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It is libellous to write and publish that a newspaper has a separate page devoted to the advertisements of usurers and quack doctors, and that the editor takes respectable advertisements at a cheaper rate if the advertisers will consent to their appearing in that page.

Russell and another v. Webster, 23 W. R. 59.

It is not libellous for one newspaper to call another "the most vulgar, ignorant and scurrilous journal ever published in Great Britain ;" but it is libellous to add, "it is the lowest now in circulation; and we submit the fact to the consideration of advertisers;" for that affects the sale of the paper and the profits to be made by advertising.-(Lord Kenyon, C.J.)

Heriot v. Stuart, 1 Esp. 437.

Any written words are libellous which impeach the credit of any merchant or trader by imputing to him bankruptcy, insolvency, or even embarrassment, either past, present, or future, or which impute to him fraud or dishonesty or any mean and dishonourable trickery in the conduct of his business, or which in any other manner are prejudicial to him in the way of his employment or trade.

“The law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesmen, and therefore words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be actionable in the case of another person, and if bare words are so, it will be stronger in the case of a libel in a public newspaper, which is so diffusive." (Per curiam in Harman v. Delany, 2 Str. 898; 1 Barnard. 289; Fitz. 121.)

Illustrations.

The printers of a newspaper, by a mistake in setting up in type the announcements from the London Gazette, placed the name of the plaintiff's firm under the heading "First Meetings under the Bankruptcy Act" instead of under "Dissolutions of Partnership." An ample apology was inserted in the next issue: no damage was proved to have followed to the plaintiff and there was no suggestion of any malice. In an action for libel against the proprietors of the paper, the jury awarded the plaintiff £50 damages. Held that the publication was libellous, and that the damages awarded were not excessive.

Shepheard v. Whitaker, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402.

[N.B.-The chief clerk thought £10 sufficient in a very similar case, Stubbs v. Marsh, 15 L. T. 312.]

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It is libellous to advertise that a certain optician is "a licensed hawker" and a quack in spectacle secrets."

Keyzor and another v. Newcomb, 1 F. & F. 559.

It is a libel to write and publish of a licensed victualler that his licence has been refused; as it suggests that he had committed some breach of the licensing laws.

Bignell v. Buzzard, 3 H. & N. 217; 27 L. J. Ex. 355.

It is libellous to write and publish of the plaintiff that he regularly or purposely supplied bad and unwholesome water to ships, whereby the passengers were made ill.

Solomon v. Lawson, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796.
Barnard v. Salter, W. N. 1872, p. 140.

But for one tradesman merely to puff up his own goods, and decry those of his rival, is no libel; unless fraud or dishonesty be imputed.

Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; 8 Jur. 571; D. & M. 507.

Heriot v. Stuart, 1 Esp. 437, ante, p. 29.

Partners may sue jointly for a libel defamatory of the partnership.

Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 637; 8 Ir. L. R. 418.

Haythorn v. Lawson, 3 C. & P. 196.

Ward v. Smith, 6 Bing. 749; 4 C. & P. 302; 4 M. & P. 595.

So a company or corporation can sue even one of their own members for a libel relating to their management of their business.

Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bing. 260; 3 Moore & Sc. 705.

Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281.

A married woman trading under her own name may sue as a trader, without joining her husband, for a libel on her in the way of her trade.

Per Brett, J., in Summers v. City Bank, L. R. 9 C. P. 583; 43 L. J.
C. P. 261.

And now see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1, post, pp. 395, 396..

Sometimes also an attack upon a thing may be defamatory of the owner of that thing, or of others immediately connected with it. But this is only so where an attack upon the thing is also an indirect attack upon the individual. If the words do not touch the personal character or professional conduct of the individual, they are not defamatory of him, and no action lies (unless the words fall within the rules relating to Slander of Title; see post, c. V.). But to impute that the goods which the plaintiff sells or manufactures are adulterated to his knowledge is a distinct charge against the plaintiff of fraud and dishonesty in his trade.

Illustrations.

A declaration alleged that the plaintiffs were manufacturers of bags, and had manufactured a bag which they called the " Bag of Bags," and that the

defendant printed and published, concerning the plaintiffs in the way of their business, the words following:-"As we have not seen the Bag of Bags, we cannot say that it is useful, or that it is portable, or that it is elegant. All these it may be, but the only point we can deal with is the title, which we think very silly, very slangy, and very vulgar; and which has been forced upon the notice of the public ad nauseam." On demurrer, Lush, J., held that the words could not be deemed libellous, either upon the plaintiffs or upon their mode of conducting their business. But Mellor and Hannen, JJ., thought that it was a question for the jury whether the words went beyond the limits of fair criticism, and whether or not they were intended to disparage the plaintiffs in the conduct of their business.

Jenner and another v. A’Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464.

The defendant published an advertisement in these words :-" Whereas there was an account in the Craftsman of John Harman, gunsmith, making guns of two feet six inches to exceed any made by others of a foot longer (with whom it is supposed he is in fee), this is to advise all gentlemen to be cautious, the said gunsmith not daring to engage with any artist in town, nor ever did make such an experiment (except out of a leather gun), as any gentleman may be satisfied of at the Cross Guns in Longacre." Held a libel on the plaintiff in the way of his trade. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages £50.

