Kay, Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods, for the third mortgagees, referred to Ord. xxii., r. 13, shewing that the Court was at liberty, under the circumstances of the case, to direct proceedings to be taken under the decree without service on the defendant, against whom the bill has been ordered to be taken pro confesso. Davey, for plaintiffs, referred to Durlow v. Simcock (14 W. R. 664). THE VICE-CHANCELLOR considered that he had power to dispense with such service, and directed the decree to be drawn up for an immediate sale, without requiring service of the decree or any proceedings under it on the mortgagor, the defendant, against whom the bill had been taken pro confesso. The form of order, as finally settled after directing an immediate sale, proceeded as follows:-"Dispense with service on defendant (the mortgagor) of this decree and all proceedings under it; but this decree is to be subject to the provisions of the rules contained in the 22nd of the Cons. Ords., as to making absolute decrees founded on bills taken pro confesso." Solicitors: West & King; Sole, Turner, & Turner, the first instalment of 5000l. of the sum which I owe you. The Dickinson, Q.C., Jackson, Q.C., and Inc, for the plaintiff. Serjt. Ballantine, Kurslake, Q.C., and Waller, Q.C., for the defendant Carnegie. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR referred to the parts of the letters above set forth as being the beginning of the gift and provision by the uncle for the plaintiff, and after commenting upon the language of those letters, and referring to the separate account at the bankers, and the acts and conduct of the parties, held that upon the authorities the gift was one for the separate use of the plaintiff; that the defendant was a trustee for her; and that the investments or the proceeds must be restored with interest at 4 per cent. from the date of the last payment of the interest. It was understood that the trust fund now consisted of sums amounting in the aggregate to 89627. 17s. 11d.-The defendant was ordered to pay all the costs of the suit, including the costs of the plaintiff's present husband. The bill was filed in May, 1871, by Mrs. Carnegie, at that time the wife of the Honourable S. T. Carnegie. The marriage between them was, in November, 1872, dissolved by a decree abso-in lute, and Mrs Carnegie some time afterwards married Baron de Billing. The bill was amended in 1873, by making him a defendant. The object of the suit was to obtain a declaration that two sums, together 10,000., mentioned in the pleadings, were given or belonged to the plaintiff for her separate use, independently of S. T. Carnegie; and that he was a trustee for her of so much of the sums, and of the securities in which the same were invested, as he had received; and for accounts, and costs of the suit. The plaintiff was a niece of the late Henry Thomas Hope. She was married to S. T. Carnegie in September, 1858. Her late father, Adrian John Hope, settled a sum of 10,000l. upon her and S. T. Carnegie in the manner mentioned in the pleadings. She had, with the consent of S. T. Carnegie, a separate banking account with Coutts & Co., into which her separate income was paid by the trustees of the settlement. On the 2nd of April, 1859, Henry Thomas Hope wrote to the plaintiff a letter, in which he said, "It is my intention, as soon as I can do it consistently with certain other financial arrangements, to request your acceptance of a sum of 10,000l., to be settled as may be most agreeable to you and to Captain (now Admiral) Carnegie. I hope this will be taken as a proof of my affection for you, and of my esteem and respect for Captain Carnegie, whose public and private character stands so high that it cannot in any way be affected by any praise or blame from us or ours. I hope it may also be considered in some degree as a protest against the want of liberality exhibited by my eminently respectable' brother in his arrangements with regard to you. Of this I, as head of our branch of the family, confess to be ashamed, and as your father condescends to occupy himself about my affairs, I am sure he cannot take amiss any interest which I may express in his." In a letter of the 4th of April, 1859, to the plaintiff, H. T. Hope said, "neither you nor Captain Carnegie had the slightest intimation of my intention to make such a proposition. I had only confided it to my excellent wife, who has nothing mean in her nature or disposition, and is never so happy as when ruminating on some plan from which others may derive pleasure or advantage. The operation will be completed before the end of the year; I hope considerably so; and if I do not survive, you may depend on those I leave behind me for carrying out my wishes." In a letter of the 8th of June, 1859, to the plaintiff, H. T. Hope wrote thus:-" I have directed my bankers Sir S. Scott & Co. to pay unto your account at Messrs. Coutts, Solicitors: J. Lott; Deane, Chubb, & Co. V.-C. H. TYSON v. BENSON. BENSON v. TYSON. April 22. Bill and Cross Bill-Contract for Sale of Real Estate-Drunkenness and Incapacity of Vendor-Specific Performance-Costs. The plaintiff Tyson filed his bill in December, 1872, for the specific performance of "This agreement is to certify that I Jonathan Benson have sold to Joseph Porter Tyson on this 30th day of October, 1872, all the estates called Paddock Wray and Christcliff, together with 400 heath-bred and heath-going sheep, for the sum of 21501." The agreement was signed by the plaintiff and the defendant and a witness-a nephew of the plaintiff-but without the intervention or assistance of professional advice. The defendant Benson filed his bill in January, 1873, praying for a declaration that the agreement was an invalid one and not binding upon him, and for an order that it might be cancelled. Benson was about 71 years of age. He inherited one estate from his father, and the other he purchased. The whole consisted of seventy-six acres, situate in Eskdale, and was let with 400 sheep for 70 a-year. After the death of his wife and his surviving daughter, Benson let his estates and resided alone at Christcliff, and gave himself up, as he alleged, to drinking, frequently re- | daughter Mrs. Jekyll, and gave the same to her daughter Mrs. sorting to the Woolpack and the Mason's Arms, two publichouses in Eskdale, and his defence was that he was incapacited by drinking; that he was wholly unfit to manage matters of any consequence, or in any way attend to important business, without proper advice, and that at the time of signing the contract he was intoxicated and incapable of properly understanding what he was doing. It was also alleged that the property was sold at too low a sum. The parties and their witnesses were cross-examined in Court on their affidavits. Lindley, Q.C., and E. G. White (Hawkins, Q.C., of the Common Law Bar with them), for the purchaser Tyson. Karslake, Q.C., and T. A. Roberts, for the vendor Benson. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR after reviewing the evidence, held that Benson was on the day when the contract was executed capable of making his own bargain, it having been proved that he talked over with Tyson and fixed the price which he was to pay for the property. Benson's bill was dismissed with costs, and on Tyson's bill a decree was made for specific performance with costs up to the hearing. Solicitors: Park, Nelson, & Morgan, agent for H. Myers Meakin, Broughton-in-Furness; Helder & Roberts, agents for Brockbank & Helder, Whitehaven. V.-C. H. Bellairs and her heirs in the same way and with the same provisoes as were therein mentioned in regard to her daughter Mrs. Jekyll, but without its being charged with any annuity, but as she had also given the Welbourne Estate to her daughter Mrs. Bellairs and her heirs, she revoked that part of her will which gave any sum of money to Mrs. Bellairs, as it was her intention that the Mulbarton and Welbourne Estates were to compose the whole property that she was to take under her will, and any money that she might have been entitled to under her will she bequeathed equally to her two daughters Mrs. Charretton and Mrs. Jekyll, so that their personal property might be in all respects equal. The codicil was signed in the presence of Mr. Story, Mrs. Jekyll, and Harriet Davey. Mrs. Jekyll was one of the attesting witnesses. Mrs. Story died on the 12th of August, 1830. After the payments which she directed Mrs. Story's separate estate when invested in annuities amounted to the sums of 89867. 15s. 31. and 58497. 