So too in actions of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the jury may award damages for the injury done to the plaintiff's reputation by the charge made against him, and by his being marched in custody through the public streets; although in the former, the gist of the action is the direct trespass to the person, and in the latter the maliciously setting the law in motion without reasonable or probable cause. In Roman law there are many instances given in which a man's reputation was assailed, not by words, but by acts. E.g.: (i) By refusing to accept a solvent person as surety for a debt, intending thereby to impute that he is insolvent. (D. 2, 8, 5, 1.) (ii) By claiming a debt that is not due, or seizing a man's goods for a fictitious debt, with intent to injure his credit. (Gai. III. 220; Just. Inst. IV. iv. 1; D. 47, 10, 15, 33.) (iii) By claiming a person as your slave, knowing him to be free. (D. 47, 10, 12, & 22.) (iv) By forcing your way into the house of another. (D. 47, 10, 23, & 44.) (v) By persistently following about a matron or young girl respectably dressed, such constant pursuit being an imputation on their chastity. (Gai. III. 220; Just. Inst. IV. iv. 1; D. 47, 10, 15, 15—22.) (vi) By needlessly fleeing for refuge to the statue of the emperor, thereby making it appear that some one was unlawfully oppressing you. (D. 48, 16, 28, 7); though it is difficult to see in this case how it was determined who was the right plaintiff. On the other hand, words may cause a man damage without in any way affecting his reputation; and for such words, if spoken without lawful occasion, an action on the case will lie, provided it can be shown that such damage is the natural and necessary consequence of the words, or was the result which the speaker intended and designed. Illustrations. I.-WORDS DISPARAGING SOMETHING, OR IMPUGNING PLAINTIFF'S TITLE THERETO. If A. falsely and maliciously disparages an article which B. makes or sells, and special damage results therefrom, an action lies, although no imputation was cast on B.'s personal or professional character. Young v. Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6; 11 W. R. 63; 9 Jur. N. S. 539; 7 L. T. 354. And see pp. 147–150. To assert falsely and unnecessarily that there is a flaw in my title to the freehold I own, is actionable if I thereby am prevented from selling it. Banister v. Banister, 4 Rep. 17. And see pp. 138–147. To say falsely that a ship is unseaworthy, intending thereby to deter seamen from sailing in her, is actionable if in consequence they refuse to go to sea in her. Casey v. Arnott, 2 C. P. D. 24; 46 L. J. C. P. 3; 25 W. R. 46; 35 L. T. 424. To set up a false and groundless claim of lien on goods I have bought is actionable, if special damage ensue. Green v. Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. N.B. An attack on a man's property or on the things he makes or sells may sometimes be also an indirect attack on himself. See pp. 30, 133. II.-WORDS DISPARAGING THE REPUTATION OF SOME PERSON OTHER THAN THE PLAINTIFF. As a rule, A. cannot sue for words defamatory of B., although he may suffer loss or inconvenience therefrom. It is generally impossible to satisfy the Court that the speaker intended this result or that it is the natural and necessary consequence of his words. Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48; Peake, 194 vel 256. Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249. A brother cannot sue for slander of his sister. Subbaiyar v. Kristnaiyar and another, I. L. R., 1 Madras, 383. Defendants attended the funeral ceremony of Premji Ludha, the headman of the Karad caste, and there before a large concourse of people made a violent attack on the moral and religious character of the deceased, declaring that he was "patit," a term of great opprobrium and reproach among Hindoos. Many of those assembled left at once in consequence, and the family of the deceased suffered great pain and annoyance, and also were much lowered in public estimation. Plaintiff sued as the heir and nearest relation of the deceased for damages. Held no action lay. Luckumsey Rouji v. Hurbun Nursey and others, I. L. R., 5 Bom. 580. But a husband may recover, without joining his wife as a co-plaintiff, for damage caused to himself by words defamatory solely of her. Baldwin v. Flower, 3 Mod. 120. Guy v. Gregory, 9 C. & P. 584. Dengate v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 5; 2 Jur. 470. Wilson v. Goit, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.) 445. If A. and B. are rival shopkeepers, and B. spreads a false and groundless report that A.'s shopman has the scarlet fever, intending thereby to prevent the public from going to A.'s shop, and succeeds in this malicious device, A. can sue B. Per Kelly, C. B., in Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 96; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500. III.-OTHER WORDS. “Undoubtedly all words are actionable if a special damage follows." Per Heath, J., in Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 44. If a man induces a servant to break his contract with his master and quit his employment, the master has an action per quod servitium amisit. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463; 17 Jur. 827. Bowen v. Hall and others, 6 Q. B. D. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305; 29 If a man menace my tenants at will, of life and member, per quod they depart from their tenures, an action upon the case will lie against him, but the menace without their departure is no cause of action. Conesby's Case, Year Book, 9 Hen. VII., pp. 7, 8; 1 Roll. Abr. 108. If defendant threatens the plaintiff's workmen, so that they do not dare to go on with their work, whereby the plaintiff loses the selling of his goods, an action lies. Garret v. Taylor (1621), Cro. Jac. 567; 1 Roll. Abr. 108. Tarleton and others v. McGawley, Peake, 270. And see Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; 37 L. J. Skinner v. Kitch, L. R. 2 Q. B. 393; 36 L. J. M. C. 322; 15 W. R. 830; 16 L. T. 413. If a man should lie in wait " and fright the boys from going to school, that schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his scholars." Per Holt, C.J., in Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East, 576, n. Plaintiff was making money at Glasgow by printing silk handkerchiefs with an ornamental design; defendant, hoping to acquire that design for himself, falsely represented to the plaintiff that it was a registered pattern, that the true owner had compelled him to give up plaintiff's name, and was about to proceed against plaintiff in Chancery for an injunction; plaintiff, naturally alarmed, stayed the execution of certain orders in hand for handkerchiefs with that design and travelled up to London to explain matters to the supposed true owner; defendant meanwhile went on printing and selling silk handkerchiefs printed with the design. Held, that the plaintiff had a good cause of action, it appearing that defendant had knowingly uttered a falsehood with intent to deprive plaintiff of a benefit and acquire it to himself, and the damage naturally flowing from plaintiff's belief in the truth of defendant's statement. Barley v. Walford, 9 Q. B. 197; 15 L. J. Q. B. 369; 10 Jur. 917. CHAPTER II. DEFAMATORY WORDS. WORDS which produce any appreciable injury to the reputation of another are called DEFAMATORY. Diffamare est in malá famâ ponere (Bartol.). The question in each case therefore is: Has the reputation of this individual plaintiff been appreciably impaired in consequence of the words employed by the defendant? No general rule can be laid down defining absolutely and once for all what words are defamatory and what not. Words which would seriously injure A.'s reputation might do B.'s no harm. Each case must be decided on its own facts. Defamation was formerly an ecclesiastical offence, cognizable only in the spiritual court; and then defamatory words would be such as the ecclesiastical court would punish. But all such suits were abolished by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41. So now it is convenient to use the word "Defamation" as a general term embracing both "Slander" and "Libel." See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6. If in any given case the words employed by the defendant have appreciably injured the plaintiff's reputation, then the plaintiff has suffered an injury which is actionable without proof of any damage. Every man has an absolute right to have his person, his property, and his reputation, preserved inviolate. "His reputation is his property, and, if possible, more valuable than other property." (Per Malins, V.-C., in Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 492; 17 W. R. 482; 20 L. T. 357.) "Indeed, if we reflect on the degree of suffering occasioned by loss of character, and compare it with that occasioned by loss of property, the amount of the former injury far exceeds that of the latter." (Per Best, C.J., in De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. at p. 406.) And just as any invasion of a man's property is actionable without proof of any pecuniary loss, so is any disparagement of his reputation. "It was the rule of Holt, C.J., to make words actionable whenever they sound to the disrepu tation of the person of whom they were spoken, and this was also Hale's and Twisden's rule, and I think it a very good rule." (Per Fortescue, J., in Button v. Heyward, 8 Mod. 24, referring perhaps to Baker v. Pierce, 6 Mod. 24.) Whenever the words clearly "sound to the disreputation" of the plaintiff, there is no need of further proof, they are defamatory on the face of them, and actionable per sc. The injury to the reputation is the gist of the action, and wherever that is clear, there is no need to inquire whether there is any injury to the pocket as well. But where it is by no means clear from the words themselves that they must have injured the plaintiff's reputation, there the Court requires proof of some special damage to show that as a matter of fact the words have in this case impaired the plaintiff's good name. Words which are merely uncivil, words of idle abuse, will not touch his credit, and, therefore, are clearly no ground for an action, unless it can be shown that in fact some appreciable damage to the plaintiff has followed from their use. The injury for which compensation is sought must be capable of being assessed by a jury. De minimis non curat lex. Mr. Townshend, the author of a learned American treatise on Slander and Libel, appears to me to fall into an error on this point. He devotes a whole chapter to maintaining "that pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is the gist of the action for slander or libel. If the language published has not occasioned the plaintiff pecuniary loss (actual or implied), then no action can be maintained. . . . In theory, the action for slander or libel is always for the pecuniary injury, and not for the injury to the reputation" (c. iv.). He might as well contend that the gist of an action of assault and battery was the doctor's bill the plaintiff had to pay. Surely the injury to the |