clause contained in a draft underlease which was being settled in V.-C. B. chambers. By indenture of lease, dated the 20th of April, 1861, Lord Sidmouth demised unto H. H. Williamson (since deceased) certain mines of coal and ironstone for a term of forty years, and this lease contained covenants on the part of the lessee not to assign the demised property except to his wife, children, and existing partner, without the consent of the lessor, and this stipulation was repeated in the clause of re-entry. H. H. Williamson died in 1867, leaving John Henshall Williamson his sole acting executor. J. H. Williamson, after obtaining the consent of Lord Sidmouth, entered into an agreement with George Baddeley, dated the 21st of July, 1871, that, subject to such consent being obtained as thereinafter-mentioned, Williamson would grant to Baddeley an underlease of a portion of the mines of coal and iron comprised in the lease from Lord Sidmouth for the term of 29 years from the 23rd of March, 1871, at the rents and royalties therein mentioned, with a proviso "that in such underlease shall be contained the like provisions, conditions, and stipulations, in all respects as were contained in the said recited indenture of lease except the covenant on the part of the lessee to leave a barrier between the mines thereby demised and the mines under the adjoining lands." On the 26th of July, 1872, the Chatterley Iron Company contracted to purchase the leasehold interest of the testator, H. H. Williamson. The contract was confirmed by an order in the suit of the 2nd of August, 1872, and completed by a conveyance dated May, 1873; both contract and conveyance being subject to the agreement of the 21st of July, 1871, between plaintiff and Baddeley. An order was ultimately made that the lease to be granted to Baddeley should be settled in chambers. A question there arose upon the frame of the provision and covenant against assignment or underletting, it being contended on behalf of Baddeley, that the name of Lord Sidmouth as the person to consent to such assigment or underletting was alone to be inserted in the covenant, and not that of the underlessors. On behalf of the underlessors (the Chatterley Iron Company) it was contended that they were entitled to the same right of controlling any underlettings and assignments by their underlessces as was given to Lord Sidmouth by the original lease, and that the meaning of the proviso for inserting the like covenants, &c., was that the names of the underlessors should be substituted for that of the original lessor. Jarman's Bythewood, vol. iv. p. 573, and Davidson's Precedents, vol. v. p. 176, were referred to as showing that where (as here) the consent of the underlessor was necessary for his protection against forfeiture, the consent of the original lessor would not be required. Kay, Q.C., Whitehorne, and E. R. Cook, for Baddeley. Joshua Williams, Q.C., and Everitt, for the Wedgwood Company, to whom, with the consent of Lord Sidmouth, Baddeley had assigned his interest under the agreement, were not heard. Eddis, Q.C., Chitty, Q.C., and Whitehead, for the Chatterley Iron Company. Batten, for other parties. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that no one could have a more sincere respect for Mr. Jarman's Precedents than he had, but the case was not one in which the consent of Lord Sidmouth, the owner of the property and the original lessor, could be dispensed with. It was a provision of the original lease that Lord Sidmouth's consent should be obtained before any alienation of the demised property could be made, but there was nothing to shew that the property in the hands of Williamson's underlessee could not be assgned or underlet without Williamson's consent, nor had any such provision been stipulated for by Williamson. The whole property was bound by the provision, that no underlease should be made without Lord Sidmouth's consent, and the covenant in the underlease, must be framed accordingly. Solicitors: Worthington Evans, for Hand, Blakiston, & Everett, Stafford; Lewis, Munns, & Longden; Wedlake & Letts. March 10. LANCEFIELD v. IGGULDEN. Administration-Specific Devise-Deficient Estate. This was a creditor's and general administration suit by plaintiff who claimed to be a creditor of the testator, and was also a specific devisee of testator's freehold building-yards and hereditaments in Canterbury, and of his messuage, premises, and land at Wingmore. The claim of plaintiff as a creditor was disputed, and had been disallowed in chambers. The estate being deficient, the main question upon further consideration was whether the specifically devised real estate was liable to contribute rateably with the residuary real estate to meet the deficiency of personal estate for payment of debts and costs. Kay, Q.C., and G. W. Collins, for plaintiff, contended that the residuary real estate was first applicable, and that the specifically devised properties were not liable to contribute until the residuary real estate had been exhausted. Miller, Q.C., and Ince, for defendants, contended that the effect of recent decisions had been to place a residuary devise on the same footing exactly as a specific devise of real estate, and that the deficiency of assets must be borne rateably by the specific and residuary devisees. Kay, in reply. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the true rule was stated in Tombs v. Roch (2 Coll. 490), that a specific devise shewed the intention of the testator that the devisee should enjoy that particular individual portion of the property. When the personal estate was exhausted, the residuary real estate was bound to contribute to meet the deficiency, and it was not until the residuary real estate was exhausted that the specific devisees could be called on to contribute. The distribution must take effect on that principle. Plaintiff ought not to be made to pay any costs, but (as he had failed to establish his claim as a creditor) he would not receive any. Solicitors: Monkton, Long, & Co.; J. Henry Jones, V.-C. H. COPE v. EVANS. Feb. 25. Trade-mark-Similarity of Mark-No Evidence of Deception. The plaintiffs for many years carried on their business as cigar manufacturers at Liverpool, and had always been in the habit of packing their cigars in small wooden boxes containing 50 or 100 cigars. In order to distinguish them, since the 23rd of April, 1869, they used a brand consisting of the words "Flor Fina Prairie Superior Tabac," stamped on the boxes, and a figure of a hunter smoking a cigar by the river side. The defendants carried on business at Leicester as cigar manufacturers. In February, 1872, the plaintiff discovered that a dealer named Becket was in the habit of selling boxes of cigars stamped with the words "Flor de La Prairie," and the word "Prairie" in various combinations stamped over the boxes. The boxes had also on them the words "Calle del Campabello Habana." The plaintiff immediately applied to Mr. Becket, who gave them the defendants' names as the manufacturers. After some correspondence this bill was filed for an injunction. There was no evidence that any person had been misled by the brand, but the plaintiff produced a witness that the public might be misled, and the defendant produced an affidavit that nobody could be misled. Morgan, Q.C., and E. Cutler, for the plaintiff. Lindley, Q.C., and II. A. Giffard, for the defendants. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said there was not in this case such a similarity between the plaintiffs' and the defendants' boxes that the Court could assume that the public would be misled, neither was there any evidence as a matter of fact that anybody had been misled, and he therefore dismissed the bill with costs. Solicitors for plaintiffs: Lumley & Lumley. Solicitors for defendants: Paterson & Co. V.-C. H. as follows: in full force and virtue. NEATE V. DENMAN. Feb. 26. Demurrer-Inns of Court-Jurisdiction of Courts of Law or Equity as between the Inns and their Members-Private Corporations. This was a demurrer. The allegations of the bill were briefly Plaintiff, in January, 1832, was called to the degree of utter barrister, and previously to such call he executed a bond to Sir Thomas Denman, treasurer, and to F. Burton and Lord Sidmouth, in 2007, of which the condition was, that if he from time to time, and at all times during his life, or so long as he should continue a member of the said society, should" discharge all debts and dues as should grow due and chargeable pay and upon him for pensions, preacher duties, commons, taxes, fines, penalties, amerciaments, and all other duties to be imposed on him by the society, the said obligation should be void, or else to be The plaintiff was not then informed that he could not withdraw from being a member of the society without the consent of the Masters of the Bench, or that such consent would not be given except on certain conditions. In 1845 the plaintiff ceased to reside in London, and withdrew from practice. He paid all the amounts claimed from him up to the year 1862, which amounted to more than 60%. In 1869, plaintiff, being then in arrear, wrote to the treasurer to the effect that he wished to withdraw from the society, and in reply to such application received the form of petition, in which it was recited that he was not now practising and did not intend to practise at the Bar in England or the Colonies, and prayed the society would order the bond to be cancelled "on payment of all his arrears of dues and duties to the treasurer, and the fine on leaving, within one month from the date of the order." Since the form was sent to him the word "India" was added after the word "Colonies," and the word "composition was substituted for the word 66 fine." Shortly after the Masters of the Bench made an order that the bond should be cancelled on the payment being made within one month, or the order to be void. " The plaintiff signed the petition, but did not pay the amount, and the order became void. The executors of the obligee of the bond then commenced an action against the plaintiff to recover the sum of 231. 11s. 10d. for dues since 1862, which the plaintiff admitted to be due. The plaintiff thereupon offered to pay the sum claimed upon being released without conditions, and on the bond being delivered up to be can celled, but refused to submit to any restraint upon his right, if any, to practise as a barrister, without being a a member of any inn. This was refused. The plaintiff therefore filed this bill, which, as amended, prayed that it might be declared that the plaintiff was entitled to retire from the society without giving any undertaking not to practise as a barrister, or subject to any condition, or liable to payment of any fine or composition. Dickinson, Q.C., and Pemberton, for the demurrer, contended that the inns were private corporations, which it had been over and over again decided were not liable in questions between them and their members to the control of the Court. Neate, for the bill, contended that here the society had taken the initiative, and could not now object. The decisions referred to were decisions at law and not of equity. It was always within the province of the Court to direct a bond to be delivered up to be cancelled. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said the question was whether he, sitting there, had jurisdiction to entertain the bill. He was clearly of opinion that he had not, and the demurrer must be allowed, with costs. Solicitors for the plaintiff: Dobinson & Geare. V.-C. H. In re BATTSFORD'S WILL. Will No Words of Limitation. Feb. 27. "left his two houses in Ratcliffe Highway, St George's, let for ninety-nine years to one Forster, and whatsoever might fall due to him by right after his decease, to his wife Lucy for life, and at her death unto her daughter Lucy Gay for her own use and benefit." He appointed his widow and one Watson his proved his will) entered into and continued in the receipt of the executors. He died in December, 1823, and his widow (who alone rents and profits till her death in 1850. Lucy Gay, who had married one Hood, then entered into receipt of the rents and profits, and continued to receive them till May, 1872, when the houses were taken by the East London Railway Company under paid into Court on the 24th of December, 1872. A petition an agreement which fixed the price at 1350., which the company was presented by Mrs. Hood, her husband being dead, which came on in January, 1873, when the dividends were ordered to be paid to Mrs. Hood, and certain inquiries directed. In December, 1873, the chief clerk certified that no heir of the testator could be found. The Attorney-General was then served with the petition on behalf of the Crown. Dickinson, Q.C., and Bedwell, for the petitioner, contended that she was absolutely entitled. Hemming claimed the property for the Crown. thority, and the petitioner must be held to be entitled to the fund. V.-C. H. DREW v. MASLEN. March 2. Will-Construction-Legal Estate in Trustees-Rule in Shelley's Case-Referential Trust-Heir-at-Law. Martha E. Maslen, who died in September, 1849, by will dated the 1st of April, 1846, devised to Drew and Richardson certain freehold houses to hold to them their heirs and assigns, for ever, to the use of Drew and Richardson and their heirs for and during the life of her son W. J. Maslen (whom she appointed executor), upon trust to permit and suffer her son to receive the rents of the hereditaments during his life for his own use and benefit, he keeping the same in good repair and insured; and on further trust to support the contingent uses and estates thereinafter limited, and after the death of her son to the use of all other of the children or child or more remote issue of her son at and every, or such one or more exclusively, of the others or such ages or times, for such estate or interest, and in such parts, subject to such limitations over to or in favour of any others, shares, and proportions, and either absolutely or conditionally, of the children or remote issue of her son as such son should by will appoint. and in default of such appointment to the use of all the children of her son, their heirs and assigns, for ever, equally as tenants in common: Provided that if there should be no child of her son, or being such he, she, or they should die under the age of 21 if a son, or if a daughter that age or marriage, then after the decease of her son and the failure of such issue the hereditaments should remain and be to the use of the heirs and assigns of her son for ever: Provided also, that after the decease of her son, and during such time as any of his children should be under the age of 21 if a son, or that age or unmarried if a daughter, the trustees should receive the rents and apply the same for his, her, or their benefit; and that it should be lawful for the trustees during the life of her son, with his consent in writing, and after his death and during the minority of his child, children, or other issue who should be entitled to the hereditaments and should be a minor, to demise the hereditaments for any term not exceeding twenty-one years for the best rents. The testatrix also devised her one undivided third part of her family estate-seven freehold houses in Dodd's Place and two Richard Battsford, by his will, dated the 24th of April, 1817, freehold houses in Clarence Street, and some other freehold pre mises specified-unto her trustees, their heirs and assigns, for ever, upon the like trusts and for the like ends, intents, and purposes for the benefit of her son and his children or child as therein before mentioned respecting her other freehold hereditaments Provided that her trustees, their heirs and assigns, should have full power, with the consent of her son during his life, and after his decease at their free will and pleasure, to sell all her undivided third part or share of and in the last mentioned estate to such persons as they should think fit, they investing the moneys arising by such sale in the purchase of other freehold hereditaments, to be settled and conveyed to the like uses and upon the like trusts as the hereditaments secondly thereinbefore devised were by her given or appointed; and until such moneys should be laid out in the purchase of other estates the same should be invested in the public funds, and the interest applied in the same manner as the rents would have been if the estate had not been sold. W. J. Maslen died in July, 1870, intestate and a bachelor. During his life Drew and Richardson sold the one third of the testatrix's family estate, and with the proceeds purchased the sum of 6581. 5s. 3d. Consols, the dividends on which W. J. Maslen received till his death. The question was, who was or were entitled to the consols. Locock Webb, for the plaintiffs, the trustees. Bagshawe, Q.C., and Beaumont, for the heir-at-law of W. J. Maslen. Cookson, and Seeley, for the coheiresses of the testatrix. Smart, for the legal personal representative of W. J. Maslen. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that as to the first devise the trustees took a legal estate in fee; and that by the rule in Shelley's Cuse the equitable fee became vested in W. J. Maslen; and that under the second devise, having reference to the former limitations, the fee simple became vested in W. J. Maslen; and that after payment of the costs, the residue of the consols belonged to his heir-at-law, Joseph Maslen. Solicitors: Wilkinson & Drew; Learoyd, Learoyd," & Peace; Cattarns, Jehu, & Cattarns; Paterson, Sons, & Garner. V.-C. H. This suit was instituted in November, 1872, by the liquidators of the Albert Life Assurance Company on behalf of themselves and all other the unsatisfied creditors of Frederick Richard Mayo, against his widow-the administratrix of his estate-and several of his children and others interested in his estate, for accounts, and payment of the amounts that might be found due. F. R. Mayo died intestate in September, 1868. At the date of his death he was the holder of 117 shares in the above-named company, which was established in 1839, with a nominal capital of 500,000l. in 25,000 shares of 207. each, and which was in September, 1869, ordered to be wound up. In May, 1871, an Act was passed for the purpose of having all matters in reference to the company determined by arbitration. The arbitrator by an order in June, 1871, made a call of 177. per share, and this call, amounting to 19897. was shortly afterwards paid. Another order was in April, 1872, made for a second call of 11. per share with interest at 57. per cent. in default of payment at the dates mentioned in the order. The administratrix subsequently to her being settled upon the list of contributories distributed the residue of the intestate's personal estate amongst his next of kin, without providing for this call, which was still unpaid. The bill was filed by leave of the arbitrator, and was originally against the administratrix alone, but it was in February, 1873, amended by making the next of kin parties. Certain of the next of kin and other de fendants filed demurrers for want of equity and parties, which were, after argument, allowed (Weekly Notes, 1873, p. 81). The administratrix admitted that she refused to pay this call; and that she had in her hands abundant assets of the intestate to pay the amount claimed by the plaintiffs, and submitted to pay such sum as they might be held entitled to at the hearing of the cause. The cause now came on to be heard. Dickinson, Q.C., and Herbert Lake, for the plaintiffs, asked for an order for payment within a certain time of the sum mentioned in the arbitrator's order, and in default, for an administration decree. Karslake, Q. C., and Colt, for the administratrix, submitted that the plaintiffs could not ask for such an order; that they could only have the decree which they had specifically prayed for; and that there was no precedent for the decree now asked, which, if made, might give the plaintiffs a preference. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR:-There is, in my opinion, no difficulty in this case. The administratrix submits to pay, and that is a submission to pay personally; and if she does not pay the amount claimed within a reasonable time, to be fixed, there must be an account taken of this debt, and an order for payment within a time to be named after the service of the certificate; and in default, the decree must provide for a general account, which will be applicable to all creditors, and under which no preference will be given to any. It seems to me a very reasonable thing to make the decree in this way. It is said that there is no authority for such a decrce; no authority has been cited against it, and that being so, I will make a precedent, though I cannot help thinking that there is one already. Solicitors: Lewis, Munns, & Longden; Lumley & Lundey. Partnership-Death of Partner-Partnership not dissolved by Death -Business carried on by Survivors - Right of Creditors of original Firm to Assets remaining in Specie. This was an appeal from a decision of the judge of the Manchester County Court. W. Simpson, C. J. Simpson, F. Simpson, and A. Simpson carried on business in partnership. The articles of partnership, dated the 2nd of January, 1871, provided that the death of either of the partners should not dissolve the partnership, but the survivors should carry on the business, and the share of the deceased partner should be ascertained at the half-yearly stocktaking next after his