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that it was legally delivered to him, and was in fact his.o But this presumption may be rebutted."

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Delivery may also be upon conditions.1 Deliveries upon conditions are of two classes: delivery as an escrow, and delivery to the other party to the instrument upon a condition. Delivery as an escrow is defined as a delivery to a third person, made to await the happening of an event, or performance of a condition, or some affirmative action on the part of the other party, before he is entitled to the absolute delivery of the instrument, as distinguished from the affirmative action of the party who delivers the instrument in escrow. The authorities agree that a delivery in escrow has two elements: It must be to some person not ultimately entitled to receive it; and the delivery must take effect and the title to the instrument pass the instant the condition of the escrow is fulfilled, even though the depositary has not formally delivered it to the person entitled to the possession. In these respects it is like the escrow of a deed, from the analogy of which it is in fact drawn. There are, however, these distinctions: A deed once delivered to be held in escrow by a third party, and wrongly passed on by him, is subject to defenses, even in the hands of a purchaser for value without notice, but a

98 N. I. L. § 16 (last sentence); Griswold v. Davis, 31 Vt. 390; Russell v. Whipple, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 536; Peets v. Bratt, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 662; Chappell v. Bissell, 10 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 274; Marshall v. Rockwood, 12 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 452; Keteltas v. Myers, 19 N. Y. 231; Cordier v. Thompson, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 172; Moak v. Stevens, 45 Misc. Rep. 147, 91 N. Y. Supp. 903 (N. I. L.); Baumeister v. Kuntz, 53 Fla. 340, 42 South. 886 (N. I. L.), semble; First Nat. Bank v. Stallo, 160 App. Div. 702, 145 N. Y. Supp. 747 (N. I. L.). The same presumption arises where the instrument is in the possession, not of the payee or indorsee, but of a transferee without indorsement. Colborn v. Arbecam, 54 Misc. Rep. 623, 104 N. Y. Supp. 986 (N. I. L.).

99 Scaife v. Byrd, 39 Ark. 568; Chandler v. Temple, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Rhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30; Jackson v. Roberts, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 478.

1 Bell v. Ingestre, 12 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 319.

2 WORTH v. CASE, 42 N. Y. 367, Moore Cases Bills and Notes, 84.

8 Edw. Bills & N. § 243; Daniel, Neg. Inst. 68, and cases cited; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596.

negotiable instrument is not. A deed being delivered conditionally to the obligee, parol evidence that it was conditional is admissible."

6

A delivery upon a condition is where the instrument is delivered to the payee, to be held by him pending some future event. So in Benton v. Martin the law was laid down that conditions might be affixed to the delivery of a note in the hands of a payee, which, as between the immediate parties, would be binding, and a defense." This does not apply to the bona fide holder. But the authori

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4 N. I. L. § 16 (3d sentence); Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 68; Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; Fearing v. Clark, 16 Gray (Mass.) 74, 77 Am. Dec. 394; Garner v. Fite, 93 Ala. 405, 9 South. 367; Graff v. Logue, 61 Iowa, 704, 17 N. W. 171; Borough of Montvale v. People's Bank, 74 N. J. Law, 464, 67 Atl. 67 (N. I. L.); Same v. Hackensack Trust Co. (N. J.) 67 Atl. 69 (N. I. L.); Buzzell v. Tobin, 201 Mass. 1, 86 N. E. 923 (N. I. L.). The intimation to the contrary in Settles v. Moore & Scobee, 149 Mo. App. 724, 129 S. W. 455 (N. I. L.), is erroneous. Chipman v. Tucker, 38 Wis. 43, 20 Am. Rep. 1, contra. Against a holder not in due course a delivery in violation of the conditions of the escrow is a defense. Carpenter v. Maloney, 138 App. Div. 190, 123 N. Y. Supp. 61 (N. I. L.).

5 Couch v. Meeker, 2 Conn. 302, 7 Am. Dec. 274; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592.

6 52 N. Y. 570.

7 N. I. L. § 16 (2d sentence); Burke v. Dulaney, 153 U. S. 228, 14 Sup. Ct. 816, 38 L. Ed. 698; Hunter v. First Nat. Bank of Ft. Wayne, 172 Ind. 62, 87 N. E. 734; Shulman v. Damigo (Sup.) 115 N. Y. Supp. 90 (N. I. L.); SMITH v. DOTTERWEICH, 200 N. Y. 299, 93 N. E. 985, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 892 (N. I. L.), Moore Cases Bills and Notes, 87; Niblock v. Sprague (Sup.) 200 N. Y. 390, 93 N. E. 1105 (N. I. L.); Newgrass v. Shulhof, 128 N. Y. Supp. 664 (N. I. L.); Young v. Hayes, 212 Mass. 525, 99 N. E. 327 (N. I. L.); Griggs v. Village of Red Jacket, 171 Mich. 142, 137 N. W. 136; Tovera v. Parker, 35 Okl. 74, 128 Pac. 101 (non-negotiable note); Horton v. Birdsong, 35 Okl. 275, 129 Pac. 701; Jones v. Citizens' Bank (Okl.) 135 Pac. 373; Gamble v. Riley (Okl.) 135 Pac. 390 (N. I. L.); Norman v. McCarthy (Colo.) 138 Pac. 28 (N. I. L.). Compare American Automobile Co. v. Perkins, 83 Conn. 520, 77 Atl. 954 (N. I. L.); Rowe v. Bowman, 183 Mass. 488, 67 N. E. 636 (N. I. L.). See Gould v. Tilton, 161 Ill. App. 142; Copans v. Dougan (Sup.) 139 N. Y. Supp. 427 (N. I. L.); Waxberg v. Stappler, 83 Misc. Rep. 78, 144 N. Y. Supp. 608 (N. I. L.).

8 N. I. L. § 16 (3d sentence). See p. 96, note 90, supra, and section 93, infra.

ties are not unanimous, many cases holding that the delivery cannot be upon condition, or in escrow, to the payee himself.

DATE

38. A date in a bill or note is not necessary to its validity.

The date of an instrument is not so necessary to it in law, that its absence avoids the instrument. It is not an essential characteristic of the instrument, as other qualities are characteristic of the instrument or of its negotiability.10 For this reason the date may be supplied by parol,11 the date of delivery being the day of date; or it may be antedated or postdated,12 or, if the date be left blank, all parties are deemed to consent that the holder may fill up the blank with a date.18 Legally speaking, the chief impor

9 Stewart v. Anderson, 59 Ind. 375; Clanin v. Esterly Harvesting Mach. Co., 118 Ind. 372, 21 N. E. 35, 3 L. R. A. 863; Jones v. Shaw, 67 Mo. 667; Carter v. Moulton, 51 Kan. 9, 32 Pac. 633, 20 L. R. A. 309, 37 Am. St. Rep. 259. See 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 205. But N. I. L. § 16 (2d sentence), authorizes a delivery to the payee upon condition or in escrow. See note 7, supra.

10 N. I. L. § 6 (subd. 1); Church v. Stevens, 56 Misc. Rep. 572, 107 N. Y. Supp. 310 (N. I. L.), semble; Bank of Houston v. Day, 145 Mo. App. 410, 122 S. W. 756 (N. I. L.), semble.

Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 441,
Law J. C. P. 91.

11 N. I. L. § 17 (subds. 2 and 3); 27 Am. Rep. 70; Davis v. Jones, 25 12 N. I. L. § 12; Pasmore v. North, 13 East, 517; Frazier v. Trow's Printing & Bookbinding Co., 24 Hun (N. Y.) 281; Gray v. Wood, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 328; McSparran v. Neeley, 91 Pa. 17; Almich v. Downey, 45 Minn. 460, 48 N. W. 197; Albert v. Hoffman, 64 Misc. Rep. 87, 117 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (N. I. L.); Triphonoff v. Sweeney, 65 Or. 299, 130 Pac. 979 (N. I. L.); Hitchcock v. Edwards, 60 L. T. (N. S.) 636 (B. E. A.); Royal Bank v. Tottenham, [1894] 2 Q. B. 715 (B. E. A.).

