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By a subsequent Act of 54 Geo. 3, c. 131, the time for the annual meeting of the trustees was altered from the first Tuesday in August to the third Tuesday in July.

By the Public Schools Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 118), which applied amongst others to Rugby School, it was enacted that the trustees of the school should be the existing governing body thereof until the appointment, in the manner therein provided, of a new governing body; and by the 13th section it was enacted that the head master of every school to which the Act applied should be appointed by, and hold his office at, the pleasure of the new governing body, and that all other masters should be appointed by and hold their offices at the pleasure of the head master; and by the 28th section, that all powers vested in the then existing governing body of a school should continue in force and might be exercised by such governing body until a new governing body should be appointed, and after such appointment, by the new governing body in the same manner in which they might have been exercised if that Act had not passed.

In November, 1869, Dr. Temple, the then head master of Rugby, was appointed Bishop of Exeter, and thereupon resigned his office of head master, and the plaintiff having sent in his application accompanied by testimonials was appointed head master on the 20th of November, 1869. The new governing body of the school, consisting of twelve members, was appointed under the Public Schools Act on the 31st of December, 1871, and among the members so appointed were Dr. Temple and Dr. Bradley (formerly assistant master of the school).

to the other candidates to the office of head master, had in fact been persuaded on several occasions specified to act in a manner hostile to the plaintiff; that the governing body improperly and in derogation of the trust reposed in them abdicated their proper functions and duties as governors and trustees of the school, and surrendered their judgment to Dr. Temple and Dr. Bradley and allowed them, and especially Dr. Temple, to be at once witnesses of facts in dispute between the assistant masters and the plaintiff, and judges of the plaintiff's conduct; and that under the circumstances the resolutions and proceedings of the governing body therein complained of were passed and adopted not in the due exercise of the powers and trusts reposed in them, nor out of a true regard for the interests of the school, but out of a predetermined hostility and motives of resentment and party spirit on the part of Dr. Temple and Dr. Bradley and the assistant masters and out of the exercise by Dr. Temple of an undue influence over the other members of the governing body, and the undue and culpable submission on the part of the other members of the governing body to such undue influence, and in fact out of motives which, according to the rules of equity, were improper and corrupt.

Under these circumstances the plaintiff submitted that the resolution of the 19th of November, 1873, was invalid and ought not to be enforced.

The caso came on upon demurrer to the bill by the governing body. Cotton, Q.C., Davey, C. Bowen, and Ilbert, in support of the demurrer.

Glasse, Q.C., J. Pearson, Q.C., H. A. Giffard, and Morgan Howard, for the bill.

The plaintiff also submitted that the resolution of the 19th of December, 1873, was invalid on this further ground, that inasmuch as he was elected to the office of head master under the provisions of the statute 17 Geo. 3, c. 71, as modified by the The bill set out a number of circumstances, from which it statute 54 Geo. 3, c. 131, he could be dismissed only in accordappeared that disputes had frequently arisen between the plain-ance with the terms of those statutes at an annual meeting of the tiff and the assistant masters as to matters connected with the trustees held on the first Tuesday in July. school, and that whenever these disputes had been referred to the old trustees of the school, while acting as the existing governing body, their decision had been favourable to the plaintiff and adverse to the assistant masters, but that after the appointment of the new governing body a different line of conduct was pursued by them, and upon threo several occasions the plaintiff received warnings that unless he could find means of conciliating the other masters they should call upon him to resign his ap-behalf of the plaintiff was, that he was not liable to be dismissed pointment. Eventually, on the 19th of December, 1873, the new governing body passed this resolution :-" That upon a review of the administration of the school from the period when the governing body came into office to the present time, they are of opinion that Dr. Hayman is not a fit and proper person to hold the position of head master of Rugby School, and that it is essential for the interests of the school that he should cease to hold that office. That in exercise of the powers vested in the governing body by the Public Schools Act, 1868, Dr. Hayman be removed from his office of head master, and that such removal take effect on the 7th of April next."