death, and half the balance found due to him (except 2007.) should remain in the hands of the survivors for three years after his death, and the other half for five years after his death, the whole balance, except the 2007., being secured to his representatives by the promissory notes of the survivors, with interest. The 2001. was to be paid to the deceased partner's representatives within one month after his death. A. Simpson died on the 27th of September, 1871, and C. J. Simpson died on the 15th of January, 1872. In each case the survivors continued to carry on the business. No steps were taken to ascertain the shares of the deceased partners, and no promissory notes were given. On the 19th of December, 1872, W. Simpson and F. Simpson, the two survivors, filed a liquidation petition. At this time the debts of the firm amounted to 43,6277., which included 23,8731. of debts contracted during the partnership of the four. The judge decided that the creditors of the four were entitled to have such of the assets of the partnership of the four as remained in specie applied in payment of their debts in priority to the other creditors. The creditors thus postponed appealed. Marten, Q.C., and Ambrose, for the appellants. De Gex, Q.C., and North, for the creditors of the four. THE CHIEF JUDGE held that the creditors of the four had no such right of priority, but that all the assets must be distributed among all the creditors rateably. Solicitors: Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.; Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle; Phelps & Sidgwick. TABLE OF CASES. Equity. CABALLERO . HENTY (Vendor and Purchaser-Specific Perform ance-Auction-Lease-Inquiry) COOK V. HARVEY (Conduct of Trustees-Costs). . L. JJ. V.-C. B. 67 69 FINCH V. PESCOTT (Will-Administration-Interest allowed to Executor on Money advanced by him) V.-C. B. 69 GOULD v. TWINE (Practice-Contempt for Non-payment of Costs of Interlocutory Motion-Motion to dismiss Bill in default of clearing Contempt, . HALFHYDE v. ROBINSON (Person of unsound Mind not so foundNext Friend-Bill for Partition-Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853, s. 120) M. R. 68 L. JJ. 68 MOWLEM, In re (Devise-Tenant in Tail-Child en ventre sa mère L. J. J. 68 SCOTT'S TRUSTS, In re (Will-Construction-Legacy to be paid at the Age of 24-Immediate vested Interest-Legatee entitled to payment at 21) V.-C. H. 70 SOUTH, In re (Execution Creditor-Remainder-27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, 8. 4) VAUGHAN v. HALLIDAY (Bankruptcy-Equity of the Purchaser of an unaccepted Draft to have covering Securities applied in discharge of his Purchase-money) WARD. SITTINGBOURNE AND SHEERNESS RAILWAY COMPANY (Company wound up and dissolved by Act of Parliament— Bill to wind up and appoint Receiver-Demurrer overruled) Specific Performance-Decree-Reference as to Title. This was a suit for the specific performance of a contract to sell a house. The plaintiff had made many requisitions as to the title, but stated in her bill that she had waived or was satisfied as to all of them but three. The Master of the Rolls held that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the contract, and made a decree accordingly, with a general reference as to title. The defendant appealed. W. Pearson, Q.C., and Yate Lee, for the defendant. THEIR LORDSHIPS were of opinion, on the facts, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance; and as to the form of the decree, their Lordships held that no investigation as to title could take place in chambers or elsewhere withNo. 10.-1874. Inquiry. This was a suit for the specific performance of a contract to buy a public-house. The defence was, that there was in existence a nine years' lease of the public-house not mentioned in the particulars of sale. To this the vendor replied that the lease was read at the auction, and that the purchaser had by delay waived the objection. The Master of the Rolls dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff appealed. Roxburgh, Q.C., and W. A. Clark, for the plaintiff. THEIR LORDSHIPS were of opinion that the purchaser was not bound to inquire of the tenant what were the terms of his tenancy, and that under the circumstances the purchaser had not delayed unreasonably before he took the objection. Their Lordships dismissed the appeal with costs. Solicitors: Routh & Stacey;Holmes & Son. L. JJ. Execution Creditor—Remainder-27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, s. 4. This was an appeal from an order of Vice-Chancellor Malins (ante, p. 55). C. Houghton recovered judgment in an action for seduction against T. D. South, with 500, damages (which were afterwards reduced to 3007.) and costs. South was at this time an infant. Under the wills of his father and grandfather he was entitled to certain freehold and copyhold estates in Kent and Middlesex in remainder expectant on the death of his mother and grandmother. Houghton sued out writs of elegit directed to the sheriffs of Kent and Middlesex, and the sheriff of Middlesex returned that South was "seised in demesne of the reversion in fee simple" of the land in Middlesex, "being of the clear yearly value of 1247.,” and that he had delivered the premises to Houghton to hold till turn as to the land in Kent, which he found to be of the annual the debt was satisfied. The sheriff of Kent made a similar re value of 201. The