(iii.) Other Reports. By the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), s. 2, "Any report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting shall be privileged, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, and if such report was fair and accurate, and published without malice, and if the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit: provided always, that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceeding, if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant has refused to insert in the newspaper in which the report containing the matter complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement of explanation or contradiction by or on behalf of such plaintiff or prosecutor." No other reports are privileged. If any one publishes an account of the proceedings of any meeting of a towncouncil, board of guardians, or vestry, of the shareholders in any company, of the subscribers to any charity, or of any public meeting, political or otherwise, and such account contains expressions defamatory of the plaintiff, the fact that it is a fair and accurate report of what actually occurred will not avail as a defence, though it may be urged in mitigation of damages; unless the case comes within the above section. By printing and publishing the statements of the various speakers, he has made them his own; and must either justify and prove them strictly true, or rely upon their being fair and bona fide comments on a matter of public interest. The above section was passed because it was considered that the common law pressed too severely upon newspaper editors and proprietors, who in the ordinary course of their business had presented to the public a full, true, and impartial account of what really took place at a public meeting, considering no doubt that thereby they were merely doing their duty, and then found that the law deemed them guilty of libel. For a detailed examination of its provisions, see post, c. XIII. p. 374. So far as I am aware, there is as yet only one reported decision on the section. It will be observed that the protection afforded by it is limited to cases in which the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit. Most properly so for unless there be some advantage to the public countervailing the injury to the individual libelled, there can be no reason why damages should not be recovered. The consequences of reproducing in the papers calumnies uttered at a public meeting are most serious. The original slander may not be actionable per se, or the communication may be privileged; so that no action lies against the speaker. Moreover, the meeting may have been thinly attended, or the audience may have known that the speaker was not worthy of credit. But it would be a terrible thing for the person defamed if such words could be printed and published to all the world, merely because they were uttered under such circumstances at such a meeting. Charges recklessly made in the excitement of the moment will thus be diffused throughout the country, and will remain recorded in a permanent form against a perfectly innocent person. We cannot tell into whose hands a copy of that newspaper may come. Moreover, additional importance and weight is given to such a calumny by its republication in the columns of a respectable paper. Many people will believe it merely because it is in print. There is in fact an immense difference between the injury done by such a slander and that caused by its extended circulation by the press. See the remarks of Lord Campbell in Darison v. Duncan, 7 E. & B.. 231; 26 L. J. Q. B. 106; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 265; and of Best, C. J., in De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 402-406, cited ante, p. 158. Illustrations. The defendants, the printers and publishers of the Manchester Courier, published in their paper a report of the proceedings at a meeting of the Board of Guardians for the Altrincham Poor Law Union, at which ex parte charges were made against the medical officer of the union workhouse at Knutsford, of neglecting to attend the pauper patients when sent for. Held, that the matter was one of public interest; but that the report was not privileged by the occasion, although it was admitted to be a bona fide and a correct account of what passed at the meeting; and the plaintiff recovered 40s. damages and costs. Purcell v. Sowler (C. A.), 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 A public meeting was called for the purpose of petitioning Parliament against the grant to the Roman Catholic College at Maynooth. The defendant made a telling speech at such meeting, commenting severely on penances and other portions of the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church. The Court held that the words were not privileged, although the object of the meeting was legal, and the defendant's speech was pertinent to the occasion. Hearne v. Stowell, 12 A. & E. 719; 4 P. & D. 696; 6 Jur. 458; ante, p. 128. See Pierce v. Ellis, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 55. At a meeting of the West Hartlepool Improvement Commissioners, one of the Commissioners made some defamatory remarks as to the conduct of the former secretary of the Bishop of Durham in procuring from the Bishop a licence for