De Gex, Q.C., and E. Pollock, for the appellant. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Robertson Griffiths, for Mrs. Heneage, were not called on.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD CAIRNS) said that the words "liable to be sued," had a technical meaning, and must be understood to refer to the ordinary proceedings at law or in equity, to which the woman would have been liable if she had been unmarried. But it would be straining those words too much to extend them to include all the consequences of a suit at law or in equity. He did not think it was intended under these words to alter the status of all married women, by making them liable to the law of bankruptcy. The petition for adjudication was therefore rightly dismissed by the registrar.

THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES concurred.

THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH also concurred; but said that he was not quite satisfied at present, as to whether a married woman, if she was shewn to have separate property, might not be made liable to an adjudication of bankruptcy. Solicitors; Clennell & Fraser; W. Kelly,

This was an appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Malius (see Weekly Notes, 1873, p. 224). The suit was instituted by Mr. F. Maynard to obtain a declaration that the defendant, Edward Eaton, was the real purchaser of certain shares which had been purchased from the plaintiff and transferred into the name of the defendant's son, George Eaton, who was then 17 years of age; and that Edward Eaton might be declared liable for all losses sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendant not having taken the shares in his

own name.

In September, 1866, Edward Eaton purchased through his stockbroker, for the next account day, 100 shares in the Bank of Hindustan, China, and Japan, at the price of 31. 18s. per share. The shares were 1001. shares, on which 267. had been paid up. The settling-day was the 13th of September, and on the 8th, Edward Eaton wrote to the brokers desiring that the shares might be transferred into the name of his son George Eaton, whom he described as a drysalter, of Upton, Macclesfield. Accordingly on the name day the broker gave the name of George Eaton as the purchaser of the shares, and on the 14th of Soptember the shares were transferred to him.

On the 21st of December, 1866, an order was made for the winding-up of the bank under the supervision of the Court, and it having come to the knowledge of the solicitors of the liquidators that George Eaton was under age at the time of the transfer, they got the list of contributories amended by substituting for his name the name of the plaintiff, the vendor of the shares.

After the commencement of the winding-up an action was brought by George Eaton, by his father as next friend, against Maynard to recover the money paid for the shares, on the ground that he had been induced by fraud and unfair representions to purchase the shares, but the matter was compromised on the terms of the plaintiff in the action withdrawing all charges against the conduct of Maynard, and Maynard repaying the purchase-money to the plaintiff.

When the suit was heard before the Vice-Chancellor, His Honour was of opinion that Edward Eaton was the real purchaser of the shares, and that the compromise of the action at law did not estop Maynard from sustaining the suit, because at the time of the compromise he had no knowledge that Edward Eaton was the real purchaser of the shares, and he accordingly granted the relief prayed in the bill. From this decision the defendant appealed.

Cotton, Q.C., and Ince, for the appellant.

tiff, were only heard upon the question whether the suit could be maintained in the face of the compromise.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD CAIRNS) said that he would assume in favour of the plaintiff in the suit that the defendant was the real purchaser of the shares. But that could not affect the validity of the compromise of the action. The infant was the only person who was capable of bringing the action, being the registered holder of the shares; and Maynard, by entering into the compromise, and being reinstated as the owner of the shares, had lost any right which he might have had against the father for indemnity arising out of the original transaction. The bill must be dismissed with costs.

THE LORDS JUSTICES Concurred.
Solicitors: Stephens & Stephens ; J. Tucker.

Debtors Summons-Affidavit by Public Officer of Banking Company -Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 7--Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, r. 15. This was an appeal from a decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy (ante, p. 12).

taken out against Lowenthal on behalf of the Sheffield Banking The question arose as to the validity of a debtors summons Company. The public officer of the company made a demand in writing, in which he described himself as the public officer of the company, and demanded payment from the debtor of the sum of 24831. due from him to the company. He also made an affirmation (being a quaker) accompanying the summons, in which he described himself as the public officer of the company, and stated that he was "" authorized to make this affirmation," but did not state that he was authorized to issue out the summons.