Harman v. Delany, 2 Stra. 898; 1 Barnard. 289, 438; Fitz. 121. A declaration alleged that the plaintiff carried on the trade of an engineer, and sold in the way of his trade goods called "self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators," and that the defendant published of the plaintiff in his said trade and as such inventor, as follows:-"This is to caution parties employing steam power from a person, offering what he calls self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators, stating that he is the sole inventor, manufacturer and patentee, thereby monopolizing high prices at the expense of the public. R. Harlow (the defendant) takes this opportunity of saying that such a patent does not exist, and that he has to offer an improved lubricator, which dispenses with the necessity of using more than one to a steam engine, thereby constituting a saving of 50 per cent. over every other kind yet offered to the public. Those who have already adopted the lubricators against which R. H. would caution, will find that the tallow is wasted instead of being effectually employed as professed." Held no libel on the plaintiff, either generally or in the way of his trade, but only a libel on the lubricators, and therefore not actionable without proof of special damage.

Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; 8 Jur. 571; D. & M. 507.

So where one tradesman merely asserts that his own goods are superior to those of some other tradesman, no action lies unless the words be published falsely and maliciously and special damage has ensued.

Young and others v. Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6; 11
W. R. 63; 9 Jur. N. S. 539; 7 L. T. 354.

Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L. R. 9
Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. R. 5.

A libel on the management of a newspaper is a libel on its proprietors, jointly, in the way of their trade, and therefore actionable without special damage, Russell and another v. Webster, 23 W. R. 59.

To write and publish that a ship is unseaworthy may be a libel on its owner. "It is like saying of an innkeeper that his wine or his tea is poisoned."

Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Sc. 471, 478; 4 Jur. 151; 9
C. & P. 326.

To advertise falsely that certain quack medicines were prepared by an eminent physician, is a libel upon such physician.

Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112; 17 L. J. Ch. 142; 12 Jur. 149. It is libellous falsely to impute to a bookseller that he publishes immoral or absurd poems.

Tabart v. Tipper, 1 Camp. 350.

It is libellous falsely to write and publish of professional vocalists that they had advertised themselves to sing at certain music-halls songs which they had no right to sing in public.

Hart and another v. Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25
W. R. 373.

But comments, however severe, on the advertisements or handbills of a tradesman, will not be libellous, if the jury find that they are fair and temperate comments, not wholly undeserved, on a matter to which public attention was expressly invited by the plaintiff.

Paris v. Levy, 9 C. B. N. S. 342; 30 L. J. C. P. 11; 9 W. R. 71; 3
L. T. 324; 2 F. & F. 71.

Morrison and another v. Harmer and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 759; 4
Scott, 524; 3 Hodges, 108.

Fair and bona fide Comment.

Every one has a right to comment on matters of public interest and general concern, provided he does so fairly and with an honest purpose. Such comments are not libellous, however severe in their terms, unless they are written intemperately and maliciously. Every citizen has full freedom of speech on such subjects, but he must not abuse it.

This branch of the law is of but recent growth. says in Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 93, 94 :—

Cockburn, C.J.,

"Our law of libel has, in many respects, only gradually developed itself into anything like a satisfactory and settled form. The full liberty of public writers to comment on the conduct and motives of public men has only in very recent times been recognised. Comments on government, on ministers and officers of state, on members of both Houses of Parliament, on judges and other public functionaries, are now made every day, which half a century ago would have been the subject of actions or ex officio informations, and would have brought down fine and imprisonment on publishers and authors. Yet

who can doubt that the public are gainers by the change, and that, though injustice may often be done, and though public men may often have to smart under the keen sense of wrong inflicted by hostile criticism, the nation profits by public opinion being thus freely brought to bear on the discharge of public duties?"

It has often been said by learned judges that fair and honest criticism in matters of public concern is "privileged." See especially Henwood v. Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 606; 41 L. J. C. P. 206; 20 W. R. 1000; 26 L. T. 938. But this does not mean that such words are "privileged by reason of the occasion " in the strict legal sense of that term. The defence really is, that the words are not defamatory, that criticism is no libel. This is very clearly pointed out by Blackburn, J., in Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185; 9 Jur. N. S. 1069; 11 W. R. 569; 8 L. T. 201. If such criticism was privileged in the strict sense of the word, it would in every case be necessary for the plaintiff to prove actual malice, however false and however injurious the strictures may have been; while the defendant would only have to prove that he honestly believed the charges himself in order to escape all liability; and this clearly is not the law. See Williams v. Spowers and others, Australian Law Times, May 13th, 1882, p. 113; and 3 Times L. R. 432.

Illustrations.

Condemnation of the foreign policy of the Government, however sweeping, is no libel.

Animadversions, however severe, on the use made by the vestry of the money of the ratepayers, is not libellous, unless corruption or embezzlement be imputed to individual vestrymen.

Criticism, however trenchant, on any new poem or novel, or on any picture exhibited in a public gallery, is no libel.

But to maliciously pry into the private life of any poet, novelist, artist, or statesman, is indefensible.

Criticism.

True criticism differs from defamation in the following particulars:

1. Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention, or call for public comment. It does not follow a public man into his private life, or pry into his domestic

concerns.

2. Criticism never attacks the individual, but only his

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