tiff claimed to be entitled to half of any profit accruing to Doulton out of the transactions connected with the Mineral Hills Silver Mines Company, but the amount of his interest was disputed, and after a suit had been instituted, was referred to arbitration, and by an award of the 22nd of July, 1871, the plaintiff was adjudged to be entitled to receive from Doulton 1700/. compensation, and Doulton was ordered to pay the plaintiff that amount out of the first moneys after he should have received the sum of 40007. from any source in connection with the Mineral Hills enterprise. Notice of this award was given to Grant by the plaintiff's solicitor. By a deed of the 26th of October, 1871, between Doulton and Grant, after reciting certain matters in dispute as to the Mineral Hills Company, and that 3000l. was due to Grant from Doulton in respect thereof, and that Doulton claimed various sums from Grant, and that it was agreed that Grant should pay Doulton 5000, and give him 1000 shares in the Mineral Hills Company, the parties mutually released each other, and Grant paid Doulton the 50007. The Mineral Hills Company became a failure, and Doulton having died insolvent, the plaintiff now contended that the award was equivalent to an equitable assignment of the moneys payable to Doulton in respect of the Mineral Hills Company transactions, and that notice of the assignment having been given to Grant, he was bound out of the 5000l. payable under the release to pay the 1700. found due to the plaintiff by the award, and that having paid it to Doulton he must pay it over again to the plaintiff. Cotton, Q.C., and W. P. Beale, for the plaintiff. Glasse, Q.C., and Speed, for Grant, contended that the award could not be considered to amount to an equitable assignment. Iliggins, Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods, for the California Mining Company. Warmington, for Blyth, a formal defendant. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the submission to the award constituted an agreement to pay out of a specific fund so much as should be found due under the award, and that was equivaleut to an equitable assignment, and the award settled the amount which ought to have been paid by Grant, under the release, to the plaintiff instead of to Doulton. Solicitors: J. Vernon Musgrave; West & King. V.-C. B. March 20. SOUCH v. EAST LONDON RAILWAY COMPANY. Company--Landowner-Subsoil-Notice to treat-CompensationLunds Clauses Act, ss. 18, 68. Plaintiff was the owner in fee of a piece of land at Shadwell, on which stood sixteen houses, eight facing eight, with a passage between them, called Victoria Place, opening at one end from Victoria Street, and at the other end closed. Defendants, the company, gave the plaintiff notice that they required to purchase six of the houses nearest Victoria Street; and upon this notice they entered, and were in possession. Defendants had not given notice that they required to purchase any part of Victoria Place, and the plaintiff called upon the defendants to undertake before 1.30 on Wednesday, the 9th of October, 1872, not to enter into possession of any part of the passage; but the defendants took no notice of the application. The bill was filed on the 10th of October, 1872, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from entering upon or taking such part of Victoria Place as lay between the premises already required to be taken, or any portion of the same, until defendants had given due notice under the Lands Clauses Act of their requiring to purchase such part, or such portion of such part, as the case might be, and also such other adjoining property of the plaintiff as they might be bound to purchase. The defendants said they did not intend to interfere with the passage, or the rights of the plaintiff or the public to the footways in Victoria Place, and the sole question was whether the defen dants could take the soil under the surface without proceeding to give notice under the Act, and compensate the plaintiff in the manner thereby provided. An injunction had been granted, and was afterwards dissolved on the terms of the defendants paying 1007. into Court, without prejudice to any question. The defences were, that the subsoil was vested not in the plaintiff, but in some public body, either the Board of Works or the vestry, and that the company were entitled to take the same without making compensation to the plaintiff. Jackson, Q.C., and Bailey, for the plaintiff. Fooks, Q.C., Davey, and Fooks, for the defendants. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR observed that the case involved no principle of public importance. The company had simply neglected to do that which it was their plain duty to have done. That the subsoil belonged to the plaintiff was not seriously disputed; he was entitled to have compensation in the words of the 68th section of the Lands Clauses Act for such damages as he had sustained; and inasmuch as the company had held him at arm's length and refused to answer his letter, they must pay the costs to the hearing. Solicitors: Russell, Son, & Scott; Wilson, Bristows, & Carpmael. Eddis, Q.C., and Loudon, moved on behalf of a purchaser, under an order of the Court, to restrain an action at law to recover the interest upon the purchase-money. The property having been sold under an order of the Court, the vendor was informed that the purchase-money, 23,0007., with interest up to the 5th of April, 1873, would be paid by a cheque of the Paymaster-General, and that the cheque was been raised as to the receipt of the money, it was not paid until made payable to the vendor personally. Some difficulty having the 24th of April. The vendor took out a summons to obtain payment of interest on the purchase-money from the 5th to the 24th of April (47.) The summons having been dismissed the vendor sued for the amount at law, and the purchaser now moved, without bill filed, to restrain such action. Kay, Q.C., and Romer, on behalf of the vendor, opposed the motion. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the proceedings of the vendor were wholly unjustifiable, and granted the injunction, directing the vendor to pay all the costs. Solicitors Rooper; Hacon. Sale of Commission-Mortgagee-Notice-Priority. The plaintiff was a first mortgagee in point of date of the proceeds of the sale of a commission in the army. These proceeds consisted of two sums, 250. payable by the officer (an ensign) promoted, and 450l. payable when (as in this case) the ensigncy was absorbed, out of a fund called the Reserve Fund, kept by the defendants, Cox & Co., the army agents, making together the full regulation price of 7001. The retirement of the mortgagor, a Mr. Clarke, was gazetted on the 9th of May, 1871. On the 10th of May the plaintiff and several other mortgagees gave Cox & Co. notice of their incumbrances; but it was not until the 13th of May that an order came from the Horse Guards directing Cox & Co. to transfer the 450l. to the credit of Clarke; and the first incumbrancer who gave notice of his claim after the 12th of May was not the plaintiff, but another mortgagee, named Davis. The question was, as to the 4507. only, whether Davis had obtained priority over the plaintiff. Eddis, Q.C., and Bradford, for the plaintiff. Swanston, Q.C., and Kisch, for Davis, relied on the decision in giving certain pecuniary legacies, gave all the residue of his Addison v. Cox (Law Rep. 8 Ch. 76). able. Dixon, and Romer, for other incumbrancers. Eddis, in reply, argued that Addison v. Cox was distinguishTHE VICE-CHANCELLOR thought that the case was decided by Addison v. Cox. Until the order came from the Horse Guards there was no fund representing this 450. which any notice could affect; there was no appropriation. Davis therefore, if he should establish the validity of his securities, would be entitled to priority. estate to his son E. S. Bigg and his daughters Sarah A. and Emma F. Bigg as tenants in common. He also appointed them executor and executrix. He died on the 23rd of July, 1823, and his will was proved on the 20th of November, 1823, by E. S. Bigg and Sarah A. Bigg. E. S. Bigg mainly acted in the trusts, and paid his sisters the income of their shares, but made no payment of capital. Emma F. Bigg died intestate on the 9th of May, 1844, leaving the plaintiff her next of kin. Sarah A. Bigg died on the 18th of July, 1865, and E. S. Bigg on the 7th of September, 1869, having appointed the defendant, L. M. Bigg, his executrix. On the 25th of January, 1873, administration of the estate of Emma F. Bigg was granted to the plaintiff, who on the 31st of January, 1873, filed this bill for the administration of the March 26. estate of Edward Bigg, the original testator, against Lucy M. Bigg the executrix of E. S. Bigg, and S. H. Bigg the heir-at-law of E. S. Bigg. Solicitors: Peard; Fladgate, Clarke, & Smith; E. J. Sydney & Son; Dyke. V.-C. B. CORPORATION OF HUDDERSFIELD v. JACOMB. Partition-31 & 32 Vict. c. 40-Minority desirous of SalePartition ordered. The answer of the defendants admitted that certain leaseholds which had been given by the will of Edward Bigg remained un- Bill for partition by the plaintiffs, who were entitled to six clevenths of a farm of about 13 acres, situate on high land about live or six miles from Huddersfield. Under powers contained in the Huddersfield Water Act, 1859, the plaintiffs had taken a strip THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said this was an express trust within of land, about an acre in extent, passing through the farm. The object of the plaintiffs was to have their six elevenths the 25th section of the Act 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, and was not allotted to them specifically, for the purposes of their under-barred by the statute. Moreover, it appeared that a part of the taking. They had powers to take adjoining lands. property still remained in specie. The plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the administration of the estate of Edward