The debtor applied to have the summons dismissed, on the ground that the demand and the affirmation were not sufficient under the 15th rule of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870. The Chief Judge overruled the objection, and the debtor appealed from his decision.

Little, Q.C., and Yute Lee, for the appellant.

De Gex, Q.C., and G. IV. Lawrance, for the banking company. THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD CAIRNS) Considered that the demand and affirmation were sufficient, and that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH concurred. Solicitors: Phelps & Sidgwick, for Sale, Shipman, & Co., Manchester; II. G. Field.

Sale of Real Estate-Memorandum of Contract-Name of Vendor -Statute of Frauds.

This was a suit for specific performance by a purchaser of real estate against the vendor.

The property was purchased at a sale by auction. The particulars of sale stated that the sale was " by direction of the proprietor," and a memorandum indorsed thereon acknowledging the plaintiff to be the purchaser, and agreeing that the vendor should in all respects fulfil the conditions of sale, was signed by the auctioneer " as agent for the vendor." The vendor's name did not appear.

The defendant raised the objection that the memorandum was not sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, inasmuch as it did not thereby appear who were the parties to the contract. The Solicitor-General (Sir R. Baggalloy), and C. Walker, for the plaintiff.

Southgate, Q.C., and Dauney, for the defendant.

Solicitors: S. W. Johnson; Balderston,

M. R.

LAMB v. CRANFIELD.
Mistake-Money Demand-Jurisdiction.

This was a demurrer.

cumstances.

Tremlett, for the demurrer.

Southgate, Q.C., and Cottrell, for the bill.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that upon the facts alleged the plaintiff's remedy was at law and not in equity, and allowed the demurrer, with liberty to a mend.

Solicitors: F. T. Donne; J. F. Bernard.

Execution Creditor-Reversionary Interest in Land-Possession by Sheriff-Sale of Infant's Property. This was a petition for a sale of the reversionary interest in land of an infant, which had been taken in execution by the sheriff of Middlesex, under a judgment recovered in an action for seduction against the infant.

Since the petition was presented the infant had attained 21, and the amount recovered by the judgment had been paid, but certain costs incurred by the sheriff still remained owing. Glasse, Q.C., and Everitt, for the petitioner.

Willis, for the respondent, contended that a reversionary interest in land was not extendable, and that where there were no rents or services incident to the reversion, there was nothing which could be taken in execution.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that any legal interest in land could be taken in execution, and that the petition was a proper one at the time it was presented. The respondent was, accordingly, ordered to pay the costs of the sheriff and of the petitioner. Solicitors: Woodard, Roche, & Son.

V.-C. M. QUINTON v. MAYOR OF BRISTOL. Feb. 26. Compulsory taking of Land and Houses-Town Improvements. This bill was filed by persons who had been appointed trustees or feoffees of certain trust property known as St. Nicholas Church Lands in the city of Bristol, against the mayor and corporation of Bristol, being the Sanitary Board constituted under the Local Government Act. The defendants were authorized to put in force the powers of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, with respect to the purchase of lands and buildings in the parish of St. Nicholas for the purpose of widening, altering, and improving Baldwin Street and Corn Street, the quantity of land required for that purpose being 840 superficial yards. The defendants gave the usual notice to treat to the plaintiffs as repre

for an injunction in the terms of the prayer. Cotton, Q.C., Shebbeare, and Glen, for the plaintiffs, now moved

J. Pearson, Q.C., and E. S. Ford, for the defendants. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said this was a very peculiar case. The plaintiffs were unwilling to part with more of their property than was actually required for the purpose of widening the street, notwithstanding that a portion of the houses would thereby be cut in two. It was not uncommon for persons to avail themselves of their right to compel railway companies to take the whole of a house when only half was required, but he did not know of any case where persons had preferred half a house being taken in preference to parting with the whole of the premises. The plaintiffs rested their case upon those authorities in which railway companies had been restrained from taking more land than they actually required, but this was not the case of a railway which was formed by a company for the purpose of profit. It was an undertaking authorized by the Legislature for the improvement of the city and for the benefit of the inhabitants, yielding no profit to the defendants. It was reasonable therefore that the defendants should be empowered to purchase the whole of the premises specified in the schedule for the more appropriate buildings, and also for reimbursing the ratepurpose of improving the locality by the erection of larger and payers by letting such buildings at a higher rent. It therefore came within the authority of Galloway v. The Mayor of London (Law Rep. 1 H. L. 34), and he thought they were entitled to take all the property. With regard to the objection that the defendants could not take the cellar, it appeared that the site was specified in the plan, which in his opinion included the cellar attached to the house. He should therefore refuse the injunction.

