of corporate existence held that corporation had adopted agreement for plaintiff's services made in its behalf before organization and was liable thereon; action of executive officers being as binding as resolution of board of directors.-Navco Hardwood Co. v. Bass, Ala., 108 So. 452.

42. Covenants - Building Restrictions. Deed, providing that property was conveyed for residence purposes only, and that no building other than one residence should occupy the land held to forbid the erection of an eight-family apartment building.-Green v. Gerner, Tex., 283 S. W. 615.

43. Customs and Usages--Payment.-Where custom of banks to repay deposits of Mexican money in Mexican bank bills became part of certificate of deposit, liability could not be affected by subsequent change in custom.-Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Cross, Tex., 283 S. W. 555.

44.

Estoppel-Assignment of Mortgage.-Where senior mortgagee agreed to assign mortgage to junior mortgagee, who had made payments thereon held that purchaser of property was not justified in relying on recital in such assignment agreement as to amount to be paid for assignment as representing amount of incumbrance, and recital did not constitute estoppel against junior mortgagee.-Eppenbach V. Eppenbach, N. Y., 215 N. Y. S. 785.

15. Evidence-Affidavits.-Affidavit taken outside state cannot be received in court as affidavit, until it is shown that person before whom it was taken was authorized to perform such act.-Herbert V. Roxana Petroleum Corporation, U. S. D. C., 12 F. (2d) 81.

46. Exchanges-Membership of Co-operative Associations.-Statute prohibiting board of trade from refusing membership to co-operative associations, and providing against rules forbidding such associations to distribute profits to bona fide members on patronage basis held constitutional and not invalid as interference with interstate commerce, or for uncertainty and ambiguity when restricted to boards of trade within state designated as "contract markets" by Secretary of Agriculture under federal Grain Futures Act, and not invalid as applied generally to both boards of trade and cooperative organizations (Laws 1925, c. 6; Const. art. 2, § 17, art. 12, § 1).-Farmers' Co-Op. Commission Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, Kan., 246 Pac. 511.

47. Frauds, Statute of-Memorandum.-Broker's memorandum of purchase of goods, in trade form, made out and sent to both seller and buyer, together with acknowledgment which was signed by each held to constitute valid contract of sale, notwithstanding no acceptance of terms of sale was sent by seller to buyer; acknowledgment of seller to broker being acceptance.-Hettrick Mfg. Co. v. Srere, Mich., 209 N. W. 97.

48. Fraudulent Conveyances-Dealer's Mortgage. --Automobile dealer's mortgage or trust receipt, under which bank asserted claim to and took possession of automobile, for purchase price of which mortgagor was indebted held void as to creditor as in violation of fraudulent mortgage and bulk sales statutes (Rev. St. 1925, arts. 4000, 4001), and because not registered as required by articles 5489, 5490.-Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich, Tex., 283 S. W. 552.

49.

Injunction-Picketing.-Where large number of strikers and sympathizers assembled daily before entrances to building, on seventh and eighth floors of which plaintiff had his factories, to extent of constituting unjust invasion of plaintiff's rights held that, in view of fact that plaintiff's employees numbered not over 300 of the 6,000 to 10.000 workers who used same entrances, plaintiff was entitled to injunction pendente lite, limiting number of pickets to 6 at main entrance and 4 at each side entrance of building.-Rentner v. Sigman, N. Y., 216 N. Y. S. 79.

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50. Insurance-Conversion of Property.-Measof insurer's liability under policy insuring against direct pecuniary loss by purchaser's conversion of automobile, depriving obligee of security for purchase-money notes, held not full amount of debt due from purchaser, but value of security at time of conversion.-Automobile Finance & Securities Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., La., 108 So. 545.

51. Described Premises.-Clause of "double fraud policy," insuring against robbery of insured engaged in fruit business or any of his employees while transporting money or property to or from

described premises held not to cover robbery of insured while he was going from theater to his home and his alleged new place of business, which was not place described in policy.-Gershon v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., N. Y., 215 N. Y. S. 801. 52. "From Date of Accident."-Total disabil. ity from an accident which does not begin until several weeks after its occurrence is not within the terms of a policy insuring against accident if the injury shall wholly and continuously disable the insured from date of accident.-Penquite v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., Kan., 246 Pac. 498.

