v. Weldhen Thomas Meyrick, by his will, dated the llth of May, 1837, from the Court of the Master of the Rolls to the Court of the gave his Pembrokeshire estates to trustees upon trust for Vice-Chancellor Hall, in which a previous suit relating to the Thomas Charlton for life, with remainder to his first and same matter was existing. other sons successively in tail male; and in default of such Greene, Q.C., and Methold, in support of the application. issue in trust for the plaintiff William Meyrick for life, with Nalder, for the respondent, only objected to pay the costs. remainder to his first and other sons successively in tail male, THEIR LORDSHIPS said that if the respondent had opposed he with remainders over. And the testator declared that if would probably have had to pay the costs. But here he did not T. Charlton or his issue male should become seised or entitled oppose, and if any previous application had been made to him in possession to the estates settled on the marriage of St. John he would probably have consented. The notice of motion was, Charlton, in the county of Salop, then the trust of the testator's however, first sent, in answer to which he offered to consent if real estates in favour of T. Charlton and his issue male should the costs were made costs in the cause. This offer was refused. absolutely cease, for the benefit of the person next entitled in The costs up to the time of that offer would be costs in the remainder, in the same way as if T. Charlton were then dead cause; and the plaintiffs in the first suit must pay the subsequent without issue male.

costs of the transfer. At the time of the testator's death the Shropshire estates Solicitors: H. Fluker ; Wood, Street, & Hayter. No. 5.-1874.

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