Dr. SLICHTER. In general, Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of the bill. In fact, it seems to me to be a bill which ought to arouse very little controversy. Its basic policy, if I understand it correctly, is to prevent the growth of employer-dominated unions. I have been trying to find some of these employer-dominated unions, and I have talked with many employers, and thus far I have been unable to discover a single employer who admits that he has an employer-dominated union. In fact, every employer with whom I have talked has been outspoken in expressing the principle-the belief in the principle that employees organizations should be entirely independent of employer control. So I should be greatly surprised were any employer to appear and oppose this bill, except in matters of detail.

The CHAIRMAN. In matters of what, please?

Dr. SLICHTER. Matters of detail. My remarks will not be long and will be divided in two parts. First of all I should like to offer some-well, perhaps you may call them destructive criticisms of the bill, and then I should like to attempt to put something in their place, to suggest something to take the place of the sections which I shall criticize. My attention has been primarily focused upon section 5, which appears on page 5 of the bill.

It seems to me that this section is perhaps based on a misconception. of the present situation in industrial relations, and if enacted in its present form there would be considerable danger that this section. would prematurely freeze the situation which would be and which ought to be permitted to remain in flux.

To begin with, notice paragraph 2 of section 5, which reads:

It shall be an unfair labor practice to refuse to recognize and/or deal with representatives of his employees, or to fail to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements with such representatives concerning wages,. hours, and other conditions of employment.

The first part of that section does not seem to me to be open to exception, but if the entire section were enacted, it would probably result in a rush on the part of employers to enter into agreements with existing company unions. After all, the company union problem is not simply a problem of preventing the formation of new company unions. It is a problem of maintaining fair competition between the company unions which exist and other organizations.

I do not like the latter part of that section anyway, because it seems to me to be merely the expression of a pious wish and I do not like the notion of merely putting pious wishes into statutes. It says, “to fail to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements." You cannot make it a definite duty of a man to try to agree. can always say he tried to agree. The words are rather meaningless. You might almost enact that the lions and lambs shall not fail to exert every reasonable effort to lie down together.

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I drop those words altogether, not merely because they are meaningless, but because I feel quite certain they would precipitate a vast number of agreements between employers on the one hand and organizations on the other, which, in fact, are really not independent, and yet which no one can prove by objective evidence are dominated by employers.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your objection is well taken. Have you any language to suggest as a substitute?

Dr. SLICHTER. No. I should simply curtail the paragraph (2), retain the words "to refuse to recognize and/or deal with representatives of his employees," and leave it there.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you later, Doctor, sometime while this legislation is pending before the Committee give us the language which you think might be substituted for these criticisms which you are making?

Dr. SLICHTER. Yes, I have a rough draft here which I shall introduce in more constructive parts of my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be most helpful.

Dr. SLICHTER. Now, paragraph (3).

The CHAIRMAN. Still on page 5?

Dr. SLICHTER. On section 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. SLICHTER (reading):

To initiate, participate in, supervise, or influence the formation, constitution, bylaws, other governing rules, operations, policies, or elections of any labor organization.

This paragraph seems to me in some respects to be meaningless and ineffective and in other respects to go too far. There are four verbs that evidently apply to each of the seven objects, which means that the section prohibits or declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to influence the policy of any labor organization. Well, now, that is what collective bargaining is, an attempt on each side to influence the policies of the other, and far from it being a bad thing, that is generically, for the employer to attempt to influence the policies of the labor organization, I should say that is a good thing. That is what bargaining is. It is difficult for me to see the logic of that.

It is equally a part of bargaining for the labor organization to attempt to influence the policies of the employer. That is why they organize, so they will be more effective in influencing his policies.

So, in prohibiting employers from attempting to influence the policies of labor organizations, you are virtually taking the heart out of collective bargaining.