Solicitors: Abbott, Jenkins, & Abbott; D. T. Burges.

In re TUMACACORI MINING AND LAND COMPANY.
Winding-up Order-No Funds possessed by Company — No
Business transacted—Property in a Foreign Country.

This was a petition for a compulsory order to wind up the Tumacacori Mining and Land Company. The company was formed in April, 1870, for the purchase of a large tract of mining, arable, and pasture land in the United States. The capital was stated at two millions, divided into 200,000 shares of 10l., and the company had power to subscribe for, accept, purchase, and take shares in any company, society, or undertaking, and to make and carry into effect arrangements with respect to the union of interests or amalgamation either in whole or in part with any other companies or persons carrying on any business similar to that of this company, and if necessary to establish any new company, and to take, hold, or sell shares in any such other company. A large portion of the shares of the company had been allotted, under the powers given to the directors, as fully paid-up shares, to the vendor of the land, who undertook to raise money upon debentures for the pur

pose of carrying on the business of the company. Two hundred fully paid-up shares had also been allotted to the six directors, who had signed the memorandum of association in respect of one share each. No business had been done by the company since its formation. The land had not been taken possession of, and no shares had been applied for by the public. The petition was presented by a transferree of 10,000 shares from the original vendor, and was supported by another transferree of 15,000 shares. It was opposed by the company on the ground that an arrangement had been made with a new company formed to take over the whole undertaking, and to work it with a sufficient capital for the purpose; and it was alleged that a compulsory winding-up order was contrary to the wishes of the directors and the majority of the shareholders.

Glasse, Q.C., and Cracknall, for the petition.

company in proportion to the shares held by them, and the other moiety should be paid to the said Messrs. Brassey, Feli, & Co., or their nominees. At the conclusion of the period fixed for the termination of the concessions the company was wound up and the property and plaut sold, and a sum of 45,000l. was thereby realized. The debts of the company, however, amounted to about 300,000., and a question was now raised upon the construction of the deed of April, 1866, whether the concessionaires were entitled to one moiety of the amount realised by the sale of the property of the company without reference to the debts, or whether the words "after payment of all expenses" must be taken to mean that there could be no division of the proceeds of the sale until all the debts of the company were paid. Glasse, Q.C., and Graham Hastings, for the concessionaires, contended that the words " after payment of all expenses" were

Cotton, Q.C., and W. Barber, for the company.
J. Pearson, Q.C., in the same interest.

THE VICE CHANCELLOR said this company was one of an extraordinary character. It had been in existence for four years, and though all the shares had been issued, it had never received or paid anything. It had neither funds, nor cash book, nor bankers, nor pass book, and all the parties connected with it had received paid-up shares, so that there was nothing now to be called up except 101. each from the seven directors who had taken one share. He did not see how the official liquidator would be paid the expenses of the winding-up. The land belonging to the company was situate in a foreign country; and although it was said to be of value it could not be sold at the present time. He should have been inclined under such circumstances to refuse any interference, and to leave the parties to take their own course, but as he understood the decision in the case of Princess of Reuss v. Bos (Law Rep. 5 H. L. 176), a registered company falling within the 79th section of the Companies Act had a right to a winding-up order; and in this case, as no business had been done ever since the company was formed four years ago, that would give a right to the order. It had been said that the directors had power to sell all or any part of their business, and to hold shares in another company; but this did not in his opinion apply to the existing state of things where the company, having done no business, was to be transferred to another company. Under all the circumstances he thought it would be better to make the usual compulsory order for winding-up.

Solicitors: W. J. Manning; Heritage.

In re MONT CENIS RAILWAY COMPANY. Concessionaires-Division of Proceeds of Sale-Payment of all Expenses.

This was an adjourned summons upon an application on behalf of the concessionaires of the Mont Cenis Railway Company that one moiety of the net moneys arising from the sale and conversion into money of the land, property, plant, machinery, estate, and effects of the company might be paid to the concessionaires. By a deed, dated the 11th of April, 1866, the concessions for making the Mont Cenis Railway which had been granted by the French and Italian Governments to Messrs. Brassey, Brogden, Fell, and others, were sold by the concessionaires to the company; and it was provided by the deed and by the articles of association, that when the period fixed by the concessions should have expired the company should be dissolved, and thereupon, as well as upon dissolution of the company at any other period, all the land, property, plant, machinery, estate, and effects of the company should be sold or otherwise disposed of as the liquidators should think fit, and one moiety of the moneys arising therefrom should after payment of all expenses be divided between the members of the

J. Pearson, Q.C., and F. Harrison, for the creditors' assignees. Millar, for the official liquidator.

W. C. Harvey, for other concessionaires.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR considered that the intention of the parties was, that if the undertaking turned out to be prosperous the profits should be divided between the concessionaires and the company after payment of all expenses in carrying on the business. Instead of all the expenses being paid, it turned out that there was a large amount of debts remaining to be paid, and these must be satisfied, as far as the proceeds would go, before any division could take place. Solicitors: J. Elliott Fox; Willoughby & Cox.

V.-C. B.

HARTLEPOOL COLLIERIES COMPANY v. MOON.

Feb. 19.

Production of Documents — Privilege Letters from Defendant's Solicitor to her Agent. This was a motion on behalf of plaintiffs, for the production of certain letters written by defendant's solicitor to her agent. The suit was for specific performance of a verbal agreement alleged to have been made by defendant in September, 1869, to grant a lease of certain collieries to plaintiffs. The defendant, Mrs. Moon, was infirm, and her collieries were managed by her son-in-law and a colliery agent.

The letters in question (between defendant's solicitor and her colliery agent), some of which were written before and some after the institution of the suit, were stated in the affidavit to have reference to the matters in question in the suit "and many of them contain confidential advice to me respecting the conduct of the suit and the defence thereto."

Kay, Q.C., and Caldecott, in support of the motion, contended that no sufficient ground was shewn for withholding this correspondence, and that the privilege only extended to communications between solicitor and client in relation to, or in anticipation of, the suit, and not to communications between the solicitor and some third party (unless in the case of his employment to collect the necessary evidence).

Swanston, Q.C., and Waller, Q.C., for the defendant, contended that an agent confidentially employed in matters connected with the subject-matter of the suit was entitled to the same privilege as a solicitor.

Kay, in reply.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that no sufficient reason had been shewn for withholding production of this correspondence, and accordingly ordered production. Solicitors: J. W. Hickin; Hurcourt & Macarthur.

Eddis, Q.C., and Jolliffe, for the petitioners, asked that Mrs. Elliott's share might be paid out to her, and not settled, the fund being small.

Robinson, for the husband, asked that the sum might be paid to him, or if not, settled in the usual way. Over the current income the Court has no jurisdiction: Newman v. Wilson (31 Beav. 34).

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR refused the application, and said that as the fund was small it had better be paid to Mrs. Elliott and not settled.

B. F. Lock appeared for the judgment creditor and for the guardians. On behalf of the latter he claimed the sum of 11. 9s. 4., being one year's past maintenance, under the 16th section of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103; and referred to Bond v. Simmons (3 Atk. 20). He also referred to the 13th section of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870. No doubt jurisdiction was primarily given to the justices, but this Court had jurisdiction either to stop the fund, or to pay it out subject to the claim of the guardians.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR observed that the argument under the Married Women's Property Act did not assist the guardians, because this sum, if recoverable at all, was expressly placed within the jurisdiction of the justices, who were to issue a summons as provided by the Act.

