ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

Senator WAGNER. Of course not.

Senator DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the decisions. that have been made by the Board inserted in the record at this point.

Mr. HANDLER. I have them with me.

Senator WAGNER. All the decisions?

The CHAIRMAN. All the decisions made by the Board you mean? Senator DAVIS. Yes; if they have them.

Senator WAGNER. That would make a volume in itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Public Printer have sufficient paper? He says they are very voluminous.

Senator DAVIS. A digest would not be out of place, would it, Senator?

Senator WAGNER. We can give that. I don't know as you want them all printed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want a written transcript of all the decisions?

Mr. HANDLER. We have the decisions of the Board.

Senator DAVIS. I just want a digest.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked for a number of cases already. Now we would like to have the decisions, whether or not there was a settlement made, and just briefly what it was. Is that right, Senator Davis?

Senator DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. HANDLER. I might state the decisions of the Board are now in the hands of the Public Printer and they are going to be published in a volume.

Senator DAVIS. If they are it is not necessary to put in here.
Mr. HANDLER. So they will be readily available.

Senator DAVIS. That is all right.

Mr. HANDLER. The Board also has a compact administrative staff which has been set up to supervise the work of the regional boards, to control the field work, prepare the hearings before the full Board, to conduct research and advise the Board on the legal phases of the problems that are presented to it, and to supervise the compliance with the Board's rulings.

Now, while the Board was initially designed to mediate industrial disputes, it has served as a board of arbitration in cases where joint submissions were voluntarily made to the Board, and in the course of time it took on a new function, namely the enforcement of section 7 (a) of the Recovery Act.

Now, the strength and the weaknesses of the present Board can be illustrated by an illustration of the way in which a typical case has been handled by the Board, if the members of the committee would be interested in my doing so.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be pleased to have you.

Mr. HANDLER. Relying upon the provisions of section 7 (a) of the act, the workers in a plant form their organization. Upon refusal of the employer to recognize

The CHAIRMAN. You are giving a specific case now?

Mr. HANDLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Without mentioning names?

Mr. HANDLER. Without mentioning names.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

Mr. HANDLER. It is quite typical.

46652-34-PT 1-3

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

Mr. HANDLER. Upon refusal of the employer to deal with the officials of a union strike is called. Now as soon as the board learns of the strike it sends a mediator to the field to adjust the dispute, if that be possible. If he fails, the parties are then summoned to appear before the full Board, which is either a regional board or the National Labor Board, depending upon the importance of the case. Strikes have generally been settled along the following lines, after full hearing by the Board: An agreement is made between the parties to the dispute and the Board and it provides typically for the following: First, the strike is called off and the workers are reinstated without discrimination; an election is held to determine who shall represent the workers and to settle this disputed question of the authority of the officials of the union to represent the workers. The employer agrees to bargain collectively with the representatives selected at this election held under the board's supervision and the parties agree to submit all their differences which cannot be settled by negotiation either to a board of arbitration or to the National Labor Board or the regional labor board for final decision. Now in this way the board developed the election by secret ballot under governmental supervision as the administrative device under section 7 (a) for determining the representatives of the employees.

Now the procedure, as you will observe, has been entirely voluntary. In the great bulk of the cases before the board this method has been eminently successful. The mediators have settled on just and equitable terms innumerable strikes in the field, and the mere existence of this administrative machinery, the local and national boards, has been responsible for the averting of countless disputes.

Now, difficulty has arisen where the parties have refused to appear before the Board, where the terms of settlement proposed by the Board have been rejected, where the employers have refused to furnish the Board with their payrolls and the cooperation which is essential if a fair and reliable election is to be held, and finally, where the hearings disclosed violations of the statute. In the last instance the lack of power on the part of the Board to enforce its decision, and its inadequate facilities for the detection of violations, have made it difficult to enforce the law with desirable vigor and promptness. Now, these difficulties are explicitly dealt with by the present bill. One of the major purposes of the bill is to provide the necessary machinery for the amicable adjustment of labor disputes. The mediation powers of the Board are continued, and, in my opinion, very properly so. Mediation is most successful when undertaken by a single individual. For this reason it is contemplated, under the bill, in continuation of our past practice, of having an experienced staff of mediators for field work. But where such mediation fails, and it does fail in many cases, unless there is to be a continuation of strife, it is imperative that there be some agency with adequate prestige to intervene in the interest of the public, and to bring about à peaceful settlement. It is for that reason that I urge that the bill remain the mediation functions of the present Board.

I can illustrate the importance of the mediation function by referring to a case which is pending before the board today. A serious dispute is pending in the automobile industry. A single mediator, either of our Board or a conciliator of the Department of Labor, is powerless

to handle a dispute of such magnitude. Now we send in every case an individual into the field, a man who is trained in industrial relations and who, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, is able to effect settlement. But there must be some agency of the Government to which resort can be had where the single individual, the mediator or conciliator, fails, and unless this board is given that mediation power there will be no agency to handle a dispute which cannot be settled by a mediator. Without granting those functions to this board, the result would be that such disputes would remain unsettled until the parties were worn out by their strife or until one had prevailed over the other as a result of brute strength.

I might add that the main function of this Board and the real reason for its establishment was to compose those differences that were threatening the recovery program, to settle that multitude of strikes that occurred during the summer, disputes which the mediators and conciliators were unable to settle themselves.

Now, a national board, commanding public respect, can, by reason of its high office and detachment, inquire into the facts and propose an equitable basis of settlement, and informed public opinion is all that is necessary to enforce its decisions. Such a board must be composed of several impartial representatives of the public, in order that it possess the disinterestedness essential to conimand public respect.