53. -Incomplete Answers.-Where applicant for health and accident insurance was required to answer as to certain serious ailments, policy issued to physician held not forfeited because of his failure to report stomach trouble and consequent headaches and insomnia, which ailment was not specified in application blank except that it might be included within expression, "any chronic or periodic, physical ailment," in absence of actual intent to deceive, in view of Act No. 52 of 1906, and Act No. 97 of 1908.-Brown v. Continental Casualty Co., La., 108 So. 464.

54. Insurable Interest.-Person having taken out insurance on brother, who was willing that it should be done, and assisted therein held to have had insurable interest in life of brother, in view of testimony showing brotherly affection and reciprocal aid and help.-Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., S. C., 133 S. E. 215.

55. Insurer's Liability on Conversion.-Where purchase-money notes secured by chattel mortgage were payable to automobile finance company, surrender of automobile by defaulting purchaser to seller who resold it was act of conversion by purchaser, so as to render insurer liable under policy indemnifying company against direct pecuniary loss by purchaser's conversion depriving company of security.-Automobile Finance & Securities Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., La., 108 So. 545.

56.--Loss in Transit.-Where insured's employee, sent to deliver securities with instructions to obtain certified check therefor, delivered securities on worthless check bearing unsigned certification stamp held that loss was not within indemnity bond covering loss of securities in transit through negligence of employees; "transit" being an act or process of causing to pass from one place to another.-Underwood v. Globe Indemnity Co., N. Y., 216 N. Y. S. 109.

57.-Ownership.-Where fire policy on dwelling house in possession of corporation under contract to purchase was issued in name of individual, without indorsement as to true state of title, and provided that it should be void if subject of insurance was building on ground not owned by insured in fee simple, and that no representative of insurer had power to waive any provision except by written indorsement, no recovery could be had thereon, though insurer's agent had knowledge of true state of title before loss.-Boston Ins. Co. v. Hudson, U. S. C. C. A., 11 F. (2d) 961.

"

58. Rupture of Blood Vessel.-Death from rupture of blood vessel, caused by straining in vomiting held to result from "bodily injury," effected exclusively through "accidental means, within terms of accident insurance policy.-Ross v. International Travelers' Ass'n, Tex., 283 S. W. 621.

59.-Theft of Car.-Under automobile theft insurance policy requiring partial loss to be paid in full, irrespective of insurable value for total loss, and making it optional for insurer to return it with compensation for physical damage at any time before actual payment, where insurer returned car which had been stolen, damaged, and with equipment missing, allowing damages for loss on car and for equipment was proper, as against contention that true amount should have been difference between insurable value and amount owners admitted car was worth when returned. -Belleview Trading Co. v. International Indemnity Co., Minn., 208 N. W. 994.

60. Interstate Commerce-Local Taxation.-Intentional interruption of movement of commodity in interstate commerce for purposes beneficial to owner, who did not from beginning expect to have uninterrupted movement to destination, but arranged for holding it until further movement could be made, renders commodity subject to local taxation.-Gulf Refining Co. v. Phillips, U. S. C. C. A., 11 F. (2d) 967.

61. Railroad Employee Unloading Supplies.Railroad employee, injured while unloading supplies to be used in interstate commerce, but not then so employed, was not working on instrumentality used in interstate commerce, within federal Employers' Liability Act (Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665).-Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., U. S. D. C., 11 F. (2d) 993. 62. Landlord and Tenant-Invitee.-Prospective tenant, going to cellar to inspect fuel storage facilities after having inspected an upstairs flat while accompanied by girl sent with her by defendant held defendant's invitee and not a mere licensee, and owner owed duty of keeping premises reasonably safe, as to her.-Serota v. Salmansohn, Mass., 152 N. E. 242.

