ures themselves. It has been held in some jurisdictions 19 that an instrument payable with current exchange is invalid, because the fluctuations in the rate of exchange make it impossible, when the bill is issued, to ascertain the amount payable. But this view is rather of the letter of the law than of its spirit. The law merchant is the result of the custom of merchants, and the statute of Anne is the result of the law merchant. It is the custom, convenience, and

Moore Cases Bills and Notes, 63; Read v. McNulty, 12 Rich. Law (S. C.) 445, 78 Am. Dec. 467; Nicely v. Commercial Bank, 15 Ind. App. 563, 44 N. E. 572, 57 Am. St. Rep. 245; Nicely v. Winnebago Nat. Bank, 18 Ind. App. 30, 47 N. E. 476; John Church Co. v. Spurrier, 20 Ind. App. 39, 50 N. E. 93. A provision for "current exchange" is meaningless in an instrument drawn and payable in the same place, and should not therefore in any jurisdiction affect the character of the instrument containing it. Hill v. Todd, 29 Ill. 101; Chandler v. Calvert, 87 Mo. App. 368, semble; Buck v. Harris, 125 Mo. App. 365, 102 S. W. 640; South Whitley Hoop Co. v. Union Nat. Bank (Ind. App.) 101 N. E. 824, contra. It has been held that a stipulation for current exchange, not expressly designating between what places, in a note dated in one state and payable in another, is also meaningless and cannot increase the amount payable. Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137, 33 Am. Rep. 356; First Nat. Bank of Galva v. Nordstrom, 70 Kan. 485, 78 Pac804; Clauser v. Stone, 29 Ill. 114, 81 Am. Dec. 299, semble. The decisions were made on the assumption that the payee resided at the place of payment. This assumption is, however, unwarranted. The stipulation in question indicates that the payee did not reside at the place of payment and that the exchange in contemplation was that between the place of date and the place of payment. Philadelphia Bank v. Newkirk, supra. These cases cannot be supported on the ground that there is no exchange between cities in the United States. Story, Bills, § 31. Nor can they be supported on the ground that there was no direct course of exchange between the place of making and the place of payment. There doubtless was an indirect course of exchange through a neighboring banking center, according to which the rate to be paid under the stipulation must be determined. lard v. Herries, supra. An instrument drawn and payable in the same place "in exchange" is defective as a bill or note, because not payable in money. First Nat. Bank of Brooklyn v. Slette, 67 Minn. 425, 69 N. W. 1148, 64 Am. St. Rep. 429; Chandler v. Calvert, 87 Mo. App. 368; Russell, Bills, pp. 50, 51. If an instrument payable "in exchange" were payable at a place other than the place of making, it might be construed as payable in money with exchange. Bradley v.. Lill, 4 Biss. 473, Fed. Cas. No. 1,783.

19 See note 18, supra.

Pol

sound business policy of merchants to induct into negotiable instruments the theory of exchange, and this reason, therefore, if no other, makes exchange a necessary modification of the general rule we have laid down.

SPECIFICATION OF PARTIES

26. The instrument must be specific as to all its parties. 27. A note or bill must be signed by the maker or drawer. 28. The drawee of an unsigned bill, who writes his acceptance upon it, is chargeable upon the instrument as the maker of a note.

29a. A bill must be addressed to some person as drawee. 29b. If a bill be addressed to the drawer, the holder may charge the drawer-drawee upon the instrument either as a bill or a note.

29c. The drawer of an unaddressed bill may, it has been held, be charged upon it as the maker of a note. 29d. One who writes his acceptance upon an unaddressed bill, is chargeable upon the instrument as the maker of a note.

30a. A bill or note must be payable to a specified person, or to bearer.

30b. The maker, or the drawer, or the drawee may be designated as payee, or the same person may be drawer, drawee, and also payee. In such cases the instrument has no inception as an obligation until its indorsement and delivery by the payee.

30c. A bill or note is payable to bearer:

(a) When it is expressed to be payable to bearer;

(b) When it is payable to a person named therein or

bearer;

(c) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable;

(d) When the name of the payee does not purport to be

the name of any person.

Signature of Parties

A person becomes a party to a bill or note by signing it as maker or drawer,20 or by signing his acceptance 21 or indorsement 22 of it. A signature is usually made by the writing of the signer's name, but one may be made by the drawing of a mark or symbol adopted by the signer to represent his name; e. g., "1, 2, 8," may be a signature.23 A signature may be affixed by means of pen, pencil,24 stamp,25 printing press,26 or other effective instrument. The signature of a party need not be written under the words from which his liability upon the instrument arises. Thus a maker may affix his signature at the beginning of a note, instead of subscribing it in the usual manner. “I, A. B., promise to pay," etc., is as effective a signature by A. B. as "I promise to pay," etc., subscribed, "A. B." 27

Bill or Note must be Signed

An instrument, otherwise sufficient in form, is not a bill or note until it has been signed by the maker or drawer.28 No person, therefore, is chargeable upon the paper as a bill or note. Since, however, informality in expression is not fatal, if the instrument satisfies the formal requisites of a bill or note, a person who writes an acceptance upon an un

20 N. I. L. § 1 (subd. 1). 22 N. I. L. § 31.

21 N. I. L. § 132.

23 Brown v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 443, 41 Am. Dec. 755; George v. Surrey, Moody & M. 516; Shank v. Butsch, 28 Ind. 19. One may sign a trade or assumed name. N. I. L. § 18.