Now, the bipartisan aspect of the Board, with a representation of labor and industry, is chiefly valuable in the peaceful settlement of disputes, in the exercise of the mediation functions of the board. When it comes to the purely judicial work of the Board, where you are inquiring into questions of law violation, obviously the value of the layman is somewhat diminished. They contribute greatly to an understanding of the problem, but you must have a corps of disinterested public representatives who are competent by training and experience to handle questions of law and judicial problems that arise in such cases.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good distinction. I suppose that is the reason for constituting the board as suggested?

Mr. HANDLER. Yes. Experience has demonstrated that the power of subpena is essential in order to bring recalcitrant parties before the board. Otherwise the aims of the statute can be frustrated in the very cases requiring the intervention of a disinterested and responsible agency of the Government.

I should like to expand that, if I may. Where you get a very serious industrial dispute, where feeling runs very high, and where there is considerable bitterness, the man who goes out in the field is unable to bring the parties together. Now without the power of subpena, the board has found that in such cases, where intervention is imperative and necessary in the public interest, one of the parties would fail to respond to its invitation to appear before the board, to permit the board to furnish its good offices in the settlement of that dispute. Now, to my mind it is imperative that the board. have the power of subpena in such cases, to call the parties together for a free and frank discussion of the difficulties. There is no compulsion whatsoever about such a procedure. The only compulsion is to have them come down and sit around the table and discuss their difficulties in the presence of a governmental body.

Senator DAVIS. If the Division of Conciliation in the Department of Labor had such power as you are asking now for the National Labor Board, wouldn't the Division of Conciliation be able to act just the same?

Mr. HANDLER. I think not, Mr. Senator, for this reason: That in these disputes of national scope, it is important that you have a board of the prestige such as the present Board, composed as it is of the leading members of both labor and management, and under the high supervision and leadership of the Senator.

Senator DAVIS. The Division of Conciliation is national in its scope.

Mr. HANDLER. Yes, but it does not command the same respect and prestige.

Senator DAVIS. Why should not it command the same respect? It is a governmental bureau, it has the Secretary of Labor to back it up-and that appointment is made by the President, just as you are arranging to make the National Labor Board here.

Mr. HANDLER. I might answer that by saying that your point illustrates the necessity for having the bipartisan representation on the Board. With the highest respect for the Department of Labor and its Division of Conciliation, it does not, in the public estimation, command the respect and confidence of men such as Mr. Swope, Mr. Green, Mr. Lewis, and the like.

Senator DAVIS. Yes; but the act creating the Department of Labor could be amended to give the President the right to appoint the men, if they want, and they could be a part of the Department of Labor and the Board would have the power of a Cabinet officer back of them, rather than they being more or less an independent board, such as is proposed in this act. It isn't, after all, so much the man as it is the governmental power back of it.

Mr. HANDLER. If I may state my personal opinion, as long as you have a governmental body, there is room for a difference of opinion as to whether it should be an independent agency, with all the respect that an agency which is independent of any department commands, or whether it should be a part of a department of the Government.

Senator DAVIS. It doesn't make any difference where it is. I cannot understand why we want to create two boards to do the same work.

Mr. HANDLER. Well, I do not believe that they do the same work. Of course this board is going to have these powers of conciliation and mediation powers.

Senator DAVIS. Well, those powers could be granted to the particular board by amending the act creating the Department of Labor. Mr. HANDLER. That would merely mean having a National Labor Board in the Department of Labor, rather than as an independent agency of the Government.

Senator DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. HANDLER. My own opinion is it will command a much greater respect if it is entirely independent of any executive department.

Senator DAVIS. Well, you say an independent board, independent of a Cabinet officer, will command greater respect than one that is in a bureau without a Cabinet officer at the head?

H

Mr. HANDLER. I believe so. Of course the bureau takes on the appearance of a mere appendage to a great department.

Senator DAVIS. Then you are developing a new board without any experience, and you have 16 or 17 years' experience back of the Department of Labor.

Mr. HANDLER. Well, there has been the closest cooperation between the two, and all the mediators are men of great experience and training.

Senator DAVIS. Why have that close corporation when one division can do it?

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator DAVIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I infer from what you say, that the employer and employee is psychologically affected very much by whether the decision made in his dispute is by some department employees as now in the Department of Labor, or whether it is made by a board directly constituted and appointed by the President of the United States.

Mr. HANDLER. Yes. I think a close analogy would be whether you would want the Interstate Commerce Commission as an independent agency, or whether you would want to put it in the Department of Commerce as an appendage of that department.

The CHAIRMAN. The first part of the question by Senator Davis was to the effect that he thought that these powers that are proposed in this bill should be given to the bureau now in the Department of Labor, and I take it that your answer to it was that such a method does not command the attention, the respect, and the solemnity that a decision affecting their rights would command by an independently constituted board?

Senator DAVIS. In other words, following that along, you must have a lot of window dressing, and stage setting to enforce a governmental decree.

Mr. HANDLER. I do not think I should agree with that. I think if a board exercising judicial functions is to command the highest respect, it ought to be put on an entirely independent basis.

Senator DAVIS. My own opinion is, having some little knowledge, and watching it since the department has been organized, that I do not know a man in the United States that could command greater respect than the Director of Conciliation in the Department of Labor. I think he is the best authority in the United States on that particular subject.

Mr. HANDLER. I would agree without reservation to that, Mr. Senator.

Senator DAVIS. You would what?

Mr. HANDLER. I said I would agree without any reservation to that.

Senator DAVIS. Then why divert from a man who is thoroughly equipped in every way to direct the conciliation, mediation, and arbitration forces of the Government to somebody that has got to learn it all over again?

Mr. HANDLER. I do not believe that the bill diverts any power from him, because most of the conciliation work is going to be carried on by Mr. Kerwin's division. The intention of the mediation clause is to enable it to supplement and to step in where his conciliation has been unsuccessful.

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »