binding acceptances. The reasons given for this rule are much the same as those given for separate acceptances in writing. A verbal promise is treated as an acceptance because sound principles of morality require that one who promises another, although by parol, to accept a particular bill of exchange, and thereby induces him to advance his money upon such bill in reliance upon such promise, should be held to make good his promise. The party advances money upon an original promise upon a valuable consideration, and the promisor is bound to carry out his undertaking. Whether it is held to be an acceptance, or whether he is subject to damages for a breach of his promise to accept, or whether he is held to be estopped from impeaching his word, is a matter of form merely. The result in either event is to compel the promisor to pay the amount of the bill with interest.82 It would seem that this reason would apply alike to existing bills and to non-existing bills, yet the cases make a distinction. A verbal promise to pay a non-existing bill, even with the qualification that the bill is subsequently taken on the faith of it, does not amount to an acceptance, because in order to constitute an acceptance there ought to have been a bill in existence to be accept

tle Shoe Co. v. Packard, 43 Wash. 527, 86 Pac. 845, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1064 (N. I. L.); Izzo v. Ludington, 79 App. Div. 272, 79 N. Y. Supp. 744, affirmed 178 N. Y. 621, 70 N. E. 1100 (N. I. L.); Faircloth-Byrd Mercantile Co. v. Adkinson, 167 Ala. 344, 52 South. 419 (N. I. L.); Dugane v. Hvezda Pokroku No. 4 (Iowa) 119 N. W. 141 (N. I. L.); Van Buskirk v. State Bank of Rocky Ford, 35 Colo. 142, 83 Pac. 778, 117 Am. St. Rep. 182 (N. I. L.); Lawson v. Layton & Layton (Del.) 86 Atl. 105 (N. I. L.); Rambo v. First State Bank, 88 Kan. 257, 128 Pac. 182 (N. I. L.); Sheets v. Coast Coal Co., 74 Wash. 327, 133 Pac. 433 (N. I. L.). The same result was reached under similar statutes before the N. I. L. was adopted. Dickinson v. Marsh, 57 Mo. App. 566. The same rule applies to checks under § 185 of the act. Baltimore & O. Ry. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 102 Va. 753, 47 S. E. 837 (N. I. L.). 82 Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170, 7 L. Ed. 386; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111, 7 L. Ed. 799; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245; Scott v. Pilkington, 15 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 280; Bissell V. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450; Williams v. Winans, 14 N. J. Law, 339; Bank of Ireland v. Archer, 11 Mees. & W. 383. In this case, a party being requested to accept a bill to be subsequently made, said: "Send it

ed.88 And to hold that the same act would be an acceptance or not, according to the varying relations of the subsequent holders of the bill, would introduce a strange anomaly and confusion into the relation of the parties to the bill, the drawee being an acceptor as to some and not as to the other indorsees. There is one further objection to be noted to parol acceptances which is found in the cases. It is that a parol acceptance is obnoxious to that provision of the statute of frauds which provides that all promises to answer for the debt of another shall be in writing and signed by the promisor. It is maintained that an acceptance is such a promise, and particularly in the case when it is an accommodation acceptance, because then the acceptor merely guaranties some one else's debt. But despite the respectable authority supporting this view, its reasons do not seem sound. In issuing a bill the drawer says to the drawee, "Pay so much money to the payee, and I will repay it to you," and the drawee in his acceptance thereupon promises to pay the money called for in the bill to the payee. The promises are thus original and independent. And if money is paid on the faith of it, there is an original consideration moving between the parties to the contract. Damage to the promisee constitutes as good a consideration

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for acceptance as usual, remitting proceeds at the same time, and I will advise my partner." In an action on the bill it was held that a parol promise to accept a bill of exchange afterwards drawn, on the faith of which promise the bill is discounted, does not amount to an acceptance. Johnson v. Collings, 1 East, 98; Kennedy v. Geddes, 8 Port. (Ala.) 263, 33 Am. Dec. 289; Mercantile Bank v. Cox, 38 Me. 500; Plummer v. Lyman, 49 Me. 229; Wilson v. Clements, 3 Mass. 1; Edson v. Fuller, 22 N. H. 183, 188; Wakefield v. Greenhood, 29 Cal. 600; Pike v. Irwin, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 14; Taylor v. Drake, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 431, 53 Am. Dec. 680.