In other respects, that section impresses me as being meaningless and ineffective. I doubt if it would have any importance, whether it would have any important practical effect. To be concrete, it prohibits employers from initiating the formation of a labor organization. Well, how is an employer to be prevented from initiating the formation of a labor organization? The prohibition is in very broad terms. It reads "directly or indirectly." But as far as the employer is concerned, suppose he, or his superintendents, or his foremen, say to some of the men, "Why don't you fellows get together and get some kind of committees to handle your affairs with us? Men in other plants round about are doing it, why don't you do it?" And the employees get together. The employer has made it evident he is not going to object if they do. And in that change of atmosphere they respond quite promptly and they start committees of their own. Has the employer initiated a labor organization?

Well, he is hauled before the National Labor Board and accused of having initiated a labor organization. His answer obviously is, "Why no, the men started it. We suggested it, it is true." His suggestion

that it would be a good thing for the men to organize, is that initiating a labor organization? I see no objective line that can be drawn, and consequently I see no way in which that word "initiate" can acquire effective meaning.

Even the prohibition against the employer supervising the elections. Any labor organization with which I am in entire sympathy, is, as a practical proposition, of very little meaning, it seems to me, because the employer can always act through employees, and you cannot put your finger on his actions and say, "Well, he is violating the law because the law says 'directly or indirectly' and he is acting indirectly." You cannot put your finger on what he is doing.

It has been the tactics of employers recently, after getting into trouble, before the Labor Board, apparently to withdraw, but in an effort to encourage the employees to take the initiative and hold elections, it has pursued those tactics, and the Labor Board apparently has found it is rather helpless in meeting those tactics.

So I do not conceive of paragraph (3) as of much help. I think the word "policies" in the last line should certainly be eliminated, and I do not think it would make much difference in the law if the whole paragraph were eliminated, though I am in sympathy with what the paragraph is trying to do in most cases.

It should be observed, however, that there are some instances in which it is entirely legitimate for an employer to initiate the labor organization. Suppose men do not act themselves? Suppose they do not feel like joining an outside labor organization? And in some instances dues in the outside labor organizations, the dues are so high that men, after 4 years of depression, do not feel like paying those dues. That is particularly true in instances where you have to buy a lot of insurance at the same time that you become a member of a labor organization. Selling a man membership in the labor organization is selling him insurance at the same time. The CHAIRMAN. Is that a frequent occurrence?

Dr. SLICHTER. It is only a minority of the organizations in the American Federation of Labor which have compulsory insurance, but some of them do. I do not care to be understood as necessarily criticising those insurance schemes, because that is a complicated problem in itself, but I am directing attention to the fact that there are circumstances under which the employer, with perfect propriety, it seems to me, may initiate a labor organization among his employees. Were that section retained, I wonder whether the courts would feel disposed to uphold the rule defining as an unfair labor practice the initiation of a labor organization by an employer under any circumstances.

There may be two conflicting and competing labor organizations in the employer's plant, and it may be that situation which leads him to take some initiative and try to introduce an organization which would prehend both of the others.

mpetition in the automobile industry at the present nts, between three labor organizations, one a company . F. of L. union, and one an independent union. on meant a great deal, my disposition would be to and let the few employers who would suffer from it, >t think it means very much of anything.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an attempt to suppress domination and control by an employer who wants to organize a union for his own selfish ends.

Dr. SLICHTER. Precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. And in doing that, it prevents a well-meaning and altruistic employer from trying to direct and guide his employees in organizing a worthwhile and sound organization, isn't that true? Dr. SLICHTER. Yes; I believe it is. Now, Mr. Chairman, up to this point, I have been entirely destructive. I should like to attempt to offer something in place of the criticisms that I have made.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the bill can be improved in a great many particulars without injuring the objective.

Dr. SLITCHER. Perhaps I should add this before passing on to the constructive phase. In section (4), or in paragraph (4) of section 5. it reads:

To contribute financial or other material support to any labor organization, by compensating anyone for services performed in behalf of any labor organization, or by any other means whatsoever.

I venture to suggest a saving clause at the end of that section reading somewhat as follows:

Except that nothing herein shall prevent employee representatives in the service of the company from drawing their regular rate of pay for committee work done within regular working hours.

