explain its meaning, as it "is composed of two English words intelligible to everybody." Homer v. Taunton, 5 H. & N. 661; 29 L. J. Ex. 318; 8 W. R. 499; 2 L. T. 512. But so are 66 blackleg" and "blacksheep," and these words do require an innuendo. 66 M'Gregor v. Gregory, 11 M. & W. 287; 12 L. J. Ex. 204; 2 Dowl. O'Brien v. Clement, 16 M. & W. 166; 16 L. J. Ex. 77. Barnett v. Allen, 1 F. & F. 125; 27 L. J. Ex. 412; 4 Jur. N. S. 488; 3 H. & N. 376. The defendant charged the plaintiff, a pawnbroker and silversmith, with duffing": an innuendo, "meaning thereby the dishonourable practice of furbishing up damaged goods and pledging them with other pawnbrokers as new," was held good. Hickinbotham v. Leach, 10 M. & W. 361; 2 Dowl. N. S. 270. The words, "He is mainsworn," were spoken in one of the northern counties where "mainsworn" is equivalent to "perjured" (forsworn with his hand on the book). Held actionable. Slater v. Franks, Hob. 126. And see Coles v. Haveland, Cro. Eliz. 250; Hob. 12. A. and B. were partners, and were conversing with the defendant. A. said they held some bills on the plaintiff's firm; the defendant said :—“You must look out sharp that they are met by them." At the trial, B. was called as a witness, and stated these facts. The counsel for the plaintiff then proposed to ask B. :-"What did you understand by that ?" But the question was objected to, and disallowed by the judge (Pollock, C. B.) in that form, and the counsel would put it in no other shape. The jury found a verdict for the defendant; and the Court of Exchequer refused to grant a new trial. Daines and another v. Hartley, 3 Exch. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81; 12 Libel complained of: "There are very few persons in society who do not look upon the whole affair to be got up for a specific occasion, and consider that it has been neither more nor less than a 'plant.' We have heard it roundly asserted that a clerk of Mr. Hamer, the notorious lawyer, was placed under a sofa at his lordship's residence when the Earl of Cardigan called there." The indictment stated, "that the said Thomas Holt used the words 'a plant' for the purpose of expressing and meaning, and the said words used by him were by divers, to wit, all the persons to whom the said libel was published, understood as expressing and meaning, an artful and wicked plan and contrivance made and entered into by the said William Paget, Esq., and other persons by false and unfounded testimony and a wrongful and wicked perversion of facts to make out, support and establish the said charge, and by concert and arrangement falsely to fix upon the said earl the commission of the said trespass and assault for the purpose of obtaining divers of the moneys of the said earl to the use of the said William Paget, Esq.," and concluded with the following innuendo:-"Thereby then and there meaning that the said William Paget, Esq., had with other persons artfully and wickedly planned and contrived to make a false and unfounded charge against the said earl of his having been guilty of the said trespass and assault upon the said wife of the said William Paget, Esq., and to make out, support and establish such charge by false and unfounded testimony and a wicked and wrongful perversion of facts for the purpose of extorting and obtaining from the said earl divers of his moneys to the use of the said William Paget, Esq." A reporter for one of the London newspapers was called to define "a plant," and his evidence justified the innuendo. The recorder left it to the jury whether they were satisfied that the word "plant" bore the meaning attributed to it by the prosecution; if so, the passage was libellous. Verdict, guilty. R. v. Thomas Holt, 8 J. P. 212. The defendant, the editor of a newspaper, owed plaintiff money under an award; and wrote and published in his newspaper these words:-"The money will be forthcoming on the last day allowed by the award, but we are not disposed to allow him to put it into Wall-street for shaving purposes before that period." "Shaving" in New York means, (i) discounting bills or notes s; (ii) fleecing men of their goods or money by overreaching, extortion, and oppression. The declaration contained no innuendo alleging that the words were used in the second defamatory sense. Held no libel, on demurrer. Stone v. Cooper (1845), 2 Denio (N. Y.), 293. 