14s. 24., and it was considered by all parties that the latter sum represented Mrs Jekyll and her children's share. The suit was instituted in February, 1872, for the administration of the trusts of the will so far as they related to the said two sums of annuities, and the material question now was whether Mrs. Jekyll (who died in January, 1872) having been an attesting witness of the codicil could take any interest thereunder. B. B. Rogers, for the plaintiff, the surviving trustee. Karslake, Q.C., and Davey, for the defendants, the Charrettons, contended that the gift to the attesting witness was on the true construction of the Statute of Frauds and of the Statute of 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, void. Dickinson, Q.C., and Cozens-Hardy, for other defendants in the same interest. Bristowe, Q.C., and Smart, for the defendants, two of the Jekylls, coutended that the case was not within the Statute of Frauds; that the Statute 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, had no application, and that therefore the gift to Mrs. Jekyll was not void. Lindley, Q.C., and Robinson, for the defendants, Mrs. Bellairs and others. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that this was a case of a power of appointment and not one of a disposition by will at all within the scope and intention of the Statute of Frauds, and therefore the Statute of 25 Geo. 2, c. 6 had no application, and that having regard to the authorities, the gift to the attesting witness was valid. Solicitors: Norris, Allens, & Carter, agents for Simpson & Son, Norwich; E. F. Sealy; Druce, Sons, & Jackson; Merriman & Pike. BANKRUPTCY. Ex parte KEIGHLEY. In re WIKE. April 27. Rehearing-Jurisdiction-Discretion of Court-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 71. By an indenture of settlement of the 17th of March, 1829, made on the marriage of John and Naomi Story (the widow of Edmund Hooke) certain sums of stock were vested in trustees in trust for the sole and separate nse and benefit of the wife, and to be given, sold, conveyed, and disposed of by her by deed or will, or otherwise, to any person or persons, and subject thereto to be held, enjoyed, and the income to be received by her in exclusion of her husband, and at her decease, in case she made no disposition of the same by deed, will, or otherwise, in trust for Mrs. Charretton, Mrs. Bellairs, and Mrs. Jekyll, her three daughters by Mr. E. Hooke, equally for their separate estate. It was agreed that all such real and personal estate as Mrs. Story should acquire during the coverture should remain for her sole and separate use, with power to her of appointing it as she should think fit. Mrs. Story on the 24th of March, 1829, by will, after reciting that under the will of Edmund Hooke she had a testamentary power of appointment in favour of his children, Mrs. Charretton, Mrs. Bellairs, and Mrs. Jekyll, over estates situate in the parishes of Mulbarton and Welbourne in Norfolk, appointed the Mulbarton estate in trust (subject This was an appeal from a decision of the judge of the Manto an annuity for Mrs. Bellairs for life) to the use of Mrs. Jekyll chester County Court. He had refused to admit a proof tendered in tail, with remainder to Mrs. Bellairs in tail, with remainder to by Keighley against the joint estate of John Wike & Son, bankMrs. Charretton in tail, with remainders over, and she appointed rupts, on the ground that the evidence did not shew that the the Welbourne Estate to the use of Mrs. Bellairs in tail with alleged debt was one for which the firm were liable. An appliremainder to Mrs. Jekyll in tail, with remainder to Mrs. Char- cation was afterwards made for a rehearing, on the ground that retton in tail, with remainders over. At the same time she ap- new evidence had been discovered since the original hearing. pointed estates comprised in the settlement of the 17th of March, The judge refused to grant a rehearing, and expressed an 1829, to Mr. Story for life, with remainder to her said three opinion that sect. 71 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, would not daughters as he should appoint, and in default to the uses de-authorize a rehearing for the purpose of making a new case on clared of the Mulbarton Estate, and after giving various bequests (not including any bequest in favour of Mrs. Bellairs) the testatrix gave to Mr. Story and two others (who were also appointed executors) all the residue of her personal estate upon trusts for the benefit of her three daughters, for life, and after their deaths for that of their children. On the 11th of August, 1830, Mrs. Story by a codicil revoked that part of her will which gave her Mulbarton Estate to her new evidence. Keighley appealed. De Gex, Q.C., G. W. Lawrance, and Ambrose, for the appellant. Little, Q.C., Jordan, and Finlay Knight, for the trustee. THE CHIEF JUDGE held that the discretion to rehear given by sect. 71, is as wide as possible in a proper case. But