the chaplain of the West Hartlepool Cemetery. These remarks were reported in the local newspaper, and the secretary brought an action against the owner of the newspaper for libel. A plea of justification, alleging that such remarks were in fact made at a public meeting of the commissioners, and that the alleged libel was an impartial and accurate report of what took place at such meeting, was held bad on demurrer. Davison v. Duncan, 7 E. & B. 229; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 265. So, also, a newspaper proprietor will be held liable for publishing a report made to the vestry by their medical officer of health, even although the vestry are required by Act of Parliament sooner or later to publish such report themselves. Popham v. Pickburn, 7 H. & N. 891; 31 L. J. Ex. 133; 8 Jur. N. S. 179; 10 W. R. 324; 5 L. T. 846. See also Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385. CHAPTER IX. MALICE. "In an ordinary action for a libel or for words, though evidence of malice may be given to increase the damages, it never is considered as essential, nor is there any instance of a verdict for the defendant on the ground of a want of malice." (Per Bayley, J., in Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. at p. 257; 6 Dowl. & R. 295; and per Mansfield, C. J., in Hargrave v. Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2425.) As we have seen, an accidental or inadvertent publication of defamatory words is ground for an action; ante, pp. 5, 6, 155. Even a lunatic is, it is said, liable for a libel. (Per Kelly, C. B., in Mordaunt v. Mordaunt, 39 L. J. Prob. & Matr. 59.) The Courts for this purpose look at the tendency of the publication, not at the intention of the publisher. (Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 643; 4 Man. & Ry. 605; Fisher v. Clement, 10 B. & C. 472; 5 Man. & Ry. 730.) The fact that the jury have expressly found in defendant's favour that he had no malicious intent, shall not avail him (per Maule, J., in Wenman v. Ash, 13 C. B. 845; 22 L. J. C. P. 190; 17 Jur. 579; 1 C. L. R. 592; Huntley v. Ward, 6 C. B. N. S. 514; 6 Jur. N. S. 18; 1 F. & F. 552; Blackburn v. Blackburn, 4 Bing. 395; 1 M. & P. 33, 63; 3 C. & P. 146); for if he has in fact spoken words which have injured the plaintiff's reputation he must be taken to have intended the consequences naturally resulting therefrom. In former days this rule was not so strictly enforced in actions of slander as of libel; the Courts in those days evincing a strong desire to discourage all actions of slander, except, perhaps, in cases where the words imputed a capital offence. Thus, where the defendant was sued for saying that he had heard that the plaintiff had been hanged for stealing a horse, and on the evidence it appeared that defendant spoke the words in genuine grief and sorrow at the news, Hobart, J., nonsuited the plaintiff, on the express ground that the words were not spoken maliciously. (Crawford v. Middleton, 1 Lev. 82. And see Greenwood v. Prick, cited Cro. Jac. 91; ante, p. 5.) Now, however, the absence of malice could only be given in evidence in mitigation of damages; and the question whether the defendant acted maliciously or not, should never be left to the jury, unless the occasion be privileged. (Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 643; 4 Man. & Ry. 605. Per Lord Denman in Baylis v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 924; 3 P. & D. 529; 4 Jur. 652. Per Parke, B., in O'Brien v. Clement, 15 M. & W. 437.) The defendant's intention or motive in using the words is immaterial, if he has in fact wrongfully injured the plaintiff's reputation. (Hooper v. Truscott, 2 Scott, 672; 2 Bing. N. C. 457; Godson v. Home, 1 Br. & B. 7; 3 Moore, 223.) It is true that the word "malicious" is usually inserted in every definition of libel or slander, that the pleader invariably introduces it into every statement of claim, and that the older cases contain many dicta to the effect that "malice is the gist" of an action of libel or slander. But in all these cases the word "malice" is used in a special and technical sense; it denotes merely the absence of lawful excuse; in fact, to say that defamatory words are malicious in that sense means simply that they are unprivileged, not employed under circumstances which excuse them. But I have thought it best to drop this technical and fictitious use of the word altogether-a use which has been termed "unfortunate" by more than one learned judge. (Per Lord Bramwell, 11 App. Cas. 253; 55 L. J. Q. B. 460; 55 L. T. 65; per Stephen, J., 41 L. T. 590.) In this book the word "malice" is always used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word; i. e., to denote some ill-feeling towards the plaintiff or the public; some mean or crooked motive of which an honourable man would be ashamed. This is called "express malice" or "actual malice" in our older books. Using the word in this sense, I say that till the defendant pleads privilege, malice is no part of the issue. As soon as the judge rules that the occasion is privileged, the plaintiff has to prove malice, but not before. In the words of Lord Justice Brett: "When there has been a writing or a speaking of defamatory matter, and the judge has heldand it is for him to decide the question—that although the matter is |