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13 Knisely v. Sampson, 100 Ill. 574; Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 336. But N. I. L. § 13, provides: "Where an instrument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated any holder may insert therein the true date of issue and the instrument shall be payable accordingly. The insertion of a wrong date does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course; but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date." Under this section,

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tance of a date is that it is presumptive evidence of the time of its actual execution,1 a presumption, however, which may be contradicted by parol evidence.15 Likewise the place of date is supposed to be contemplated by the parties as the place of payment,16 because, in the absence of all other guides to any information on this point, the courts turn to the instrument itself, and say the place of date is probably the place of residence of the parties, and it is reasonable to suppose that the parties contemplated the place of their residence as the place where the instrument was to be paid. It becomes important sometimes in determining whether the instrument is a foreign or inland bill or note, and where presentment and demand are to be made, or where notices of dishonor are to be sent, and questions of that character.18 These remarks are to be understood with some limitations. The date of a completed instrument cannot be changed unless by mutual consent without avoiding it.1 Neither must it be understood

17

which changes the law, the insertion without authority of a date other than the date of issue discharges the prior parties, Bank of Houston v. Day, 145 Mo. App. 410, 122 S. W. 756 (N. I. L.); except as against subsequent holders in due course.

14 N. I. L. § 11; McQuillan v. Eckerson (Mich.) 144 N. W. 510.

15 Germania Bank of New York v. Distler, 4 Hun, 633, affirmed in 64 N. Y. 642; Drake v. Rogers, 32 Me. 524; Brewster v. McCardell, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 479. See N. I. L. § 30.

16 The dating of a promissory note is prima facie evidence of the place of payment, as it is presumptive evidence that the maker resides at the place of date. Where the maker is known to have a residence which is not changed when the note is payable, a regular demand must be made, regardless of the place of date. Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 145, 45 Am. Dec. 457. See, also, Bank of Orleans v. Whittemore, 12 Gray (Mass.) 469, 74 Am. Dec. 605. As to the presumption raised by the date as to the maker's residence, see Smith v. Philbrick, 10 Gray (Mass.) 252, 69 Am. Dec. 315; Demond v. Burnham, 133 Mass. 339.

17 N. I. L. §§ 129, 152. See pages 31-33, supra.

18 Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 121, 2 Am. Dec. 222.

19 N. I. L. § 125 (subd. 1). See § 105, post. Where a note is intended to bear date as of its execution, but is wrongly dated by mistake, the mistake may be corrected, except as to an innocent purchaser who would be prejudiced. Almich v. Downey, 45 Minn. 460, 48 N. W. 197.

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NEGOTIABLE BILLS AND NOTES-REQUISITES

(Ch. 2 that dating a note at a particular place makes that place the one at which payment should be demanded. It does not.20 It merely is a presumption to guide the court. And, lastly, in practical affairs an instrument without date will not circulate, because neither banks nor merchants will discount it. The date, in most instances, determines when the instrument is to be paid. And unless it has a date, or one is agreed upon and inserted, it is impracticable as a circulating medium.

VALUE RECEIVED

39. Value received is not necessary to be expressed in a negotiable instrument.

The expression "value received" is an acknowledgment of the receipt of a consideration sufficient prima facie to support the contract, and make it a binding promise for the payment of money. It raises the various questions relating to consideration, which, so far as they pertain to the circulation of the instrument, are commented upon hereafter.21 In itself, with bills it means that a consideration has been received by the drawer of the payee, or by the acceptor of the drawer, according as the bill has or has not been accepted.22 With notes it implies a consideration received by the maker.23 Indorsers, from the mere fact of their indorsement, are deemed to have received a consider

20 Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 114, 7 Am. Dec. 442. It is held in this case that where a note is not made payable at a particular place, and the owner has a known and permanent residence within the state, the holder is bound to make a demand at such residence in order to charge the indorser. Whoever takes such note is presumed to have made inquiry for the residence of the maker in order to know where to demand payment.

21 See post, § 111, et seq.

22 Grant v. Da Costa, 3 Maule & S. 351; Benjamin v. Tillman, 2 McLean, 213, Fed. Cas. No. 1,304; Highmore v. Primrose, 5 Maule & S. 65; Thurman v. Van Brunt, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 409.

23 Clayton v. Gosling, 5 Barn. & C. 361, 8 Dowl. & R. 110.

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