he thought that on the present occasion no sufficient case had been made out. He therefore dismissed the appeal. Solicitors: Mackrell & Co.; Torr, Janeway, & Co. senger. Shortly after the accident in which the plaintiff was injured Dr. W. medically examined the plaintiff on behalf of the company, and continued to do so from time to time, and made reports to the company, some before and some after the writ was issued. Cockburn, CJ., at chambers, made the usual order for plaintiff, &c., to inspect and take copies of the reports made before action brought, with leave to defendants to go to the Court. R. T. Reid moved accordingly to rescind the order, on the ground, as stated on affidavit, that the reports were made to the company for the purpose of assisting the company to establish their defence in anticipated litigation. The trial took place at the last Gloucester Assizes before Lord Coleridge, C.J., when the facts appeared to be as follows:-The alleged libel was published in the South Wales Daily News, and related to the conduct of the plaintiff at a meeting held in Swansea to promote the election to Parliament of the liberal candidate for that borough. The plaintiff, who was a supporter of the conservative candidate, had, from motives of curiosity, attended the meeting with two companions, also conservatives, and a disturbance had arisen at the meeting in consequence of their presence. The paragraph in the newspaper imputed to them conduct" consistent with their having imbibed too freely of the cup that inebriates." The learned judge left it to the jury to say whether the paragraph exceeded the limits of fair discussion by a writer in a public newspaper of a matter of public interest. The jury found for the defendant. nisi for a new trial on the ground that the learned judge misHuddleston, Q.C. (Bosanquet with him), now moved for a rule directed the jury. He contended that the conduct of private persons attending an election meeting, as the plaintiff had done, did not raise any question of privilege. THE COURT (Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Denman, JJ.) held that the direction was right, and accordingly refused the rule. Rule refused. Attorneys for plaintiff: Gover & Norton. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Lush, JJ.) refused the rule, expressly adhering to their decision in Baker v. London and South Western Railway Company (Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 91), in preference to the decisions in later cases in the Court of Com- C. P. mon Pleas. Attorneys for defendants: Burchells. Q. B. DENNIS v. WHETHAM AND ANOTHER. April 27. Sheriff-Action for false Return of nulla boña-Prior Writs fraudulent. Action against defendants, the Sheriff of Middlesex, for making a false return of nulla bona to a writ of fi. fa. to levy 1281. Pleas, not guilty, and that there were no goods of the execution debtor on which defendants could have levied under plaintiff's writ. At the trial it appeared that the defendants had not levied at all; but that there were goods of the execution debtor (which the jury valued at 50%.) upon which they might have levied. The defendants set up as a defence that there were two writs of fi. fa. against the execution debtor for more than 50%. lodged with them prior to the plaintiff's writ, and that therefore the plaintiff was not damnified. The jury having found that the prior writs were fraudulent, the judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff for 501. M. Chambers, Q.C., moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, contending that as the defendants had no notice that the prior writs were fraudulent, they were not bound to know it; and therefore if they had levied on the execution debtor's goods, the plaintiff would have got nothing, and therefore was not damnified, and the action would not lie without damage. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Lush, JJ.) refused the rule. It was the sheriff's duty to have levied, and assuming the prior writs to have been fraudulent, the plaintiff might have been able to interplead or to take other steps to dispute the validity of the prior writs, and so to obtain the proceeds of the levy, and he was therefore damnified, and the action would lie. Attorney for defendants: W. Maynard. April 21. STEWART V. EDDOWES AND Another. These were actions arising out of a contract for sale of a ship, which were tried at Liverpool before Amphlett, B., when a verdict passed in both actions against Stewart. The question in both actions was, whether there was a contract for sale of the ship between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the second action as vendors and purchaser respectively. It appeared that the defendants in the first action, the Messrs. Eddowes, were acting as brokers for the vendors for the sale of the ship, and negotiations had taken place in the matter between them and Mr. Stewart. One of the Messrs. Eddowes had drawn up a written memorandum of the terms of the sale, and sent it unsigned to Stewart. The latter made certain interlineations in red ink, and having signed the document as altered submitted it to Eddowes. Eddowes stated that it was no use to submit the document as altered to the vendors as it would not be assented to. The red ink interlineations were then struck out with the assent of Stewart, and the document was sent to the vendors. They made certain further interlineations, and sent the document back to Eddowes, who then signed it on behalf of the vendors and took it to Stewart, who assented to the terms of it as it then stood. It was contended by the counsel for Stewart that parol evidence could not be given of what had taken place after Stewart had signed, on the ground that this would be to vary the written contract by parol, in contravention of the provisions of the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. The learned judge received the evidence. Benjamin, Q.C. (Baylis with him), now moved for a new trial on the ground of misreception of evidence. THE COURT (Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Denman, JJ.) held that the evidence was admissible, on the ground that there never was a contract until Stewart had finally assented to the terms of the contract, and the evidence only went to shew what the written contract was upon which the parties had agreed that their signatures should operate. They therefore refused the rule. Rule refused. Attorneys for Stewart: Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle, for Hull, Stone, & Fletcher, Liverpool. House of Lords. TABLE OF CASES. Common Law. WATT e. LIGERTWOOD (Contempt of Court-Consequent Penalty) Equity. M. R. 98 ASTLEY V. EARL OF ESSEX (Will-Devise in tail-Name and Arms Clause-Forfeiture-Condition-Ignorance of Rights-Statute of Limitations-3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, 88. 3, 4) BEST'S SETTLEMENT TRUST, In re (Marriage Settlement-Ultimate Trust of Personalty for Persons who should be the "Personal Representative or Representatives of the Wife"-Her Administrators, and not her Next of Kin held entitled) V.-C. H. 100 BRUFF. COBBOLD (Amalgamation of Railway Companies-Fund set aside to compensate Officers of former Company—Inquiry who entitled as " Officers"-Distribution of Fund as Annuities) V.-C. H. 100 FRY, In re. MATtthews v. FreeMAN (Construction of Will—Name V.-C. M. or Description) Guthrie v. WALROND (Executor proving after Decree-Supplemental Order) V.-C. M. GUY v. HOLMAN (Will-Bequest to Children equally-Legatees to account for Moneys for which they had given Security or Acknowledgment-Advancement to one Child, who after Testator's Death acknowledged it as a Debt-Order to account to the Estate) V.-C. H. HOGG . SCOTT (Copyright-Registration-Piracy--5 & 6 Vict. e. 45-No Suit within a Year - Alleged Acquiescence of Plaintiff-Compilations of Books from the same Sources-Injunction) 99 99 102 V.-C. H. 102 HANCOCK v. HEATON (Partnership Accounts-Separate Business— Profits from Transactions remotely connected with Partnership Business) V.-C. M. JONES v. LLOYD (Practice-Pleading-Suit by Person of Unsound Mind not found 89 by Inquisition-Next Friend-Dissolution of Partnership-Notice to dissolve-Withdrawal of Notice) M. R. OPENSHAW v. DAVIES (Practice-Minules-Inquiry as to Heir-atLaw) V.-C. M. PERRY v. MERRITT (Will. Construction Gift of Personally to Wife for her absolute Use and Benefit-Subsequent Gift of the Money remaining after Payment of her Debts to other Persons -Absolute Gift to Wife. V.-C. H. SMITH V. HARDING (Direction to Trustees to sell Real Estate-Gift of Surplus Proceeds to Nephew-Gift of Residue of Personalty to Nephew charged with Legacies-Deficiency of PersonaltyIntestacy Representative of Nephew entitled to Surplus Proceeds of Real Estate). SPCESTOWE'S CHARITY, In re (Payment out of Court--Trustees of Charity-Persons absolutely entitled-Land Clauses Act) V.-C. H. 101 V.-C. M. 99 Cox r. LEIGH (Sheriff-Landlord and Tenant-Payment of one Year's Rent-8 Anne, c. 14, s. 6). Q. B. 104 FLETCHER V. BAKER (County Court-Notice of Jury-Three clear Days before" the day for hearing"-9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, ss. 70, 71-County Court Rules, 104, 105) Q. B. 105 MELLOR v. WATKINS (Landlord and Tenant-Effect of Surrender of Lease on Interest of Sub-lessee-Parol Licence, Revocation of Rights of Licensee) PETROCOCHINO AND OTHERS v. BOTT (Shipping-Construction of Bill of Lading) PITTS, APP.; MILLAR, RESP. (Cruelty to Animals-12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, 8. 3-Place used for the Purpose of baiting Animals) Q. B. 103 REG. v. CASTRO (Indictment for Perjury removed from Central Criminal Court by Certiorari-Offence charged to have been committed in the City of London and in the County of Middlesex- -County in which Indictment shall be tried-9 & 10 Vict. c. 24, s. 3-Trial at Bar, Order for-11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 70, 8. 7-Sentence passed in Vacation and not in Term) Q. B. 104 REG. v. COOPER (Misappropriation of Money-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 88. 75, 76). C. C. 108 REG. v. FARRELL (Evidence-Deposition-Witness too ill to travel -11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 17) C. C. 108 REG. v. GUARDIANS OF STEPNEY UNION (Criminal Lunatic, Order of Justices on Parish of Settlement for Maintenance of — 9 Geo. 4, c. 40, 8. 54—“ Debt, claim, or demand incurred by or become due from overseer or guardians to be paid during the current half-year"—22 & 23 Vict. c. 49, s. 1) Q. B. 103 REG. v. GUARDIANS OF WORCESTER UNION (Poor Law-Removal of Pauper-Irremoreability-Break of Residence-9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1) Q. B. 105 REG. v. PEMBLITON (Malicious Injury to Property-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 51-Malice-Intention) C. C. Bnkey. 103 WILLIAMS, Ex parte. In re WILLIAMS (Composition-Second Meeting of Creditors—Right to withdraw Proof-Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, r. 273). No. 15.-1874. During the sittings of the Courts THE WEEKLY NOTES will be published | tain freehold and copyhold estate to Elizabeth Corbett for life, on Saturday, and will generally comprise Notes of the Decisions up to with remainder to William Thompson Corbett for life, with and including those of the previous Wednesday. All cases of permanent remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, with divers interest noted herein will be reported in full in THE LAW REPORTS. remainders over, with an ultimate remainder to the testator's right heirs. And the testator declared, that every person who should for the time being be under and by virtue of his will entitled to the possession of the estate for his own benefit should, on becoming entitled in possession, and on attaining the age of 21 years, take and use the name and arms of Thompson, with a proviso that in case any such person should fail or neglect so to do for the space of 12 calendar months after he should have so House of Lords. JOHN WATT, JUNIOR v. LIGERTWOOD, et al. April 21. become entitled in possession, and should have attained the age Contempt of Court-Consequent Penalty. The appellant, an advocate or procurator in Aberdeen, presented on behalf of one of his clients a petition for an interdict from the sheriff against the sale of certain bathing machines. The petition was opposed. After hearing both parties, on the 19th of March, 1867, the sheriff refused the interdict; but when he was about to have his judgment written out on the petition. the appellant laid hold of it, saying, "I withdraw the petition." The sheriff said that the petition could not be withdrawn, and ordered the appellant to restore it to the clerk, intimating at the same time that disobedience to the order would be treated as a "contempt of Court." The appellant, nevertheless, walked off with the document, whereupon the sheriff informed the clerk that he, the clerk, should be held responsible for the recovery of the petition. The clerk, therefore, at once asked and obtained from the sheriff a caption against the appellant, who was forthwith apprehended in his office and lodged in prison, but released next day. The action was brought by the appellant against the sheriff clerk, and the sheriff clerk depute, concluding that the caption or warrant of imprisonment should be rescinded and annulled, and that the defenders should be ordered to pay the appellant 50001. for damages in respect of his imprisonment. The Lord Ordinary, on the 24th of November, 1870, dismissed the action, and his interlocutor was adhered to by the Second Division of the Court below, who found, however, on the 28th of October, 1871, that "no expenses were due to either party.” Mr. Watt appealed to the House of Lords against the judgment of the Court of Session on the merits. The sheriff clerk and the sheriff clerk depute presented also a cross appeal complaining that costs had not been awarded to them. Mr. John Pearson, Q. C., and Mr. A. Robertson, were heard for Mr. Watt. The Lord Advocate, and Mr J. T. Anderson, appeared for the sheriff clerks, but were not called upon, THE HOUSE holding it to be clear that Mr. Watt was wholly and exclusively in the wrong; and that to refuse their costs to the officers of the court, who had merely done their duty, was an injustice which their Lordships could not allow. Mr. Watt's appeal, therefore, was dismissed with costs; and the cause was remitted back to the Court below, with a direction to assoilzie the sheriff clerk and the sheriff clerk depute, and to award to them their costs. (See a note of this case at an earlier stage Weekly Notes, 1870, p. 143.) Appellant's agent: James Dodds. of 21 years, then and in such case his estate and interest, and the the estates should go to the person who should be next in repowers consequential thereto, should cease and determine, and mainder, as if the person so failing or neglecting were then dead. Elizabeth Corbett died in 1825; William Thompson Corbett died in 1832, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Thomas George Corbett, who died without issue male in 1868, having suffered a recovery of the freeholds in 1818, and having devised the estate to the defendant upon certain trusts. These trusts are now being administered in this suit. An order was made for the sale both of the freeholds and copyholds. It was then found that the entail had not been barred as regards the copyholds; and the question as to who was entitled to the purchase-money for them was now raised by consent on a summons calling on the purchaser to pay his purchase-money into Court. arms clause applied to tenants in tail: secondly, if it did, wheThere were three questions: first, whether the name and ther Thomas George Corbett, who was alleged not to have comStatute 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 3; thirdly, if he had not, whether plied with it, had acquired an estate in fee simple under the a subsequent tenant in tail who had not complied with the clause within a year from the death of Thomas George Corbett could escape the application of the clause on the ground of ignorance of his rights under the will and absence in India. out the summons. Southgate, Q.C., and Cookson, for the plaintiffs, who had taken Borrett, Badcock, Blakesley, and Cadman Jones, for respondents. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the clause applied to tenants in tail; that by virtue of 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 4, time did not begin to run against a remainderman until the death of Thomas George Corbett, who had consequently not acquired the did not prevent the operation of the clause. fee; and that ignorance of rights and absence from this country Solicitors: Frere & Co.; White, Borrett, & Co.; Deedes. May 4. Practice-Pleading-Suit by Person of Unsound Mind not found so by Inquisition Next Friend Dissolution of Partnership — Notice to dissolve- Withdrawal of Notice. his next friend, alleging to the effect that in March, 1867, the This was a bill by a person of unsound mind not so found, by plaintiff and defendant entered into partnership for the term of 14 years from the 31st of March, 1867, subject to a provision that at the end of the first seven years of the term it should be lawful for either partner, by giving notice in writing to the other partner, to dissolve the partnership; that the business was carried on by the plaintiff and defendant in accordance with the articles until about three years before the filing of the bill, when the health of the plaintiff failed, and owing to softening of the brain he became, and had ever since continued, incapable of attending to business, and was then in fact of unsound mind; that on the 17th of September, 1873, the defendant gave notice partnership upon the 31st of March, 1873, when the first seven to the plaintiff and his family of his intention to dissolve the years thereof expired, but on the 28th of March, 1873, gave a notice withdrawing the same, the plaintiff being of unsound mind |