63. Mortgage Foreclosure.-A tenant of the mortgagor, who, after a mortgage foreclosure sale, takes a lease agreeing to give as rent a share of the crop, may, when the mortgagor fails to redeem, and he is threatened with eviction by the holder of the sheriff's certificate of sale, attorn to the latter and retain possession as his tenant without first being actually ousted.-McCray v. Superannuated Fund, Minn., 208 N. W. 1001.

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64.-"Proceeding in Bankruptcy."-Order directing bankrupt's landlord to deliver deposit to bankruptcy trustee, and making landlord's claim for unpaid rents a general claim, involves questions arising in "proceeding in bankruptcy," viewable by petition to revise, under Bankruptcy Act, § 24b (Comp. St. § 9608), and not by appeal, under section 25a (3), being Comp. St. § 9609, as debt or claim of $500 or over, nor as "controversy" arising in bankruptcy proceedings.-In re Barnett, U. S. C. C. A., 12 F. (2d) 73.

65. Libel and Slander Libelous per se. Charges contained in publication that milkman employed by dairy was importer of germs and had transmitted germs to milk, which he handled held libelous per se, and such as did not require proof of any damages, general or special, since they are presumed as a matter of law.-Miles v. Record Pub. Co., S. C., 133 S. E. 99.

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66. Life Estates-Sale of Timber.-Making merchandise of standing timber by life tenant "waste," and he is liable to account therefor, whether committed actively or permissively. Westmoreland v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Bank, Ala., 108 So. 536.

67. Limitation of Actions-Tort.-In this case plaintiffs' petition discloses that the transaction complained of and the injury sustained resulting in damages was the result of the negligent and unskillful manner in which the operator attempted to perform the services of "shooting" the well incumbent upon him by reason of the contract, and the damages sought to be recovered are necessarily based upon the negligent acts of the defendant, and not upon a breach of the contract. Hence, we hold that the third subdivision of section 185, C. S. 1921, providing that certain character of actions shall be brought within two years controls in this case, rather than the second subdivision of said section, which provides that "an action upon a contract, express or implied, not in writing," can only be brought within three years from the time when the cause of action arose. -Jackson v. Central Torpedo Co., Okla., 246 Pac. 426.

68. Logs and Logging-Lien for Hauling.-One merely furnishing teams for hauling logs, the log owner doing the loading, driving, and unloading, is not an "employee or laborer" by Hemingway's Code, §§ 2415-2417, as amended by Laws 1922, c. 282, given a lien on the logs for his wages. — Weeks v. Seale, Miss., 108 So. 505.

69.

Master and Servant-Dangerous Material.— Railroad, if negligent in not warning car repairer that nails furnished him were more dangerous than ordinary nails, would be liable for any damage thereby caused which was natural and reasonable result of such negligence, regardless of whether like injury had previously resulted from use of such nails.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Biggs, Tex., 283 S. W. 627.

70. Due Care.-Employee was not precluded from recovery, under Rev. Gen. St. Fla. 1920, §§ 4971-4973, for injuries from being struck by log being placed on pile by machinery on skidder, because he had stopped work long enough to warm himself by fire at place of injury.-Geneva Mill Co. v. Andrews, U. S. C. C. A., 11 F. (2d) 924.

71. Unsafe Place.-In action under federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 86578665) for injuries received while employe was engaged in repairing wharf, employer held entitled to directed verdict, where it was shown that injuries resulted directly from defective repair construction in which employe was engaged.-Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Brown, Miss., 108 So. 503.

72. Mines and Minerals-Wrongful Taking of Coal. Where coal is taken from under the land of another, wilfully, wrongfully, and intentionally, and without right, the measure of damages to the owner of such coal is the market value of the same at the mouth of the mine, without any deduction for the cost of labor and other expenses incurred in severing and transporting such coal to the mouth of the mine.-Brady v. Stafford, Ohio, 152 N. E. 188.