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said the first point relied upon on

by the new governing body, but that the power to dismiss him was vested in, and must be exercised by, the old trustees, and that as they could only exercise it at the annual meeting in July, the resolution of the 19th of December, 1873, was necessarily invalid. He was, however, of opinion that the plaintiff became subject to the new governing body upon their coming into existence, and that this objection to the resolution of dismissal could not, therefore, be sustained.

It was also his opinion that the plaintiff, and all the head masters of the public schools to which the Act of 1868 applied, were subject to the control of the new governing body of each The bill stated that at the time of the plaintiff's appointment school, and that they held their office at the pleasure merely of to the office of head master it appeared to have been the opinion the new governing body, and were consequently liable to be disof Dr. Temple, Dr. Bradley, and of the assistant masters, that missed without notice, and without any reason being assigned. some candidate other than the plaintiff ought to have been But it was contended that this Court would control the proelected head master, and being prejudiced against the plaintiff ceedings of such bodies as this whenever it was satisfied that on religious and political or other grounds, they deliberately their powers had been exercised corruptly, unjustly, or for the formed the scheme and design of procuring the annulment of purpose of effecting some collateral object. He thought the his appointment, or otherwise of so harassing and thwarting the result of the authorities was, that the Court might then interplaintiff in relation to the school as to make his position as head fere; but if the governing body had fairly and honestly exercised master intolerable, and so if possible compel him to resign; that their power of dismissing the plaintiff their decision was not Dr. Temple and Dr. Bradley took part against the plaintiff and liable to the control of this Court. It was said that the governsided with the assistant masters in their conduct of open opposi-ing body was not so constituted as to be capable of coming tion to him; that Dr. Temple, after his appointment on the now to a just and impartial decision, and that in fact its decision governing body, abused the power and influence over his col-was partial and unjust. Upon a review of all the facts in leagues which his long experience gave him, to further the aforesaid scheme and design of himself and the assistant masters, and made incorrect representations to his colleagues as to matters of fact and as to the established customs of the school; and that the governing body, under the influence of Dr. Temple and Dr. Bradley, who were personally hostile to the plaintiff, on the ground of his having been elected by the trustees in preference

this case, as stated upon the bill, he could not come to the conclusion that the opinions of the governing body were not fairly and honestly entertained by them; and, under these circumstances, he must allow the demurrer, but he should do so without costs.

Solicitors for the plaintiff: Bower & Cotton.

Solicitors for the defendants: Iliffe, Russell, & Iliffe.

V.-C. M.

THOMAS v. HOWELL.

March 23. table institutions, one of which should be the Royal National Construction of Will-Pure and Impure Personalty-Charitable Life Boat Institution, and the other nineteen institutions, such Bequests-Contingency in Gift-Erroneous Statement of Facts as his trustees or trustee should select, the sum of 2007. and by a codicil, dated the 28th of October, 1871, he bequeathed as follows: Presuming and believing that the rental of my estate will produce from 16,000l. to 18,000l., I desire the four executors, who are named at the top of my will, will appropriate 40007. more to the established institutions of the country making it together 80007.

-Costs.

This was a suit to administer the estate of John Howell; and various questions arising under his will, which was dated the 21st of April, 1870, were now submitted to the Court.

The testator directed that all expenses and money necessary to be paid by his executors or trustees, and any legacies other than legacies to charities or for charitable purposes, should be paid and satisfied out of such part of his estate as could not legally be applied to charitable purposes, and that his legacies to charitable institutions or for charitable purposes should be paid only out of such part of his estate as should be legally applicable for such purposes.

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The testator's estate consisted chiefly of leasehold property, the rents of which together with the income of the rest of his property did not, as appeared from the chief clerk's certificate, amount to much more than 10,000. a year. It was not disputed that the gift in the codicil referred to that above mentioned in The question was argued whether the gift of the 40007, by the codicil was absolute or contingent on the income of the testator's estate reaching the specified amount.

the will.