Lock asked for the guardians' costs of appearing.
Eddis opposed.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that on the question (which had not been argued) whether the death of the plaintiff, after the hearing but before judgment was delivered, prevented the Court from delivering judgment, he had no doubt but that where the delay was the act of the Court, the Court had jurisdiction to date the judgment the day of the hearing, and that must be done in this case. On the question whether these trains were "ordinary" trains within the meaning of the 27th section of the Act, he considered that they were accelerated trains for a special purpose, and could in no sense be called ordinary trains. The bill must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the plaintiff: Leman, Groves, & Leman. Solicitors for the defendants: L. Crombie,

In this case the Ringwood Railway Company, by their Act, dated 1859, contracted with the then owner of Avon Cottage that they would at a given signal stop all "ordinary trains" for the accommodation of the owner. In 1870 the line was, under an agreement, worked by the South Western Company. Up to the year 1872 the right was exercised and allowed by both the companies, but in March of that year the London and South Western put on two additional trains, viz., a down train which, as altered, left Ringwood Junction at 5 P.M., and timed, as altered, to reach Christchurch at 5.20 P.M., and Bournemouth at 5:30 PM, and an up-train timed, as altered, to leave Bournemouth at 115 A.M., and timed to reach Christchurch at 1114 A.M., and Ringwood at 11:33 A.M. These trains the South Western Company refused to stop, and consequently a correspondence took place between the respective solicitors. Subsequently to the dispute the company in their time tables described these trains as "Bournemouth Fast Special," and "Fast Special to Bournemouth." The plaintiff, as owner of Avon Cottage, subsequently filed this bill, to compel the company to stop these trains in pursuance of the agreement.

The company, in their answer, submitted that these trains were not within the meaning of the words "ordinary trains," but formed part of a system of fast trains from and to London, in apposition to trains on the Great Western, for which trains higher fares would be charged but that the company already required the maximum fares.

The case was argued on the 20th and 21st of January last; but between that date and the 11th of February, when His Honour was prepared to give judgment, the plaintiff died; the matter then stood over till the 17th.

Dickinson, Q.C., and F. O. Haynes, appeared for the plaintiff. Greene, Q.C., and Everitt, for the defendants, the South Western, and

Cecil Russell, for the Ringwood Company.

the parties that the bankrupt should pay off the debt by weekly instalments of 17. 10s. or 17., but this agreement did not appear upon the register. On the 3rd of April, 1874, E. Sontham took possession of the furniture. The same day, but later, a receiver appointed under the petition took possession of the bankrupt's property. The judge decided that the bill of sale was void under section 2 of the Bills of Sales Act, and that the trustee was entitled to the furniture. E. Southam appealed.

De Gex, Q.C., and Robertson Griffiths, for the appellant. Little, Q.C., and Hamilton Humphreys, for the trustee, werc not called on.

THE CHIEF JUDGE affirmed the decision.
Solicitors: A. D. Smith; Johnson & Weatheralls.

Proof of Debt-Security-Bill of Exchange-Production-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 16 (sub-s. 2)—Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, rules 67, 72, 134-Form, No. 32.

This was an appeal from a decision of the judge of the Birmingham County Court.

Robert Carter having been adjudicated a bankrupt, the first meeting of the creditors was held on the 19th of January, 1874. The Worcester City and County Banking Company (Limited) tendered a proof for 20311. 16s. 7d. The affidavit of the bank manager stated that the debt was for money lent and advanced to the bankrupt, with interest and commission, and that the bank had no security for it, except the bills of exchange specified in the schedule, and a mortgage of a leasehold house, which was assessed at 7007. Some of the other creditors objected to this proof because the bills were not produced. The registrar, who was chairman of the meeting, overruled the objection, and the judge affirmed this decision.

The objecting creditors appealed.

De Gex, Q.C., and Finlay Knight, for the appellants.
Roxburgh, Q.C., and Horton Smith, for the bank.

THE CHIEF JUDGE held that the bills ought to have been produced, and he discharged the order admitting the proof. Solicitors: Wilkins, Blyth, & Marsland; Field & Co.