writs having been registered, Houghton presented a petition for the sale of South's interest in the property in the two counties. Before the petition came on for hearing South came of age and paid the amount of the debt and costs to Houghton, and the Vice-Chancellor made an order on the petition that South should pay the costs of the petition and of the writs of elegit and the sheriffs' charges. From this order South appealed. E. C. Willis, and Clare, for the appellant, contended that the petition ought to have been dismissed with costs, on the ground that the debtor's interest was only a remainder, which the sheriff could not seize, and which therefore did not come within the 4th section of the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, unless there had been an equitable delivery in execution by means of a suit in Chancery. The sheriffs' return was also false, inasmuch as the debtor's interest in the land was described as a reversion with a present annual value instead of a mere remainder. Everitt (Glasse, Q.C., with him), for the creditor. THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES said that a man could not be seised or possessed (which were the words of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110) of a remainder, and the sheriff, therefore, could not take it in execution. Moreover, the petition was inconsistent with the return; for the sheriff returned that the debtor was seised of a reversion which he had delivered to the creditor, but the petition asked | had been made to stay all proceedings in the suit until the for the sale of the debtor's interest, which was only a remainder. plaintiff should clear her contempt. The petition was altogether wrong, and must be dismissed with costs. Davey now moved on behalf of the defendant, in the terms of the following notice of motion :-"That it appearing that the plaintiff is in contempt by reason of the non-payment of the sum of 11. 14s. 2d., the plaintiff be ordered to clear her contempt on or before the 26th day of March, 1870, and that in default of her doing so, and of paying the costs of this motion the plaintiff's bill stand dismissed as against the defendants." Whitehorne, for the plaintiff. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that this would be introducing a new practice for which there appeared to be no authority, and that the motion must be refused with costs. Solicitors: Lovell, Son, & Pitfield; R. Sherwood. The plaintiff, who was the owner of one-third, was a lady of unsound mind, not so found by inquisition, who sued by her next friend. The defendants, who were entitled to the other M. R. two-thirds, desired a sale, and a decree for sale was accordingly made. One of the defendants offered to purchase the other two shares for 400., which the Court considered to be a beneficial offer, and ordered it to be carried out. A petition was then presented under the Trustee Act for an order vesting the estate of the plaintiff in the purchaser, which was heard in the first instance before the Lords Justices. When the petition was opened the Lord Justice James asked whether there was any authority for a bill of this nature being filed by a person of unsound mind not so found, by a next friend. Miller, Q.C., and Brett, for the petitioners, said that it was a mere matter of form, whether the person of unsound mind was plaintiff or a defendant. If she had been a defendant the same decree for sale must have been made. The property was at present unproductive, and the lady had no other property and was maintained by the next friend. THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES said that it was altogether improper for a bill to be filed by a person of unsound mind by a next friend to deal with her real estate. In the present case the difficulty could be got over by making an application under the 120th section of the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853, which gave summary powers to the Court in Lunacy to sell the estate of a lunatic whose property amounted to less than 500. The petition might be amended for that purpose, but he wished it to be understood that the Court would not sanction or act under the proceedings in the present suit. THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH concurred. In re MowLEM. March 3. Devise-Tenant in Tail-Child en ventre sa mère-Intermediate Devise of certain real estate to trustees to the use of the first and other sons of testator's nephew in tail male, with remainders over; and devise of all the residue of testator's real estate to trustees upon the trusts in the will mentioned. The testator died on the 8th of March, 1868. His nephew was married, but his son, the infant tenant in tail, was not born till the 6th of July, 1868. The trustees, after the death of the testator, entered into receipt of the rents of the devised estate. The question was, who was entitled to the intermediate rents between the death of the testator and the birth of the infant. Fry, Q.C., and Rodwell for the infant. Southgate, Q.C., and E. S. Ford, for the trustees. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the trustees must account to the residuary devisees for the rents which had accrued tenant in tail. due between the testator's death and the birth of the infant Solicitors: Hedges & Brandreth. V.-C. M. March 12. WARD v. SITTINGBOURNE AND SHEERNESS RAILWAY COMPANY. |