24 Geary v. Physic, 5 Barn. & C. 234; Reed v. Roark, 14 Tex. 329, 65 Am. Dec. 127; Baker v. Dening, 8 Adol. & E. 94.

25 Mayers v. McRimmon, 140 N. C. 640, 53 S. E. 447, 111 Am. St. Rep. 879 (N. I. L.).

26 Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424. See N. I. L. § 191 (last par.). 27 TAYLOR v. DOBBINS, 1 Strange, 399, Moore Cases Bills and Notes, 66. See N. I. L. § 17 (subd. 6); Germania Nat. Bank of Milwaukee v. Mariner, 129 Wis. 544, 109 N. W. 574 (N. I. L.). 28 N. I. L. §§ 1 (subd. 1), 18. A note signed by two or more as makers, which reads, "We promise to pay," is the joint obligation of the signers. Barnett v. Juday, 38 Ind. 86; Groves v. Sentell, 153 U. S. 465, 14 Sup. Ct. 898, 38 L. Ed. 785. But where a note reading, "I promise to pay," is signed by two or more as makers, they are jointly and severally liable upon it. N. I. L. § 17 (subd. 7); Ullery v. Brohm, 20 Colo. App. 389, 79 Pac. 180; Noble v. Beeman-Spaulding-Woodward

signed note obligates himself as maker of the instrument.29 A reasonable interpretation of his acceptance is that he adopted the promise in the instrument as his own. Similarly, if the drawee of an unsigned bill write an acceptance upon it, he is chargeable upon the instrument as the maker of a note.30 His acceptance indicates his intention to comply with the order in the instrument. The whole instrument evidences an intention on his part to pay the sum stated to the payee named at the time specified. It is, therefore, his promissory note.

Designation of Drawee

Without a drawee, an instrument cannot be a bill of exchange.31 The reason for this is that a bill is an order. The courts, however, are frequently able to sustain as a promissory note an instrument which for lack of a drawee is imperfect as a bill of exchange; for, where the essentials of a note are present, the courts will enforce the obligation in spite of formal inaccuracies. In PETO v. REYNOLDS,32 where an instrument otherwise in the form of a bill was not addressed to any one, but across the face was written "Accepted," over what purported to be the defendant's signature, Barons Parke and Alderson both agreed that, while they could not treat the instrument as a bill, because of the absence of the drawee's name, they would, on proof of the defendant's signature, hold it to be a promissory note.

Co., 65 Or. 93, 131 Pac. 1006, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162 (N. I. L.). An instrument in the form of a note, reading, "I, A., promise to pay," and signed, “A. or else B.," is not the note of B. Ferris v. Bond, 4 Barn. & Ald. 679. It seems, however, to be the several note of A., with B.'s guaranty written upon it!

29 Block v. Bell, 1 Mootly & R. 149.

30 Drummond v. Drummond, Morrison's Dict. 1445; 1 Ames Cas. Bills & N. 883; Tevis v. Young, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 197, 71 Am. Dec. 474, contra.

31 N. I. L. & 1 (subd. 5). N. I. L. § 128, provides: "A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees jointly, whether they are partners or not; but not to two or more drawees in the alternative or in succession." See Dugane v. Hoezda Pokroku No. 4 (Iowa) 119 N. W. 141.

329 Exch. 410, Moore Cases Bills and Notes, 67. See Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 1.

NORT.B.& N.(4TH ED.)-6

The courts have even gone so far as to say that, if the drawee be not specified in the bill, but be otherwise capable of identification from it, that will suffice. In Gray v. Milner, the bill was addressed, "Payable at No. 1 Wilmot St., opposite the Lamb, Bethnal Green, London," and the argument was that, not being addressed to any one, it was not a bill of exchange. It appeared, however, in answer to this, that "Accepted. Chas. Milner" was written across the face of the bill. The court held that this was a bill of exchange; Dallas, J., saying that the direction to a particular place could only mean to the person who resided there, and that the defendant, by accepting it, acknowledged that he was the person to whom it was directed. Of Gray v. Milner it may be said that it can only be supported upon the theory that a bill of exchange made payable at a particular place of residence or of business can only be meant to be addressed to the person who resides or does business at that place. But it may also be said that such is certainly a very strained construction of the law, and it is to be questioned whether the courts would to-day adopt such a view of this rule if the case were presented to them afresh. It would seem that the acceptance evidences an intention to incur an obligation, and that the holder might treat the instrument as a promissory note, as suggested in PETO v. REYNOLDS.35

34

An instrument in the form of a bill addressed to the drawer is not a bill. Since, however, the form of the instrument discloses an intention on the part of the drawer to assume an obligation to pay the sum specified to the payee named at the time stated, it is a promissory note. Thus in

38 8 Taunt. 739. An action was brought on the following writing: "Oct. 21, 1804. Two months after date, pay to the order of John Jenkins, £78, 11s. value received. Thos. Stephens. At Messrs. John Morson & Co." It was held that the instrument was a bill of exchange, and that Morson & Co. could be considered the drawees. Shuttleworth v. Stephens, 1 Camp. 407.

34 Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16; Story, Bills (Bennett's Ed.) 58; 1 Pars. Notes & B. 62.

35 2 Ames Cas. Bills & N. p. 832.