There has been a great deal of committee work done within regular working hours, and it has been customary for the man who has been taken away from the bench or the machine, to get his regular rate of pay while doing that committee work. That has been true in union shops as well as in nonunion shops, and I see no reason for disturbing that situation, which section (4) might do, or paragraph (4), might do, if narrowly interpreted. Now to pass on to the constructive suggestions. The problem which impresses me as overwhelmingly important is not the one of preventing the formation of the so-called "company union", because as a practical matter I do not believe that can be done. I think the employer who makes the suggestion, "Well, boys, you certainly ought to have a committee to look after your interest," can always do that, you can always create committees and deal with them, so the problem is not preventing that action. It cannot be done, even if it were desirable to do it.

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But the problem is giving the independent labor organizations & fair opportunity to compete with the employee committees and to provide a method by which, in an impartial manner, the wishes, the preferences of the employees can be ascertained, and in particular to prevent the employer from showing an undue preference in dealing with various competing committees, because where there is a company union and a trade union in the same plant, each trying to deal with the employer, the way the employer is likely to behave is simply this: He meets any committee which wishes to talk over things with him, he is very nice to them, and does not hesitate to discuss conditions in his shop with them, but he has a choice, he indicates that he is going to make concessions, and in case he is going to make those concessions, he has his choice as to which committee will get the concessions. The great weapon of the employer in maintaining the fidelity of company unions as against trade unions is in letting those men be the ones who

bring home the bacon. If you study the history of the formation of company unions on the railroads, you will find that is the way in many instances in which the trade union was undermined. The trade union could not get concessions and the employee committee could.

So, in my judgment, the problem is one of determining who has the right to represent the employees and placing some restrictions upon the dealings of the employer with other persons.

This is what I suggest, in a very rough form. I have plagiarized rather liberally the President's recent order authorizing the National Labor Board to hold elections, but it is not 100 percent plagiarization. Whenever either the employer or a substantial number of the employees, as defined in the discretion of the National Labor Board, of any plant or industrial unit of any employer shall question the right of any persons to represent the employees in collective bargaining, the Board may take appropriate steps to determine who are the representatives of the employees.

In doing so the Board may, in its discretion, conduct an election either under the exclusive control of the Board or with the cooperation of the interested parties, and under such rules and regulations as the Board shall prescribe. Thereafter the Board shall publish primarily the names of those representatives who are selected by the vote of at least the majority of the employees voting. Whenever the National Labor Board shall have determined, upon investigation, or as the result of an election, who are the representatives of the majority of the employees of any employer, or of the majority of any specific group of employees in his employ, the Board shall certify the names to the employer, who shall immediately post the names on bulletin boards throughout the plant.

After certification of representatives of employees by the National Labor Board, it shall be an unfair labor practice for the employer, at any time within a year of the election, to bargain with other persons purporting to represent the employees, without submitting any agreements to the certified representatives, either for approval or for further negotiation, and no agreement governing wages, hours, or working conditions made within 1 year of the certification of employee representatives by the National Labor Board shall be binding on the employees, unless approved by the certified representatives.

If I may interject here, it seems to me futile to undertake to specify, as paragraph (2) does that two sides shall make a reasonable effort to agree, but it is possible to say that the employer must not make agreements with persons who are not representatives of his employees, unless those representttives have first an opportunity to ratify the agreement or to go to the employer and say, "No, this is not satisfactory; we must have this, that, and the other changed." I would add to the section the following:

On receiving complaints from a substantial number of employees in any plant, or industrial union of any employer, that the employer is bargaining collectively with persons who are not representatives of the employees, the National Labor Board may, in its discretion, order the employer and the alleged representatives to cease and desist from negotiating agreements pending determination by the National Labor Board of the persons who are representatives of the employees.

The danger is that the employer will rush in the agreement with persons who represent no one, and then when an independent organization undertakes to bargain, the employer will say, "I am sorry, but I am bound by an agreement. I might consider dealing with you, but this agreement ties my hands. You know you have always stood for the sacredness of agreements. You live up to your own agreements, and I must live up to mine."