The testator left a considerable amount of property, both real and personal, amounting to about 140,000l., but that portion of his estate which consisted of pure personalty was not sufficient to pay all the charitable gifts in the will. It became necessary which established the rule that the mere expression of an erroTHE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the previously decided cases, therefore to determine what sums constituted the pure per-neous belief as to a particular state of facts, as a ground for giving sonalty, and what legacies were distinctly charitable bequests. It appeared that on the 20th of December, 1871, a sum of 80007. was placed by the London and Westminster Bank to the credit of the testator's drawing or banking account by way of loan, such loan to be repaid by the testator on or before the 14th of March, 1872. This amount was reduced by the testator before his death to the sum of 65001. He died on the 28th of February, and at his death there was a sum of 6291. 12s. 2d. standing to his general drawing account.

It was submitted to the judgment of the Court whether or not this sum of 6297. 12s. 2d. was an asset come to the hands of the executors, or must be treated as a set off by the bank in reduction of the sum due to them on the aforesaid loan.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that the executors were bound to pay the whole debt due to the bankers, after setting off one account against the other, consequently the 6297. 12s. 2d. was not part of the pure personalty of the testator.

At the testator's death there was a sum of 8611. 19s. due to him as arrears of rent, and a question was now raised whether the same should contribute a proportion of the ground rent and other outgoings in respect of the property from which the rent

arose.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that rent in arrear was in the nature of fruit fallen, and was to be considered as pure personalty; and was not liable to contribute to outgoings.

There was an item in the accounts of 22027. 17s. 6., being the apportioned amount of the quarter's rent of the testator's leasehold estates, due Lady Day 1872, up to the 28th of February, 1872, the day the testator died. A question was raised, whether the sum so apportioned was or was not an asset connected with land.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR decided that the quarter's rent apportioned up to the day of the testator's death was pure personalty. Amongst the legacies given by the testator there occurred the following: "I give to each of ten poor clergymen of the Church of England, whether holding benefices or not, to be selected by my friend Joseph B. Owen if alive, or if dead then by the acting executors or executor of my will, and in his or their judgment not holding High Church or Puseyite doctrines-2007.

The question submitted to the Court was, whether these were charitable gifts, and if so, only payable out of pure personalty. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that these legacies were not charitable bequests within the meaning of the Statute of Mortmain. It was a gift to ten clergymen to be selected on account of their being poor and requiring assistance. They were to be chosen as sustaining a particular character, and it was not like a gift for a continuing charitable object. He thought that upon principle it was not a charitable bequest, and there was no authority opposed to this view. The legacies would therefore be paid out of the general estate.

or revoking a legacy, did not import a contingency into the gift,
had no application where the erroneous belief related to the
amount of the testator's property, and that in the present case
as there was not property of the specified amount, the gift of the
4000/. failed.
This decision rendered it unnecessary to argue a point as to
which of the charities were entitled to receive part payment
of their legacies out of the impure personalty.

Counsel had been appointed under the decree to represent the two classes of charities, but at the present hearing on further consideration some of the charities appeared separately, and the question was now raised whether those so appearing were entitled to any costs.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the hearing on further consideration was a proceeding under the decree, and that consequently the charities appearing separately were not entitled to any costs. The following counsel appeared for the several parties; Glasse, Q.C., and North, for the plaintiffs.

Cotton, Q.C., and Davey, for the residuary legatees.

V. Hawkins, and Robinson, for the two classes of charities.
Hemming, for the Attorney-General.

Alexander, and Owen (of the Common Law Bar), for the various
J. Pearson, Q.C., Bovill, Q.C., Higgins, Q.C., Wood, Holland,
charities and other parties.

Solicitors: Bower & Cotton; Farrer, Ouvry, & Co.; Raven & Bradley Cookson, Wainewright, & Pennington; Whitakers & Woolbert; H. T. Boodle; Norris, Allens, & Carter.

V.-C. B.

March 16.

SHAND V. DU BUISSON. Jurisdiction-Attachment out of Lord Mayor's Court. This was a suit to enforce an attachment for 7521. obtained in the Lord Mayor's Court by plaintiffs (merchants in Rood Lane, E C.), and to establish their right to the money which had been paid into Court by the garnishees Henckell, Du Buisson, & Co., defendants to the bill, but since payment into Court dismissed from the suit. The claim of plaintiffs arose upon a balance of account between themselves and Poolacoora Veerabudra Chetty (a native merchant of Madras), by which it appeared that on the 18th of February, 1867, P. V. Chetty was indebted to plaintiffs to the amount of 7521.

On the 2nd of April, 1868, plaintiffs having discovered that Messrs. Henckell had in their hands a sum of 10357. belonging to P. V. Chetty, issued an attachment out of the Lord Mayor's Court against Henckell & Co., as garnishees, and P. V. Chetty as defendant, and attached the 10351. for their debt. Henckell & Co. pleaded a previous attachment of the 12th of March, 1868, The testator, also by his will gave to each of twenty chari-issued by Poolacoora Sarabiah Chetty of Madras, an adopted

son of Veerabudra Chetty, for an alleged debt of 10357. based | the Wesleyan Methodist Chapel vestry of Guisborough, to poor upon payments made by Sarabiah to the creditors of Veerabudra, pious members of the Methodist Society resident in the town and on the 26th of June, 1868, Sarabiah Chetty obtained a ver- above the age of 50 years; the said surplus to be paid by the dict and judgment on his attachment, the effect of which was to two society stewards of the chapel. And the testator ordered that defeat any action by plaintiffs in the Lord Mayor's Court. the society stowards for the time being should be the trustees The case of plaintiffs was that Sarabiah Chetty was not a to receive the dividends, rents, or profits arising from the investbona fide creditor of Veerabudra Chetty, that the debt was ficti- ment of the said 6007. thereby bequeathed for that special purtious, and that the attachment based thereon was fraudulent and pose, and that the two society stewards retain to themselves 17. collusive, and that even if there was any bonâ fide debt due to each annually as a remuneration for their trouble, and that the Sarabiah Chetty, as alleged by him, such debt arose in India said sum of 6007. be invested within eighteen months after his out of the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor's Court, and therefore death. that the attachment was wholly void.

P. V. Chetty remained in prison for debt at Madras from October, 1866, until his death in May, 1868, about which time he was, by order of the Madras Court, declared insolvent, and all his property vested in Benjamin Brooks for the benefit of his creditors.

An order was made in the suit on the 17th of December, 1868, by which Henckell & Co. were ordered to pay in the residue (after deducting their costs) of the 10357.

Kay, Q.C., and W. F. Robinson, for plaintiffs, contended that (1) the Court had jurisdiction to restrain defendant from sweeping away this money by means of his prior attachment on it being shown that such attachment was improperly obtained; and (2), that the defendant had not upon the evidence shewn that there was any bona fide debt due to him when he obtained his attachment.

Jackson, Q.C., and Bardswell, for defendant Sarabiah Chetty, contended that there had been a valid equitable assignment by P. V. Chetty in favour of the defendant of the 10357., and that plaintiffs, who were merely creditors whose attachment had been defeated by the defendant's prior attachment, had no possible claim in equity except such as might arise from having failed at law.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that as the whole matter had been transferred from the Lord Mayor's Court into this Court, he had full jurisdiction to decide the question at issue between the parties. The evidence did not establish the validity of the debt alleged by defendant to have been due to him. The judgment in the Mayor's Court being based upon a debt which had no valid existence was, therefore, utterly void, and formed no obstacle to the claim of plaintiffs, who were entitled to payment of the balance due to them out of the fund in Court. Solicitors: Simpson & Cullingford; Hillyer, Fenwick, & Stibbard

V.-C. B.

March 16.

DAWSON v. SMALL. Will-Charity-Surplus-Prior invalid Gift. John Small, by his will dated the 18th of June, 1846, after a gift to Sarah Dawson for her life of his dwelling-house, an annuity of 15/. per annum, and the use of all his household furniture and farming implements, and a gift to his executors of all his real and personal estate upon trust for the legacy and annuity given to Sarah Dawson, and for payment of debts, funeral, and testamentary expenses, bequeathed 6007. out of such part of his personal estate as should not be secured upon mortgages or chattels real, or be invested in Government securities, upon trust to invest, and that the interest, dividends, or rents arising therefrom be for ever applied in keeping up in good repair all the tombstones and headstones of his relatives and self in Guisborough churchyard, with the wall and iron palisading surrounding the same, likewise the two headstones belonging to his family outside of the said inclosure, with directions for repairing the iron and stonework, cleaning and painting the tombstones and recutting the letters when growing illegible, and keeping down grass and weeds; and likewise the headstones of his brother and cousin in Seamer churchyard and of his brother in Guisborough churchyard to be kept in order and painted. Any surplus money that might remain after defraying yearly these expenses was to be given every year on the 6th of September, in

It being established on the authorities that a gift for the purpose of keeping up a tomb was void, the question which arose upon further consideration was whether the invalidity of the prior gift made the gift of the surplus invalid also (from the impossibility of ascertaining any surplus), and whether in such case the 600l. was well given to charity generally, or passed to the next of kin as undisposed of.

Swanston, Q.C., and J. Cutler, for the plaintiffs, contended that the trustees of the Wesleyan Chapel were entitled to the 6007. Hemming, for the Attorney-General, contended that the 6007. was well given for the charitable purposes other than the maintenance of the graves.

Eddis, Q.C., and Torriano, for next of kin, contended that as the surplus could only be ascertained after the application of the principal gift, which was impossible, the whole failed. Chitty, Q.C., and Caldecott, for other parties.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held, that as the prior gift for the purpose of keeping up the tombstones was void and incapable of being carried into effect, the whole 600l. was well given to the Wesleyan Charity.

Solicitors: Pitman & Lane; Bell, Brodrick, & Gray; Raven & Bradley.

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Mrs. Dilkes executed a will bearing date the 8th of May, 1873. The foundation of the will was a printed form on the first side of a sheet of paper, containing a heading, a clause of revocation, and one for the appointment of an executor. At the end of the first side was a printed attestation clause. At the top of the second side were printed the words, the will continued, and at the bottom of that side was a second attestation clause. The form had been filled up and specific legacies given, which covered the first and second sides of the paper. The residue was not disposed of. The deceased executed the paper by making her mark in the space left for her name in the attestation clause on the first side, and the witnesses attested that mark by subscribing their names on the same side. Subsequently the deceased made her mark in the attestation clause on the second side, but the witnesses did not attest that. The will was entirely written and read over to the deceased before she made her first mark. Searle moved for administration with the will annexed to be granted to her father, the executor named in the will having renounced probate thereof. He submitted that the Court might decree probate, at any rate of that part above the first mark of the deceased: Keating v. Brooks (4 N. of C. 261); In the Goods of Davies (3 Curt. 748); Sweetland v. Sweetland (4 Sw. & Tr. 6).

SIR J. HANNEN rejected the motion on the ground that, taking the holograph part of the document as the will, there was no attested signature at the end of it, the mark there placed had not been attested by the witnesses.

Attorneys: Williamson, Hill, & Co.

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COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE v. HARRISON. Succession Duty-Allowance for Annuity ceasing on the Succession. This was an appeal against a decision of the Court of Exchequer on the Succession Duty Act.

The respondent's father was tenant for life of an estate of which the respondent was the first tenant in tail. The father and son resettled the estate, and by the resettlement the son was to receive an annuity of 400%. (charged upon the estate) during the life of the father. The annuity was regularly paid. Upon the father's death the respondent entered into possession of the whole estate. On a claim being made for succession duty on the whole value of the estate he tendered the proper amount of duty, with this exception, that he claimed an allowance of duty in respect of the annuity of 400., contending that he was only bound to pay duty on the value of the residue of the estate, upon the ground that, on succeeding to the estate, he had been Revenue claimed duty on the value of the whole estate, disdeprived" of the annuity. The Commissioners of Inland regarding the annuity altogether.

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The Court of Exchequer Chamber decided, on the authority of The Attorney-General v. Braybrooke (9 H. L. C. 150), and Attorney-General v. Floyer (9 H. L. C. 477), that the allowance claimed must be made. This appeal was then brought.

