coloured plans attached to the conveyance, each lot conveyed being numbered. Each lot had a frontage upon one of the roads, and was stated in the conveyance to be on the side of the road and adjoining thereto; neither the admeasurement nor colouring included the road. The roads had been dedicated to the public as far as any act of the defendants could do so, but no proceedings had been taken to make them repairable by the parish. The plaintiffs, the board of works of the district, from time to time paved the new streets formed by the houses on the estate, and apportioned the costs among the owners of houses forming the streets and the owners of lands bounding and abutting on the streets; and in so doing assessed defendants in respect of the new streets and roads when bounding or abutting on the sides or ends of the streets paved as "land abutting" on those streets, under s. 77 of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, and also charged the defendants in respect of two ancient highways not maintained and repaired by the plaintiffs, bounding the defendants' estate, the soil of which was in the defendants. Barrow (Morgan Howard, Q.C. with him), for plaintiffs. Attorneys for plaintiffs: Newman, Dale, & Stretton. a The defendant in October gave the plaintiff an order to repair Act, 1869, contained no enactment making void any contract liable. THE COURT (Blackburn, Lush, and Quain, JJ.) held the plaintiff's contention to be correct, and that the defendant was liable. Attorneys for plaintiff: Turner & Son. Attorney for defendant: Butcher. Ex. Highway-5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, ss. 84, 85-Stopping up Highway as unnecessary-Certificate, Requisites of. ELLIS AND OTHERS v. WILMOT. Bankruptcy Act, s. 125. Nov. 12. By s. 84 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, when the inhabitants in vestry Principal and Surety-Effect of Discharge of Principal under the deem it expedient that a highway should be stopped up, the chairman of the meeting shall by an order in writing direct the surveyor to apply to two justices to view the same; provided that if any other person is desirous of stopping up a highway he is to require the surveyor to give notice to the churchwardens to assemble the inhabitants in vestry, and submit to them the wish of such person; and if they agree to the proposal, the surveyor is to apply to the justices for the purposes aforesaid. By s. 85, when it appears upon such view of two justices made at the request of the surveyor, that any public highway is unnecessary, the justices are to direct the surveyor to give certain public notices, and proof of the publications of such notices having been given to the satisfaction of such justices. . . the justices are to certify that the highway is unnecessary, and the reason why, and this certificate is to be lodged with the clerk of the peace for the county and read by him at the quarter sessions, and there enrolled. This was an appeal against a certificate under the hands of two justices for the county of Middlesex relative to the stoppingup of a certain public footpath or highway. The quarter sessions confirmed the certificate, subject to a case. The certificate stated that all the particulars required by s. 85 had been complied with, but omitted to state that the surveyor at whose request it was alleged the justices viewed the highway sought to be stopped up, had first duly obtained the consent of the inhabitants of the parish, in vestry assembled, to the proposed stopping-up of the highway. Philbrick, Q.C., and Poland, for the Crown. THE COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Archibald, JJ.) held that a certificate under the statute was sufficient if it stated that the particulars contained in s. 85 had been complied with, and Case stated in an action on a bond, dated the 8th of December, 1869, given by the defendant as surety to secure payment of a sum of 70007. by one Thomas Etheridge to the plaintiffs. It appeared that in April, 1871, Etheridge filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs by arrangement or composition under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, ss. 125, 126, and afterwards a resolution was duly passed by the statutory majority of his creditors that his affairs should be liquidated by arrangement under s. 125, and not in bankruptcy, and a trustee was appointed thereunder. The plaintiff proved in respect of the bond for 70001. against the estate of Etheridge, and received a dividend of 9s. 27. in the pound. On the 5th of August, 1872, the statutory majority of Etheridge's creditors resolved that his discharge be granted to him, and it was granted accordingly, and a certificate of his discharge was, duly delivered to him. The plaintiffs voted for this resolution, and the defendant, who was present at the meeting, dissented from it. He did not prove under the liquidation in respect of his liability as surety under the bond. He now contended that he was released by reason of the plaintiffs having assented to the granting of the order of discharge. Manisty, Q.C. (Petheram with him), argued for the plaintiffs; and Prentice, Q.C. (Gould with him), for the defendant. THE COURT held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. Attorneys for plaintiffs: Jones, Blaxland, & Son. 205 COLLINS v. SLADE (Lease and Underlease-Covenant against “an- 201 201 V.-C. M. FOWKES V. PASCOE (Gift to a Stranger-Presumption of Intention M. R. 203 ELLIS V. LOFTUS IRON COMPANY (Trespass-Animal, Owner liable Q. B. 208 During the sittings of the Courts THE WEEKLY NOTES will be published on Saturday, and will generally comprise Notes of the Decisions up to and including those of the previous Wednesday. All cases of permanent interest noted herein will be reported in full in THE LAW REPORTS. M. R. 203 L. C. & L. JJ. 204 206 Mortgage-Priority-Registration-2 & 3 Anne, c. 4 (Yorkshire This was an appeal by the defendants Potter and Brown from MACNICHOL'S ESTATE, In re. MACNICHOL v. MACNICHOL (Repre- THEIR LORDSHIPS dismissed the appeal with costs. Solicitors: Edwards, Layton, & Jacques; Redhead; Emmet & and the assignee of their expected share in the personal estate the plaintiff was entitled as of right to the writ, just as if the of the lunatic, which consisted of a sum in the public funds, Act had not passed. The Court had no discretion in the for an order that no part of the fund in question or the interest matter. thereof might be transferred or paid on the death of the lunatic to any persons claiming under the petitioning next of kin without notice to the assignee. L. JJ. In re C (AN ALLEGED LUNATIC). Nov. 23. Lunacy Regulation Act, 1862, s. 11-Inquiry based upon Report of Commissioners-Order for Costs out of alleged Lunatic's Estate. An inquiry was directed upon the report of the commissioners in lunacy whether Mr. C., who was at the time confined in a lunatic asylum, was of unsound mind. Mr. C. demanded a jury, and the inquiry was accordingly held before a jury, who found that he was of sound mind. The official solicitor of the Court of Chancery now presented a petition asking that the costs of the inquiry and of the proceedings in lunacy might be paid out of the alleged lunatic's estate. Leigh Pemberton, appeared for the petitioner; and referred to the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 86) s. 11. THE LORDS JUSTICES made the order asked for. Solicitors: Meynell & Pemberton. Attachment-Debtors' Act, 1869, s. 4, exception 3. This was an appeal against an order for a writ of attachment made by the Master of the Rolls. THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH concurred. Solicitors: Sole, Turner, & Knight; J. Lott, agent for Darvill & Co., Windsor. This was an appeal from a decision of the Chief Judge Bacon, THEIR LORDSHIPS said that both on principle and on authority The trustee appealed. T. Brett, for the appellant. Bagley, for the respondent. THEIR LORDSHIPS held that as the 1007. was payable only if the lease was not given up it did not create a debt. The resolutions were therefore passed by a proper majority, and must be registered. Solicitors: Harris & Finch; Hobbes. The defendant J. Bear was one of the executors of T. Sutton. A sum of money, being the purchase-money of some real estate, was paid into a bank to the joint account of Bear and his coexecutor W. Drake, and was drawn out by Drake and misapplied. Drake was a solicitor and managed the administration. Bear was a village schoolmaster, and took no active part in the matter. One of the residuary legatees filed a bill for administra- M. R. tion against Bear and the administrator of Drake, who was dead, charging the executors with breach of trust. The order on further directions, in conformity with the chief clerk's certificate, declared Bear and his co-executor jointly and severally liable to pay 22007., and ordered Bear and the administrator of Drake's estate to pay the money into Court. The money not having been paid the plaintiff moved for a writ of attachment against Bear, which the Master of the Rolls granted. Bear appealed from this order. The affidavits stated that Bear was 75 years of age, and in a bad state of health, and that an arrest would endanger his life. Cozens-Hardy, for the appellant, contended, first, that as the fund had never been in the sole possession or power of Bear the case did not come within the 3rd exception of the 4th section of the Debtors' Act, 1869, and therefore no writ of attachment could issue; secondly, that the issuing of the writ was a matter of discretion with the Court, and ought not to be granted against the Defendant, as its execution would probably cause his death. A commission of sequestration had been issued in this matter, under which the principal debt had been recovered. The costs of the sequestrators were however disputed by the debtor; and a difficulty had arisen as to the payment of them out of the debtor's property. Cottrell now moved on behalf of the creditor that the costs, charges, and expenses of the sequestrators might be taxed as between solicitor and client, and paid by the debtor, and that upon such payment the sequestration might be discharged. Terrell, for the creditor, objected to the costs being between solicitor and client, but consented to the order in other respects. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that the costs must be between party and party, and made an order accoordingly. Solicitors: Charles Rogers & Sons; Shapland. M. R. Demurrer-Administration Suit-Multifariousness. The bill was filed by the infant co-heiresses-at-law and sole next of kin of an intestate against his administratrix and the trustees of several settlements made on the intestate's marriage, the said William Stott, his appointees, heirs, and assigns, all under which the plaintiffs claimed to be interested, and also against trustees to whom the administratrix had assigned the intestate's share in a partnership business, upon trust to apply the profits of such share, and, if necessary, the proceeds to arise from the sale of such share (which the trustees were thereby empowed to make) in payment of the debts of the intestate, and subject thereto upon trust for the administratrix. The bill prayed that the rights and interests of the plaintiffs in the real and personal estates of the intestate, and also under the trusts of the several settlements, might be ascertained and secured by and under the decree and direction of the Court; that the real and personal estate of the intestate might be administered; and that a guardian of the plaintiffs might be appointed, and an allowance made for their maintenance. The trustees of the share of the partnership business demurred on the ground of multifariousness. Marten, Q.C., and Procter, for the demurrer, contended that they were not proper parties to a suit for the general administration of the estate, and that relief as against them ought to have been sought in a suit which should not mix the claim against them with the performance of the trusts of the settlements. Southgate, Q.C., and Robson, for the bill, were not called on. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the question of multifariousness was one of discretion and convenience, and that the interests of the infants would be most conveniently ascertained in one suit, and overruled the demurrer. Solicitors: E. Peacopp; Sharp & Ullithorne. M. R. mines, veins, and seams of coal, cannel and iron stone and other mines and minerals lying within or under the said piece of land hereby appointed, granted, and conveyed, or any part or parts thereof respectively, with full liberty, power, and authority for the said William Stott, his appointees, heirs, and assigns, and his, their, or any of their lessees, agents, and workmen, and every or any other person or persons by his, their, or any of their order or permission, at any time or times and from time to time to search for, get, win, take, cart and carry away the same, and sell or convert to his or their own use the said excepted mines, veins, and seams of coal, cannel, and ironstone, and other mines and minerals, or any of them, or any part or parts thereof, at pleasure, and to do all things necessary for effectuating all or any of the aforesaid purposes, but without entering upon the surface of the said premises or any part thereof, so that compensation in money be made by him or them for all damage that shall be done to the erections of the said plot by the exercise of any of the said excepted liberties or in consequence thereof." The mill and works had been erected pursuant to the covenant. The defendants had recently worked the mines underneath the mill by outstroke from an adjacent mine, and in so doing had caused the surface of the land to subside, and had caused great damage to the mill. The suit was instituted to restrain the defendants from working the mines so as to injure the plaintiffs' mill, and now came on to be heard. Fry, Q.C., and Finch, for the plaintiffs. Southgate, Q.C., and Archibald Brown, for the defendants. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the plaintiffs were not In re BARNED'S BANKING COMPANY. M. R. FOWKES v. PASCOE. The Joint Stock Discount Company were the holders of certain bills of exchange indorsed by Barned's Banking Company. All Nov. 17. the parties to the bills were insolvent, and the bills had been proved Gift to a Stranger-Presumption of Intention-Resulting Trust. against the estates of all of them, including Barned's Banking Company. Under the rule in Ex parte Waring certain securities and 1850, purchased sums of stock in the name of the defendant Sarah Baker, widow, at various times between the years 1843 given to the acceptors of the bills by the drawers had been Pascoe, who was the son by a second marriage of the widow of realized, and the proceeds paid to the bill holders; and the question now raised on an adjourned summons was, whether a deceased son of Sarah Baker, and transferred other sums of the proofs against Barned's Bank ought not to be reduced by the stock into the names of herself and Pascoe. Mrs. Baker died in 1850, having appointed Pascoe, and a gentleman named Thomson, amounts so received by the bill holders. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Romer, for the Joint Stock Discount Com-executors and trustees of her will. The bill was filed by parties Conveyance-Exception of Mines-Right to Support. By an indenture, dated the 31st of December, 1861, William Stott, the predecessor in title of the defendants, conveyed a piece of land (with the exception and reservation of the mines and minerals thereunder), to certain uses for securing to William Stott, his heirs and assigns, a rent-change of 721. 3s. 2d., and subject thereto to the use of John Pilkington (the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs) in fee. The deed contained covenants for the erecting and maintaining on the land of a cotton mill and works, which were to be of the annual value of not less than 1507. The exception and reservation of the mines and minerals was in the following terms: "Except and always reserved out of these presents and the direction, appointment, grant, and conveyance hereby made unto interested under the will against Pascoe and Thomson, and prayed a declaration that the sums of stock belonged to the testatrix's estate, and consequential relief. Pascoe, by his answer, stated that the testatrix always took as much interest in him as she could have done if he had been her own child, and that her intention in making the investments of stock in the joint names of herself and Pascoe was, that the stock should at her death become absolutely his property; and he claimed to be absolutely entitled to the stock for his own benefit. Some women who had been domestic servants of Mrs. Baker, deposed that she used to speak to them of Pascoe as her adopted son; but no member of the family corroborated their evidence, nor was there any statement to that effect in Pascoe's answer. Southgate, Q.C., Waller, Q.C., and Davey, for the plaintiffs. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that Pascoe had not established the existence of a quasi parental relationship towards him on the part of the testatrix; that the evidence failed to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust, there being no difference in this respect between an investment of stock in the joint names and a purchase in the name of another; and decreed Pascoe to replace the stock. Solicitors: Evans & Co.; Thompson & Groom. M. R. Nov. 17. V.-C. M. MORRICE v. AYLMER. Construction of Will-" Shares." The will of George William Aylmer contained a bequest of "all such stocks in the public funds and shares in any railway company of which I may die possessed." At the time of making his will, and also at the time of his death, the testator was the registered proprietor of 6300l. ordinary stock, and sixty-three "New" shares of 12/. 10s. each, in the London and North Western Railway Company. The question was, whether the 6300l. stock passed by the bequest. Southgate, Q.C., and Nalder, for the plaintiff. Miller, Q.C., and W. Barber, for the defendant. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held, following Oakes v. Oakes (9 Hare, 666) that the stock did not pass by the bequest. Solicitors: Collyer-Bristowe, Withers, & Russell; Rogers, Jull, & Rogers. V.-C. M. Nov. 19. CORPORATION OF FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS v. PASTOR. Practice-Written Bill-Leave to File Printed Bill-Expiration of the Period allowed. This was a motion under the 6th section of the Improvement of Jurisdiction of Equity Act (15 & 16 Vict. c. 86), Morg. pp. 163-4, and the 9th Order, rule 4, that the written bill filed in this suit might be restored to the file and a printed copy received and filed as of the day on which the written bill was filed, notwithstanding that the fourteen days allowed by the rules of the Court for filing the printed bill had expired. The motion was opposed on the technical ground of length of time, the written bill having been filed so long ago as the 1st of July, and also on the ground that it was improperly filed against the representative of a foreign government, without any evidence of consent on the part of the government, who were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. It was therefore asked that the the bill might be dismissed and the whole costs of the suit might Nov. 16. be ordered to be paid by the plaintiffs. In re MACNICHOL'S ESTATE. MACNICHOL v. MACNICHOL. Representation-Administration in India-Judgment in Foreign Court. This was a suit for the administration of the estate of Nichol Macnichol. A claim was brought in against the estate by one John Cave Orr, who in an action in the High Court of Calcutta, brought by him as the administrator of one William Cameron, had recovered judgment against Nichol Macnichol in his lifetime for a claim equivalent to 52771. 1s. 7d. The liability was not disputed, but it had been suggested that Mr. Orr must perfect his title as administrator by taking out administration to William Cameron in this country. North, for Orr. Glasse, Q.C. and Jason Smith, liggins, Q. C. and Whitehorne, for the other parties. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that it was not necessary to take out administration in this country to William Cameron. Solicitors: Wynne; Farmer & Robins; Oehme. Emma Bostock, by her will, dated the 2nd of June, 1869, gave her residue in trust as follows; "for all the nephews and nieces in the first degree of relationship to my late husband, Ellis Bostock, who were living at the time of his decease, excepting the said Evereld Catherine Richards, and James Bethune Bostock, in equal shares as tenants in common." At the date of the death of the testatrix's husband there were nine nephews and nieces who answered this description. One of these had died before the date of the will, whether with or without the testatrix's knowledge did not appear, and another died subsequently in her lifetime. The suit was instituted by the trustees and executors of the will. J. Pearson, Q.C., and Woodroffe, for one of the nephews, contended that the residuary gift was to a class, and that the fund was divisible into sevenths. Macnaghten, for parties in the same interest. Caldecott (Glasse, Q.C., with him), for the next of kin, contended that the gift was to persons ascertained at the date of the will, and they took as individuals, and that the shares of those who were dead had lapsed. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the gift was to a class, and that only those took who survived the testatrix, and the division must be in sevenths. Solicitors: C. B. Dimond; Robinson & Preston. Glasse, Q.C., and Kekewich, in support of the motion. Higgins, Q.C., Robinson, and Hornell, for the defendants. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said the question as to the propriety of filing this bill would have to be decided at the hearing, and it might be that he should have to order the bill to be amended as he had done in a previous case by striking out the name of the Spanish Government as defendants, but the question of filing a printed bill was purely technical, and the excuse for not having done so within the prescribed period of fourteen days was this: that negotiations were pending between the parties which might lead to a discontinuance of the suit, and under such circumstances the plaintiffs were unwilling to take any further proceeding, which might have the appearance of being hostile. He considered that the Court had full discretion to relax the rule as to filing a printed bill when the facts warranted such a course being adopted. No case had been cited where such an order had been refused, although two were cited in which the order had been made under excuses of forgetfulness. Here the plaintiffs had, as they believed, good ground for suspending proceedings, and it would be unjust on such a techinical ground to dismiss the bill. He thought the justice of the case would be met by ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs of this application, but he should not make them pay the costs of the suit. Solicitors: Freshfields & Williams; Travers Smith & Co.; Hollams, Son, & Coward. Adjourned summons. The Maria-Anna and Steinbank Coal and Coke Company was registered as a limited company under the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856. The memorandum of association provided that the nominal capital should be 160,000l. divided into 16,000 shares of 107. each. Clauses 3 and 4 of the articles of association stated certain facts relating to a liability of 30,000l. incurred on behalf of the company, and clause 5 was as follows: "If the parties who have signed the above-mentioned notes for the said sums of 20,000. and 10,000l., or any of them, or the said company, shall be called upon to pay the same principal sums, or either of them, or the interest for the same respectively, and the said company shall not have in hand funds of the company applicable to the payment thereof of sufficient amount, then and in every such case each and every shareholder in the |