Bigg. Solicitors for the plaintiff: Singleton & Tattershall. Solicitors for the defendants: Prior, Bigg, Church, & Adams. The defendant who was entitled to four elevenths, and who claimed to be entitled to the remaining eleventh under a conveyance, which was in dispute, from the other defendant, Schofield, asked for a sale; alleging that the farm could not conveniently be partitioned; that the plaintiffs (who had already taken possession) had already cut off the water supply, and had cut off nearly the whole of the land from access to the farm buildings, and that there were mines of coal, fireclay, and other minerals under the soil. James Launchbury, by his will, dated the 13th of March, 1800, Kay, Q.C., Bagshawe, Q.C., and F. G. Bagshawe, for the plain-after directing certain parts of his property to be sold, gave to tiffs: The onus is on the minority of shareholders to shew the his brother William his land and estate at Ramsden, Oxford, propriety of a sale, where the majority ask for a partition. Jackson, Q.C., and William Barber, for Jacomb. Chitty, Q.C., and Caldecott, for Schofield, supported the plain tiffs' case. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the case turned entirely upon the language of the Act of Parliament. Before the statute co-owners had a clear right to a partition. The statute did not take away that right; but it gave power to the Court, if it should appear that by reason of the nature of the property, or the number of parties interested, or other circumstances, a sale would be more beneficial for the parties interested, to direct a sale. That meant more beneficial for "all" the parties interested. In this instance, the plaintiffs were a public body; they had taken part of the property under their compulsory powers, of the rest they were owners in undivided shares, and found it necessary to become the owners absolutely-and this, for public purposes. The public had to be considered in the matter; and in His Honour's opinion, the defendant had not made out that a sale would be more beneficial than a partition for all the parties interested. As to the mines, the evidence failed to shew that they were of workable value. There would be an order for partition; with an inquiry as to the number of shares and the rights of the parties, with a direction for a division in chambers according to those rights. No costs up to the hearing. Solicitors: Van Sandau & Cumming, for J. Batley, Huddersfield; Williamson, Hill, & Co.; Shum, Crossman, & Crossman, for J. Sykes & Son, Huddersfield. V.-C. H. MUTLOW v. BIGG. for life, and if he should die before his wife Martha, he gave his brother's widow 201. a year for life out of his landed estate above mentioned to be paid by the person next in possession; and after his brother's death he left his houses and estates as aforesaid to his nephew for life, and after his death to his sister's eldest son Edward for life, and after his nephew Edward's death then to his brother William for life, and after their deaths as aforesaid, then he gave all the said houses, land, and estate unto his five nieces. The testator directed a small property to be purchased and added to his other adjoining property, to be held in rotation during the several lives as heretofore he had left and beqeathed his other lands. The testator died on the 2nd of April, 1802, leaving all his five nieces him surviving. A question was raised whether the devise to the five nieces was for life or in fee, and the plaintiff, who represented one of nieces, filed this bill praying for a declaration of the rights of the parties. Greene, Q.C., and Ward, for the plaintiff, contended that the word "estate" conveyed the whole interest of the testator. H. Fawcett, Davenport, Lindley, Q.C., Roupell, Dunn, J. Cutler, Hardy, Q.C., Grosvenor Woods, and Locock Webb, appeared for the different parties. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the word "estate" must be taken to mean the whole interest of the testator, unless the context controlled the construction. Here the testator expressly, as to the preceding gift, cut down the gift to a life estate in express terms. The inference therefore was that when he did not so qualify the word in the last gift, that he intended the word to be used in the larger sense. He must therefore hold that the whole interest of the testator passed to the nieces, and there must be March 11. a declaration to that effect. Solicitor for the plaintiff: Biller. Will-Express T: ust-Statute of Limitations. Solicitors for the defendants: Boyle; Clinch & Alderton; PhilEdward Bigg, by his will, dated the 6th of January, 1820, after pot; Davenport; Purkis & Perry ; White & Sons. During the sittings of the Courts THE WEEKLY NOTES will be published on Saturday, and will generally comprise Notes of the Decisions up to and including those of the previous Wednesday. All cases of permanent interest noted herein will be reported in full in THE LAW REPORTS. House of Lords. April 20. NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. R. W. WANLESS. This was a proceeding in error against a judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, which had affirmed a previous judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench. The action was brought to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have been occasioned to the young man Wanless through the negligence of the company's servants. There is a branch of the North Eastern Railway which runs from Pensher to Sunderland. At the east end of the Hylton station on that branch there is a public highway, which crosses the railway on the level. There is a gate on each side for the passage of carriages, and two smaller swing gates for foot passengers. There is a gate keeper's box on one side of the line. On the 27th April, 1868, the plaintiff and three other boys were coming from the village of Hylton on the north side of the railway, intending to cross over the line by the level crossing. A train of forty-eight empty coal trucks was proceeding along the up or south line of rails from Sunderland to Pensher. The boys saw this train and waited till it had passed, when they began to cross. At that moment another train of loaded coal trucks was coming in the opposite direction, namely, from Pensher to Sunderland, and the plaintiff, advancing to cross the line, was struck by it, knocked down, and injured. There was, as usual, contradictory evidence, the company's witnesses asserting that if the boy had looked he might have seen the approaching train; the plaintiff's witnesses saying that there was a projecting screen on the line which would intercept the view of a coming train. The jury found for the plaintiff, damages 100. Leave was reserved to the company to move to enter a verdict or a nonsuit if the Court should be of opinion that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company's servants, or for a new trial as on a verdict against the weight of evidence. A rule was accordingly obtained, but was discharged, and the Exchequer Chamber upheld the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench (Law Rep. 6 Q. B. 481). The case was then brought up to this House. Mr. Manisty, Q.C., and Mr. Kemplay, Q.C., appeared for the Ex. 88 GORRIS v. SCOTT (Statutory Duty-Contagious Diseases (Animals) . 88 Ex. 88 Equity. RASCH v. Dowson. April 16. Solicitor's Lien on Documents-Equitable Deposit-Evidence. This was a motion by the testator's creditors by way of appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins (ante, p. 34). Simmonds, for the appellants. Graham Hastings, for Sympson & Warner. THEIR LORDSHIPS said that a claim against the estate of a deceased person which was supported by no evidence but the claimant's own unsupported evidence of conversations between himself and the testator, could not be allowed. That moreover, in the present case the expressions stated to have been used by Mr. Dowson amounted to nothing more than a reference to the lien which the solicitors had on the documents in their possession, and if the solicitors had at the time understood them as intended to create an equitable mortgage, they would no doubt have taken care to have a memorandum in writing. The order of the Vice-Chancellor must therefore be discharged. Solicitors: Sympson & Warner; J. M. Green. L. JJ. April 17. HARTLEPOOL COLLIERIES COMPANY v. MOON. Production of Documents-Privilege-Letter from Defendant's Solicitors to her Agent. This was an appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Bacon, ordering the production of certain letters from the solicitor of the defendant to her agent in the management of her colliery; some of which were written before and some after the institution of the suit (ante, p. 56). Swanston, Q.C., and Waller, Q.C., for the defendant, who appealed. Caldecott (Kay, Q.C., with him), for the plaintiffs. THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES said that the order of the ViceChancellor was right, having regard to the form of the affidavit of the defendant, which claimed privilege for all the letters. But the defendant might file a further affidavit claiming privilege for such of the letters as had been written after the dispute had arisen, and with reference to the defence in the suit, either before or after the suit had actually been commenced. THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH concurred. Solicitors: J. W. Hickin; Harcourt & Macarthur. L. JJ. Ex parte ANGERSTEIN. In re ANGERSTEIN. Bankruptcy-Costs of Trustee, THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH said that the reason for ordering the trustees to pay costs was, that applications of this kind to the Court of Bankruptcy were substitutes for actions at law. In an action at law a trustee in bankruptcy would be liable for costs just as any other plaintiff. In a case where a trustee makes an application the success of which is doubtful, he ought before making it to get from the creditors an indemnity against the costs, if he knows that there