The Attorney-General (Sir J. Karslake), and The Solicitor-General (Sir R. Baggallay), for the appellants.

Mr. Garth, Q.C., and Mr. A. J. Smith, for the respondent.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD CAIRNS), LORD CHELMSFORD
LORD HATHERLEY, and LORD SELBORNE held that the House
was bound by those decisions, and that, no substantial distincion
existing between them and the present case, the judgment of the
Court below must be affirmed.

Solicitor for the appellants: Solicitor for Inland Revenue.
Solicitors for the respondent: Meynell & Pemberton.

March 30. March 20. CALEDONIAN RAILWAY COMPANY, APPS.; GREENOCK AND GLASGOW AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, APPS.; WEMYSS BAY RAILWAY COMPANY, Resps. CALEDONIAN RAILWAY COMPANY, RESPS. Agreement for Arbitration-Confirmed by Parliament. Claim by one Railway Company against another for 41,2501. The appellants sued the respondents for payment of several The question in this case was whether the appellants were sums of money, amounting in the whole to about 34607. with bound to pay to the respondents 41,250., with interest at 5 per interest. The defence was that the action was excluded or cent. from the 1st of August, 1869. The Court of Session de-barred by an agreement for arbitration scheduled to the Greenock cided in the affirmative, holding that the Caledonian Railway Company were entitled to the amount, and that the Glasgow and South Western Railway Company were bound to pay it. The latter company appealed to the House, having for their

counsel

The Dean of Faculty, and Mr. Pearson, Q.C.

The Solicitor-General (Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C.), and Mr. Cotton, Q.C., appeared for the respondents.

At the close of the appellants' argument the House, without calling on the respondents' counsel, expressed its concurrence No. 12.-1874.

and Wemyss Bay Railway Act, and having consequently a statutory authority. The Court of Session decided unanimously in in favour of the respondents; holding, that the question between the parties" under the agreement libelled must be settled by arbitration" (see the Scottish Jurist, vol. xliv. p. 505). Hence the appeal to the House.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Richard Baggallay, Q.C.), and Mr. Kay, Q.C., were heard for the appellants.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. Gordon, Q.C.), and Mr. Cotton, Q.C., for the respondents, were not called upon.

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Building Agreement - Clause of Forfeiture-Time of EssenceConditional Waiver-Non-performance of Conditions-Delay. By an agreement dated the 1st of January, 1873, the Clothworkers' Company agreed to demise a piece of land in Telegraph Street, in the city of London, to Joseph Messenger & Isaac Wilcox, for 80 years from the 25th of December, 1872, and Messenger & Wilcox agreed to erect certain buildings thereon within one year from the 25th of December, 1872; and in case default should be made in completing such erection for two months from the expiration of the year, the company had power to put an end to the agreement.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that time was of the essence of the agreement of the 15th of July, 1873; that the notice of the 16th of August, 1873, was only a limited and conditional waiver of the stipulations of the agreement, and that the conditions on which such waiver was to take place, had not been complied with, and that the plaintiffs had not shewn sufficient promptness in coming to the Court, and he dismissed the bill with costs, without prejudice to any action which the plaintiffs might be advised to bring for the recovery of the 1000l. paid by them.

Solicitors: Blagden; Argles & Rawlins; Glynes & Co.

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Will-Construction—Annuity to Trustee-Continuance of
Trusteeship.

This was a petition for payment out of Court of a fund standing to the credit of the suit, which was instituted in 1861 by the plaintiff, then an infant, for the administration of the estate of her great aunt Sarah Rowe.

Glasse, Q.C., and North, for the plaintiff, asked to have the whole fund paid out, and contended that the trusteeship was completely executed and the annuity had ceased.

The plaintiff on attaining 21, which had recently happened, became, in the events which had happened, absolutely entitled By articles of agreement dated the 15th of July, 1873, Mes- to the fund in Court, subject only to a question as to an annuity senger & Wilcox agreed to sell their interest under the agree to the defendant William Waring. Sarah Rowe, by her will, ment of the 1st of January, 1873, to Barclay & Vallance (the plain-appointed William Waring a trustee, and gave him an antiffs), at the price of 2000, to be paid as follows:-2001. on the nuity of 100. so long as he should continue to exercise the signing of the agreement, 800l. on the 14th of July, and the re- office of trustee under her will. maining 1000%. on the 31st of July, 1873, or such defined date as the parties might agree upon; and it was provided that the vendors' title should not be investigated, and that no formal assignment of the agreement should be required, the purchasers taking upon themselves all liabilities of the vendors whatsoever; and it was also stipulated that if the purchasers should fail to pay either the 8007. on the 14th of July, or the 1000l. on the 31st of July, or such deferred date as might be agreed upon, all money paid previously to such default should be forfeited, and the agreement should be void.

agree

The 2007, and 8007. were paid on the execution of the ment, the 1000l. was not paid on the 31st of July; nor was any deferred time for payment agreed on.

On the 16th of August, 1873 (at which date the plaintiffs had been let into possession, but had not commenced any works) Messenger wrote a letter to Vallance giving notice that unless the works were commenced on the following Monday, the 1000. must be paid within one week from the following Tuesday. The works were not commenced nor was the 10007. paid, but no step was taken on either side until the 2nd of October, when Messenger & Wilcox gave notice, that in consequence of default having been made in the payment of the purchase-money, the agreement had become void, and that they would proceed to deal with the property as if the agreement had not been entered into. To this Vallance at once replied by a notice requiring Messenger & Wilcox to perform the agreement, but containing no offer to pay the 10007. On the 16th of October, the Clothworkers' Company wrote to Messenger and Wilcox requiring them to proceed with the buildings. Shortly afterwards Messenger & Wilcox in consideration of 12007., agreed to assign the benefit of the agreement to Edward Browning, who on the 26th of December entered on the property and commenced building.

On the 8th of January, 1874, the plaintiffs filed this bill, against Messenger, Wilcox, & Browning, offering to pay the 1000%. with interest, and praying for specific performance, and for injunctions to restrain Browning from continuing in possession of the property, and Messenger and Wilcox from assigning their interest under the agreement.

The cause now came on to be heard.
Southgate, Q.C., Bagshawe, Q.-C., and F. G. Bagshawe, for the
plaintiffs.

Roxburgh, Q.C., and Everitt, for Messenger and Wilcox.
Fry, Q.C., and B. B. Rogers, for Browning.

Cotton, Q.C., and Cozens-Hardy, for the defendant Waring, contended that though no active trusts remained to be performed, the trusteeship continued till either the death of the trustee or his resignation and the appointment of a successor, and that a fund ought to be retained to answer the annuity.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that when the active duties of the trusteeship ceased the annuity ceased also, and the plaintiff was entitled to the entire fund.

Solicitors: Norris, Allens, & Carter; Worthington Evans.

V.-C. M.

SMITH v, GRANT.

March 25. Equitable Assignment-Arbitration-Release after Notice of Award.

This was a suit arising out of certain transactions connected with bringing into the marke tthe Minerals Hills Silver Mines Company, which was formed for working certain mines in America supposed to be of great value.

About December, 1870, or January, 1871, the defendant, Albert Grant, was introduced by Frederic Doulton, since deceased, to one Asbury Harpending, as having the power of disposing of certain valuable mineral property in America, and it was arranged that Grant should enter into an arrangement for the purchase of the property for 200,000., conditionally on certain eminent mining engineers certifying to the truth of a representation of Harpending that 200,000l. worth of ore was in sight; and for the convenience of Grant the contract was entered into with the California Mining Company, formed expressly for the purpose, in which he was the only person substantially interested.

The engineers sent out reported favourably of the property, and the Mineral Hills Mining Company was formed to purchase it from the California Company for 480,000l., of which 240,000. was to be in cash, and 240,000l. in shares of the Mineral Hills Company.

Doulton was engaged in many other transactions of a similar nature, and was assisted in carrying them out by the plaintiff, a financial agent, under arrangements whereby the plaintiff was to receive portions of the profits of the transactions. The plain

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