83 Bank of Ireland v. Archer, 11 Mees. & W. 383, note 82; Johnson v. Collings, 1 East, 98.

84 A parol acceptance for value is not affected by the section of the statute of frauds referred to. Ames Cas. on Suretyship, p. 107, note 6, par. 3. A parol acceptance for accommodation has, however, been held to be within the statute of frauds. Chicago Heights Lumber Co. v. Miller, 219 Ill. 79, 76 N. E. 52, 109 Am. St. Rep. 314, and cases cited in the last paragraph of this opinion. Contra: JARVIS v. WIL SON, 46 Conn. 90, 33 Am. Rep. 18, Moore Cases Bills and Notes, 5.

as benefit to the promisor. And where there is a substantial credit given by the party to the drawer upon the bill, and the party parts with his present rights at the instance of the promisee, this promise is substantially a new and independent one, and not a mere guaranty of the existing promise of the drawer. The object of the promise is to induce the party to take the bill upon the credit of the promise, and, if he so take it, it binds the promisor.

ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR OR SUPRA PROTEST

54. DEFINITION-An acceptance supra protest is an undertaking by a stranger to the bill, after protest, for the benefit of all parties subsequent to him for whose honor it is made, and conditioned to pay the bill when it becomes due if the original drawee does not.

54a. An acceptance supra protest may be made— (a) After dishonor by non-acceptance.

(b) After protest for better security after acceptance.

The acceptance for honor is an exception to the rule (supra, § 46) that no one but the drawee can be an acceptor. It is not commonly met with in this country, and therefore it is our purpose to outline without much discussion of the rules concerning it.

In its nature it is a sort of conditional acceptance, the contract being, as we shall hereafter see (see post, § 72), to pay if, upon further presentment of the bill to the drawee for payment at maturity, it is again dishonored and duly protested. The bill must in the first instance be presented to the drawee and protested, because the drawer and indorsers have a right to presentment to and demand of the drawee and also a right to the full legal form of protest.8 But protest once being made, any person not a party to the bill may accept it for the honor of any other party to it, or there may be successive acceptors to the bill

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85 Story, Bills, § 256.

NORT.B.& N.(4TH ED.)-10

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for the honor of different parties to it, or any one acceptor may accept for any or all parties to the bill. The method of making an acceptance for honor is for the party to appear before a notary public and declare that he accepts such protested bill in honor of the drawer or indorsers, as the case may be, and he then in some form of writing signifies such acceptance. Usual forms are "Accepts S. P.," or "Accepted for the honor of X." As soon as this form is complete, it is the duty of the acceptor for honor to notify the parties to the bill for whose honor he has accepted. Of course, no holder is bound to take the acceptance of such an acceptor, but having once accepted it he is bound by it and cannot sue such party until the maturity of the bill and its dishonor by the acceptor supra protest.87

There is a species of acceptance for honor known as the protest for better security. According to Mr. Chitty,88 "The custom of merchants is stated to be that if the drawee of a bill of exchange abscond before the day when the bill is due, the holder may protest it in order to have better security for its payment, and should give notice to the drawer and indorsers of the absconding of the drawee; and if the acceptor of a foreign bill become bankrupt before it is due, it seems the holder may also in such case protest for better security. The neglect to make this protest will not affect the holder's remedy against the drawer and indorsers, and its principal use appears to be that by giving notice to the drawer and indorsers of the situation of the acceptor, or by which it is become improbable that payment will be made, they are enabled by other means to provide for the payment of the bill when due." 89

86 Konig v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 250, 7 L. Ed. 132.

87 Williams v. Germaine, 7 Barn. & C. 468, 1 Man. & R. 394. For the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law concerning acceptance for honor, see §§ 161-170.

88 Chit. Bills, 383.

89 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 530. See, also, Ex parte Wackerbarth, 5 Ves. 574.

TIME ALLOWED FOR ACCEPTANCE

55. The drawee is allowed a reasonable time, generally held to be 24 hours, within which to accept a bill of exchange.

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After presentment the drawee is entitled to a reasonable time to decide whether or not he will accept, and this is generally held to be twenty-four hours.90 It is said that this time may be shortened by the departure of the regular mail in the meantime, but this rule has not been followed in the United States. If, upon expiration of the time allowed, the drawee has not accepted, it is the duty of the holder to protest for non-acceptance.92 The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that the drawee shall be allowed twenty-four hours, but that acceptance, if given, dates from the day of presentation.98 A bill may be accepted after acceptance has been refused, and after protest for non-acceptance." It may also be accepted after maturity, or after dishonor, in which case the acceptor becomes liable to pay the holder on demand.95

90 Bellasis v. Hester, 1 Ld. Raym. 280; Ingram v. Forster, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 243; Connelly v. McKean, 64 Pa. 113; Case v. Burt, 15 Mich. 82.

91 Rand. Com. Paper, § 595.

92 Ingram v. Forster, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 243.

93 § 136; First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S. W. 965 (N. I. L.).

94 Stockwell v. Bramble, 3 Ind. 428; Rand. Com. Paper, § 596. But the previous refusal discharges the other parties unless they assent or the bill was protested. 2 Ames Cas. Bills & N. 789; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 491.

95 Rand. Com. Paper, § 596. "A bill may be accepted when it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment. N. I. L. § 138.