are no assets out of which he can be paid. He could see no difference between the case of an official liquidator and that of a trustee in bankruptcy. With regard to a liquidator the rule had been laid down that he must pay costs when he failed in an application. THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES said that Mr. Angerstein had been called into Court to meet an application which had failed, and he had a clear right to be indemnified against the costs. The rule had been established that no costs should be given of a successful appeal; but in all other cases, in the absence of special circumstances, the costs ought to follow the event. Solicitors: Linklater & Co.; Lumley & Lumley. Bankruptcy-Liquidation by Arrangement-Removing Trustee and Committee of Inspection-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, ss. 83, 120— Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, rr. 305, 307. This was an appeal from Mr. Registrar Brougham sitting as Chief Judge. H. A. Hart filed a petition for liquidation, which was agreed to by his creditors at a meeting, and a trustee and also a committee by a creditor with the concurrence of one-fourth of the creditors, of inspection were appointed. Afterwards a meeting was called under the 125th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and the 304th, 305th, and 307th of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, at which the trustee and committee of inspection were removed, and a Registrar Keene refused to register these resolutions, considernew trustee and committee of inspection were appointed. Mr. ing that the meeting ought to have been summoned by a member of the committee or by the Court, under the 120th of the Bankruptcy Rules. The matter was then brought before Mr. Registrar Brougham, who held that the meeting was regularly summoned, and from this decision some of the creditors appealed. Willis Bund, for the appellants. Winslow, Q.C., and Marcy, for the creditors who supported the registration. THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES said that the meeting was quite regular. There were two distinct sets of rules, one for bankruptcy and one for liquidation by arrangement. The 13th subsection of the 82nd section of the Act, which directed that members of the committee of inspection might be removed at a April 17. general meeting, applied both to bankruptcy and liquidation, but the mode of summoning the meeting was different in the two cases. In the present case the meeting had been properly summoned under the 305th rule for the removal of the trustee as well as of the committee of inspection. The appeal must be In this case the trustee in the bankruptcy applied to the registrar for an order for payment to him of a sum of 5000., which he alleged to belong to the bankrupt's estate, and the registrar granted the application. Mr. W. Angerstein, the father of the bankrupt, claimed the fund, and appealed from the registrar's decision. Fry, Q.C., Thesiger, Q.C., Winslow, Q.C., and F. H. Linklater, for the appellant. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Douglas Straight, for the trustee. THEIR LORDSHIPS discharged the order of the registrar, and ordered the trustee to pay the costs of the application to the registrar, which he might recover from the estate. Roxburgh said that the estate was very scanty, and that the effect of the order would be that the trustee would have to pay a great part of the costs personally. dismissed with costs. BLAXALL v. ALLAN. April 18. manufacturer of bone manure, having previously indorsed upon | M. R. the lease, and signed, the following memorandum: "This deed, Bankrupt-Order of Discharge-Order and Disposition Clause— and all thereto belonging, I give to Edward Bennetto Richards from this time forth, with all the stock-in-trade." John Delbridge died in April, 1873. Purchase by Bankrupt. At the inquiry to be made whether the plaintiffs had given notice of their charge; and if they had, then the usual decree for fore This was a suit by mortgagees of an annuity against Dr. Allan The bill was filed by Edward Bennetto Richards, an infant, (the annuitant) and his assignee in bankruptcy, seeking forewho was the son of Mrs. Richards, praying that it might be de- closure. The cause was heard in December, 1873. clared that the memorandum and delivery of the lease to hearing the objection (which had not been taken by answer) Mrs. Richards created a valid trust in favour of the plaintiff of was raised that notice of the mortgage had not been given to the the lease, and the interest of John Delbridge in the premises, trustees of the fund out of which the annuity was payable, and goodwill, and stock-in-trade. consequently that the annuity remained in the order and dispoThe defendants, who were parties claiming under a testamen-sition of the mortgagor. The Master of the Rolls directed an tary disposition by John Delbridge, demurred for want of equity. Fry, Q.C., and Phear, in support of the demurrer, contended that the memorandum could not amount to a good gift of the leasehold, as it was not under seal, nor of the stock-in-trade, as there was no delivery; and that inasmuch as it was intended as a transfer, it could not be converted into a declaration of - W. R. Fisher (Southgate, Q.C., with him), for the plaintiff, contended that, though there was no equity to perfect an imperfect gift, yet, where the intention was clear, the Court would hold the instrument, however informal, to be a good declaration trust. of trust. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the case was governed by Milroy v. Lord (4 D. F. & J. 264), and that where a gift was intended to take effect by transfer, the Court would not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust. The demurrer must be allowed. Solicitors: Gregory & Co., agents for Carlyon & Paull, Truro; T. D. Bolton, agents for Hill & Hill, Helston. M. R. POTTER V. DUFFIELD. April 17. Sule of Real Estate-Memorandum of Contract-Name of Vendor -Statute of Frauds. This was a suit for specific performance by a purchaser of real estate. The property was put up for sale on the 20th of August, 1869, under printed particulars and conditions of sale. The vendor's name did not appear. Messrs. Duffield & Bruty were stated to be the solicitors of the vendor, and Messrs. Beadel were the auctioneers. The plaintiff was the highest bidder at the auction, and signed a memorandum acknowledging himself the purchaser, and agreeing to complete the purchase according to the conditions; and Messrs. Beadel signed at the foot of this memorandum another in the following terms: "Confirmed on behalf of the vendor, Beadels." The bill was filed against Mr. Duffield, a member of the firm of Duffield & Bruty, alleging that he was third mortgagee and vendor of the property. Mr. Duffield, by his answer, denied that he was vendor, and stated that William Polley, the mortgagor, was the vendor, and he submitted that there was no memorandum of the agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Messrs. Beadel deposed that they were instructed by Bruty (Mr. Duffield's partner) to sell on behalf of Polley. Polley, on the other hand, gave evidence that he was not the vendor. Rooth (Roxburgh, Q.C., with him), for the plaintiff. Southgate, Q.C., and Begg, for the defendant, were not called upon. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that there was no memorandum of the agreement, such as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the contracting parties not being named or sufficiently described; that parol evidence could not be given to shew who the vendor was, and that even if it could, the result of the evidence adduced appeared to be that the defendant was not the vendor, and he dismissed the bill with costs. Solicitors: Denton, Hall, & Barker; Duffield & Bruty. closure. The plaintiffs now presented a petition for leave to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, alleging that that in July, 1873, during the pendency of the suit, the assignee since the decree was made they had for the first time discovered the mortgagor, who had previously obtained his order of disin bankruptcy had sold the annuity to a trustee for Dr. Allan, charge in the bankruptcy. tended that whether or not the mortgagees had given notice of Dr. Allan was entitled to hold the annuity discharged from the M. R. April 20. JERVIS v. WOLFerstan. Trustee-Indemnity-Payment by Executor-Refunding. In August, 1866, Swynfen Jervis transferred 625 shares in the Albert Life Assurance Company into the names of the plaintiff and defendant P. O. Jervis, who agreed to hold the same upon the trusts declared by an indenture dated the 21st of August, 1866, being for Catherine Jervis, the wife of the settlor, during her life, and after her death for the benefit of certain of the settlor's children and grandchildren. On the 21st of August, 1866, Swynfen Jervis made his will, and thereby appointed the plaintiff and defendant P. O. Jervis his executors, and bequeathed his residuary personal estate to his daughters, Mrs. Broughton and Mrs. Brackenbury, and his son, Walter Neil Jervis in equal shares. The testator died on the 15th of January, 1867. By a settlement made on the occasion of the marriage of Mrs. Broughton, the testator had covenanted to bequeath by his will or otherwise provide that whatever residue of his personal estate should remain at his decease should be equally divided between his daughters, Mrs. Broughton and Mrs. Brackenbury, and his son, Walter Neil Jervis, and it was thereby agreed that Mrs. Broughton's share should be paid to the trustees of her settlement, and held upon the trusts therein declared, By Mrs. Brackenbury's marriage settlement her share in the testator's property was vested in trustees upon the trusts therein declared. In May, 1869, the plaintiff and defendant, P. O. Jervis, knowing that the testator's estate might possibly be under some liability in respect of the Albert shares, but believing such liability |