73. Municipal Corporations-Liability for Explosives. Where a town or city, in working its streets, an uses dynamite caps, explosive, and leaves such explosive in an exposed position near the public school grounds and in close proximity to the sidewalk which is used by the school children in going to and from school, and a small boy, ten years of age, observes the box containing the dynamite caps while walking along the sidewalk and takes one of the caps and applies a lighted match causing the same to explode, inflicting a serious injury to the child, the town or city is liable for damages.-Town of Depew, Creek County v. Kilgore, Okla., 246 Pac. 606.

74. Public Dances.--Municipality cannot prohibit orderly public dances merely because admission fee is charged; Act No. 136 of 1898, § 15, par. 26, not applying to such.- Town of Jonesville v. Boyd, La., 108 So. 481.

76. Negligence-Defective Escalator. Evidence of worn and defective condition of escalator handrail held to make question of defendant's negligence one for jury in action for injuries sustained when plaintiff's hand caught in such railing.-Cook v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., Mass., 152 N. E. 58.

77. Liability of Owner for Negligence of Independent Contractor.-Owner of cargo of lumber, piled on public dock by stevedoring contractor, cannot be chargeable with negligence as matter of law merely because pile of lumber fell and injured plaintiff, even though doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, where it appeared that at time of accident either an employee of contractor, or persons not shown to have had any connection with owner, were working on lumber pile.-Surry Lumber Co. v. Zissett, Md., 133 Atl. 458.

78. Unguarded Powder Cans.-There was evidence which tended to show that one of the defendants, with the knowledge and consent of the other, operated a stone quarry in Kansas City on land owned by the latter; that three open cans of powder were left in the quarry, in the open, and unprotected, unguarded, without warning sign; that boys found the powder; that one of them, 14 years old, took some of the powder away with him and afterward exploded it; and that the explosion resulted in his death held that this court cannot say that his mother cannot recover damages for his death.-Serviss v. Cloud, Kan., 246 Pac. 509. 79. Oil and Gas-Amount of Royalty.-Lease providing for delivery to credit of lessors, free of cost, into pipe line equal one-eighth part of all oil, gas, casing-head gas, and gasoline produced, manufactured, and saved from leased premises, payable monthly as same be sold held construed to reserve to lessor one-eighth of manufactured products, and not merely one-eighth of value of gas delivered at wells into pipes.-Chestnut & Smith Corporation v. Amis, Tex., 283 S. W. 578. 80. Cancellation of Lease.-The lessee of a quarter section of land under an oil and gas lease for 10 years, and as much longer as mineral could be produced in paying quantities, drilled one producing oil well and one dry hole. After expiration of the definite term, the district court canceled the lease, except as to a tract sufficient to operate the producing well. Held the judgment was correct.-McCarney v. Freel, Kan., 246 Pac. 500.

81. Principal and Agent-Respondeat Superior. -Oil company held not liable for damages resulting from collision between milk wagon and oil truck used in distributing its products, where truck belonged to one claimed to be its agent, and driver was employed and directed solely by him.Sams v. Arthur, S. C., 133 S. E. 205.

82. Principal and Surety-Public Improvements. -Section 6832 of the Compiled Laws for 1913, requiring public officers or members of boards to take from contractors for public improvements bonds conditioned for the payment of claims on account of labor or materials furnished "to stand as security for all such bills, claims, and demands until the same are fully paid," is construed and held to require the assumption of a liability on behalf of a contractor for public improvements in favor of laborers and materialmen similar to the security of a mechanic's lien for improvements of private property.-Thompson Yards v. Kingsley, N. D., 208 N. W. 949.

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83. Railroads-Speed of Railway Motor Car.That plaintiff was a deputy marshal, guarding defendant's employee during strike, may be sidered in determining whether he had such control over railway motor car driven by employee as resulted in his conduct being a direct and efficient cause of peril, resulting in injury.-Ellzey v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 12 F. (2d) 4.

84. Sales-Rescission.-Buyers of garage business, who signed contract after having charge of business for 10 days, and were not hindered by seller in making inquiry into business, being tendered books and invoices for examination, which they declined held not entitled to rescission because seller had estimated gasoline sales at about 100 gallons daily in winter and more in summer, but actually sold only 61 gallons daily as yearly average, where there was no fiduciary relation between parties, and business had declined after sale.-Schmauder v. Dell, Ore., 246 Pac. 349.

85. Terms.--Hosiery buyers, by signing and returning seller's "confirmation" copy of order, terms of which differed from buyers' proposal, accepted it, and were bound by its terms, since it constituted new proposal, in view of Civ. Code, §§ 1585, 1586.-May Hosiery Mills v. G. C. Hall & Son, Cal., 246 Pac. 332.

86. Street Railroads-Interest in Street.-Under franchise to construct and operate elevated railroad, granted by state and city under Rapid Transit Act (Laws 1875, c. 606), held that railroad became vested with interest in street in perpetuity for elevated railroad purposes, which was an easement with character of property, transferable independent of life of corporation.-In re Forty-second St. Spur of Manhat. Ry. Co., N. Y., 216 N. Y. S. 2.

87. Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur held not to apply, where on a dark rainy night a truck hit by electric car was left standing near and on ground sloping towards track at point where motorman's view was obstructed by curve.-National Wholesale Grocery Co. v. United Electric Rys. Co., R. I., 133 Atl. 242.

88. Subrogation-Collateral on Note.-Where indorser's right to possession of collateral attached to note depended on his being subrogated to rights of holder as pledgee, and indorser did not pay note, Supreme Court will not pass on indorser's right to possession, since subrogation does not take place until payment is made, but indorser's rights will be reserved.-Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Canal Land & Live Stock Co., La., 108 So. 472.

89. Taxation-Sale of Oil Property.-Under Tax Law, § 359, as added by Laws 1919, c. 627. profit derived from sale of oil property under contract executed in 1919, providing for unsecured installment payments to be made during 1919 and 1920 held taxable as income during years in which payments were actually received, requiring apportionment to years 1919 and 1920; Tax Law, § 364, as added by Laws 1919, c. 627, and Rules and Regulations of State Tax Commission, arts. 36, 37, not being applicable.-People v. Gilchrist, N. Y., 216 N. Y. S. 76. 90. Theaters and Shows-Safe Premises.-If theater floor is uneven, so that a person of ordinary care and prudence exercising such care would be likely to fall over it, jury may consider theater negligent.-Central Amusement Co. v. Van Nostran, Ind., 152 N. E. 183.

91. Trade Unions-Breach of Contract.-Trade union, sued for breach of contract to pay strike

benefits, payment of which was discontinued by order of its duly authorized officials held entitled to affirmative instructions, in view of constitution and by-laws considered under general issue. -Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill, Ala., 108 So. 456.

32.

Trusts and Trustees-Interest of Remaindermen.-Where, for a valuable consideration, land was conveyed to trustees to the use of a named person during his life, with direction that trustees should keep it free from incumbrances or liens and on death of such person convey it to his children held law with reference to vesting of estate in remainder under a devise did not apply, and before death of first beneficiary his children had no interest subject to attachment or execution. -Matthews v. Curtis, Ohio, 151 N. E. 778.

93. Vendor and Purchaser-Lien on Crop.-A contract between a vendor and a purchaser of land to be paid for on the crop payment plan. which contained a stipulation subjecting the annual crops to a lien for the price and further stipulations maturing the balance of the purchase price and providing that the contract should terminate on a definite date, is construed, and it is held that the contract does not provide for a lien upon a crop raised subsequent to the date of termination as fixed.-Breher v. Hase, N. D., 208 N. W. 974.

94. -Minor's Interest.-Where it was understood by all parties to sale of land that stated amount of cash paid was value of minor vendor's interest, and was to be used in procuring title through confirmation of sale by probate court, and deed, separate and distinct from prior deed not binding as to minor's interest, was ordered to be made to purchaser, there was severance or separation of vendors' joint interest in land as respects minor, and no vendor's lien existed on her undivided interest therein.-Hood v. Christopher, Ala., 108 So. 519.

95.- Time of Essence.-As respects payment, provision in contract for sale of land that time should be of essence thereof held waived by both parties, where it contained no provision as to place of deed before declaring forfeiture.-Hauert v. of performance, and vendor did not make tender Kaufman, S. D., 208 N. W. 981.

96. Workmen's Compensation-"Arising Out of Employment."-Where foreman of gang of city workmen, whose business it was to cut grass and weeds and clean streets, sought shelter in a private garage because of rainstorm, and on approaching garage was bitten by dog, from which he died, held that injury was not compensable as an accident "arising out of employment."-Ryan v. City of Port Huron, Mich., 209 N. W. 101.

97. Fishing on Employer's Premises.-Recov ery, under Workmen's Compensation Act, for death of employee killed while fishing for own purposes, is not barred, where employee was on premises of employer; employee being required to be engaged in course of his employment only when injury occurs away from employer's plant. -Bristow v. Department of Labor and Industries, Wash., 246 Pac. 573.

98. Injury to Policeman.-A police officer, while on duty, went to his home where he kept his weapons to get his revolver. It accidentally fell upon the floor, and was discharged, breaking his leg. Held that the compensation law applied. McDaniel v. City of Benson, Minn., 209 N. W. 26.

99. "In or About Factory."-Defendant conducted a wholesale dairy business, in which it used a number of auto trucks. Plaintiff was employed by defendant to keep the trucks in repair. Defendant's foreman directed plaintiff, and other employees, to push a truck into a street, down a grade, to loosen the starter which had stuck, and repair it. This was done. While plaintiff was working on the truck, on the street, about 200 feet from the factory, he was struck and injured by a passing automobile. Held the injury occurred "in, on, or about the factory" of defendant. within the meaning of R. S. 44-505.-Wise v. Central Dairy Co., Kan., 246 Pac. 501.

100.-Surgical Operation.-Where consensus of expert opinion, in proceeding for compensation for permanent disability arising from injury to knee, is that outcome of operation would be problematical, employee is under no compulsion to take risk of an operation.-General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ind. Acc. Com'n, Cal., 246 Pac. 570.

Central Law Journal

St. Louis, September 6, 1926

CLAIMS ARISING FROM "ONE ACCIDENT'

The case of Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 246 Pac. 1055, decided by the District Court of Appeals of California, holds that an automobile insurer, whose liability on "claims arising from one accident" was limited to a certain amount, is not l'able in greater sum, where the insured's car struck another car, breaking the steering gear on insured's car, by reason of which it ran into a third car, damage being caused to both of the cars so collided with. The policy involved in this case contained a provision that in no case shall the insurer be liable with respect to claims arising from one accident for more than $1,000. The insured's chauffeur was driving his car in a southerly direction on a state highway and met an Overland car with which he collided negligently, inflicting damage upon the same. The force of the collision broke the steering gear of insured's car, causing it to become unmanageable and to collide. with a Cadillac car, causing damage to it. The defendant, insurer, paid $1,000 toward the damage to the Cadillac car, and the owner of the Overland car recovered judgment against the insured in the sum of $500, which defendant refused to pay, discla'ming all further liability under its policy. On this state of facts the court held that there was but one accident and consequently that the liability of the insurer was limited to $1,000.

The court in its opinion states that though there was in this case but one proximate cause of the unexpected and untoward occurrence in which the double injury happened, it does not for that reason alone necessarily follow that the injuries resulted from but one "accident." as that term is used in the policy. For, obviously, there is a clear distinction between the chauffeur's want of due care, considered as the cause of the accident, and

the accident considered as the cause of the resulting injuries. Whether there were two accidents or only one accident, presents a question, the solution whereof depends upon the meaning to be given to the word "accident" as used in this contract of insurance. The court then goes on at considerable length to discuss the meaning of the word "accident" and seems to approve the common definition that it means an unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces. hurt or loss. This definition also states that it is often used to denote any unintended or unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause, and if the cause is not known, the loss or hurt itself would be called an accident. The word is also often used to denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to discriminate between them. Aside from the finding of the court, we suggest that in this policy the word was used in its broadest sense and not intended as a limitation in itself of the liability of the insurer, because the insuring clause was to the effect that the policy covers insured's legal l'ability to other persons for injury to or destruction of the property of such persons resulting solely and directly from the ownership, maintenance and use of the automobile. This is followed by the clause limiting the liability to $1,000 on claims arising from one accident.

Under the policy, however, which was a contract between the insurer and the insured, the meaning of the word "accident" should be construed in relation only to the contract as it applies to the insurer and the insured, because it applies to no one else. From the standpoint of the owner of the Overland car and the owner of the Cadillac car there were two accidents. There was an accident which caused damage to the Overland car regardless of any subsequent events. There was an accident which caused damage to the Cadillac car without regard to any past events. But insofar as the insurer was concerned, it may well be said that there was only one accident and that the insurer was liable only to the extent of the $1,000 on claims

arising out of such accident. There was one continuous, connected course of events, which resulted in damage to the cars of two different people.

Whether or not the conclusion of the court is correct, we think that fault can be found with some of its reasoning. In one place it quotes from a case wherein the court had under consideration the meaning of the word "accident," as used in an ordinary accident insurance policy. In that case the court said: "A result, though unexpected, is not an accident; the means or cause must be accidental." The court, in the present case, then says: "This language applies with equal force to such accidents as fall within the purview of liability insurance policies such as the one before us. Liability insurance is but a branch of accident and casualty insurance." If the court intended to say exactly what this language indicates, it is clearly wrong. In the ordinary accident policy, liability arises only when the insured suffers an injury caused by accidental means. There is a wide d'fference between injury caused by accident and injury caused by accidental means. In the pres

ent case, if the insured's chauffeur had intentionally collided with another automobile, the occurrence would not have been an accident insofar as the chauffeur was concerned, but would have been an accident insofar as the owner of the car collided with was concerned. Had the conduct of the chauffeur, causing him to collide with the other car, been unintentional, then there would have been an accident. both from his standpoint and from the standpoint of the owner of the other car. The means or cause of an accident may be intentional, but result in an accident. Under an ordinary accident policy if the means or cause resulting in an accident were intended there is no lability, whereas the policy in question says nothing about the means or cause of the accident, but deals strictly with accident without qualification.

The court also distinguishes this from the

case of South Staffordshire Tramways Company v. Sickness & Accident Association (1891), 1 Q. B. 402, wherein the policy provided: "So far as regards claims for personal injury and damage to property made against the assurer in respect of accidents caused by vehicles belonging to the

assured and for which accidents the assured shall be l'able, the association shall pay the assured the sum of 250 pounds in respect of any one accident." In regard to this the court says that it is evident that by the use of the word "accidents" in the insurance clause, which provides for indemnity, the parties intended to treat as several accidents all such untoward occurrences as might happen to several persons upon any one occasion. The court declared that as a corollary to th's construction it follows that the words "any one accident" subsequently appearing in the policy, were intended to mean any one unexpected and untoward event happening to each of several persons who might be injured by plaintiff's vehicle at any one time. Further, on this question, the court says: "That is to say, if in the preceding part of the policy the word 'accident' was intended to embrace each separate, untoward occurrence happening to each of the several persons who might be injured upon any one occasion, then the word 'accident,' in the phrase any one accident' must receive the same construction." It appears from the quoted portion of the policy in the English case that the policy covered a number of veh eles and covered all accidents caused by such vehicles. The policy then limits the liability of the association to 150 pounds in respect of any one accident. We think that the policy in the English case cannot be so construed. There were a number of vehicles and the accidents caused by these vehicles were covered by the policy, and the use of these words in the plural has utterly no bearing upon construction to be placed upon the word "accident." They do not indicate, in our estimation, any such thing as is contended by the California

ecurt.