4. Words primâ facie innocent, but capable of a Defamatory Meaning. Wherever the defendant's words are capable both of a harmless and an injurious meaning, it will be a question for the jury to decide which meaning the hearers or readers would on the occasion in question have reasonably given to the words. Here an innuendo is essential to show the latent injurious meaning. Without an innuendo, there would be no cause of action shown on the record. And such innuendo should be carefully drafted; for on it the plaintiff must take his stand at the trial. He cannot during the course of the case adopt a fresh construction. He may, it is true, fall back on the natural and obvious meaning of the words: but that we assume here not to be actionable. And such innuendo must be specific; it must distinctly aver a definite actionable meaning. A general averment, such as, "using the words in a defamatory sense," or "for the purpose of creating an impression unfavourable to the plaintiff," would be insufficient. (Cox v. Cooper, 12 W. R. 75; 9 L. T. 329.) The words, too, must be fairly susceptible of the defamatory meaning put upon them by the innuendo, or the judge at the trial will stop the case. "The judge must decide if the words are reasonably capable of two meanings; if he so decide, the jury must determine which of the two meanings was intended." (Per Sir Montague Smith, 6 App. Cas. at p. 158; Jenner and another v. A'Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464; Grant v. Yates, 2 Times L. R. 368.) And their decision on the point is final and conclusive. In determining this question the jury will consider the whole of the circumstances of the case, the occasion of publication, the relationship between the parties, &c. A further question of fact may arise: Were there any facts known both to speaker and hearer which would reasonably lead the latter to understand the words in a secondary and a defamatory sense? And this is a question for the jury, if there be any evidence to go to them of such facts. (Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty & Sons (C. A.), 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851; (H. L.) 7 App. Cas. 741; 52 L. J. Q. B. 232; 31 W. R. 157; 47 L. T. 662; 47 J. P. 214; Ruel v. Tatnell, 29 W. R. 172; 43 L. T. 507.) Also whenever the words of a libel are ambiguous, or the intention of the writer equivocal, subsequent libels are admissible in evidence to explain the meaning of the first, or to prove the innuendoes, even although such subsequent libels be written after action brought. Hence "if the defendant can get either the Court or the jury to be in his favour, he succeeds. The prosecutor or plaintiff cannot succeed unless he gets both the Court and the jury to decide for him." (Per Lord Blackburn, 7 App. Cas. at p. 776.) Illustrations. "He is a healer of felons;" innuendo, a concealer of felons. Held actionable. Pridham v. Tucker, Yelv. 153; Hob. 126; Cart. 214. " "He has set his own premises on fire.' These words are prima facie innocent; but may become actionable, if it be averred that the house was insured, and that the words were intended to convey to the hearers that the plaintiff had purposely set fire to his own premises with intent to defraud the insurance office. There being no such averment, the Court arrested judgment. Sweetapple v. Jesse, 5 B. & Ad. 27; 2 N. & M. 36. "She secreted one and sixpence under the till, stating, 'These are not times to be robbed." No innuendo. There being nothing to show that the 1s. 6d. was not her own money, the Court arrested judgment; for, though special damage was alleged, it was not the necessary and natural consequence of the words, as set out in the declaration. Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645; 3 N. & M. 116, ante, p. 90. The plaintiff, Mary Griffiths, was a butcher and had a son, Matthew. Words spoken by defendant:-" Matthew uses two balls to his mother's steelyard;" innuendo, "meaning that plaintiff by Matthew, her agent and servant, used improper and fraudulent weights in her said trade, and defrauded and cheated in her said trade." After verdict for the plaintiff, held that the words, as stated and explained, were actionable. Griffiths v. Lewis, 7 Q. B. 61; 8 Q. B. 841; 14 L. J. Q. B. 197; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249; 9 Jur. 370; 10 Jur. 711. To say that the plaintiff is "Man Friday" to another is not actionable, without an innuendo averring that the term imputed undue subserviency and selfhumiliation. Forbes v. King, 2 L. J. Ex. 109; 1 Dowl. 672. See Woodgate v. Ridout, 4 F. & F. 202. Words complained of:-"The old materials have been relaid by you in the asphalte work executed in the front of the Ordnance Office, and I have seen the work done." Innuendo, "that the plaintiff had been guilty of dishonesty in his trade by laying down again the old asphalte which had before been used at the entrance of the Ordnance Office, instead of new asphalte according to his contract;" and this innuendo was held not too large. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages 40s. Baboneau v. Farrell, 15 C. B. 360; 24 L. J. C. P. 9; 3 C. L. R. 42; 1 Jur. N. S. 114. An action was brought for the following libel on the plaintiff in the way of his trade:-"Society of Guardians for the Protection of Trade against Swindlers and Sharpers. I am directed to inform you that the persons using the firm of Goldstein and Co. are reported to this Society as improper to be proposed to be balloted for as members thereof." After verdict for the plaintiff, the Court arrested judgment, because there was no averment that it was the custom of the Society to designate swindlers and sharpers by the term "improper persons to be members of this Society." [There was an innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiff was a swindler and a sharper, &c.," which would be sufficient now; but before the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 61, an innuendo required a prefatory averment to support it.] The words in their natural and obvious meaning were held to be no libel. Goldstein v. Foss, 6 B. & C. 154; 1 M. & P. 402; 2 Y. & J. 146; 9 To say of a merchant, "He hath caten a spider," Mr. Justice Wild said was "actionable with a proper averment what the meaning is." But the report does not vouchsafe any explanation of the meaning. Franklyn v. Butler, Pasch. 11 Car. I., cited in Annison v. Blofield, Carter, 214. The words "Ware hawk there; mind what you are about," will, with proper averments, amount to a charge of insolvency against the plaintiff, a trader; and so are actionable. Orpwood v. Barkes (vel Parkes), 4 Bing. 261; 12 Moore, 492. The plaintiff was a grocer, and had started what is known as a Christmas club, to which he endeavoured to obtain 1,000 subscribers. The defendant, a fellow tradesman, said "His shop is in the market." Innuendo: "meaning thereby that the plaintiff was going away, and was guilty of fraudulent conduct in his business, inasmuch as he had received subscriptions from members of the club, well knowing that they would be unable to obtain any benefit therefrom." Held, that, the words not being in themselves defamatory, and there being no evidence to support the innuendo, the defendant was entitled to judgment. Ruel v. Tatnell, 43 L. T. 507; 29 W. R. 172. The defendant said to an upholsterer:-" You are a soldier; I saw you in your red coat doing duty; your word is not to be taken." These words are prima facie not actionable; but it was explained that there was then a common practice for tradesmen to sham enlisting so as to avoid being arrested for debt. The words were therefore held actionable as damaging the credit of a trader. Arne v. Johnson, 10 Mod. 111. Gostling v. Brooks, 2 F. & F. 76. The defendant said of the plaintiff :-" Foulger trapped three foxes in Ridler's wood." These words are primâ facie not actionable. But the declaration averred that the plaintiff was a gamekeeper, that it is the duty of a gamekeeper not to kill foxes, that the plaintiff was employed expressly on the terms that he would not kill foxes, and that no one who killed foxes would be employed as a gamekeeper. Held, on demurrer, a good declaration; for the words, so explained, clearly imputed to the plaintiff misconduct in his office or occupation, and were therefore actionable without proof of special damage. Foulger v. Newcomb, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595. But an indictment for publishing a handbill, "B. Oakley of Chillington, Game and Rabbit Destroyer, and his wife, the seller of the same in country and town," was quashed, there being no innuendo explaining the words or showing that they implied any offence or referred to the trade or calling of the prosecutor. Reg. v. James Yates, 12 Cox, C. C. 233. A landlord sent to his tenants a notice :-" Messrs. Henty & Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment any cheques drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and Counties Bank." Innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiffs were not to be relied upon to meet the cheques drawn upon them, and that their position was such that they were not to be trusted to cash the cheques of their customers." Held, that the words in their natural and primary sense were not libellous; that the onus lay on the bank to show that they conveyed some secondary libellous meaning; and that as no evidence was offered of facts known to the tenants which could reasonably induce them to understand the words in the defamatory sense ascribed to them by the innuendo, |